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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS1994

Neural network applications in telecommunications

Neural network capabilities include automatic and organized handling of complex information, quick adaptation to continuously changing environments, nonlinear modeling, and parallel implementation. This viewgraph presentation presents Bellcore work on applications, learning chip computational function, learning system block diagram, neural network equalization, broadband access control, calling-card fraud detection, software reliability prediction, and conclusions.

Alspector, Joshua↗
NASA NTRS2004

The Office of Inspector General (OIG)

The NASA Office of Inspector General is the Federal Law Enforcement Agency at NASA which conducts criminal and regulatory investigations in which NASA is a victim. The OIG prevents and detects crime, fiaud, waste and abuse and assists NASA management in promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in its programs and operations. Investigations (OI) and the Office of Audits (OA). The investigations side deals with criminal Investigations, administrative investigations, and civil investigations. The Audits side deals with inspections and assessments as well as the Auditing of NASA Programs and Activities. Our mission at the OIG is to conduct and supervise independent and objective audits and investigations relating to agency programs and operations; to promote economy, effectiveness and efficiency within the agency; to prevent and detect crime, fraud, waste and abuse in agency programs and operations; to review and make recommendations regarding existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to agency programs and operations. We are also responsible for keeping the agency head and the Congress fully and currently informed of problems in agency programs and operations. deal with False Claims, False Statements, Conspiracy, Theft, Computer Crime, Mail Fraud, the Procurement Integrity Act, the Anti-Kickback Act, as well as noncompliance with NASA Management Instructions, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), and the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Most of the casework that is dealt with in our office is generated through gum shoe work or cases that we generate on our own. These cases can come from Law Enforcement Referrals, GIDEP Reports, EPlMS (NASA Quality System), Defense Contract Audit Agency, Newspaper Articles, and Confidential Information. In many cases, confidentiality is the biggest factor to informants coming forward. We are able to maintain confidentiality because the 01 is independent of NASA Management and doesn t report to the Center Directors, therefore the informant s mangers and supervisors are unaware of the informants actions. The only time when an informant s confidentiality may be compromised is when it is needed in a Court of Law and is released through a Judicial Court Order. During my tenure here at the NASA OIG/OI at Glenn Research Center, I have been involved in many different tasks. They have ranged from updating Suspected Unapproved Parts case files to independently interviewing NASA employees to turn up general background information. The 01 has the duty of informing NASA aeronautical safety managers of potential Nonconforming products. My mission is to compile a database of Nonconformance reports for distribution. The background information that I turn up from my interviews is then used to determine NASA s susceptibility to acceptance of unapproved parts. The IG organization is divided up into two separate disciplines, the Office of 01 investigations primarily focus on violations of Federal laws. Some of these violations

Macisco, Christopher A.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Identifying Objects via Encased X-Ray-Fluorescent Materials - the Bar Code Inside

Systems for identifying objects by means of x-ray fluorescence (XRF) of encased labeling elements have been developed. The XRF spectra of objects so labeled would be analogous to the external bar code labels now used to track objects in everyday commerce. In conjunction with computer-based tracking systems, databases, and labeling conventions, the XRF labels could be used in essentially the same manner as that of bar codes to track inventories and to record and process commercial transactions. In addition, as summarized briefly below, embedded XRF labels could be used to verify the authenticity of products, thereby helping to deter counterfeiting and fraud. A system, as described above, is called an encased core product identification and authentication system (ECPIAS). The ECPIAS concept is a modified version of that of a related recently initiated commercial development of handheld XRF spectral scanners that would identify alloys or detect labeling elements deposited on the surfaces of objects. In contrast, an ECPIAS would utilize labeling elements encased within the objects of interest. The basic ECPIAS concept is best illustrated by means of an example of one of several potential applications: labeling of cultured pearls by labeling the seed particles implanted in oysters to grow the pearls. Each pearl farmer would be assigned a unique mixture of labeling elements that could be distinguished from the corresponding mixtures of other farmers. The mixture would be either incorporated into or applied to the surfaces of the seed prior to implantation in the oyster. If necessary, the labeled seed would be further coated to make it nontoxic to the oyster. After implantation, the growth of layers of mother of pearl on the seed would encase the XRF labels, making these labels integral, permanent parts of the pearls that could not be removed without destroying the pearls themselves. The XRF labels would be read by use of XRF scanners, the spectral data outputs of which would be converted to alphanumeric data in a digital equivalent data system (DEDS), which is the subject of the previous article. These alphanumeric data would be used to track the pearls through all stages of commerce, from the farmer to the retail customer.

Schramm, Harry F.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Using X-rays to determine which compact groups are illusory

If the large-scale galaxy distribution is filamentary, as suggested by some observations and recent hydrodynamical simulations, then lengthwise views of filaments will apparently produce compact groups (CGs) that are in reality stretched out along the line of sight. This possibility has been advocated recently by Hernquist, Katz, & Weinberg (1995). Here we propose a test for this hypothesis using X-ray emission from CGs. The observable quantity Q identical with L(sub x)a(sup 3)(sup p)/(L(sup 2)(sup g))T(sup 1/2)(sub x) should be proportional to the axis ratio of the group, a/c, where a and c are the short and long axes of a prolate distribution, a(sub p) is the radius of the group projected onto the sky, L(sub x) is the bolometric X-ray luminosity, L(sub g) is the group blue luminosity, and T(sub x) is the gas temperature. We find that the distribution of Q is consistent with the notion that many CGs with unusually small values of a/c are frauds, i.e., that the values of Q are anomalously small. Absent other information, it is equally possible that CGs are very gas-poor relative to rich clusters; however, this can be tested using the Sunyaev-Zeldovich effect. If the groups have a close to normal ratio of gas to total mass, but are simply stretched out along the line of sight, a Sunyaev-Zeldovich signal should be detectable.

Ostriker, Jeremiah P.↗