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At least 19 records

Information Theory - The Bridge Connecting Bounded Rational Game Theory and Statistical Physics

A long-running difficulty with conventional game theory has been how to modify it to accommodate the bounded rationality of all red-world players. A recurring issue in statistical physics is how best to approximate joint probability distributions with decoupled (and therefore far more tractable) distributions. This paper shows that the same information theoretic mathematical structure, known as Product Distribution (PD) theory, addresses both issues. In this, PD theory not only provides a principle formulation of bounded rationality and a set of new types of mean field theory in statistical physics; it also shows that those topics are fundamentally one and the same.

Wolpert, David H.

Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment and game theory for cyber security risk analysis in nuclear power plants

Nuclear Power Plants and energy systems have become more prone to cyber-attacks with their digitalization and the increased use of smart equipment. Hence, it is important to quantify the risk associated with cyber-attacks in such systems. Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment which involves studying the evolution of a system due to random events and operator and attacker actions during a cyber-attack by employing a physics-based model of the system is a suitable framework to quantify cybersecurity risk in nuclear power plants. In addition to the plant dynamics, it is also important to model the strategies of the attackers and plant operators for an effective cybersecurity risk assessment. Game theory provides a set of necessary tools to model such strategic interactions. In this research, a framework that integrates dynamic probabilistic risk assessment with game theory for cybersecurity risk analysis in nuclear power plants is presented. The mathematical formulation is derived based on the theory of continuous event trees. We propose a game theory based action model, that utilizes physics-based rewards to define the strategies of attackers and operators at every decision epoch. As a case study, the risk associated with cyber-attacks on the digital components in the secondary side of a pressurized water reactor is studied using a reduced order model. A set of attacker actions and a set of operator actions are defined for the system. The operator and attacker interactions were modelled using simultaneous game, their action policies were computed using the concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and the evolution of the system was studied.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING

Game Theory in Cybersecurity: A Review of Applications, Models, and Challenges

There are no aspects of society left unchanged by the Internet. From commerce to communication, from entertainment to engineering, every industry and sphere of influence exists in a new state thanks to the advent of the information age. This convenience, rarely controverted, comes with capricious actors, who wish to gain access to these systems for myriad reasons, be it financial, political, or mere intellectual gain. This paper presents information that can help readers to better understand the fundamentals of cybersecurity from a game theory perspective, such as coalitional games, Colonel Blotto systems, or how to find Nash Equilibrium. This paper also reviews how game theory can enhance understanding of cybersecurity through cooperative and non-cooperative methods, such as information sharing, defense modeling, and attacker analysis. The authors use the analysis to serve as a bridge for those in either field who need a way to best comprehend the methodologies of their contrasting fields.

Egan, Matthew

Synthesis of robust nonlinear autopilots using differential game theory

A synthesis technique for handling unmodeled disturbances in nonlinear control law synthesis was advanced using differential game theory. Two types of modeling inaccuracies can be included in the formulation. The first is a bias-type error, while the second is the scale-factor-type error in the control variables. The disturbances were assumed to satisfy an integral inequality constraint. Additionally, it was assumed that they act in such a way as to maximize a quadratic performance index. Expressions for optimal control and worst-case disturbance were then obtained using optimal control theory.

Menon, P. K. A.

Game Theory Approaches for System-level Incentive Design

This report presents a generalized Stackelberg game framework for designing and evaluating financial incentives that enhance power system resilience through strategic deployment of distributed energy resources(DERs) under various contingencies. The proposed approach addresses the challenge of coordinating individual community investment decisions to meet system-wide resilience objectives. The framework is demonstrated in a three-community test system subjected to two transmission contingency scenarios: inter-community line failure (Case 1) and complete main grid disconnection (Case 2). In both cases, three incentive levels are compared: a Base case with no financial incentives, and low and high incentive cases. In Case 1, the Base case (no incentives) results in a total installed DER capacity of 217.2 MW, with no load shedding due to alternative routing, but community costs remain high. Increasing incentives raises DER deployment to 286.9 MW, lowers aggregate community costs by $22M annually, and completely avoids the need for costly new transmission line construction. In Case 2, the Base case results in 24.3 MWh of unserved load; introducing incentives eliminates all load shedding and ensures up to 89 MWh of battery storage is available for emergency reserve. These results demonstrate that targeted incentives can dramatically improve grid resilience and cost-effectiveness. The framework thus offers policymakers and system planners a robust tool to quantify and compare the effectiveness of incentive programs for multi-community transmission networks behavior, system resilience, and economic efficiency.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION

Predictive Game Theory

Probability theory governs the outcome of a game; there is a distribution over mixed strat.'s, not a single "equilibrium". To predict a single mixed strategy must use our loss function (external to the game's players. Provides a quantification of any strategy's rationality. Prove rationality falls as cost of computation rises (for players who have not previously interacted). All extends to games with varying numbers of players.

Wolpert, David H.

Predicting Pilot Behavior in Medium Scale Scenarios Using Game Theory and Reinforcement Learning

Effective automation is critical in achieving the capacity and safety goals of the Next Generation Air Traffic System. Unfortunately creating integration and validation tools for such automation is difficult as the interactions between automation and their human counterparts is complex and unpredictable. This validation becomes even more difficult as we integrate wide-reaching technologies that affect the behavior of different decision makers in the system such as pilots, controllers and airlines. While overt short-term behavior changes can be explicitly modeled with traditional agent modeling systems, subtle behavior changes caused by the integration of new technologies may snowball into larger problems and be very hard to detect. To overcome these obstacles, we show how integration of new technologies can be validated by learning behavior models based on goals. In this framework, human participants are not modeled explicitly. Instead, their goals are modeled and through reinforcement learning their actions are predicted. The main advantage to this approach is that modeling is done within the context of the entire system allowing for accurate modeling of all participants as they interact as a whole. In addition such an approach allows for efficient trade studies and feasibility testing on a wide range of automation scenarios. The goal of this paper is to test that such an approach is feasible. To do this we implement this approach using a simple discrete-state learning system on a scenario where 50 aircraft need to self-navigate using Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) information. In this scenario, we show how the approach can be used to predict the ability of pilots to adequately balance aircraft separation and fly efficient paths. We present results with several levels of complexity and airspace congestion.

Game Theory

Application of differential game theory to role-determination in aerial combat

The development of criteria which specify the roles of pursuer and evader as functions of the relative geometry and of the important parameters of the problem are discussed. A reduced-order model of the relative motion is derived and discussed. In this model, the two aircraft move in the same plane at unequal but constant speeds, and with different maximum turn rates. The equations of relative motion are of third order, the dependent variables being the relative range, bearing, and heading of the two aircraft. Termination of the pursuit-evasion game is defined by either the heading-limited or the range-limited end condition. These are geometric conditions for which the evading aircraft is in front of the other, with the relative heading and relative range satisfying certain inequalities. Retrograde solutions to the equations of relative motion were used with the derived optimal terminal maneuvers to find where an assumed set of end conditions could have begun.

Merz, A. W.

Using Game Theory to Qualitatively Analyze Global Relations

As the world becomes smaller, the importance of global education increases. Technological advancements have made news instantaneous. The advent of the Internet has made contact with another part of the world just a click away. Such achievements have put pressure on educational institutions to prepare students for the global community in which they already live. !~ey must not only ~e taug~~ about the world and the interactions among countries, but also, how the decIsions are made which facillta~e. these interactions and what factors might contribute to the chain reactions which might erupt from such declsl?n~. It is critical that students learn the skills of decision-making and analysis in order to be able to operate Within a world where threats and crises abound. As tomorrow's leaders, today's students must be exposed to the global world and its mechanisms and learn the tools to navigate within it.

Tacosa, Corliss A.