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At least 19 records

NASA-STD-7009 Guidance Document for Human Health and Performance Models and Simulations

Rigorous verification, validation, and credibility (VVC) processes are imperative to ensure that models and simulations (MS) are sufficiently reliable to address issues within their intended scope. The NASA standard for MS, NASA-STD-7009 (7009) [1] was a resultant outcome of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to ensure MS are developed, applied, and interpreted appropriately for making decisions that may impact crew or mission safety. Because the 7009 focus is engineering systems, a NASA-STD-7009 Guidance Document is being developed to augment the 7009 and provide information, tools, and techniques applicable to the probabilistic and deterministic biological MS more prevalent in human health and performance (HHP) and space biomedical research and operations.

numerical analysis

Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation

For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. Formalization of the process for creating these causal diagrams will enable the creation of a composite risk network that is vetted by members of the NASA community and configuration managed. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document outlines the pilot process, the standardized approaches, and guidance for risk custodian teams when creating and updating DAGs as a part of the NASA Human System Risk Management process.

Risk

Demonstrating Assurance of Model-Based Fault Diagnosis Systems on an Operational Mission

Developers of robotic scientific and commercial spacecraft are trending towards use of onboard autonomous capabilities for responding quickly to dynamic environments and rapidly changing situations. These capabilities need to know the state of the spacecraft’s health. Model-based fault diagnosis (MBFD) is an approach to estimating health by continuously verifying accurate behavior and diagnosing off-nominal behavior. Proper functioning of MBFD depends on 1) the quality of the diagnostic system model that is analyzed and compared to commands and onboard measurements to estimate a system’s health state, and 2) the correct functionality of the diagnosis engine interrogating the model and comparing its analyses to observed system behavior. Our goal is to develop Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques for MBFD to provide future missions sufficient confidence in its functionality and performance to deploy it on the systems they develop. Our work has been focused on infusing the techniques we developed earlier to an operational mission. First, we are constructing diagnostic models of a spacecraft attitude control system and updating our diagnostic engine so they can be demonstrated aboard the Arcsecond Space Telescope Enabling Research in Astrophysics (ASTERIA) mission, an operational spacecraft for which experiments in autonomy are being planned and executed, using the V&V techniques we have previously developed to assure they are both correct and complete. Since it is nearing the end of its life, ASTERIA provides a unique opportunity to demonstrate MBFD since the monitored components are expected to fail. Our demonstration will give system developers additional confidence to make timely, informed MBFD deployment decisions. Second, we will be completing performance assessments of the diagnostic engine/diagnostic model ensemble both on the flight system and ground-based testbeds to gain confidence in MBFD’s ability to run successfully in a spacecraft’s resource-constrained environment without adversely affecting other on-board activities. Finally, we are capturing our experience in preparing this demonstration in a set of checklists and guidance documents. Current practice includes high-level institutional guidance documents and standards, but at a high level of abstraction that does not necessarily address specific MBFD concerns. The purpose of the new checklists is to provide future mission developers clear, unambiguous, procedure-oriented guidance on assuring MBFD. This paper describes our work in these areas. For the first area, we describe the diagnostic models and updated diagnostic engine that will be used for the on-board demonstration. We describe how the V&V techniques we developed earlier are used to assure model and engine correctness and completeness. For the second area, we identify the performance measurement and assessment techniques used to characterize the diagnostic engine and diagnostic models, and discuss the effect of measured performance on overall mission operation. Finally, we present the checklist and guidance documents and describe how they meet the goals of providing system developers with clear, unambiguous, procedure-oriented guidance on MBFD assurance. We show how the techniques we have developed map into those artifacts.

Nikora, Allen

Targetting and guidance program documentation

A FORTRAN computer program was developed which automatically targets two and three burn rendezvous missions and performs feedback guidance using the GUIDE algorithm. The program was designed to accept a large class of orbit specifications and to automatically choose a two or three burn mission depending upon the time alignment of the vehicle and target. The orbits may be specified as any combination of circular and elliptical orbits and may be coplanar or inclined, but must be aligned coaxially with their perigees in the same direction. The program accomplishes the required targeting by repeatedly converging successively more complex missions. It solves the coplanar impulsive version of the mission, then the finite burn coplanar mission, and finally, the full plane change mission. The GUIDE algorithm is exercised in a feedback guidance mode by taking the targeted solution and moving the vehicle state step by step ahead in time, adding acceleration and navigational errors, and reconverging from the perturbed states at fixed guidance update intervals. A program overview is presented, along with a user's guide which details input, output, and the various subroutines.

Harrold, E. F.

Directed Acyclic Graphs: A Tool for Understanding the NASA Human Spaceflight System Risks - Human System Risk Board

For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding of these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document is a sister document to NASA/TM 20220006812 Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation (1). In that document, the basic guidance for creating and standardizing directed acyclic graphs as tools for cross-risk analysis is provided. This document contains the initial configuration managed DAGs that were created as a result of applying those principles. These initial versions were accepted by the HSRB in January of 2022. Each of the Human System Risks are represented by a DAG that has been reviewed by the larger Human Health and Performance community at NASA including life scientists, physical scientists, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, exercise specialists and more. These results show the starting point for Human System Risk DAGs as shared mental models and communication aids across the boundaries of the various expertise needed to understand and mitigate the human risks in spaceflight. Because they are a starting point, each of these DAGs can be expected to change over time as new or refined evidence becomes available. The process for updating these DAGs can be found in the JSC-66705 Human System Risk Management Plan (2) that is publicly available on the NASA Technical Reports Server.

Erik L. Antonsen

Human Systems Integration: Unmanned Aircraft Control Station Certification Plan Guidance

This document provides guidance to the FAA on important human factors considerations that can be used to support the certification of a UAS Aircraft Control Station (ACS). This document provides a synopsis of the human factors analysis, design and test activities to be performed to provide a basis for FAA certification. The data from these analyses, design activities, and tests, along with data from certification/qualification tests of other key components should be used to establish the ACS certification basis. It is expected that this information will be useful to manufacturers in developing the ACS Certification Plan,, and in supporting the design of their ACS.

Source record

Tri-Agency Reliability Engineering Post: Mission Disposal and Extension Assessment Guidance Addendum

The intent of this addendum is to support the guidance document, Tri-Agency Reliability Engineering Guidance: Post Mission Disposal and Extension Assessment (https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20210024973). It is intended to further assist spacefaring entities in assessing their designs and operational plans for extending missions and Post Mission Disposal (PMD) by providing an hypothetical mission example.

Digital transformation

NASA Handbook for Models and Simulations: An Implementation Guide for NASA-STD-7009

The purpose of this Handbook is to provide technical information, clarification, examples, processes, and techniques to help institute good modeling and simulation practices in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). As a companion guide to NASA-STD- 7009, Standard for Models and Simulations, this Handbook provides a broader scope of information than may be included in a Standard and promotes good practices in the production, use, and consumption of NASA modeling and simulation products. NASA-STD-7009 specifies what a modeling and simulation activity shall or should do (in the requirements) but does not prescribe how the requirements are to be met, which varies with the specific engineering discipline, or who is responsible for complying with the requirements, which depends on the size and type of project. A guidance document, which is not constrained by the requirements of a Standard, is better suited to address these additional aspects and provide necessary clarification. This Handbook stems from the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation (2003), which called for Agency-wide improvements in the "development, documentation, and operation of models and simulations"' that subsequently elicited additional guidance from the NASA Office of the Chief Engineer to include "a standard method to assess the credibility of the models and simulations."2 General methods applicable across the broad spectrum of model and simulation (M&S) disciplines were sought to help guide the modeling and simulation processes within NASA and to provide for consistent reporting ofM&S activities and analysis results. From this, the standardized process for the M&S activity was developed. The major contents of this Handbook are the implementation details of the general M&S requirements ofNASA-STD-7009, including explanations, examples, and suggestions for improving the credibility assessment of an M&S-based analysis.

Steele, Martin J.

Automated Collision Avoidance (ACA) and Automated Return to Course (ARTC) Requirement and Guidance Review: Final

This report's objectives were to review regulatory and guidance documents to identify requirements and considerations for the design and operation of automated systems that perform the functions of automated collision avoidance (ACA) and/or automated return to course (ARTC). The importance of this work is twofold: 1) to help focus efforts addressing new automated collision avoidance and return to course systems requirements and considerations, and 2) in pulling together available requirements from multiple sources, generate a master resource for these automated system requirements and considerations. Reviewed documents include regulations, industry standards and research papers that specifically address ACA and ARTC systems, other automatedl control and guidance systems, ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) and Eurocontrol documents.

Automation

Space shuttle entry terminal area energy management

A historical account of the development for Shuttle's Terminal Area Energy Management (TAEM) is presented. A derivation and explanation of logic and equations are provided as a supplement to the well documented guidance computation requirements contained within the official Functional Subsystem Software Requirements (FSSR) published by Rockwell for NASA. The FSSR contains the full set of equations and logic, whereas this document addresses just certain areas for amplification.

Moore, Thomas E.

Guidance and Control Software Project Data - Volume 2: Development Documents

The Guidance and Control Software (GCS) project was the last in a series of software reliability studies conducted at Langley Research Center between 1977 and 1994. The technical results of the GCS project were recorded after the experiment was completed. Some of the support documentation produced as part of the experiment, however, is serving an unexpected role far beyond its original project context. Some of the software used as part of the GCS project was developed to conform to the RTCA/DO-178B software standard, "Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification," used in the civil aviation industry. That standard requires extensive documentation throughout the software development life cycle, including plans, software requirements, design and source code, verification cases and results, and configuration management and quality control data. The project documentation that includes this information is open for public scrutiny without the legal or safety implications associated with comparable data from an avionics manufacturer. This public availability has afforded an opportunity to use the GCS project documents for DO-178B training. This report provides a brief overview of the GCS project, describes the 4-volume set of documents and the role they are playing in training, and includes the development documents from the GCS project. Volume 2 contains three appendices: A. Guidance and Control Software Development Specification; B. Design Description for the Pluto Implementation of the Guidance and Control Software; and C. Source Code for the Pluto Implementation of the Guidance and Control Software

Hayhurst, Kelly J.

Are we ready for the first EASA guidance on the use of ML in Aviation?

NASA has been working for the past 12 years on software tools for the assurance of software in Aviation critical systems. For now two years, NASA has focused more on the use of AI-based techniques in Aviation than the traditional software systems used in the past. The primary focus has been on machine learning (ML), and more specifically, on supervised off-line learning ML systems. NSA’s research has been driven by case studies such as a vision-based centerline tracking system (implemented using deep neural networks) and the new generation of collision avoidance systems developed under the FAA guidance, i.e., the family of ACAS-X products. Since EASA has recently released its first usable guidance for Level 1 machine learning applications, it is opportunity to see how the research done at NASA is mapping to this first guidance for ML. In this talk I will use the EASA guidance document as a guide to present the past, present, and future tools and techniques being developed at NASA. The intent is to not only provide an overview of the research effort at NASA but also to see how this effort is addressing the concerns listed in the EASA first usable guidance for ML.

Guillaume Brat

Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project Verification, Validation, and Credibility (VVandC)

The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project supports end user requests by employing the Integrated Medical Evidence Database (iMED) and IMM tools as well as subject matter expertise within the Project. The iMED houses data used by the IMM. The IMM is designed to forecast relative changes for a specified set of crew health and mission success risk metrics by using a probabilistic model based on historical data, cohort data, and subject matter expert opinion. A stochastic approach is taken because deterministic results would not appropriately reflect the uncertainty in the IMM inputs. Once the IMM was conceptualized, a plan was needed to rigorously assess input information, framework and code, and output results of the IMM, and ensure that end user requests and requirements were considered during all stages of model development and implementation, as well as lay the foundation for external review and application. METHODS: In 2008, the Project team developed a comprehensive verification and validation (VV) plan, which specified internal and external review criteria encompassing 1) verification of data and IMM structure to ensure proper implementation of the IMM, 2) several validation techniques to confirm that the simulation capability of the IMM appropriately represents occurrences and consequences of medical conditions during space missions, and 3) credibility processes to develop user confidence in the information derived from the IMM. When the NASA-STD-7009 (7009) [1] was published, the Project team updated their verification, validation, and credibility (VVC) project plan to meet 7009 requirements and include 7009 tools in reporting VVC status of the IMM. Construction of these tools included meeting documentation and evidence requirements sufficient to meet external review success criteria. RESULTS: IMM Project VVC updates are compiled recurrently and include updates to the 7009 Compliance and Credibility matrices. Reporting tools have evolved over the lifetime of the IMM Project to better communicate VVC status. This has included refining original 7009 methodology with augmentation from the HRP NASA-STD-7009 Guidance Document working group and the NASA-HDBK-7009 [2]. End user requests and requirements are being satisfied as evidenced by ISS Program acceptance of IMM risk forecasts, transition to an operational model and simulation tool, and completion of service requests from a broad end user consortium including operations, science and technology planning, and exploration planning. IMM v4.0 is slated for operational release in the FY015 and current VVC assessments illustrate the expected VVC status prior to the completion of customer lead external review efforts. CONCLUSIONS: The VVC approach established by the IMM Project of incorporating Project-specific recommended practices and guidelines for implementing the 7009 requirements is comprehensive and includes the involvement of end users at every stage in IMM evolution. Methods and techniques used to quantify the VVC status of the IMM Project represented a critical communication tool in providing clear and concise suitability assessments to IMM customers. These processes have not only received approval from the local NASA community but have also garnered recognition by other federal agencies seeking to develop similar guidelines in the medical modeling community.

Walton, M.

TPSAS-NF1676L-32030-DND

Composite structures are often difficult to inspect due to the anisotropic nature of the material systems and the range of flaws and defects that can arise in the manufacturing process. NASA?s Advanced Composites Project, a public-private partnership between government, universities and industry, seeks to address improved methods, tools, and protocols to reduce the development and certification timeline for composite materials and structures. The rapid inspection of composites is one of the three focused research areas of the project. One deliverable of the project is to develop an NDE Methods and Capabilities Handbook. This Handbook provides a publically available guidance document that facilitates the selection of appropriate NDE techniques and provides recommended protocols for detecting and characterizing common flaw types in solid laminate polymer matrix composite (PMC) structures. The Handbook will reduce the time required to develop qualified inspection processes for composite aircraft structures during the development, certification, and manufacturing phases by providing a reference that helps minimize trial and error and provides guidance on best practices, techniques, and settings, for specific flaw types and geometries. The Handbook will include an NDE Guidance Matrix that provides an applicability rating for NDE techniques as they apply to given flaw types. NDE techniques will include, but is not limited to ultrasound, laser based ultrasound, infrared thermography, and x-ray CT. Flaw types will include, but are not limited to porosity, delamination, voids, AFP defects and impact damage. The Handbook will contain details that support the applicability rating including, but not limited to, specimen details, inspection parameters, data analysis techniques, inspection efficiency (speed & cost), and limitations. This presentation will describe key Handbook activities with examples of the techniques and flaw types examined by the Advanced Composite Consortium members.

Patricia A Howell

Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations for Airborne Contaminants: Revision C

The enclosed table lists official Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations (SMACs) for selected airborne contaminants. They are based upon experiments conducted at standard pressure and oxygen environments and may or may not be applicable to altered atmospheres. The values listed in this summary document are applicable only to ambient conditions at standard temperature and oxygen (14.7 psi and 21% O2 at 25°C). These are guideline values set by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)/Johnson Space Center (JSC) Toxicology Group in cooperation with the National Research Council Committee on Toxicology (NRCCOT), through publication in the peer- reviewed scientific literature, or NASA Technical Memoranda. Based on documented guidance (NRC, 1992; NRC, 2016), NASA has established SMACs for 58 chemical compounds that are particularly relevant to atmospheric contamination of the International Space Station (ISS) and targets of Exploration. Some long-term limits (1000-days) have also been established to support manned deep-space exploration. Summaries of these SMACs are presented in tabular form as part of this publication. This document provides a tabular summary of values that have been previously established based on guidelines established by NASA and the National Research Council’s Committee on Toxicology and vetted and published through the NRCCOT and/or non-NASA scientific literature and NASA Technical Memoranda. Short‐term (1‐ and 24‐hour) SMACs apply to off‐nominal situations, such as accidental releases aboard a spacecraft. These limits permit risk of minor, reversible effects, such as mild mucosal irritation. In contrast, the long‐term SMACs are set to fully protect healthy crewmembers from adverse effects resulting from continuous exposure to specific air pollutants for up to 1000 days. Because allergic reactions or chemical idiosyncrasy to certain airborne pollutants are very difficult to predict, crewmembers with allergies or unusual sensitivity to trace pollutants may not be afforded complete protection, even when long‐term SMACs are not exceeded.

SMACs

NDE Methods and Capabilities Handbook – Resources for the Composites NDE Community

Composite structures are often difficult to inspect due to the anisotropic nature of the material systems and the range of flaws and defects that can arise in the manufacturing process. NASA’s Advanced Composites Project, a public-private partnership between government, universities and industry, sought to address improved methods, tools, and protocols to reduce the development and certification timeline for composite materials and structures. The rapid inspection of composites was one of the three focused research areas of the project. One deliverable of the project was to develop an NDE Methods and Capabilities Handbook. This Handbook provides a publicly available guidance document that facilitates the selection of appropriate NDE techniques and provides recommended protocols for detecting and characterizing common flaw types in solid laminate carbon fiber reinforced polymer composite (CFRP) structures. The Handbook seeks to reduce the time required to develop qualified inspection processes for composite aircraft structures during the development, certification, and manufacturing phases by providing a reference that helps minimize trial and error and provides guidance on best practices, techniques, and settings, for specific flaw types and geometries. NDE techniques include, but are not limited to ultrasound, laser based ultrasound, infrared thermography, and x-ray CT. Flaw types include, but are not limited to porosity, delamination, voids, AFP defects and impact damage. The Handbook contains details such as inspection parameters, data analysis techniques, inspection efficiency (speed & cost), and limitations. This presentation will describe key Handbook activities with examples of the techniques and flaw types examined by the Advanced Composite Consortium members. Availability of the fabricated NDE standards as well as the raw data collected on the standards by the Consortium members to the NDE community is discussed.

Patricia A Howell