Modeling high-performance computing application-failure and hardware-failure data
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In the probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) used in the nuclear industry, human failure events (HFEs) are determined as a subset of hardware failures, namely those hardware failures that could be triggered by human action or inaction. This approach is top-down, starting with hardware faults and deducing human contributions to those faults. Elsewhere, more traditionally human factors driven approaches would tend to look at opportunities for human errors first in a task analysis and then identify which of those errors is risk significant. The intersection of top-down and bottom-up approaches to defining HFEs has not been carefully studied. Ideally, both approaches should arrive at the same set of HFEs. This question remains central as human reliability analysis (HRA) methods are generalized to new domains like oil and gas. The HFEs used in nuclear PSAs tend to be top-down— defined as a subset of the PSA—whereas the HFEs used in petroleum quantitative risk assessments (QRAs) are more likely to be bottom-up—derived from a task analysis conducted by human factors experts. The marriage of these approaches is necessary in order to ensure that HRA methods developed for top-down HFEs are also sufficient for bottom-up applications.
In the probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) used in the nuclear industry, human failure events (HFEs) are determined as a subset of hardware failures, namely those hardware failures that could be triggered by human action or inaction. This approach is top-down, starting with hardware faults and deducing human contributions to those faults. Elsewhere, more traditionally human factors driven approaches would tend to look at opportunities for human errors first in a task analysis and then identify which of those errors is risk significant. The intersection of top-down and bottom-up approaches to defining HFEs has not been carefully studied. Ideally, both approaches should arrive at the same set of HFEs. This question is crucial, however, as human reliability analysis (HRA) methods are generalized to new domains like oil and gas. The HFEs used in nuclear PRAs tend to be top-down—defined as a subset of the PRA—whereas the HFEs used in petroleum quantitative risk assessments (QRAs) often tend to be bottom-up—derived from a task analysis conducted by human factors experts. The marriage of these approaches is necessary in order to ensure that HRA methods developed for top-down HFEs are also sufficient for bottom-up applications.
In the probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) used in the nuclear industry, human failure events (HFEs) are determined as a subset of hardware failures, namely those hardware failures that could be triggered or exacerbated by human action or inaction. This approach is top-down, starting with hardware faults and deducing human contributions to those faults. Elsewhere, more traditionally human factors driven approaches would tend to look at opportunities for human errors first in a task analysis and then identify which of those errors is risk significant. The intersection of top-down and bottom-up approaches to defining HFEs has not been carefully studied. Ideally, both approaches should arrive at the same set of HFEs. This question remains central as human reliability analysis (HRA) methods are generalized to new domains like oil and gas. The HFEs used in nuclear PSAs tend to be top-down—defined as a subset of the PSA—whereas the HFEs used in petroleum quantitative risk assessments (QRAs) are more likely to be bottom-up—derived from a task analysis conducted by human factors experts. The marriage of these approaches is necessary in order to ensure that HRA methods developed for top-down HFEs are also sufficient for bottom-up applications. In this paper, I first review top-down and bottom-up approaches for defining HFEs and then present a seven-step guideline to ensure a task analysis completed as part of human error identification decomposes to a level suitable for use as HFEs. This guideline illustrates an effective way to bridge the bottom-up approach with top-down requirements.
After the Fukushima Daiichi power plant disaster in 2011, the United States Congress ordered the Department of Energy (DOE) to investigate new fuel and cladding types that would be more tolerant in an accident similar to the accident at Fukushima. The resulting program was dubbed the Accident Tolerant Fuels (ATF) program. As a part of this program, insertion is planned for an experiment to go into an ATR loop, and physics analysis must be performed. Discussed are the test fission power, void worth, and hardware failure reactivity insertion. For the sensor qualification test, the test fission power was 0 kW, the void worth was 0.42$, and the hardware failure was 0.01$ and 0.04$. For the fueled experiment, the safety case fission power was 170 kW, the void worth was 0.34$, and the hardware failure was 0$ and 0.03$.
Modern gas turbine engines are typically operated in a lean-premixed configuration in order to meet emissions requirements. Lean operation makes gas turbines more susceptible to combustion instability, which can cause catastrophic hardware failure if left unchecked. The spatially uneven distribution of fuel in a gas turbine combustor, known as fuel staging, is an effective way of suppressing instabilities. This dissertation examines the effect of both steady-state and transient fuel-staging in a model gas turbine combustor. First, the steady-state effect of fuel staging on nominally unstable operating conditions is examined. At 200 degrees Celsius and a bulk flow velocity of 26 m/s, the combustor undergoes self-excited instabilities when the equivalence ratio is between φ = 0.70 and φ = 0.74 when all nozzles are fueled equally. These instabilities are suppressed when the center nozzle equivalence ratio is increased to φ Staging = 0.85 and the outer nozzle equivalence ratio maintained at φ = 0.70 or when the global equivalence ratio is maintained at φ = 0.70 by increasing the center nozzle equivalence ratio to φ Staging = 0.74 and decreasing the outer nozzle equivalence ratio to φ Staging = 0.69. The staged p' RMS amplitudes are found to decrease with increasing equivalence ratio and the damping rates found to increase with increasing equivalence ratio. Next, axisymmetric fuel staging transients are conducted valve opening/closing timescales of 1, 16, 58, 4,000, and 10,000 ms, and equivalence ratios of φ staging = 0.75, 0.80, 0.85. It should be noted that these valve opening/closing timescales, referred to as τ Transient , differ from the actual fuel convection timescale that are summarized in Table 5.2. It is found that the combustor pressure fluctuation at the end of the transient strongly depends on staging equivalence ratio but not on τ Transient . Increasing the staging equivalence ratio decreased the staged- stable combustor pressure amplitude, similarly to the steady-state results. The staged-stable damping rate trends are insensitive to to τ Transient and increased with increasing staging equivalence ratio. The timescale of the transition, τ, is found to be sensitive to both τ Transient and the staging equivalence ratio. For a Modern gas turbine engines are typically operated in a lean-premixed configuration in order to meet emissions requirements. Lean operation makes gas turbines more susceptible to combustion instability, which can cause catastrophic hardware failure if left unchecked. The spatially uneven distribution of fuel in a gas turbine combustor, known as fuel staging, is an effective way of suppressing instabilities. This dissertation examines the effect of both steady-state and transient fuel-staging in a model gas turbine combustor. First, the steady-state effect of fuel staging on nominally unstable operating conditions is examined. At 200 degrees Celsius and a bulk flow velocity of 26 m/s, the combustor undergoes self-excited instabilities when the equivalence ratio is between φ = 0.70 and φ = 0.74 when all nozzles are fueled equally. These instabilities are suppressed when the center nozzle equivalence ratio is increased to φ Staging = 0.85 and the outer nozzle equivalence ratio maintained at φ = 0.70 or when the global equivalence ratio is maintained at φ = 0.70 by increasing the center nozzle equivalence ratio to φ Staging = 0.74 and decreasing the outer nozzle equivalence ratio to φ Staging = 0.69. The staged p' RMS amplitudes are found to decrease with increasing equivalence ratio and the damping rates found to increase with increasing equivalence ratio. Next, axisymmetric fuel staging transients are conducted valve opening/closing timescales of 1, 16, 58, 4,000, and 10,000 ms, and equivalence ratios of φ staging = 0.75, 0.80, 0.85. It should be noted that these valve opening/closing timescales, referred to as τ Transient , differ from the actual fuel convection timescale that are summarized in Table 5.2. It is found that the combustor pressure fluctuation at the end of the transient strongly depends on staging equivalence ratio but not on τ Transient . Increasing the staging equivalence ratio decreased the staged-stable combustor pressure amplitude, similarly to the steady-state results. The staged-stable damping rate trends are insensitive to to τ Transient and increased with increasing staging equivalence ratio. The timescale of the transition, τ, is found to be sensitive to both τ Transient and the staging equivalence ratio. For a Modern gas turbine engines are typically operated in a lean-premixed configuration in order to meet emissions requirements. Lean operation makes gas turbines more susceptible to combustion instability, which can cause catastrophic hardware failure if left unchecked. The spatially uneven distribution of fuel in a gas turbine combustor, known as fuel staging, is an effective way of suppressing instabilities. This dissertation examines the effect of both steady-state and transient fuel-staging in a model gas turbine combustor. First, the steady-state effect of fuel staging on nominally unstable operating conditions is examined. At 200 degrees Celsius and a bulk flow velocity of 26 m/s, the combustor undergoes self-excited instabilities when the equivalence ratio is between φ = 0.70 and φ = 0.74 when all nozzles are fueled equally. These instabilities are suppressed when the center nozzle equivalence ratio is increased to φ Staging = 0.85 and the outer nozzle equivalence ratio maintained at φ = 0.70 or when the global equivalence ratio is maintained at φ = 0.70 by increasing the center nozzle equivalence ratio to φ Staging = 0.74 and decreasing the outer nozzle equivalence ratio to φ Staging = 0.69. The staged p' RMS amplitudes are found to decrease with increasing equivalence ratio and the damping rates found to increase with increasing equivalence ratio. Next, axisymmetric fuel staging transients are conducted valve opening/closing timescales of 1, 16, 58, 4,000, and 10,000 ms, and equivalence ratios of φ staging = 0.75, 0.80, 0.85. It should be noted that these valve opening/closing timescales, referred to as τ Transient , differ from the actual fuel convection timescale that are summarized in Table 5.2. It is found that the combustor pressure fluctuation at the end of the transient strongly depends on staging equivalence ratio but not on τ Transient . Increasing the staging equivalence ratio decreased the staged- stable combustor pressure amplitude, similarly to the steady-state results. The staged-stable damping rate trends are insensitive to to τT Transient and increased with increasing staging equivalence ratio. The timescale of the transition, τ, is found to be sensitive to both τ Transient and the staging equivalence ratio. For a given τ Transient , the decay timescale decreased with increasing staging equivalence ratio. For 1, 16, and 58 ms transients, τ does not depend on τ Transient , though it does strongly depend on direction, where instability onset cases have longer and more variable τ than instability decay cases. The same dependence of τ on direction is seen for the 4,000 and 10,000 ms transients. However, unlike the short duration transients, τ does depend on τ Transient as would be expected. Phase space reconstruction shows the instability is a harmonic limit cycle with a single frequency. The instantaneous phase images shows the center region of the combustor goes out-of-phase first followed by the rest of the combustor. Finally, asymmetric fuel staging tests are conducted. It is found that non-axisymmetric staging can be as effective as axisymmetric staging, although small hardware variations between nozzles can affect the the minimum staging equivalence ratio that consistently suppresses the instability. These changes in the bifurcation equivalence ratio can make staging configurations appear less effective; however, both axisymmetric and non-axisymmetric staging configurations exhibit similar staged-stable p' RMS , damping rates, and instability transition times for equivalence ratios greater than the bifurcation equivalence ratio. Instantaneous phase images show similar instantaneous phase relationship structures in the staged nozzle (center or outer), suggesting that the instability suppression mechanism is similar in each case. This result is surprising given that the time-averaged flame shapes are very different between axisymmetric and non-axisymmetric staging configurations. The similar effectiveness of axisymmetric and non-axisymmetric staging in this geometry is attributed to the fact that the instability mode is a nominally axisymmetric plane wave. It is hypothesized that non-axisymmetric staging configurations will likely be more effective than axisymmetric staging configurations when the instability mode shape is asymmetric (such as a circumferential wave).
Hardware failures are inevitable on large high performance computing systems. Faults or performance degradations in the high-speed network can reduce the entire system s performance. Since the introduction of the Gemini interconnect, Cray systems have become resilient to many networking faults that were fatal in their previous generation systems. These new network reliability and resiliency features have enabled higher uptimes on Cray systems by allowing them to continue running with reduced network performance. Oak Ridge National Laboratory has developed a set of user-level diagnostics that stresses the high-speed network and searches for components that are not performing as expected. Nearest-neighbor bandwidth tests check every network chip and network link in the system. Additionally, performance counters stored on the network ASIC s memory mapped registers (MMRs) are used to better understand the state of the network. Applications have also been characterized under various suboptimal network conditions to better understand what impact network problems have on user codes.
This dataset provides Level 1 (L1) full-waveform light detection and ranging (LiDAR) data collected for the 2025 Colorado Headwaters Ecological Spectroscopy Study (CHESS). These data were acquired to enable characterization of vegetation structure and other three-dimensional features of the land surface, and to evaluate structural changes that may have occurred between a prior LiDAR acquisition in 2018 and the 2025 overflight. Waveform LiDAR data can provide more detailed information about objects on the ground than discrete point clouds typically do, and they are often used for granular target segmentation and characterization of subcanopy vegetation. The data were acquired over three study domains in the Upper Gunnison river basin: the upper East River watershed (CRBU); Almont Triangle and Taylor Canyon (ALMO); and Upper Taylor River watershed (UPTA) between 2025-06-13 and 2025-07-15. LiDAR data were acquired using the Optech Galaxy Prime Airborne LiDAR Terrain Mapper onboard the National Ecological Observatory Network (NEON) Airborne Observation Platform (AOP). These are the primary waveform LiDAR data delivered by NEON and are provided per flightline in compressed Pulsewaves format, an open-source binary file standard. A Pulsewaves object comprises a two files: a pulse (.pls) file, which stores the geographic origin, outgoing vector, and metadata for every laser pulse emitted by the scanner, and a wave file (.wvs), which stores the sequential amplitude samples of the outgoing pulse and the returning signals. The files are published here in their compressed forms (.plz, .wvz). All waveform data were processed following the theoretical workflow described in the NEON L0-to-L1 Waveform LiDAR Algorithm Theoretical Basis Document (Krause and Goulden 2022a); however, the Pulsewaves output format differs from a legacy format described in that document. Waveform amplitude samples are recorded at 1 nanosecond intervals. All coordinates are provided in meters. Horizontal coordinates are referenced in Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) zone 13N and the World Geodetic System (WGS) 1984 ensemble datum. Elevations are referenced to Geoid12A. Waveform data for the UPTA survey area were collected without incident and the published records are complete. However, both the ALMO and CRBU collections experienced issues that resulted in incomplete data for those areas. On collection day 2018-06-16 a hardware failure caused the waveform digitizer to lose data from the eastern edge of the ALMO site (Figure 22). The waveform data for flightlines 2–20 could not be extracted from the digitizer, and the data proved unrecoverable. As a result, a portion of the site does not have coverage with waveform data. Although no hardware failure was observed during collection over the CRBU area, final waveform files generated by vendor software contained only ~25% of the expected number of return pulses. After discovery, NEON initiated troubleshooting with the vendor. The root cause of the data ablation had not been identified at the time of publication. Additional data will be published in an update to this package if further recovery proves successful. CHESS Project Description: The Colorado Headwaters Ecological Spectroscopy Study (CHESS) comprised a multi-week airborne remote sensing and field observation campaign in the Upper Gunnison Basin, Colorado, conducted in June and July of 2025. Airborne remote sensing was conducted by the National Ecological Observatory Network Airborne Observation Platform (NEON AOP), concurrent with a field campaign run by the Rocky Mountain Biological Laboratory (RMBL), the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) and SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory Watershed Function Science Focus Area (SFA), and NASA-JPL (Jet Propulsion Laboratory) Earth Surface Mineral Dust Source Investigation (EMIT) program. Between June 10 and July 18, 2025, the NEON AOP flight team collected high-resolution aerial imaging spectroscopy and Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) data over three domains: the Upper East River (CRBU), Almont Triangle (ALMO), and the Upper Taylor Basin (UPTA). In coordination with the flights, a field campaign acquired ground-truth observations, including observations of vegetation composition, foliar traits, forest demography, and subsurface properties in 18 core sampling areas within the domains. Additional surface water observations were taken at over 380 point locations. All CHESS campaign datasets can be found within the CHESS ESS-DIVE data portal: https://data.ess-dive.lbl.gov/portals/chess. Funding Acknowledgement: Field and remote-sensing data acquisition was performed under a grant from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (80NSSC24K1005). This work was also supported by the Watershed Function Science Focus Area at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory funded by the US Department of Energy, Office of Science, Biological and Environmental Research under Contract No. DE-AC02-05CH11231.
Though robustness and resilience are commonly quoted as features of neuromorphic computing systems, the expected performance of neuromorphic systems in the face of hardware failures is not clear. In this work, we study the effect of failures on the performance of four different training algo-rithms for spiking neural networks on neuromorphic systems: two back-propagation-based training approaches (Whetstone and SLAYER), a liquid state machine or reservoir computing approach, and an evolutionary optimization-based approach (EONS). We show that these four different approaches have very different resilience characteristics with respect to simulated hardware failures. We then analyze an approach for training more resilient spiking neural networks using the evolutionary optimization approach. We show how this approach produces more resilient networks and discuss how it can be extended to other spiking neural network training approaches as well.
Due to the cost of hardware failures within mission critical and scientific applications, it is necessary for software to provide a mechanism to prevent or recover from interruptions. The Kokkos ecosystem is a programming environment that provides performance and portability to many applications that run on DOE supercomputers as well as smaller scale systems. These applications require a higher level of service due to the cost associated with each simulation or the critical nature of the mission. Software resilience enables an application of manage hardware failures reducing the cost of an interruption. Two different resilience methodologies have been added to the Kokkos ecosystem: checkpointing has been added for restart capabilities and a resilient execution model has been added to account for failures in compute devices. The design and implementation of each of these additions are described, and appropriate examples are included for end users.
This paper presents a smart distribution grid testbed to test or compare designs of integrated information management systems (I2MSs). An I2MS extracts and synthesizes information from a wide range of data sources to detect abnormal system behaviors, identify possible causes, assess the system status, and provide grid operators with response suggestions. The objective of the testbed is to provide a modeling environment with sufficient data sources for the I2MS design. The testbed includes five information layers and a physical layer; it generates multi-layer chronological data based on actual measurement playbacks or simulated data sets produced by the physical layer. The testbed models random hardware failures, human errors, extreme weather events, and deliberate tampering attempts to allow users to evaluate the performance of different I2MS designs. Initial results of I2MS performance tests showed that the testbed created a close-to-real-world environment that allowed key performance metrics of the I2MS to be evaluated.
High-density synchrophasors provide valuable information for power grid situational awareness, operation and control. Unfortunately, due to factors including communication instability and hardware failure, their data quality can be greatly deteriorated by anomalies. Since the anomalies can impact the performance of the synchrophasor applications, it is of paramount significance to propose a model to detect anomalies in synchrophasor. In this study, a convolutional neural network model is established to detect and classify the anomalies in the synchrophasor measurements. Additionally, four types of anomalies observed in actual synchrophasors including erroneous patterns, random spikes, missing points and high-frequency interferences are considered in this study. The proposed model is extensively evaluated via field-collected measurements from the synchrophasor network in Jiangsu grid, China. The superior performance of the proposed model indicates the great potential of using deep learning for the detection of abnormal synchrophasor measurements.
Recently, the CSNI directed WGRisk to set up a task group called DIGREL to initiate a new task on developing a taxonomy of failure modes of digital components for the purposes of PSA. It is an important step towards standardized digital I&C reliability assessment techniques for PSA. The objective of this paper is to provide a comparison of the failure mode taxonomies provided by the participants. The failure modes are classified in terms of their levels of detail. Software and hardware failure modes are discussed separately.
Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems provides the foremost means to improve performance and reduce costs for existing light-water reactors (LWRs). However, qualification of digital technologies remains a challenge?especially the issue of software common cause failure (CCF), which has been difficult to address. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, software CCFs due to design flaws might become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multi-layer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. In 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy?s (DOE?s) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C (RADIC) process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. This paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI& systems at Idaho National Laboratory.
Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems will greatly benefit existing light water reactors. However, the issue of software common cause failure (CCF) remains an obstacle in terms of qualification for digital technologies. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, design flaws could cause software CCFs to become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multilayer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing procedures. In Fiscal Year 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades and designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. Here this paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI&C systems at Idaho National Laboratory.
Most of the existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the world rely on traditional analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems for monitoring, control, and protection functions. With the industrial base largely moving to digital systems, the operation and maintenance of plants involves managing issues including lack of needed analog spare parts, increasing maintenance costs, and the loss of vendor support. Compared with existing analog I&C systems, digital I&C systems have significant functional advantages, such as reliable system performance in terms of accuracy and computational capability, high data handling and storage capabilities to fully measure and display operating conditions, and improved capabilities (e.g., fault tolerance, self-testing, signal validation, process system diagnostics). Therefore, the U.S. nuclear power industry has initiated the replacement of existing, aging analog systems with digital I&C technology, and is developing new designs for advanced plants using digital systems in integrated control rooms to provide modern control and protection systems. However, the qualification of digital I&C systems remains a challenge, especially the issue of software common cause failure (CCF), which has been difficult to address. A CCF is the malfunction of two or more plant components or functions due to a single failure source. CCFs have the potential to generate unanalyzed events or sequences that may not be bounded by previous plant accident analyses, therefore, to challenge the plant safety. Existing analyses on CCF in I&C systems are mainly focusing on hardware failures. With the application and upgrades of new digital I&C systems, software CCFs due to design flaws have become a potential threat to plant safety considering most redundancy designs are using the similar digital platforms or software in the operating and application systems. With complex multi-layer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of a particular concern in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. Therefore, there is a need to develop an integrated risk assessment strategy with digital CCF and plant transient responses considered to assure the long-term safety and reliability of vital digital systems and reduce uncertainties in costs, time, and support integration of digital systems in the plant. The overall goal of this project is to deliver a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure digital I&C technologies for the digital upgrades to existing NPPs. To deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, this technical basis is instructive for nuclear vendors and utilities to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed-up industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for digital I&C upgrades including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis; (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address CCFs and quantify responding failure probabilities for digital I&C technologies; (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the individual level, system level, and plant level; and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced digital I&C technologies on NPPs. Upgrading digital I&C (safety and non-safety related) systems in existing NPPs within a cost-effective and regulatory acceptable way offers the foremost means of performance improvements and cost-reductions for existing NPPs. One key outcome of this project is to perform plant-specific risk assessment to provide a sustainable scientific support for enabling industry to balance the digital-related risks, costs, reliability, and safety.
Photovoltaic energy has come a long way from its early days when small cells were fabricated in the labs in the early 50s. While it took a long time for PV modules to mature into what we now see in the market and in rooftops across the world, the power electronics has been lagging behind & was always the weakest point in the PV plant, being responsible for the majority of failures & robbing the PV plants of their full potential by losing precious Watts in the process of converting power from DC to AC. Since the early days of PV power, it has been recognized that the modules need to operate at their maximum power point in order to extract as much power as is available from the PV modules at a given time of day and year. Numerous maximum power point devices were developed to do just this. While effective at extracting as much power as they can, soon after there was a realization that in a PV installation where a central inverter is used, many losses occur, hence energy yield losses. This has led to thinking about alternative architectures where the maximum power point tracking (MPPT) is performed much closer to the modules rather than at a central inverter. Several architectures were proposed ranging from a microinverter, microconverter, string inverter, string optimizer, and to a multi-string inverter or optimizer. While these architectures promise to increase the energy yield by 5% to 25% (depending where MPPT is located), & recovering losses due to shading, soiling, mismatch … there were no real studies and implementations in the field to corroborate these numbers. The program that GE Global Research proposed & received funding for is aimed at a type of distributed architectures, namely the dc architectures where only the MPPT function is distributed across the PV plant. Further, the project is concerned with choosing the right architecture for large scale commercial & utility scale plants but not residential installations. Findings from Task 1- Define Requirements & Develop Architecture- showed that for large scale commercial & utility PV plants, locating the MPPT at the string level with a string size of >3kW is the most cost effective solution & that the increase in energy yield of 6% to 8% is more than enough to make up for the increased cost due to additional power electronics. Our study also shows that in addition to an increase in energy yield, having a dc/dc converter at the string level brings additional benefits such as increased array visibility, allowing for increased monitoring and diagnostics; high and constant dc bus voltage which allows for reducing losses further and optimizing the inverter; and ability to detect ground and arc faults. Task 2 focused on designing a suitable dc/dc converter that meets the requirements defined in Task 1: Efficiency, Cost, & Reliability. For this task, we surveyed and simulated all candidate topologies known by the practitioners in the field. We also generated a novel topology, simulated it, & compared it to existing topologies. Our novel topology being a partial power processing converter came out on top due to its simplicity (fewer parts), it high efficiency, its reliability, and its lower cost. In the remaining tasks of the project, we built the hardware, tested it first in the lab, then in the field and once we worked out all the bugs and issues and were confident our system was robust, we installed it on the rooftop and started collecting the data by mid-Q3 2012. We shared our work with the scientific community in the form of conference & Journal papers, hence contributing to the general understanding of this technology area. The methods, techniques, and hardware developed under this project have all been tested in the field over long periods of time, and under many conditions and have been shown to be robust and reliable. The converters built and developed under this program have been in operation in the field since mid-June 2012, and no hardware failures have been recorded. While some software issues have been seen, none have been showstoppers. The cost analysis of the hardware showed that it meets the cost target set in the requirement document developed in the trade-off study. Improving the performance of solar installations for commercial and utility scale plants contributes to reducing their cost of ownership, hence spreading them to a larger section of the society and making them affordable. Our project contributed to the understanding of the distributed architectures, showed that PV plants’ cost of electricity can be reduced through additional power electronics which allows for harvesting more energy from the plant. When the project started in 2009, the cost of PV energy was still high, hence there was a real need to increase the energy yield, hence reduce the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE). While costs have come down significantly, the need for increasing the energy yield is still relevant, hence the project results, hardware, and techniques developed are still pertinent today. By taking this project from concept to rooftop demonstration, we showed that the technology is mature enough, robust enough, and has the potential to be used by many more customers, hence benefiting the public in general through the spread of PV energy, which ultimately contributes to reducing our dependency on fossil fuel, improving the environment, and creating more jobs.
The current U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing process for digital systems rests on deterministic engineering criteria. In its 1995 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) policy statement, the Commission encouraged the use of PRA technology in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data. Although many activities have been completed in the area of risk-informed regulation, the risk-informed analysis process for digital systems has not yet been satisfactorily developed. Since digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems are expected to play an increasingly important role in nuclear power plant (NPP) safety, the NRC established a digital system research plan that defines a coherent set of research programs to support its regulatory needs. One of the research programs included in the NRC's digital system research plan addresses risk assessment methods and data for digital systems. Digital I&C systems have some unique characteristics, such as using software, and may have different failure causes and/or modes than analog I&C systems; hence, their incorporation into NPP PRAs entails special challenges. The objective of the NRC's digital system risk research is to identify and develop methods, analytical tools, and regulatory guidance for (1) including models of digital systems into NPP PRAs, and (2) using information on the risks of digital systems to support the NRC's risk-informed licensing and oversight activities. For several years, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) has worked on NRC projects to investigate methods and tools for the probabilistic modeling of digital systems, as documented mainly in NUREG/CR-6962 and NUREG/CR-6997. However, the scope of this research principally focused on hardware failures, with limited reviews of software failure experience and software reliability methods. NRC also sponsored research at the Ohio State University investigating the modeling of digital systems using dynamic PRA methods. These efforts, documented in NUREG/CR-6901, NUREG/CR-6942, and NUREG/CR-6985, included a functional representation of the system's software but did not explicitly address failure modes caused by software defects or by inadequate design requirements. An important identified research need is to establish a commonly accepted basis for incorporating the behavior of software into digital I&C system reliability models for use in PRAs. To address this need, BNL is exploring the inclusion of software failures into the reliability models of digital I&C systems, such that their contribution to the risk of the associated NPP can be assessed.