Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “hardware tampering”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

PRISTINE: An Emulation Platform for PCB-Level Hardware Trojans

Printed circuit Boards (PCBs) are becoming increasingly vulnerable to malicious design alteration, also known as Trojan attacks, due to a distributed business model that often involves various untrusted parties. Such attacks can be mounted at various stages in the PCB life cycle. The relative ease of alteration of PCB hardware even after fabrication (due to physical access to surface-mounted critical components and traces) makes them attractive for an adversary to manipulate their functional/physical behavior for malicious intent. There is a growing need to explore viable Trojan attacks in a PCB, analyze their functional and physical characteristics (e.g., impact on power or delay), and study the effectiveness of countermeasures against these attacks. While simulation-based approaches for PCB Trojan insertion are effective at creating a large population of possible Trojans, they fail to provide functional feasibility analysis with a realistic workload for a trigger circuit. Also, they cannot estimate a Trojan’s side-channel footprint due to the unavailability of physical models of diverse PCB components. To address these deficiencies, in this paper, we present PRISTINE, a PCB-level emulation system for any integrity or physical tampering issues, specifically, hardware Trojan insertion. The need for building such an emulation platform to resolve PCB trust issues in the supply chain is also surveyed and discussed. Both custom Hardware Hacking (HaHa) boards and multiple commercial PCBs are then used to test the ability of the proposed system to emulate various hardware Trojans specially designed to exploit board-specific hardware characteristics. Experimental results on emulated board-level Trojans show that a wide range of Trojans can be successfully activated, thus enabling the expected payload effects on both types of boards to be studied and quantified. The resulting data are further analyzed to create PCB-level Trojan benchmarks. In particular, a comparative evaluation of the experimental results is used to propose a risk level metric that quantifies the probability of detection and degree of payload impact of each Trojan on a given commercial PCB.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Development and Testing of an ISRU Soil Mechanics Vacuum Test Facility

For extraterrestrial missions, earth based testing in relevant environments is key to successful hardware development. This is true for both early component level development and system level integration. For In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) on the moon, hardware must interface with the surface material, or regolith, in a vacuum environment. A relevant test environment will therefore involve a vacuum chamber with a controlled, properly conditioned bed of lunar regolith simulant. However, in earth-based granular media, such as lunar regolith simulant, gases trapped within the material pore structures and water adsorbed to all particle surfaces will release when exposed to vacuum. Early vacuum testing has shown that this gas release can occur violently, which loosens and weakens the simulant, altering the consolidation state. A mid-size chamber (3.66 m tall, 1.5 m inner diameter) at the NASA Glenn Research Center has been modified to create a soil mechanics test facility. A 0.64 m deep by 0.914 m square metric ton bed of lunar simulant was placed under vacuum using a variety of pumping techniques. Both GRC-3 and LHT-3M simulant types were used. Data obtained from an electric cone penetrometer can be used to determine strength properties at vacuum including: cohesion, friction angle, bulk density and shear modulus. Simulant disruptions, caused by off-gassing, affected the strength properties, but could be mitigated by reducing pump rate. No disruptions were observed at pressures below 2.5 Torr, regardless of the pump rate. The slow off-gassing of the soil at low pressure lead to long test times; a full week to reach 10(exp -5) Torr. Robotic soil manipulation would enable multiple ISRU hardware test within the same vacuum cycle. The feasibility of a robotically controlled auger and tamper was explored at vacuum conditions.

lunar regolith↗

"Glitch Logic" and Applications to Computing and Information Security

This paper introduces a new method of information processing in digital systems, and discusses its potential benefits to computing and information security. The new method exploits glitches caused by delays in logic circuits for carrying and processing information. Glitch processing is hidden to conventional logic analyses and undetectable by traditional reverse engineering techniques. It enables the creation of new logic design methods that allow for an additional controllable "glitch logic" processing layer embedded into a conventional synchronous digital circuits as a hidden/covert information flow channel. The combination of synchronous logic with specific glitch logic design acting as an additional computing channel reduces the number of equivalent logic designs resulting from synthesis, thus implicitly reducing the possibility of modification and/or tampering with the design. The hidden information channel produced by the glitch logic can be used: 1) for covert computing/communication, 2) to prevent reverse engineering, tampering, and alteration of design, and 3) to act as a channel for information infiltration/exfiltration and propagation of viruses/spyware/Trojan horses.

hardware vulnerabilities↗