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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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13 records

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DOE OSTI2024

PRISTINE: An Emulation Platform for PCB-Level Hardware Trojans

Printed circuit Boards (PCBs) are becoming increasingly vulnerable to malicious design alteration, also known as Trojan attacks, due to a distributed business model that often involves various untrusted parties. Such attacks can be mounted at various stages in the PCB life cycle. The relative ease of alteration of PCB hardware even after fabrication (due to physical access to surface-mounted critical components and traces) makes them attractive for an adversary to manipulate their functional/physical behavior for malicious intent. There is a growing need to explore viable Trojan attacks in a PCB, analyze their functional and physical characteristics (e.g., impact on power or delay), and study the effectiveness of countermeasures against these attacks. While simulation-based approaches for PCB Trojan insertion are effective at creating a large population of possible Trojans, they fail to provide functional feasibility analysis with a realistic workload for a trigger circuit. Also, they cannot estimate a Trojan’s side-channel footprint due to the unavailability of physical models of diverse PCB components. To address these deficiencies, in this paper, we present PRISTINE, a PCB-level emulation system for any integrity or physical tampering issues, specifically, hardware Trojan insertion. The need for building such an emulation platform to resolve PCB trust issues in the supply chain is also surveyed and discussed. Both custom Hardware Hacking (HaHa) boards and multiple commercial PCBs are then used to test the ability of the proposed system to emulate various hardware Trojans specially designed to exploit board-specific hardware characteristics. Experimental results on emulated board-level Trojans show that a wide range of Trojans can be successfully activated, thus enabling the expected payload effects on both types of boards to be studied and quantified. The resulting data are further analyzed to create PCB-level Trojan benchmarks. In particular, a comparative evaluation of the experimental results is used to propose a risk level metric that quantifies the probability of detection and degree of payload impact of each Trojan on a given commercial PCB.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2013

Hardware device to physical structure binding and authentication

Detection and deterrence of device tampering and subversion may be achieved by including a cryptographic fingerprint unit within a hardware device for authenticating a binding of the hardware device and a physical structure. The cryptographic fingerprint unit includes an internal physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware device, which generate an internal PUF value. Binding logic is coupled to receive the internal PUF value, as well as an external PUF value associated with the physical structure, and generates a binding PUF value, which represents the binding of the hardware device and the physical structure. The cryptographic fingerprint unit also includes a cryptographic unit that uses the binding PUF value to allow a challenger to authenticate the binding.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2014

Hardware device binding and mutual authentication

Detection and deterrence of device tampering and subversion by substitution may be achieved by including a cryptographic unit within a computing device for binding multiple hardware devices and mutually authenticating the devices. The cryptographic unit includes a physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware device, which generates a binding PUF value. The cryptographic unit uses the binding PUF value during an enrollment phase and subsequent authentication phases. During a subsequent authentication phase, the cryptographic unit uses the binding PUF values of the multiple hardware devices to generate a challenge to send to the other device, and to verify a challenge received from the other device to mutually authenticate the hardware devices.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2011

The Development of a Smart Distribution Grid Testbed for Integrated Information Management Systems

This paper presents a smart distribution grid testbed to test or compare designs of integrated information management systems (I2MSs). An I2MS extracts and synthesizes information from a wide range of data sources to detect abnormal system behaviors, identify possible causes, assess the system status, and provide grid operators with response suggestions. The objective of the testbed is to provide a modeling environment with sufficient data sources for the I2MS design. The testbed includes five information layers and a physical layer; it generates multi-layer chronological data based on actual measurement playbacks or simulated data sets produced by the physical layer. The testbed models random hardware failures, human errors, extreme weather events, and deliberate tampering attempts to allow users to evaluate the performance of different I2MS designs. Initial results of I2MS performance tests showed that the testbed created a close-to-real-world environment that allowed key performance metrics of the I2MS to be evaluated.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NASA NTRS2014

Development and Testing of an ISRU Soil Mechanics Vacuum Test Facility

For extraterrestrial missions, earth based testing in relevant environments is key to successful hardware development. This is true for both early component level development and system level integration. For In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) on the moon, hardware must interface with the surface material, or regolith, in a vacuum environment. A relevant test environment will therefore involve a vacuum chamber with a controlled, properly conditioned bed of lunar regolith simulant. However, in earth-based granular media, such as lunar regolith simulant, gases trapped within the material pore structures and water adsorbed to all particle surfaces will release when exposed to vacuum. Early vacuum testing has shown that this gas release can occur violently, which loosens and weakens the simulant, altering the consolidation state. A mid-size chamber (3.66 m tall, 1.5 m inner diameter) at the NASA Glenn Research Center has been modified to create a soil mechanics test facility. A 0.64 m deep by 0.914 m square metric ton bed of lunar simulant was placed under vacuum using a variety of pumping techniques. Both GRC-3 and LHT-3M simulant types were used. Data obtained from an electric cone penetrometer can be used to determine strength properties at vacuum including: cohesion, friction angle, bulk density and shear modulus. Simulant disruptions, caused by off-gassing, affected the strength properties, but could be mitigated by reducing pump rate. No disruptions were observed at pressures below 2.5 Torr, regardless of the pump rate. The slow off-gassing of the soil at low pressure lead to long test times; a full week to reach 10(exp -5) Torr. Robotic soil manipulation would enable multiple ISRU hardware test within the same vacuum cycle. The feasibility of a robotically controlled auger and tamper was explored at vacuum conditions.

lunar regolith↗

NASA NTRS2009

"Glitch Logic" and Applications to Computing and Information Security

This paper introduces a new method of information processing in digital systems, and discusses its potential benefits to computing and information security. The new method exploits glitches caused by delays in logic circuits for carrying and processing information. Glitch processing is hidden to conventional logic analyses and undetectable by traditional reverse engineering techniques. It enables the creation of new logic design methods that allow for an additional controllable "glitch logic" processing layer embedded into a conventional synchronous digital circuits as a hidden/covert information flow channel. The combination of synchronous logic with specific glitch logic design acting as an additional computing channel reduces the number of equivalent logic designs resulting from synthesis, thus implicitly reducing the possibility of modification and/or tampering with the design. The hidden information channel produced by the glitch logic can be used: 1) for covert computing/communication, 2) to prevent reverse engineering, tampering, and alteration of design, and 3) to act as a channel for information infiltration/exfiltration and propagation of viruses/spyware/Trojan horses.

hardware vulnerabilities↗

DOE OSTI2015

Ultra-secure RF Tags for Safeguards and Security - SBIR Phase II Final Report

This is the Final Report for the DOE Phase II SBIR project “Ultra-secure RF Tags for Safeguards and Security.” The topics covered herein include technical progress made, progress against the planned milestones and deliverables, project outcomes (results, collaborations, intellectual property, etc.), and a discussion on future expectations of deployment and impacts of the results of this work. In brief, all planned work for the project was successfully completed, on or ahead of schedule and on budget. The major accomplishment was the successful development of a very advanced passive ultra-secure RFID tag system with combined security features unmatched by any commercially available ones. These tags have high-level dynamic encrypted authentication, a novel tamper-proofing mechanism, system software including graphical user interfaces and networking, and integration with a fiber-optic seal mechanism. This is all accomplished passively (with no battery) by incorporating sophisticated hardware in the tag which harvests the energy from the RFID readers that are interrogating the tag. Based on initial feedback (and deployments) at DOE’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), it is anticipated these tags and their offspring will meet DOE and international community needs for highly secure RFID systems. Beyond the accomplishment of those original objectives for the ultra-secure RF tags, major new spin-off thrusts from the original work were identified and successfully pursued with the cognizance of the DOE sponsor office. In particular, new classes of less sophisticated RFID tags were developed whose lineage derives from the core R&D thrusts of this SBIR. These RF “tag variants” have some, but not necessarily all, of the advanced characteristics described above and can therefore be less expensive and meet far wider markets. With customer pull from the DOE and its national laboratories, new RFID tags and systems (including custom readers and software) for government needs in asset management and tracking were developed. These were tested at a national laboratory and other government facilities, and resulted in immediate procurement actions by the government and deployment of these new systems. Thus, commercialization of the results of this Phase II DOE SBIR was already underway before the end of the SBIR itself. More importantly, operations involving asset management at selected DoE and government sites are already being impacted favorably and could have much broader impacts in the near future.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2022

A Review of Technologies that can Provide a 'Root of Trust' for Operational Technologies

The supply chain attack pathway is being increasingly used by adversaries to bypass security controls and gain unauthorized access to sensitive networks and equipment (e.g., Critical Digital Assets). Cyber-attacks targeting supply chain generally aim to compromise the environments, products, or services of vendors and suppliers to inject, add, or substitute authentic software and hardware with malicious elements. These malicious elements are deemed to be authentic as they arise from the vendor or supplier (i.e., the supply chain). This research aims at providing a survey of technologies that have the potential to reduce exposure of sensitive networks and equipment to these attacks, thereby improving tamper resistance. The recent advances in the performance and capabilities of these technologies in recent years has increased their potential applications to reduce or mitigate exposure of the supply chain attack pathway. The focus being on providing an analysis of the benefits and disadvantages of smart cards, secure tokens, and elements to provide root of trust. This analysis provides evidence that these roots of trust can increase the technical capability of equipment and networks to authenticate changes to software and configuration thereby increasing resilience to some supply chain attacks, such as those related to logistics and ICT channels, but not development environment attacks.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Verifying Deep Reductions in the Nuclear Arsenals: Development and Demonstration of a Motion-detection Subsystem for a “Buddy Tag” Using Non-export Controlled Accelerometers

Future nuclear arms-control agreements may place numerical limits on items that are difficult to monitor with national technical means, even when complemented with onsite inspections. Such items could include small objects and mobile assets, such as non-deployed nuclear warheads and mobile missile launchers. Typically, this verification task can be addressed with unique identifiers, but standard tagging techniques may be unacceptable in this case due to host concerns about safety and intrusiveness. First proposed in the late 1980s and partially developed by Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s, the “Proximity Tag” or “Buddy Tag” concept seeks to overcome these concerns by separating the tag from the treaty accountable item itself. A buddy tag has two key elements: a tamper-indicating enclosure and a motion-detection system designed to detect illicit movements in a stand-down period. As part of this project, we have built a buddy-tag prototype for demonstration and evaluation purposes. This paper reviews the design choices and functionalities of the tag’s motion-detection subsystem.We pursue a modular approach for the tag’s hardware, built around an Arduino-class microcontroller and a non-export-controlled low-noise accelerometer, and use open-source algorithms for the motion-detection software. Finally, we discuss the results of an extensive experimental campaign involving both indoor and outdoor measurements assessing the performance of the tag under real-world environmental conditions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2014

Development of a Whole Container Seal

This paper outlines a technique for utilizing electrically conductive textiles as a whole container seal. This method has the potential to provide more robustness for ensuring that the container has not been breached versus conventional sealing methods that only provide tamper indication at the area used for normal access. The conductive textile is used as a distributed sensor for detecting and localizing container tamper or breach. For sealing purposes, the conductive fabric represents a bounded, near-infinite grid of resistors. The well-known infinite resistance grid problem was used to model and confirm the expected accuracy and validity of this approach. An experimental setup was built that uses a multiplexed Wheatstone bridge measurement to determine the resistances of a coarse electrode grid across the conductive fabric. Non-uniform resistance values of the grid infer the presence of damage or tears in the fabric. Results suggest accuracy proportional to the electrode spacing in determining the presence and location of disturbances in conductive fabric samples. Current work is focused on constructing experimental prototypes for field and environmental testing to gauge the performance of these whole container seals in real world conditions. We are also developing software and hardware to interface with the whole container seals. The latest prototypes are expected to provide more accuracy in detecting and localizing events, although detection of a penetration should be adequate for most sealing applications. We are also developing smart sensing nodes that integrate digital hardware and additional sensors (e.g., motion, humidity) into the electrode nodes within the whole container seal.

Kuhn, Michael J↗

DOE OSTI2023

Active High Assurance Authentication Protocol (AHAAP)

The AHAAP Maturation Project involves maturation and evaluation of a patented zero-trust tamper-resistant high-assurance session-less dynamic and active device authentication protocol that simultaneously authenticates identity and provides integrity verification in a single step, substantially reducing the risk of cyberattack, and eliminating the need for costly and complex conventional communication security systems requirements (i.e., cryptography, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and key management). These cybersecurity attributes of the technology must be preserved when applying the technology to different cybersecurity solutions, including Command & Control (C&C), Over-the-Air (OTA) update, Common Access Card (CAC), and distributed energy resource (DER) implementations, among others. The technology research objective is to test and verify that the cybersecurity attributes of the technology are not degraded in different cybersecurity applications. The primary technology development objective is to build minimum viable products to demonstrate the technology addresses today’s cybersecurity threats so that prospective investors, strategic partners, regulatory agencies, and commercial customers can interact with and assess the protection assured by the technology. The AHAAP Maturation Project goal is to develop, test, and validate one or more AHAAP implementations. The AHAAP Maturation Project tasks are: (i) engineer AHAAP implementation software, (ii) build a functional prototype that implements the AHAAP software for demonstration, testing, analysis, and evaluation purposes, and (iii) generate a report detailing the results of the AHAAP C&C software and hardware implementation. The final project deliverables are: (i) AHAAP software implementation and prototype, (ii) a report from Sandia National Laboratories detailing the results of the AHAAP implementations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2017

Building Energy Management Open Source Software

This is the repository for Building Energy Management Open Source Software (BEMOSS), which is an open source operating system that is engineered to improve sensing and control of equipment in small- and medium-sized commercial buildings. BEMOSS offers the following key features: (1) Open source, open architecture – BEMOSS is an open source operating system that is built upon VOLTTRON – a distributed agent platform developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). BEMOSS was designed to make it easy for hardware manufacturers to seamlessly interface their devices with BEMOSS. Software developers can also contribute to adding additional BEMOSS functionalities and applications. (2) Plug & play – BEMOSS was designed to automatically discover supported load controllers (including smart thermostats, VAV/RTUs, lighting load controllers and plug load controllers) in commercial buildings. (3) Interoperability – BEMOSS was designed to work with load control devices form different manufacturers that operate on different communication technologies and data exchange protocols. (4) Cost effectiveness – Implementation of BEMOSS deemed to be cost-effective as it was built upon a robust open source platform that can operate on a low-cost single-board computer, such as Odroid. This feature could contribute to its rapid deployment in small- or medium-sized commercial buildings. (5) Scalability and ease of deployment – With its multi-node architecture, BEMOSS provides a distributed architecture where load controllers in a multi-floor and high occupancy building could be monitored and controlled by multiple single-board computers hosting BEMOSS. This makes it possible for a building engineer to deploy BEMOSS in one zone of a building, be comfortable with its operation, and later on expand the deployment to the entire building to make it more energy efficient. (6) Ability to provide local and remote monitoring – BEMOSS provides both local and remote monitoring ability with role-based access control. (7) Security – In addition to built-in security features provided by VOLTTRON, BEMOSS provides enhanced security features, including BEMOSS discovery approval process, encrypted core-to-node communication, thermostat anti-tampering feature and many more. (8) Support from the Advisory Committee – BEMOSS was developed in consultation with an advisory committee from the beginning of the project. BEMOSS advisory committee comprises representatives from 22 organizations from government and industry.

Source record↗

DOE OSTI2017

Building Energy Management Open Source Software

Source record↗