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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2018

Spacecraft Charging: Hazard Causes, Hazard Effects, Hazard Controls

Spacecraft flight environments are characterized both by a wide range of space plasma conditions and by ionizing radiation (IR), solar ultraviolet and X-rays, magnetic fields, micrometeoroids, orbital debris, and other environmental factors, all of which can affect spacecraft performance. Dr. Steven Koontz's lecture will provide a solid foundation in the basic engineering physics of spacecraft charging and charging effects that can be applied to solving practical spacecraft and spacesuit engineering design, verification, and operations problems, with an emphasis on spacecraft operations in low-Earth orbit, Earth's magnetosphere, and cis-Lunar space.

cis-lunar space↗
NASA NTRS1971

Pyrotechnic hazards classification and evaluation program. Phase 3, segments 1-4: Investigation of sensitivity test methods and procedures for pyrotechnic hazards evaluation and classification, part A

The findings, conclusions, and recommendations relative to the investigations conducted to evaluate tests for classifying pyrotechnic materials and end items as to their hazard potential are presented. Information required to establish an applicable means of determining the potential hazards of pyrotechnics is described. Hazard evaluations are based on the peak overpressure or impulse resulting from the explosion as a function of distance from the source. Other hazard classification tests include dust ignition sensitivity, impact ignition sensitivity, spark ignition sensitivity, and differential thermal analysis.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1971

Pyrotechnic hazards classification and evaluation program. Phase 2, segment 3: Test plan for determining hazards associated with pyrotechnic manufacturing processes

A comprehensive test plan for determining the hazards associated with pyrotechnic manufacturing processes is presented. The rationale for each test is based on a systematic analysis of historical accounts of accidents and a detailed study of the characteristics of each manufacturing process. The most hazardous manufacturing operations have been determined to be pressing, mixing, reaming, and filling. The hazard potential of a given situation is evaluated in terms of the probabilities of initiation, communication, and transition to detonation (ICT). The characteristics which affect the ICT probabilities include the ignition mechanisms which are present either in normal or abnormal operation, the condition and properties of the pyrotechnic material, and the configuration of the processing equipment. Analytic expressions are derived which describe the physical conditions of the system, thus permitting a variety of processes to be evaluated in terms of a small number of experiments.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1981

Thunderstorm hazards flight research: Storm hazards 1980 overview

A highly instrumented NASA F-106B aircraft, modified for the storm hazards mission and protected against direct lightning strikes, was used in conjunction with various ground based radar and lightning measurement systems to collect data during thunderstorm penetration flights. During 69 thunderstorm penetrations, there were 10 direct lightning strikes to the aircraft. No problems were encountered with any of the aircraft's systems as a result of the strikes and the research instrumentation performed as designed. Electromagnetic characteristics of nine strikes were recorded, and the results of other experiments confirm the theory that X-ray radiation and nitrous oxide gas are being produced by processes associated directly with thunderstorm electric fields and lightning discharges. A better understanding of aircraft lightning attachment mechanisms and strike zones is being accomplished by careful inspection, identification, and documentation of lightning attachment points and swept stroke paths following each strike to the aircraft.

Deal, P. L.↗
NASA NTRS1974

Bibliography on aircraft fire hazards and safety. Volume 1: Hazards. Part 1: Key numbers 1 to 817

Ignition temperatures of n-hexane, n-octane, n-decane, JP-6 jet fuel, and aircraft engine oil MIL-7-7808 (0-60-18) were determined in air using heated Pyrex cylinders and Nichrome wires, rods, or tubes. Ignition temperature varied little with fuel-air ratio, but increased as the size of the heat source was decreased. Expressions are given which define the variation of the hot surface ignition temperatures of these combustibles with the radius and the surface area of the heat source. The expressions are applicable to stagnant or low velocity flow conditions (less than 0.2 in./sec.). In addition, the hot gas ignition temperatures of the combustible vapor-air mixtures were determined with jets of hot air. These ignition temperatures also varied little with fuel-air ratio and increased as the diameter of the heat sources was decreased.

Pelouch, J. J., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Statistical Issues for Uncontrolled Reentry Hazards Empirical Tests of the Predicted Footprint for Uncontrolled Satellite Reentry Hazards

A number of statistical tools have been developed over the years for assessing the risk of reentering objects to human populations. These tools make use of the characteristics (e.g., mass, material, shape, size) of debris that are predicted by aerothermal models to survive reentry. The statistical tools use this information to compute the probability that one or more of the surviving debris might hit a person on the ground and cause one or more casualties. The statistical portion of the analysis relies on a number of assumptions about how the debris footprint and the human population are distributed in latitude and longitude, and how to use that information to arrive at realistic risk numbers. Because this information is used in making policy and engineering decisions, it is important that these assumptions be tested using empirical data. This study uses the latest database of known uncontrolled reentry locations measured by the United States Department of Defense. The predicted ground footprint distributions of these objects are based on the theory that their orbits behave basically like simple Kepler orbits. However, there are a number of factors in the final stages of reentry - including the effects of gravitational harmonics, the effects of the Earth s equatorial bulge on the atmosphere, and the rotation of the Earth and atmosphere - that could cause them to diverge from simple Kepler orbit behavior and possibly change the probability of reentering over a given location. In this paper, the measured latitude and longitude distributions of these objects are directly compared with the predicted distributions, providing a fundamental empirical test of the model assumptions.

Matney, Mark↗
NASA NTRS2007

EVA Hazards due to TPS Inspection and Repair

Tile inspection and repair activities have implicit hazards associated with them. When an Extra Vehicular Activities (EVA) crewmember and associated hardware are added into the equation, additional hazards are introduced. Potential hazards to the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU), the Orbiter or the crew member themselves are created. In order to accurately assess the risk of performing a TPS inspection or repair, an accurate evaluation of potential hazards and how adequately these hazards are controlled is essential. The EMU could become damaged due to sharp edges, protrusions, thermal extremes, molten metal or impact with the Orbiter. Tools, tethers and the presence of a crew member in the vicinity of the Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) pose hazards to the Orbiter. Hazards such as additional tile or Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) damage from a loose tool, safety tethers, crewmember or arm impact are introduced. Additionally, there are hazards to the crew which should be addressed. Crew hazards include laser injury, electrical shock, inability to return to the airlock for EMU failures or Orbiter rapid safing scenarios, as well as the potential inadvertent release of a crew member from the arm/boom. The aforementioned hazards are controlled in various ways. Generally, these controls are addressed operationally versus by design, as the majority of the interfaces are to the Orbiter and the Orbiter design did not originally account for tile repair. The Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS), for instance, was originally designed to deploy experiments, and therefore has insufficient design controls for retention of the Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS). Although multiple methods to repair the Orbiter TPS exist, the majority of the hazards are applicable no matter which specific repair method is being performed. TPS Inspection performed via EVA also presents some of the same hazards. Therefore, the hazards common to all TPS inspection or repair methods will be addressed.

Stewart, Christine E.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Hazard Detection Software for Lunar Landing

The Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) Project is developing a system for safe and precise manned lunar landing that involves novel sensors, but also specific algorithms. ALHAT has selected imaging LIDAR (light detection and ranging) as the sensing modality for onboard hazard detection because imaging LIDARs can rapidly generate direct measurements of the lunar surface elevation from high altitude. Then, starting with the LIDAR-based Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA) algorithm developed for Mars Landing, JPL has developed a mature set of HDA software for the manned lunar landing problem. Landing hazards exist everywhere on the Moon, and many of the more desirable landing sites are near the most hazardous terrain, so HDA is needed to autonomously and safely land payloads over much of the lunar surface. The HDA requirements used in the ALHAT project are to detect hazards that are 0.3 m tall or higher and slopes that are 5 or greater. Steep slopes, rocks, cliffs, and gullies are all hazards for landing and, by computing the local slope and roughness in an elevation map, all of these hazards can be detected. The algorithm in this innovation is used to measure slope and roughness hazards. In addition to detecting these hazards, the HDA capability also is able to find a safe landing site free of these hazards for a lunar lander with diameter .15 m over most of the lunar surface. This software includes an implementation of the HDA algorithm, software for generating simulated lunar terrain maps for testing, hazard detection performance analysis tools, and associated documentation. The HDA software has been deployed to Langley Research Center and integrated into the POST II Monte Carlo simulation environment. The high-fidelity Monte Carlo simulations determine the required ground spacing between LIDAR samples (ground sample distances) and the noise on the LIDAR range measurement. This simulation has also been used to determine the effect of viewing on hazard detection performance. The software has also been deployed to Johnson Space Center and integrated into the ALHAT real-time Hardware-in-the-Loop testbed.

Huertas, Andres↗
NASA NTRS2013

Helicopter Flight Test of a Compact, Real-Time 3-D Flash Lidar for Imaging Hazardous Terrain During Planetary Landing

A second generation, compact, real-time, air-cooled 3-D imaging Flash Lidar sensor system, developed from a number of cutting-edge components from industry and NASA, is lab characterized and helicopter flight tested under the Autonomous Precision Landing and Hazard Detection and Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project. The ALHAT project is seeking to develop a guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) and sensing system based on lidar technology capable of enabling safe, precise crewed or robotic landings in challenging terrain on planetary bodies under any ambient lighting conditions. The Flash Lidar incorporates a 3-D imaging video camera based on Indium-Gallium-Arsenide Avalanche Photo Diode and novel micro-electronic technology for a 128 x 128 pixel array operating at a video rate of 20 Hz, a high pulse-energy 1.06 μm Neodymium-doped: Yttrium Aluminum Garnet (Nd:YAG) laser, a remote laser safety termination system, high performance transmitter and receiver optics with one and five degrees field-of-view (FOV), enhanced onboard thermal control, as well as a compact and self-contained suite of support electronics housed in a single box and built around a PC-104 architecture to enable autonomous operations. The Flash Lidar was developed and then characterized at two NASA-Langley Research Center (LaRC) outdoor laser test range facilities both statically and dynamically, integrated with other ALHAT GN&C subsystems from partner organizations, and installed onto a Bell UH-1H Iroquois "Huey" helicopter at LaRC. The integrated system was flight tested at the NASA-Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on simulated lunar approach to a custom hazard field consisting of rocks, craters, hazardous slopes, and safe-sites near the Shuttle Landing Facility runway starting at slant ranges of 750 m. In order to evaluate different methods of achieving hazard detection, the lidar, in conjunction with the ALHAT hazard detection and GN&C system, operates in both a narrow 1deg FOV raster-scanning mode in which successive, gimbaled images of the hazard field are mosaicked together as well as in a wider, 4.85deg FOV staring mode in which digital magnification, via a novel 3-D superresolution technique, is used to effectively achieve the same spatial precision attained with the more narrow FOV optics. The lidar generates calibrated and corrected 3-D range images of the hazard field in real-time and passes them to the ALHAT Hazard Detection System (HDS) which stitches the images together to generate on-the-fly Digital Elevation Maps (DEM's) and identifies hazards and safe-landing sites which the ALHAT GN&C system can then use to guide the host vehicle to a safe landing on the selected site. Results indicate that, for the KSC hazard field, the lidar operational range extends from 100m to 1.35 km for a 30 degree line-of-sight angle and a range precision as low as 8 cm which permits hazards as small as 25 cm to be identified. Based on the Flash Lidar images, the HDS correctly found and reported safe sites in near-real-time during several of the flights. A follow-on field test, planned for 2013, seeks to complete the closing of the GN&C loop for fully-autonomous operations on-board the Morpheus robotic, rocket-powered, free-flyer test bed in which the ALHAT system would scan the KSC hazard field (which was vetted during the present testing) and command the vehicle to landing on one of the selected safe sites.

Roback, VIncent E.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Hazard Analysis for Building 34 Vacuum Glove Box Assembly

One of the characteristics of an effective safety program is the recognition and control of hazards before mishaps or failures occur. Conducting potentially hazardous tests necessitates a thorough hazard analysis in order to prevent injury to personnel, and to prevent damage to facilities and equipment. The primary purpose of this hazard analysis is to define and address the potential hazards and controls associated with the Building 34 Vacuum Glove Box Assembly, and to provide the applicable team of personnel with the documented results. It is imperative that each member of the team be familiar with the hazards and controls associated with his/her particular tasks, assignments and activities while interfacing with facility test systems, equipment and hardware. In fulfillment of the stated purposes, the goal of this hazard analysis is to identify all hazards that have the potential to harm personnel, damage the facility or its test systems or equipment, test articles, Government or personal property, or the environment. This analysis may also assess the significance and risk, when applicable, of lost test objectives when substantial monetary value is involved. The hazards, causes, controls, verifications, and risk assessment codes have been documented on the hazard analysis work sheets in Appendix A of this document. The preparation and development of this report is in accordance with JPR 1700.1, "JSC Safety and Health Handbook" and JSC 17773 Rev D "Instructions for Preparation of Hazard Analysis for JSC Ground Operations".

Meginnis, Ian↗
NASA NTRS1995

NASA LaRC Hazardous Material Pharmacy

In 1993-1994 the Office of Environmental Engineering contracted SAIC to develop NASA Langley's Pollution Prevention (P2) Program. One of the priority projects identified in this contract was the development of a hazardous waste minimization (HAZMIN)/hazardous materials reutilization (HAZMART) program in the form of a Hazardous Materials Pharmacy. A hazardous materials pharmacy is designed to reduce hazardous material procurement costs and hazardous waste disposal costs. This is accomplished through the collection and reissue of excess hazardous material. Currently, a rarely used hazardous material may be stored in a shop area, unused, until it passes its expiration date. The material is then usually disposed of as a hazardous waste, often at a greater expense than the original cost of the material. While this material was on the shelf expiring, other shop areas may have ordered new supplies of the same material. The hazardous material pharmacy would act as a clearinghouse for such materials. Material that is not going to be used would be turned in to the pharmacy. Other users could then be issued this material free of charge, thereby reducing procurement costs. The use of this material by another shop prevents it from expiring, thereby reducing hazardous waste disposal costs.

Esquenet, Remy↗
NASA NTRS2012

Hazard Analysis for Pneumatic Flipper Suitport/Z-1 Manned Evaluation, Chamber B, Building 32

One of the characteristics of an effective safety program is the recognition and control of hazards before mishaps or failures occur. Conducting potentially hazardous tests necessitates a thorough hazard analysis in order to protect our personnel from injury and our equipment from damage. The purpose of this hazard analysis is to define and address the potential hazards and controls associated with the Z1 Suit Port Test in Chamber B located in building 32, and to provide the applicable team of personnel with the documented results. It is imperative that each member of the team be familiar with the hazards and controls associated with his/her particular tasks, assignments, and activities while interfacing with facility test systems, equipment, and hardware. The goal of this hazard analysis is to identify all hazards that have the potential to harm personnel and/or damage facility equipment, flight hardware, property, or harm the environment. This analysis may also assess the significance and risk, when applicable, of lost test objectives when substantial monetary value is involved. The hazards, causes, controls, verifications, and risk assessment codes have been documented on the hazard analysis work sheets in appendix A of this document. The preparation and development of this report is in accordance with JPR 1700.1, JSC Safety and Health Handbook.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2015

Lidar Sensor Performance in Closed-Loop Flight Testing of the Morpheus Rocket-Propelled Lander to a Lunar-Like Hazard Field

For the first time, a suite of three lidar sensors have been used in flight to scan a lunar-like hazard field, identify a safe landing site, and, in concert with an experimental Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) system, guide the Morpheus autonomous, rocket-propelled, free-flying test bed to a safe landing on the hazard field. The lidar sensors and GN&C system are part of the Autonomous Precision Landing and Hazard Detection and Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project which has been seeking to develop a system capable of enabling safe, precise crewed or robotic landings in challenging terrain on planetary bodies under any ambient lighting conditions. The 3-D imaging flash lidar is a second generation, compact, real-time, air-cooled instrument developed from a number of cutting-edge components from industry and NASA and is used as part of the ALHAT Hazard Detection System (HDS) to scan the hazard field and build a 3-D Digital Elevation Map (DEM) in near-real time for identifying safe sites. The flash lidar is capable of identifying a 30 cm hazard from a slant range of 1 km with its 8 cm range precision at 1 sigma. The flash lidar is also used in Hazard Relative Navigation (HRN) to provide position updates down to a 250m slant range to the ALHAT navigation filter as it guides Morpheus to the safe site. The Doppler Lidar system has been developed within NASA to provide velocity measurements with an accuracy of 0.2 cm/sec and range measurements with an accuracy of 17 cm both from a maximum range of 2,200 m to a minimum range of several meters above the ground. The Doppler Lidar's measurements are fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The Laser Altimeter, also developed within NASA, provides range measurements with an accuracy of 5 cm from a maximum operational range of 30 km down to 1 m and, being a separate sensor from the flash lidar, can provide range along a separate vector. The Laser Altimeter measurements are also fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The flight tests served as the culmination of the TRL 6 journey for the lidar suite and included launch from a pad situated at the NASA-Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) runway, a lunar-like descent trajectory from an altitude of 250m, and landing on a lunar-like hazard field of rocks, craters, hazardous slopes, and safe sites 400m down-range just off the North end of the runway. The tests both confirmed the expected performance and also revealed several challenges present in the flight-like environment which will feed into future TRL advancement of the sensors. The flash lidar identified hazards as small as 30 cm from the maximum slant range of 450 m which Morpheus could provide, however, it was occasionally susceptible to an increase in range noise due to heated air from the Morpheus rocket plume which entered its Field-of-View (FOV). The flash lidar was also susceptible to pre-triggering on dust during the HRN phase which was created during launch and transported by the wind. The Doppler Lidar provided velocity and range measurements to the expected accuracy levels yet it was also susceptible to signal degradation due to air heated by the rocket engine. The Laser Altimeter, operating with a degraded transmitter laser, also showed signal attenuation over a few seconds at a specific phase of the flight due to the heat plume generated by the rocket engine.

Roback, Vincent E.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Lidar Sensor Performance in Closed-Loop Flight Testing of the Morpheus Rocket-Propelled Lander to a Lunar-Like Hazard Field

For the first time, a suite of three lidar sensors have been used in flight to scan a lunar-like hazard field, identify a safe landing site, and, in concert with an experimental Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) system, help to guide the Morpheus autonomous, rocket-propelled, free-flying lander to that safe site on the hazard field. The lidar sensors and GN&C system are part of the Autonomous Precision Landing and Hazard Detection and Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project which has been seeking to develop a system capable of enabling safe, precise crewed or robotic landings in challenging terrain on planetary bodies under any ambient lighting conditions. The 3-D imaging Flash Lidar is a second generation, compact, real-time, aircooled instrument developed from a number of components from industry and NASA and is used as part of the ALHAT Hazard Detection System (HDS) to scan the hazard field and build a 3-D Digital Elevation Map (DEM) in near-real time for identifying safe sites. The Flash Lidar is capable of identifying a 30 cm hazard from a slant range of 1 km with its 8 cm range precision (1-s). The Flash Lidar is also used in Hazard Relative Navigation (HRN) to provide position updates down to a 250m slant range to the ALHAT navigation filter as it guides Morpheus to the safe site. The Navigation Doppler Lidar (NDL) system has been developed within NASA to provide velocity measurements with an accuracy of 0.2 cm/sec and range measurements with an accuracy of 17 cm both from a maximum range of 2,200 m to a minimum range of several meters above the ground. The NDLâ€"TM"s measurements are fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The Laser Altimeter (LA), also developed within NASA, provides range measurements with an accuracy of 5 cm from a maximum operational range of 30 km down to 1 m and, being a separate sensor from the Flash Lidar, can provide range along a separate vector. The LA measurements are also fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The flight tests served as the culmination of the TRL 6 journey for the ALHAT system and included launch from a pad situated at the NASA-Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) runway, a lunar-like descent trajectory from an altitude of 250m, and landing on a lunar-like hazard field of rocks, craters, hazardous slopes, and safe sites 400m down-range just off the North end of the runway. The tests both confirmed the expected performance and also revealed several challenges present in the flight-like environment which will feed into future TRL advancement of the sensors. Guidance provided by the ALHAT system was impeded in portions of the trajectory and intermittent near the end of the trajectory due to optical effects arising from air heated by the rocket engine. The Flash Lidar identified hazards as small as 30 cm from the maximum slant range of 450 m which Morpheus could provide; however, it was occasionally susceptible to an increase in range noise due to scintillation arising from air heated by the Morpheus rocket engine which entered its Field-of-View (FOV). The Flash Lidar was also susceptible to pre-triggering, during the HRN phase, on a dust cloud created during launch and transported down-range by the wind. The NDL provided velocity and range measurements to the expected accuracy levels yet it was also susceptible to signal degradation due to air heated by the rocket engine. The LA, operating with a degraded transmitter laser, also showed signal attenuation over a few seconds at a specific phase of the flight due to the heat plume generated by the rocket engine.

Roback, V. Eric↗
NASA NTRS1971

Lunar mission safety and rescue: Hazards analysis and safety requirements

The results are presented of the hazards analysis which was concerned only with hazards to personnel and not with loss of equipment or property. Hazards characterization includes the definition of a hazard, the hazard levels, and the hazard groups. The analysis methodology is described in detail. The methodology was used to prepare the top level functional flow diagrams, to perform the first level hazards assessment, and to develop a list of conditions and situations requiring individual hazard studies. The 39 individual hazard study results are presented in total.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2005

GO/NO-GO - When is medical hazard mitigation acceptable for launch?

Medical support of spaceflight missions is composed of complex tasks and decisions that dedicated to maintaining the health and performance of the crew and the completion of mission objectives. Spacecraft represent one of the most complex vehicles built by humans, and are built to very rigorous design specifications. In the course of a Flight Readiness Review (FRR) or a mission itself, the flight surgeon must be able to understand the impact of hazards and risks that may not be completely mitigated by design alone. Some hazards are not mitigated because they are never actually identified. When a hazard is identified, it must be reduced or waivered. Hazards that cannot be designed out of the vehicle or mission, are usually mitigated through other means to bring the residual risk to an acceptable level. This is possible in most engineered systems because failure modes are usually predictable and analysis can include taking these systems to failure. Medical support of space missions is complicated by the inability of flight surgeons to provide "exact" hazard and risk numbers to the NASA engineering community. Taking humans to failure is not an option. Furthermore, medical dogma is mostly comprised of "medical prevention" strategies that mitigate risk by examining the behaviour of a cohort of humans similar to astronauts. Unfortunately, this approach does not lend itself well for predicting the effect of a hazard in the unique environment of space. This presentation will discuss how Medical Operations uses an evidence-based approach to decide if hazard mitigation strategies are adequate to reduce mission risk to acceptable levels. Case studies to be discussed will include: 1. Risk of electrocution risk during EVA 2. Risk of cardiac event risk during long and short duration missions 3. Degraded cabin environmental monitoring on the ISS. Learning Objectives 1.) The audience will understand the challenges of mitigating medical risk caused by nominal and off-nominal mission events. 2.) The audience will understand the process by which medical hazards are identified and mitigated before launch. 3.) The audience will understand the roles and responsibilities of all the other flight control positions in participating in the process of reducing hazards and reducing medical risk to an acceptable level.

Hamilton, Douglas R.↗