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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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DOE OSTI2025

A Regularized Variance-Reduced Modified Extragradient Method for Stochastic Hierarchical Games

We consider an N -player hierarchical game in which the i th player’s objective comprises of an expectation-valued term, parametrized by rival decisions, and a hierarchical term. Such a framework allows for capturing a broad range of stochastic hierarchical optimization problems, Stackelberg equilibrium problems, and leader-follower games. We develop an iteratively regularized and smoothed variance-reduced modified extragradient framework for iteratively approaching hierarchical equilibria in a stochastic setting. We equip our analysis with rate statements, complexity guarantees, and almost-sure convergence results. We then extend these statements to settings where the lower-level problem is solved inexactly and provide the corresponding rate and complexity statements. Our model framework encompasses many game theoretic equilibrium problems studied in the context of power markets. We present a realistic application to the study of virtual power plants, emphasizing the role of hierarchical decision making and regularization. Preliminary numerics suggest that empirical behavior compares well with theoretical guarantees.

Tikhonov regularization↗

DOE OSTI2025

Game theoretic modeling and optimization of competition and collaboration in dual channel electronic waste supply chains

The rapid growth of electronic waste (e-waste) presents critical challenges for sustainable resource recovery and environmental protection. This study develops a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model formulated as a hierarchical Stackelberg game, that integrates dynamic pricing and cost-sharing mechanisms to optimize both economic and environmental outcomes. The model explicitly captures strategic interactions between manufacturer-led and third-party recycling channels, accounting for consumer behavior, regulatory incentives, and market competition. Numerical simulations conducted (implemented over a four-iteration horizon using a commercial optimization solver) show that, relative to the baseline equilibrium, manufacturer profit increases from 11.6 thousand USD to 37.9 thousand USD (+226.8%), total recycled volume rises from 7,848 to 7,942 units (+1.2%), and collector profit nearly doubles under cost-sharing, enabling more equitable profit distribution. Furthermore, scenario-based simulations across Sub-Saharan Africa, high-income economies, and emerging Asian industrial countries reveal that infrastructure quality, policy intensity, and labor costs critically shape recycling efficiency and profit allocation. These findings demonstrate that subsidies alone are insufficient to ensure system efficiency. Instead, coordinated strategies that integrate internal incentive alignment with context-sensitive policy support are required. Overall, this study offers a robust framework for designing resilient, efficient, and regionally adaptable e-waste management systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2025

Multi-scale, Multi-disciplinary, and Multi-agent Explainable AI with Koopman-Undergirded Learning, Prediction, and Analysis (M3EA KULPA) (Project Closeout Report)

The goal of this project was to develop and use domain-aware machine learning formulations, based on the Koopman Operator (KO), for modelling multi-scale, multi-disciplinary (e.g., multi-physics), and/or multi-agent systems. The project developed these formulations for the following cases: • Systems with dynamics at two separate time scales, • Systems with a bi-level hierarchical control structure, • Systems with bi-level hierarchical control and dynamics at two separate time scales (the lower level controls operating at the faster time scale), and • Systems with n separate but interacting agents/disciplines (with/without control, respectively); the controls for each agent could include bi-level hierarchical control and dynamics at two separate time scales as described above. The project then defined a set of dynamical systems consisting of different nonlinear oscillators that could be used to test these different formulations and then subsequently learned the KO models for those systems. With the KO models, we were able to do the following: • Quantify system stability, including both long-term and transient behavior, • Quantify the effects of feedbacks between the different time scales and agents/disciplines in terms of those feedbacks’ effects on system stability, • Replace a standard Proportional-Integral (PI) control in the hierarchical control structure with a KO-based Linear-Quadratic Regular (LQR), a form of optimal control, • Calculate optimal supervisory control policies a) with and without time scale separated dynamics at the lower level control levels and b) with both PI and KO-based LQR lower level control policies, and • Calculate dynamic Nash equilibria for multi-agent systems where each agent makes its own control decisions.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗