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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Revisiting Current Paradigms: Subject Matter Expert Views on High Consequence Facility Security Assessments

Security assessments support decision-makers' ability to evaluate current capabilities of high consequence facilities (HCF) to respond to possible attacks. However, increasing complexity of today's operational environment requires a critical review of traditional approaches to ensure that implemented assessments are providing relevant and timely insights into security of HCFs. Using interviews and focus groups with diverse subject matter experts (SMEs), this study evaluated the current state of security assessments and identified opportunities to achieve a more "ideal" state. The SME-based data underscored the value of a systems approach for understanding the impacts of changing operational designs and contexts (as well as cultural influences) on security to address methodological shortcomings of traditional assessment processes. These findings can be used to inform the development of new approaches to HCF security assessments that are able to more accurately reflect changing operational environments and effectively mitigate concerns arising from new adversary capabilities.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Testing and Evaluation of Security Response at High-Consequence Nuclear Facilities

High-consequence nuclear facilities are required to implement a physical protection system (PPS) capable of preventing a design basis threat (DBT) adversary from completing radiological sabotage or theft of nuclear material. Response forces are a core component of the PPS. A rigorous testing and evaluation program is required to ensure that the response forces are appropriately trained and equipped and are capable of meeting the regulatory and mission requirements.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Incorporating the Role(s) of Human Actors in Complex System Design for Safety and Security

Traditional systems engineering demonstrates the importance of customer needs in scoping and defining design requirements; yet, in practice, other human stakeholders are often absent from early lifecycle phases. Human factors are often omitted in practice when evaluating and down-selecting design options due to constraints such as time, money, access to user populations, or difficulty in proving system robustness through the inclusion of human behaviors. Advances in systems engineering increasingly include non-technical influences into the design, deployment, operations, and maintenance of interacting components to achieve common performance objectives. Furthermore, such advances highlight the need to better account for the various roles of human actors to achieve desired performance outcomes in complex systems. Many of these efforts seek to infuse lessons and concepts from human factors (enhanced decision-making through Crew Resource Management), systems safety (Rasmussen's “drift toward danger”) and organization science (Giddens' recurrent human acts leading to emergent behaviors) into systems engineering to better understand how socio-technical interactions impact emergent system performance. Safety and security are examples of complex system performance outcomes that are directly impacted by varying roles of human actors. Using security performance of high consequence facilities as a representative use case, this article will outline the System Context Lenses to understand how to include various roles of human actors into systems engineering design. Several exemplar applications of this organizing lenses will be summarized and used to highlight more generalized insights for the broader systems engineering community.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Multilayered Network Models for Security: Enhancing System Security Engineering with Orchestration

Security engineering approaches can often focus on a particular domain—physical security, cyber security, or personnel security, for example. Yet, security systems engineering consistently faces challenges requiring socio-technical solutions to address evolving and dynamic complexity. While some drivers of this complexity stem from complex risk environments, innovative adversaries, and disruptive technologies, other drivers are endogenous and emerge from the interactions across security engineering approaches. In response, INCOSE's Systems Security Working Group identified the need to better coordinate “disparate security solutions [that] operate independently” as one of eleven key concepts in their IS21 FuSE Security Roadmap. From this perspective, this need for “security orchestration” aligns with the perspective that security is a property that emerges from interactions within complex systems. Current efforts at Sandia National Laboratories are developing a systems security engineering approach that describes high consequence facility (HCF) security as a multidomain set of interacting layers. The result is a multilayered network (MLN)-based approach that captures the interactions between infrastructure, physical components, digital components, and humans in nuclear security systems. This article will summarize the MLN-based approach to HCF security and describe two preliminary results demonstrating potential benefits from incorporating interactions across disparate security solutions. Here, leveraging the logical structure of networks, this MLN model-based approach provides an example of how security orchestration provides enhanced systems security engineering solutions.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

LDRD23-0730: Invoking Multilayer Networks to Develop a Paradigm for Security Science—Summary Report

Current approaches to securing high consequence facilities (HCF) and critical assets are linear and static and therefore struggle to adapt to emerging threats (e.g., unmanned aerial systems) and changing environmental conditions (e.g., decreasing operational control). The pace of change in technological, organizational, societal, and political dynamics necessitates a move toward codifying underlying scientific principles to better characterize the rich interactions observed between HCF security technology, infrastructure, digital assets, and human or organizational components. The promising results of Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) 20-0373—“Developing a Resilient, Adaptive, and Systematic Paradigm for Security Analysis”—suggest that when compared to traditional security analysis, invoking multilayer network (MLN) modeling for HCF security system components captures unexpected failure cases and unanticipated interactions.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS1990

A unique high heat flux facility for testing hypersonic engine components

A major concern in advancing the state-of-the-art technologies for hypersonic vehicles is the development of an aeropropulsion system capable of withstanding high thermal loads expected during hypersonic flights. Consequently, there is a need for experimental facilities capable of providing a high heat flux environment for testing compound concepts and verifying analyses. A hydrogen/oxygen rocket engine was developed to provide a high enthalpy/high heat flux environment for component evaluation. This Hot Gas Facility is capable of providing heat fluxes ranging from 200 (on flat surfaces) up to 8000 Btu per sq ft per sec (at a leading edge stagnation point). Gas temperatures up to 5500 R can be attained as well as Reynolds numbers up to 360,000 per ft. Test articles such as cowl leading edges, transpiration-cooled seals, fuel injectors, and cooled panel concepts can be evaluated with gaseous hydrogen as coolant. This facility and its configuration and test capabilities are discussed. Results from flow characterization experiments are also shown and their implications considered.

Melis, Matthew E.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Magnetic Measurements of Arc Instabilities in Segmented Arc Heater Column

The Aerodynamic Heating Facility (AHF) at NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) generates high enthalpy, supersonic flow environments for ground testing of NASAheat shield materials. This arc jet heater operates by passing a DC arc (<3200A,<2500V) through a gas column (~10cm diameter, 2m length) and ejecting the heatedgas through a supersonic nozzle into a test chamber. The arc plasma is a partially ionized air mixture at low temperature (< 2eV) but needs to be stable for long test times (up to 30min) at high power (< 20MW). Currently, the operational envelope of the facility is limited by arc instabilities including the kink instability. Consequently, it is of interest to characterize these instabilities to better understand facility limits and inform methods to extend stable operational ranges. Due to the high enthalpy and long timescales (i.e., minutes) diagnostics must be non-invasive. This work will cover the development of two sets of magnetic sensors: differential B-dot sensors and tri-axial magnetic hall sensors and will describe initial measurements of arc motion usingthese sensors.

Kink instability↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Magnetic Measurements of Arc Instabilities in Segmented Arc Heater Column

The Aerodynamic Heating Facility (AHF) at NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) generates high enthalpy, supersonic flow environments for ground testing of NASAheat shield materials. This arc jet heater operates by passing a DC arc (<3200 A,<2500 V) through a gas column (~6 cm diameter, 2 m length) and ejecting the heated gas through a supersonic nozzle into a test chamber. The arc plasma is a partially ionized air mixture at low temperature (< 2 eV) but needs to be stable for long test times (up to 30 min) at high power (< 20 MW). Currently, the operational envelope of the facility is limited by arc instabilities including the kink instability. Consequently, it is of interest to characterize these instabilities to better understand facility limits and inform methods to extend stable operational ranges. Due to the high enthalpy and long timescales (i.e., minutes) diagnostics must be non-invasive. This work will cover the development of two sets of magnetic sensors: differential B-dot sensors and tri-axial magnetic hall sensors and will describe initial measurements of arc motion using these sensors.

Kink instability↗
DOE OSTI2020

Assessment of operational availability for the PIP-II Superconducting Radio Frequency linear accelerator facility

Operational availability is a critical performance measure for an accelerator facility in modern time. A high availability enables the facility to serve a wide range of users simultaneously. Consequently, besides pure accelerator physics considerations, newly proposed accelerator facilities account for the availability and reliability aspects in the design phases. It allows incorporation of appropriate mitigation strategies for the most vulnerable systems in the machine and therefore, minimizes unscheduled interruptions during the operation. This report lays out a methodology for the availability assessment of the complete particle accelerator facility and presents an initial assessment of the availability of the newly proposed Proton Improvement Plan-II (PIP-II) accelerator facility at Fermilab. The paper describes a comprehensive reliability model of the PIP-II facility that comprises not only 800 MeV linear accelerator (linac) system but also essential utility systems in the form of cryogenic, water, power and air systems. The paper details estimations of the availability of the PIP-II facility for two operational modes i.e. the nominal operational mode featuring 800 MeV beam and critical operational mode involving operation with the lowest objective beam energy of 600 MeV.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Progress Towards the Validation of a new RELAP5-3D model of the High Temperature Test Facility

Validation is a key step in the development of any type of systems model. As the next generation of reactors approaches, the need for codes that have been validated for these new types of systems continues to grow. An example of a prominent option is the Reactor Excursion Leak Analysis Program (RELAP5-3D), developed by Idaho National Laboratory. This code was developed for the purpose of systems level thermal-hydraulic modeling of light water reactors (LWRS) and postulated transients that can occur in LWRS.RELAP5-3D has been substantially validated against LWR data. Due to its long history as a reactor safety analysis tool, there has been an effort to adapt RELAP5-3D for the purposes of advanced reactor concepts such as prismatic high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs). However, RELAP5-3D has not nearly been validated and verified for HTGRs to the degree of LWRs, warranting verification and validation opportunities with computational benchmarks and existing experimental facilities. Examples of such facilities include the modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (MHTGR) 350 and the high temperature engineering test reactor (HTTR) from Japan. The MHTGR 350 is a benchmark design concept for code-to-code verification purposes; therefore, it does not provide any experimental data for validation opportunities The HTTR provides useful multiphysics validation data but does not have the in-core instruments to generate thermal-hydraulic experimental data to help with RELAP5-3D validation. Consequently, a facility that could provide key in-core temperatures for thermal-hydraulic validation was still needed. The High Temperature Test Facility (HTTF) is an integral effects facility for HTGR thermal hydraulics developed and operated by Oregon State University. HTTF represents ¼ length scale of the General Atomics MHTGR and is rated for a total power of 2.2 MW. Axially, the core consists of an upper and lower reflector and 10 blocks, numbered from bottom to top (Block 1 is right above lower reflector). The core is heated via graphite resistive heater rods, with respective channels distributed throughout the core. The primary coolant is helium and heat can radiate out of the core to the reactor cavity cooling system (RCCS), which is cooled by water. The primary purpose of the facility is to investigate pressurized conduction cooldown (PCC) and depressurized conduction cooldown (DCC) transients, which are also referred to as the pressurized and depressurized loss of forced cooling respectively. Two experiments were chosen to perform the validation study with a RELAP5-3D model of HTTF. These experiments are PG-27 (PCC) and PG-29 (DCC). These were chosen based off of the quality of available experimental data before and during the experiment which led to their inclusion in the HTGR Thermal Hydraulics Benchmark.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Indirect Magnetic Measurements on the Aerodynamic Heating Facility (AHF)

The arc jet complex at NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) investigates various thermal protection systems (TPS) and their performance in high enthalpy flow environments to improve heat shields used in atmospheric entry. The arc jet operates by inducing an arc between two electrodes and passing the heated gas through a supersonic nozzle. The arc plasma is typically a partially ionized air mixture at low temperature (< 2 eV) but operates for long periods of time (up to 30 min) at high power (< 60 MW). However, simulations using the in-house ARC Heater Simulator (ARCHeS) code predict that the arc is still unstable to MHD instabilities, primarily the kink instability, which limit the operational envelope of the facility [1]. Consequently, it is important to better characterize these instabilities to improve facility stability and extend operational ranges. Due to the high enthalpy and long timescales (i.e., minutes) arc diagnostics must be non-invasive (i.e., optical or magnetic). This work will cover the development of tri-axial magnetic hall sensors for arc jet instabilities and subsequent 3D characterization of arc motion. The latest results describing the kink instability amplitude, frequency and wavelength will be presented and represent the first measurements of this instability in a NASA arc jet facility. References: [1] Meurisse, J. (2018). 3D Unsteady Model of Arc Heater Plasma Flow Using the ARC Heater Simulator (ARCHeS), APS Gaseous Electronics Conference, 2018: APS.

Sebastian Vicente Colom↗
DOE OSTI2025

Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at an International Research Reactor

The nuclear industry recognizes the difficulties involved in developing effective managerial and leadership skills in a highly technical and proficient workforce such as that found in nuclear facilities. Implementing an insider threat mitigation program (ITMP) within the nuclear industry is a complex and ongoing process that demands a comprehensive understanding of human behavior, an organization’s security culture, and rigorous regulatory requirements yet also accounts for facility characteristics, physical security, material flow, and activities involving nuclear material. Given the high-consequence nature of research reactor operations, even minor lapses can lead to safety, security, and reputational risks. An effective ITMP requires a defense-in-depth approach that incorporates behavioral analysis, robust vetting procedures, continuous monitoring, and cross-disciplinary coordination. It must also promote a culture of vigilance and accountability at all levels up to and including executive leadership but be flexible enough to adapt to evolving global threats and technological advances. Insider threat mitigation is not a one-time effort but rather a sustained commitment to excellence in safety and security. Establishing a culture in which personnel proactively report incidents and issues that could affect nuclear safety and security is vital to maintaining a safe and secure operational environment. This document was developed to guide senior management and research reactor organizations in creating comprehensive programs to effectively manage and mitigate insider threat behaviors and actions. It focuses on the key pillars of an effective ITMP, including the national legal framework, security culture, preventive and protective measures, cyber security, and performance evaluation. By using a systematic approach during implementation, facilities can foster environments conducive to insider threat detection and support long-term program sustainability. The document also provides strategies for improving communication across all levels of an organization, helping to eliminate barriers that hinder the development of robust ITMPs and enhance overall security culture. In today’s organizations, the concept of leveraging safety and security culture lessons to facilitate knowledge transfer is rapidly evolving to expedite insider threat management and security culture improvements. This document outlines the rationale for evaluating an ITMP based on national customs, culture, and stakeholders. The elements are all germane to reliability and trustworthiness and relate to security concerns that states may encounter. The document focuses not only on individual perceptions regarding security issues and capability building but also on team building and how to resolve concerns. The implementers of a facility’s ITMP may zero in on indicators of insider threats within their enterprise. This material will benefit organizations when it is applied using a systematic and structured approach as demonstrated throughout the document.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS2006

NASA Critical Facilities Maintenance Assessment

Critical Facilities Maintenance Assessment (CFMA) was first implemented by NASA following the March 2000 overtest of the High Energy Solar Spectroscopic Imager (HESSI) spacecraft. A sine burst dynamic test using a 40 year old shaker failed. Mechanical binding/slippage of the slip table imparted 10 times the planned force to the test article. There was major structural damage to HESSI. The mechanical "health" of the shaker had not been assessed and tracked to assure the test equipment was in good working order. Similar incidents have occurred at NASA facilities due to inadequate maintenance (e.g., rainwater from a leaky roof contaminated an assembly facility that housed a spacecraft). The HESSI incident alerted NASA to the urgent need to identify inadequacies in ground facility readiness and maintenance practices. The consequences of failures of ground facilities that service these NASA systems are severe due to the high unit value of NASA products.

maintenance↗