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NASA NTRS2022

Directed Acyclic Graphs: A Tool for Understanding the NASA Human Spaceflight System Risks - Human System Risk Board

For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding of these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document is a sister document to NASA/TM 20220006812 Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation (1). In that document, the basic guidance for creating and standardizing directed acyclic graphs as tools for cross-risk analysis is provided. This document contains the initial configuration managed DAGs that were created as a result of applying those principles. These initial versions were accepted by the HSRB in January of 2022. Each of the Human System Risks are represented by a DAG that has been reviewed by the larger Human Health and Performance community at NASA including life scientists, physical scientists, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, exercise specialists and more. These results show the starting point for Human System Risk DAGs as shared mental models and communication aids across the boundaries of the various expertise needed to understand and mitigate the human risks in spaceflight. Because they are a starting point, each of these DAGs can be expected to change over time as new or refined evidence becomes available. The process for updating these DAGs can be found in the JSC-66705 Human System Risk Management Plan (2) that is publicly available on the NASA Technical Reports Server.

Erik L. Antonsen↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

High Value Risk Targets in Human System Risk

The Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has the overall responsibility for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks that it has identified to be associated with human spaceflight. The Board is also charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to mitigate those risks, and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Each Risk Custodian Team (RCT) identifies High Value Risk Mitigation Targets (HVRMT) that have the highest likelihood or greatest impact in reducing their risk. These typically include areas where there are major gaps in knowledge or capability; or other targets that promise to yield returns worthy of investments in time, money and other resources by stakeholders interested in reducing Human System Risk. As part of the review of each risk the Board members consider and discuss the HVRMT statements, which are then approved by the Board Chair. High Value Risk Mitigation Targets can include research activities funded by the Human Research Program, but often involve recommending standards, monitoring, or other operational goals to reduce risk. This presentation will discuss common themes and highlights of the approved HVRTs to inform IWS attendees and the wider research community.

D M Buckland↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human Systems Risk Network - A Ranking Analysis of Risks

INTRODUCTION The Human Systems Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for understanding, managing, and mitigating the risks associated with spaceflight. For a particular mission, the HSRB assigns each human system risk a rating on a 5x5 grid assessing its likelihood and consequence, which is ultimately used to compare and rank the risks. The HSRB approaches risk management by primarily establishing the context of each human system risk individually with the understanding that mitigating one risk might affect the likelihood, consequence, and mitigation approaches of another. To support this effort the HSRB, subject matter experts, and risk custodian teams created directed acyclic graphs (DAG), often called a causal graph, for the twenty-nine risks. In this presentation, we propose a new ranking algorithm for the risks which includes the downstream influence of each risk according to the information in the DAGs and provide an application of graph theoretic tools. METHODS In 2014, Mindock and Klaus proposed a taxonomy for human system risk influences which we have adopted to categorize the nodes in each DAG. Analyzing the nodes that correspond to the risks in this taxonomy allows us to analyze and understand how each risk influences the others. We construct an auxiliary network, which we call the Primary Risk Network (PRN), where the nodes are the twenty-nine space flight risks and, a directed edge connects Risk A to Risk B if Risk A has some influence on the likelihood or consequence of Risk B as described in the DAGS. We perform a variety of graph theoretic ranking methods on the nodes (or risks) in the PRN, including Katz centrality. RESULTS We rank the nodes in the PRN using the Katz centrality score. The ten risks with the highest score are pictured in Figure 1, colored (light to dark) according to their score. We analyze other centrality measures like betweenness centrality, eigenvector centrality, and the Estrada index, and provide the meaning of the corresponding rankings in terms of the risks. Future work includes analyzing the other categories in the taxonomy defined by Mindock and Klaus [1]. For example, we are interested in analyzing the nodes that are labeled as countermeasures or capabilities and perform similar analysis to measure their effect on certain medical conditions.

dag↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human System Risk Communication: Directed Acyclic Graphs

- The Human System Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for the management of a portfolio of 30 human system risks that NASA tracks and configuration manages to mitigate for future crewed exploration missions. - The HSRB has been exploring the concept of causal diagrams (in the form of Directed Acyclic Graphs or DAGs) as an approach to creating knowledge graphs for each risk to enable shared mental models of causal flow from spaceflight hazards to mission outcomes among HSRB Stakeholders. - These diagrams are intended to improve insight and communication of risk across the myriad subject matter experts and management interested in human system risk reduction. This includes program managers, systems engineers, and operators in addition to the Human Health and Performance Directorate. - The DAG project was intended to create the foundation for composition of the 30 baselined DAGs into a single risk network and software is being developed in parallel to enable this forward work.

directed acrylic graph↗
NASA NTRS2016

NASA Human System Risk Assessment Process

NASA utilizes an evidence based system to perform risk assessments for the human system for spaceflight missions. The center of this process is the multi-disciplinary Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The HSRB is chartered from the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) at NASA Headquarters. The HSRB reviews all human system risks via an established comprehensive risk and configuration management plan based on a project management approach. The HSRB facilitates the integration of human research (terrestrial and spaceflight), medical operations, occupational surveillance, systems engineering and many other disciplines in a comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB considers all factors that influence human risk. These factors include pre-mission considerations such as screening criteria, training, age, sex, and physiological condition. In mission factors such as available countermeasures, mission duration and location and post mission factors such as time to return to baseline (reconditioning), post mission health screening, and available treatments. All of the factors influence the total risk assessment for each human risk. The HSRB performed a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30, where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research and, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit for 6 and 12 months, deep space for 30 days and 1 year, a lunar mission for 1 year, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary two-page assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence of that risk, available risk mitigations, traceability to the Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS) and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the Human Research Program, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets to provide the most economical and timely mitigations. The risk assessments were completed for the 6 DRMs and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB reviews each risk at least annually or when new evidence/information is available that adds to the body of evidence. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Francisco, D.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human System Risk Changes in 2021

The Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has the overall responsibility for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks that it has identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to mitigate those risks, and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Risks are re-evaluated in a Continuous Risk Management (CRM) process. This session will summarize the risk posture changes that have occurred in the last year and what high level research, performance, and epidemiologic data have informed those changes. Human System Risks updated in 2021 include: Dynamic Loads, Sensorimotor, EVA, Crew Egress, Behavioral Medicine, Electrical Shock, Human System Integration Architecture (HSIA), Toxic Exposure, Bone Fracture, Cardiovascular, Medical Conditions, Renal Stone, CO2 Exposure, and Pharmacology.

Mary Van Baalen↗
NASA NTRS2024

Alignment of NASA’s Human System Risks with Technological Capability Gaps to Enable Integrated Research and Technology Development Strategic Planning

BACKGROUND: Radiation, reduced gravity, distance from earth, isolation and confinement, and habitation within artificially created and controlled life support environments are hazards that present risk to human space explorers. NASA’s Human System Risk Board (HSRB) maintains a set of twenty-nine different Human System Risks with subject matter experts from across the agency providing regular updates to the estimated likelihood and consequence associated with each risk. The Human Research Program (HRP) has historically used these risk classifications as a primary basis for identifying and prioritizing human research investments aimed at characterizing and/or mitigating the respective human system risks. In many cases, technology development is required to mature and validate risk mitigation strategies, however, NASA’s primary technology development programs have not typically used Human System Risks as a basis for strategic planning. A primary function of the Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS) – Crew Health and Performance (CHP) System Capability Leadership Team (SCLT) is to continually identify, review, and update technological capability gaps and to establish and oversee multiyear strategic roadmaps aimed at guiding NASA’s technology development priorities in these areas. These roadmaps are intended to be agency-wide and independent of any program, directorate, or other organization within NASA. DESCRIPTION: The SCLT and HRP collaborated to establish a set of Human System Capability Gaps, which establish a formal linkage between the capability gaps used to prioritize investments across much of NASA, and the Human System Risks that are primarily used to inform and prioritize human research. This set of twenty-eight gaps was developed by subject matter experts, and each gap mapped to the primary associated Human System Risks. The gaps and risk mapping were then reviewed and approved via the HSRB, thereby formally aligning the research-focused Human System Risks with the technology-focused capability gaps. DISCUSSION: This effort has enabled development of integrated roadmaps and budget coordination with research and technology development activities that are formally linked to agency-recognized capability gaps and Human System Risks. Close and ongoing coordination between the SCLT, HRP, Mars Campaign Office, and the Health & Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) is essential to ensure alignment and prioritization of CHP-related research and technology development to enable NASA’s future exploration missions.

Andrew F J Abercromby↗
NASA NTRS2015

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗
NASA NTRS2016

Humans vs Hardware: The Unique World of NASA Human System Risk Assessment

Understanding spaceflight risks to crew health and performance is a crucial aspect of preparing for exploration missions in the future. The research activities of the Human Research Program (HRP) provide substantial evidence to support most risk reduction work. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), acting on behalf of the Office of Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO), assesses these risks and assigns likelihood and consequence ratings to track progress. Unfortunately, many traditional approaches in risk assessment such as those used in the engineering aspects of spaceflight are difficult to apply to human system risks. This presentation discusses the unique aspects of risk assessment from the human system risk perspective and how these limitations are accommodated and addressed in order to ensure that reasonable inputs are provided to support the OCHMO's overall risk posture for manned exploration missions.

Anton, W.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Integrating Spaceflight Human System Risk Research

NASA is working to increase the likelihoods of human health and performance success during exploration missions, and subsequent crew long-term health. To manage the risks in achieving these goals, a system modeled after a Continuous Risk Management framework is in place. "Human System Risks" (Risks) have been identified, and approximately 30 are being actively addressed by NASA's Human Research Program (HRP). Research plans for each of HRP's Risks have been developed and are being executed. Ties between the research efforts supporting each Risk have been identified, however, this has been in an ad hoc fashion. There is growing recognition that solutions developed to address the full set of Risks covering medical, physiological, behavioral, vehicle, and organizational aspects of the exploration missions must be integrated across Risks and disciplines. We will discuss how a framework of factors influencing human health and performance in space is being applied as the backbone for bringing together sometimes disparate information relevant to the individual Risks. The resulting interrelated information is allowing us to identify and visualize connections between Risks and research efforts in a systematic and standardized way. We will discuss the applications of the visualizations and insights to research planning, solicitation, and decision-making processes.

Mindock, J.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Integrating Spaceflight Human System Risk Research

NASA is working to increase the likelihood of human health and performance success during exploration missions as well as to maintain the subsequent long-term health of the crew. To manage the risks in achieving these goals, a system modelled after a Continuous Risk Management framework is in place. "Human System Risks" (Risks) have been identified, and approximately 30 are being actively addressed by NASA's Human Research Program (HRP). Research plans for each of HRP's Risks have been developed and are being executed. Inter-disciplinary ties between the research efforts supporting each Risk have been identified; however, efforts to identify and benefit from these connections have been mostly ad hoc. There is growing recognition that solutions developed to address the full set of Risks covering medical, physiological, behavioural, vehicle, and organizational aspects of exploration missions must be integrated across Risks and disciplines. This paper discusses how a framework of factors influencing human health and performance in space is being applied as the backbone for bringing together sometimes disparate information relevant to the individual Risks. The resulting interrelated information enables identification and visualization of connections between Risks and research efforts in a systematic and standardized manner. This paper also discusses the applications of the visualizations and insights into research planning, solicitation, and decision-making processes.

Mindock, Jennifer↗
NASA NTRS2015

Addressing Human System Risks to Future Space Exploration

NASA is contemplating future human exploration missions to destinations beyond low Earth orbit, including the Moon, deep-space asteroids, and Mars. While we have learned much about protecting crew health and performance during orbital space flight over the past half-century, the challenges of these future missions far exceed those within our current experience base. To ensure success in these missions, we have developed a Human System Risk Board (HSRB) to identify, quantify, and develop mitigation plans for the extraordinary risks associated with each potential mission scenario. The HSRB comprises research, technology, and operations experts in medicine, physiology, psychology, human factors, radiation, toxicology, microbiology, pharmacology, and food sciences. Methods: Owing to the wide range of potential mission characteristics, we first identified the hazards to human health and performance common to all exploration missions: altered gravity, isolation/confinement, increased radiation, distance from Earth, and hostile/closed environment. Each hazard leads to a set of risks to crew health and/or performance. For example the radiation hazard leads to risks of acute radiation syndrome, central nervous system dysfunction, soft tissue degeneration, and carcinogenesis. Some of these risks (e.g., acute radiation syndrome) could affect crew health or performance during the mission, while others (e.g., carcinogenesis) would more likely affect the crewmember well after the mission ends. We next defined a set of design reference missions (DRM) that would span the range of exploration missions currently under consideration. In addition to standard (6-month) and long-duration (1-year) missions in low Earth orbit (LEO), these DRM include deep space sortie missions of 1 month duration, lunar orbital and landing missions of 1 year duration, deep space journey and asteroid landing missions of 1 year duration, and Mars orbital and landing missions of 3 years duration. We then assessed the likelihood and consequences of each risk against each DRM, using three levels of likelihood (Low: less than or equal to 0.1%; Medium: 0.1%–1.0%; High: greater than or equal to 1.0%) and four levels of consequence ranging from Very Low (temporary or insignificant) to High (death, loss of mission, or significant reduction to length or quality of life). Quantitative evidence from clinical, operational, and research sources were used whenever available. Qualitative evidence was used when quantitative evidence was unavailable. Expert opinion was used whenever insufficient evidence was available. Results: A set of 30 risks emerged that will require further mitigation efforts before being accepted by the Agency. The likelihood by consequence risk assessment process provided a means of prioritizing among the risks identified. For each of the high priority risks, a plan was developed to perform research, technology, or standards development thought necessary to provide suitable reduction of likelihood or consequence to allow agency acceptance. Conclusion: The HSRB process has successfully identified a complete set of risks to human space travelers on planned exploration missions based on the best evidence available today. Risk mitigation plans have been established for the highest priority risks. Each risk will be reassessed annually to track the progress of our risk mitigation efforts.

Paloski, W. H.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Characterization of Evidence for Human System Risk Assessment

Understanding the kinds of evidence available and using the best evidence to answer a question is critical to evidenced-based decision-making, and it requires synthesis of evidence from a variety of sources. Categorization of human system risks in spaceflight, in particular, focuses on how well the integration and interpretation of all available evidence informs the risk statement that describes the relationship between spaceflight hazards and an outcome of interest. A mature understanding and categorization of these risks requires: 1) sufficient characterization of risk, 2) sufficient knowledge to determine an acceptable level of risk (i.e., a standard), 3) development of mitigations to meet the acceptable level of risk, and 4) identification of factors affecting generalizability of the evidence to different design reference missions. In the medical research community, evidence is often ranked by increasing confidence in findings gleaned from observational and experimental research (e.g., "levels of evidence"). However, an approach based solely on aspects of experimental design is problematic in assessing human system risks for spaceflight. For spaceflight, the unique challenges and opportunities include: (1) The independent variables in most evidence are the hazards of spaceflight, such as space radiation or low gravity, which cannot be entirely duplicated in terrestrial (Earth-based) analogs, (2) Evidence is drawn from multiple sources including medical and mission operations, Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health (LSAH), spaceflight research (LSDA), and relevant environmental & terrestrial databases, (3) Risk metrics based primarily on LSAH data are typically derived from available prevalence or incidence data, which may limit rigorous interpretation, (4) The timeframe for obtaining adequate spaceflight sample size (n) is very long, given the small population, (5) Randomized controlled trials are unattainable in spaceflight, (6) Collection of personal and environmental data on the astronaut population may create opportunities for advanced analytics and human-environment modeling that goes beyond that achieved in isolated experimental designs; and (7) Translation of relevant research to operations is a complex, transdisciplinary enterprise in which the approach must apply across the physical, biological, behavioral, and social sciences. The approach to synthesizing evidence must address both source and fidelity of data, and reflect the most general attributes of quality of evidence in science and engineering: reliability and validity. The authors are developing a two-factor approach which includes the various kinds of evidence required to understand risks and for the integrated interpretation of all evidence that is essential to develop standards and countermeasures. A unified framework for aggregating and assessing different kinds of evidence provides a consistent, traceable, evidence-based decision-making process to translate research to operations in an environment where engineers, scientists, physicians, and managers all engage in analyzing the trade space of vehicle design, standards, requirements and solutions for spaceflight.

Steinberg, S. L.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Enhancing Interdisciplinary Human System Risk Research Through Modeling and Network Approaches

NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) supports research to reduce human health and performance risks inherent in future human space exploration missions. Understanding risk outcomes and contributing factors in an integrated manner allows HRP research to support development of efficient and effective mitigations from cross‐disciplinary perspectives, and to enable resilient human and engineered systems for spaceflight. The purpose of this work is to support scientific collaborations and research portfolio management by utilizing modeling for analysis and visualization of current and potential future interdisciplinary efforts.

Mindock, Jennifer↗
NASA NTRS2009

Human System Risk Management - Tools of our Trade

The risk of infectious disease to select individuals has historically been difficult to predict in either spaceflight or on Earth with health care efforts relying on broad-based prevention and post-infection treatment. Over the past 10 years, quantitative microbial risk assessment evaluations have evolved to formalize the assessment process and quantify the risk. This process of hazard identification, exposure assessment, dose-response assessment, and risk characterization has been applied by the water and food safety industries to address the public health impacts associated with the occurrence of and human exposure to pathogens in water and food for the development of preventive strategies for microbial disease. NASA is currently investigating the feasibility of using these techniques to better understand the risks to astronauts and refine their microbiological requirements. To assess these techniques, NASA began an evaluation of the potable water system on the International Space Station to determine how the microbial risk from water consumption during flight differed from terrestrial sources, such as municipal water systems. The ultimate goal of this work is to optimize microbial requirements which would minimize unnecessary cargo and use of crew time, while still protecting the health of the crew. Successful demonstration of this risk assessment framework with the water system holds the potential to maximize the use of available resources during spaceflight missions and facilitate investigations into the evaluation of other routes of infection, such as through the spaceflight foods system.

Ott, C. Mark↗