Assessing the Nuclear Terrorist Threat: Indexing Illicit Trafficking and Nuclear Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Proctor, Kimberly↗
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PNNL Strategic Goods Testbed: A Data Library for Illicit Nuclear Trafficking
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has put significant effort into nonproliferation activities as an institution, both in terms of the classical nuclear material focused approach and in the examination of other strategic goods necessary to implement a nuclear program. To assist in these efforts, several projects in the Analysis in Motion (AIM) and Signature Discovery (SDI) Initiatives at PNNL are developing machine learning methodology for human-computer interaction in real time environments to assist analysts in this domain. All of these technical projects require access to data – whether it is in terms of detector data, shipping records, financial information, company relations, or other communications. The first question that mathematical and computational researchers come up with when asked to build analyst assist or automated tools is “What does the data look like? ” They become frustrated when basic questions like this can not be easily answered and this can have the effect of pushing researchers away from the nuclear trafficking domain, especially in strategic commodity and export control areas where data sets can not easily be generated through standard experimental techniques. For small projects that are building a proof of concept for their methodology, obtaining this data can be arduous and expensive. To relieve the burden of data collection from these projects and grow a lab-wide capability, the Strategic Goods Testbed Team has taken over data collection and placed subscriptions and access to flat data files in a centralized location so that all projects can benefit from these items. We have collected shipping data in the form of PIERS records, judicial information about export control cases, NAC data on the nuclear fuel industry, and financial data from Dun and Bradstreet and our data sets are continuing to expand. With a single access agreement, researchers in data-mining and other fields can utilize all of the records that have been downloaded, make requests through subscription services, and interact with other researchers through our interface. Our testbed team provides more than a simply static repository by working with researchers to refine their data needs and insure data quality as well as quantity. We are currently working with laboratory and initiative specific management to examine effective ways for continuing data growth and sustainability.
data capability↗
State of practice and emerging application of analytical techniques of nuclear forensic analysis: highlights from the 4th Collaborative Materials Exercise of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG)
Founded in 1996 upon the initiative of the “Group of 8” governments (G8), the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) is an ad hoc organization of official nuclear forensics practitioners (scientists, law enforcement, and regulators) that can be called upon to provide technical assistance to the global community in the event of a seizure of nuclear or radiological materials. The ITWG is supported by and is affiliated with roughly 40 countries and international partner organizations including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), EURATOM, INTERPOL, EUROPOL, and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). Besides providing a network of nuclear forensics laboratories that are able to assist law enforcement during a nuclear smuggling event, the ITWG is also committed to the advancement of the science of nuclear forensic analysis, largely through participation in periodic table top and Collaborative Materials Exercises (CMXs). Exercise scenarios use “real world” samples with realistic forensics investigation time constraints and reporting requirements. These exercises are designed to promote best practices in the field and test, evaluate, and improve new technical capabilities, methods and techniques in order to advance the science of nuclear forensics. The ITWG recently completed its fourth CMX in the 20 year history of the organization. This was also the largest materials exercise to date, with participating laboratories from 16 countries or organizations. Three samples of low enriched uranium were shipped to these laboratories as part of an illicit trafficking scenario, for which each laboratory was asked to conduct nuclear forensic analyses in support of a fictitious criminal investigation. An objective review of the State Of Practice and Art of international nuclear forensic analysis based upon the outcome of this most recent exercise is provided.
ITWG CMX-4↗
SIGNATURES OF ILLICIT NUCLEAR PROCUREMENT NETWORKS: AN OVERVIEW OF PRELIMINARY APPROACHES AND RESULTS
The illicit trafficking of strategic nuclear commodities (defined here as the goods needed for a covert nuclear program excluding special nuclear materials) poses a significant challenge to the international nuclear nonproliferation community. Export control regulations, both domestically and internationally, seek to inhibit the spread of strategic nuclear commodities by restricting their sale to parties that may use them for nefarious purposes. However, export controls alone are not sufficient for preventing the illicit transfer of strategic nuclear goods. There are two major pitfalls to relying solely on export control regulations for the deterrence of proliferation of strategic goods. First, export control enforcement today relies heavily on the honesty and willingness of participants to adhere to the legal framework already in place. Secondly, current practices focus on the evaluation of single records which allow for the necessary goods to be purchased separately and hidden within the thousands of legitimate commerce transactions that occur each day, disregarding strategic information regarding several purchases. Our research presents two preliminary data-centric approaches for investigating procurement networks of strategic nuclear commodities. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been putting significant effort into nonproliferation activities as an institution, both in terms of the classical nuclear material focused approach and in the examination of other strategic goods necessary to implement a nuclear program. In particular, the PNNL Signature Discovery Initiative (SDI) has codified several scientific methodologies for the detection, characterization, and prediction of signatures that are indicative of a phenomenon of interest. The methodologies and tools developed under SDI have already been applied successfully to problems in bio-forensics, cyber security and power grid balancing efforts and they have now made the nonproliferation of strategic goods into a challenge problem for testing their methodology and tools. As a first step towards the detection and characterization of illicit procurement networks, our research examines procurement networks as defined by a system of entities (people or companies) that enter into transactions of specific items with one another. Once we have defined such networks, we are interested in answering questions about the behavior and characterization of such networks. The questions we wish to answer regarding procurement networks are, first, “Can we detect networks within large, noisy datasets?” and second, “To what extent can we compare multiple networks and identify their similarities?” As procurement networks can be naturally viewed as a graph, we have employed several graph analytic tools to aid in these tasks. In particular, Graphscape, an SDI tool, uses a novel method to approximate edit distance, a graph distance measure based on the number of changes needed to transform one graph into another, in order to measure how similar two given graphs are to each other. Given a set of graphs where vertices represent companies and edges represent a shipment from company A to company B, we can calculate an all-for-all comparison of graphs. In this way, we are able to determine which graphs are most similar, and which require more changes to transform one into the other. The set of graphs to be compared can be further specialized to provide more insight, e.g., using different time periods to explore events in a company life cycle.
graph analysis↗
Characterization of a boron-loaded deuterated liquid scintillator for fast and thermal neutron detection
The preparation and characterization of novel boron-loaded deuterated liquid scintillators (BLDLS) are presented for the first time to investigate the performance of a detector sensitive to both fast and thermal neutrons intended for future neutron spectroscopy measurements. Three deuterated toluene-based scintillation cocktails were produced, one without boron, one loaded with ortho-carborane (natural boron isotopic abundance), and one with 96 wt% 10B enriched ortho-carborane. General optical and material properties were analyzed to include the composition, density, index of refraction, photoluminescence emission spectra, and absorbance spectra in addition to the relative light yield, resolution, relative efficiency, and pulse-shape-discrimination performance for all three scintillators and a hydrogen-based EJ-309 scintillator to evaluate the effects of boron loading in comparison with a common commercially-available scintillator and feasibility for future neutron spectroscopy measurements. Finally, the detection of shielded neutron sources was explored to capitalize on the 10B thermal neutron capture reaction. The results showed loading the scintillators with boron deteriorated the PSD performance slightly compared to the unloaded deuterated scintillator and resulted in a relative light yield loss of 26% and 41% for the 10B enriched and natural boron BLDLS, respectively. Lastly, the BLDLS have a higher relative detection efficiency than the unloaded deuterated scintillator for shielded neutron sources, based on total count rate, a desirable characteristic for missions related to finding and characterizing illicitly-trafficked special nuclear material.
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Performance evaluation of neutron noise analysis in detecting special nuclear materials
Reliable and rapid inspection techniques play a vital role in preventing illicit trafficking of special nuclear materials. Active interrogation systems using neutrons produced by portable, high-flux deuterium-deuterium or deuterium-tritium neutron generators are being actively developed as a secondary scanning tool for this purpose. In this study, a neutron noise analysis-based approach for detecting unshielded and shielded special nuclear materials by using a pulsed deuterium-tritium neutron generator was evaluated. Here, this approach analyzes the fluctuation of neutron counts. Its performance was quantified with regard to time-to-detection to achieve a minimum probability of detection of 99% and a probability of false alarm of less than 1% considering various amounts of special nuclear materials and different shielding configurations. It was demonstrated that this approach could detect 17 uranium slugs in 5 s given a neutron generator yield of 8.1 × 10 7 n/s. These slugs could be detected within a reasonable time frame (200 s) when they were shielded by 10.16 cm of high-density polyethylene. The results obtained using the neutron noise analysis approach were compared with those obtained using the commonly used differential die-away analysis technique, a sensitive technique for detecting the presence of fissile materials by utilizing the prompt fission neutrons produced when the source neutrons from a neutron generator are completely diminished. For example, the time to detect 2 unshielded uranium slugs was 2.1 s when using the differential die-away analysis technique; it increased to 93 s for the neutron noise analysis approach. Although the noise analysis-based approach exhibits an overall performance which is not as good as that of differential die-away, neutron noise provides an alternative method for effective detection of special nuclear materials.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Second Line of Defense Program, Secondary Screening Operations Field Data Collection
Secondary screening is a key component of the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program’s capability to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. The primary detection system—the radiation portal monitor—makes alarm decisions based on gross counts of gamma and neutron radiation; it is able to provide little other information regarding what may have caused an elevated radiation level. Conducting a proper secondary screening with an instrument capable of identifying radioisotopes is the only way to determine what radioactive material is present—most importantly if it is a threat material. Only by knowing the radioactive material can a prudent decision be made with regard to disposition and response—and can the mistaken release of a threat be avoided.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Second Line of Defense Program Radioactive Source Information and Policy Guide. Revision 1.2
The Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program works with partner countries to enhance their capabilities in deterring, detecting, and interdicting the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials through international borders by providing radiation detection equipment and related training. The program supports sustainability by working with partner countries to establish the functional and operational requirements for people, processes, and equipment that promote proficient performance throughout the lifetime of the radiation detection system.
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Developing a simulation tool for evaluating in-motion detector systems [Slides]
In order to combat the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, Radiation Detection Systems (RDS) are used to scan pedestrians, vehicles, cargo, luggage, and other conveyances. Many of these systems are used in an “in-motion” configuration where the detector or target are moving past the other. Current modeling and simulation tools lack the ability to produce time-series detector response profiles for in-motion applications.
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Response of the REWARD detection system to the presence of a Radiological Dispersal Device
In recent years an increased international concern has emerged about the radiological and nuclear (RN) threats associated with the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials that could be potentially used for terrorist attacks. The objective of the REWARD (Real Time Wide Area Radiation Surveillance System) project, co-funded by the European Union 7. Framework Programme Security, consisted in building a mobile system for real time, wide area radiation surveillance, using a CdZnTe detector for gamma radiation and a neutron detector based on novel silicon technologies. The sensing unit includes a GPS system and a wireless communication interface to send the data remotely to a monitoring base station, where it will be analyzed in real time and correlated with historical data from the tag location, in order to generate an alarm when an abnormal situation is detected. Due to its portability and accuracy, the system will be extremely useful in many different scenarios such as nuclear terrorism, lost radioactive sources, radioactive contamination or nuclear accidents. This paper shortly introduces the REWARD detection system, depicts some terrorist threat scenarios involving radioactive sources and special nuclear materials and summarizes the simulation work undertaken during the past three years in the framework of the REWARD project. The main objective consisted in making predictions regarding the behavior of the REWARD system in the presence of a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD), one of the reference scenarios foreseen for REWARD, using the Monte Carlo simulation program MCNP6. The reference scenario is characterized in detail, from the i) radiological protection, ii) radiation detection requirements and iii) communications points of view. Experimental tests were performed at the Fire Brigades Facilities in Rome and at the Naples Fire Brigades, and the results, which validate the simulation work, are presented and analyzed. The response of the REWARD detection system to the presence of an RDD is predicted and discussed. (authors)
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Financial incentives for reducing proliferation risks
This article submitted for publication to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists explains the possible financial incentives for financial institutions and large integrators to reduce nuclear proliferation risks by including anti-proliferation measures in their due diligence and requiring their suppliers to meet heightened compliance standards. Because manufacturers of dual-use nuclear goods are diverse and numerous outreach is difficult. However, financial institutions and large integrators work with nearly all dual-use manufacturers, making financial institutions and integrators well-positioned to increase awareness of proliferation and trafficking risks throughout the nuclear supply chain
anti-proliferation↗
Oxygen stable isotopes in the nuclear fuel cycle: Assessment of the potential for determining the fabrication and provenance history of anhydrous and hydrous uranium oxides
Determining the origin and history of interdicted nuclear materials is a central challenge in nuclear forensics. The oxygen stable isotope composition of uranium oxide compounds has emerged as a promising forensic signature, attracting increasing attention since the early 2000s. This review examines analytical techniques for measuring oxygen isotope compositions in uranium oxides and evaluates how the nuclear fuel production cycle introduces or modifies these isotopic signatures. The potential for forensic geolocation is explored through workflows that calibrate the relationship between environmental water oxygen isotopes and those found in uranium oxides. Key strengths and limitations of this approach are assessed, including gaps in knowledge related to isotope fractionation during specific stages of the fuel cycle, and processing facility water inputs. The importance of proper sample handling and storage under inert atmospheres, as well as a deeper understanding of both intra-sample oxygen isotope heterogeneity, and hydrous uranium oxide phase formation, is highlighted for improving the reliability of forensic interpretations. In conclusion, the development of uranium oxide standards with well-characterized δ 18 O values and international collaboration toward consensus on their use are identified as essential steps for advancing the field.
Attribution↗
Development of an optical sensor for measuring opacity changes in polyvinyl toluene scintillators
Polyvinyl toluene (PVT) based detectors are used in radiation portal monitors (RPMs) worldwide to detect the trafficking of illicit nuclear material. PVT scintillators, which are normally optically clear, have been observed to suffer internal fogging throughout their volume due to prolonged exposure to varying environmental conditions. These changes could lead to reduced performance for RPMs that utilize plastic scintillators. In this research, a proof of concept system, consisting of different color light emitting diodes (LEDs) and a single optical sensor (OS), were used to examine the change in light transmission through a PVT scintillator. This Optical Monitoring System (OMS), coupled with an environmentally exposed PVT detector, was tested in an environmental chamber where it was subjected to changes in temperature and humidity ranging from 55 °C at 100% relative humidity to –20 °C at 40% relative humidity. At temperatures below 10 °C, light transmission was reduced by 81% ± 8% for blue LEDs, 84% ± 5% for yellow LEDs, and 49% ± 4% for green LEDs. Similar reductions in detected light were not recorded when the OMS was tested with only air between the LEDs and OS. Therefore, the significant reductions in transmitted light were attributed to changes occurring within the PVT scintillator. These results indicate that a significant reduction in PVT opacity occurs due to wide environmental changes. A device such as the OMS could be used to track these changes and provide users an early indication that a portal monitor is suffering from reduced performance.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Automated Detection of Anomalous Shipping Manifests to Identify Illicit Trade
We describe an approach to analyzing trade data which uses clustering to detect similarities across shipping manifest records, classification to evaluate clustering results and categorize new unseen shipping data records, and visual analytics to provide to support situation awareness in dynamic decision making to monitor and warn against the movement of radiological threat materials through search, analysis and forecasting capabilities. The evaluation of clustering results through classification and systematic inspection of the clusters show the clusters have strong semantic cohesion and offer novel ways to detect transactions related to nuclear smuggling.
classification↗
Nuclear Forensics: Identification and Characterization of Materials Outside of Regulatory Control [Slides]
Nuclear forensics is the collection and analysis of nuclear or radiological material to support investigations into the diversion, trafficking, or illicit activities involving materials. The goal is to link nuclear or radioactive material to people, processes, events and/or locations.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Nuclear Forensics: Science and Policy for a Safer World [Slides]
Nuclear forensics is the collection and analysis of nuclear or radiological material to support investigations into the diversion, trafficking, or illicit activities involving materials.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Nuclear Forensics: Identification and Characterization of Materials Outside of Regulatory Control [Slides]
Nuclear forensics is the collection and analysis of nuclear or radiological material to support investigations into the diversion, trafficking, or illicit activities involving materials. The goal is to link nuclear or radioactive material to people, processes, events and/or locations.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
CENC PSN VOID FY20 Report
Maritime trade accounts for approximately 80 percent of international commerce. The high volume of vessels traversing domestic and international ports makes port areas prime targets for terrorism as well as illegal trafficking of drugs and arms (conventional or nuclear). Port security is therefore a worldwide concern affecting global economies, freedom of movement, and national security. However, extensive port monitoring is inherently complex and time consuming — making it truly viable only via an automated framework that can detect potential illicit activity and alert authorities in a timely manner. The development of image processing algorithms for this purpose requires access to large, labeled datasets that cover the breadth of targets of interest as well as the environments that they are observed within. Curated and labeled datasets of this nature are of enormous value to Sandia's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and National Security Program portfolios, as well as to Sandia's machine learning/automatic target recognition (ML/ATR) algorithm development and R&D communities. The goal of this project is to create a commercial satellite imagery dataset of labeled maritime vessels in port areas to support the development of ML/ATR algorithms for port security nonproliferation purposes. This dataset — Port Security Nonproliferation Vessel Overhead Imagery Dataset (PSN VOID) — has the potential to support a variety of other ancillary missions, such as maritime domain awareness, domestic and international security, drug interdiction, and weapons trafficking.
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