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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2011

Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

This report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclear weapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The work of the US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whether - in a biological weapons verification regime - the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the genetic information associated with the various pathogens. In addition, it has been determined that a suitable information barrier could be applied to this technology when the verification regime has been defined. Finally, the report posits a path forward for additional development of information barriers in a biological weapons verification regime. This path forward has shown that a new analysis approach coined as Information Loss Analysis might need to be pursued so that a numerical understanding of how information can be lost in specific measurement systems can be achieved.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2012

The Functional Requirements and Design Basis for Information Barriers

This report summarizes the results of the Information Barrier Working Group workshop held at Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque, NM, February 2-4, 1999. This workshop was convened to establish the functional requirements associated with warhead radiation signature information barriers, to identify the major design elements of any such system or approach, and to identify a design basis for each of these major elements. Such information forms the general design basis to be used in designing, fabricating, and evaluating the complete integrated systems developed for specific purposes.

Fuller, James L.↗
DOE OSTI2017

Scenarios and Spectra Set for CTBT OSI Information Barrier Testing

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty limits radiation measurements during an on-site inspection to those isotopes the States Parties have agreed are appropriate for the purpose of determining if a nuclear explosion has occurred without revealing irrelevant confidential information. To accomplish this, the radiation detectors used will need to have information barriers that are proven to function reliably over the wide range of possible inspection uses and scenarios. In order to provide a basis set of spectra for testing proposed information barrier systems, PNNL and LLNL defined a set of treaty-compliant and non-compliant scenarios and then independently developed a set of spectra relevant to those scenarios. Real spectra were utilized to the extent possible, but often computer simulations were necessary. These spectra will next be used to assess the performance of an INL information barrier system.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

Fission Meter Information Barrier Attribute Measurement System - NA-243 FNI/UKC FY2017 Task 1-2 Report

An SNM attribute Information Barrier (IB) system was developed for a 2011 US/UK Exercise. The system was modified and extensively tested in a 2013-2014 US-UK Measurement Campaign. This work demonstrated rapid deployment of an IB system for potential treaty use. The system utilizes an Ortec Fission Meter neutron multiplicity counter and custom computer code. The system demonstrates a proof-of-principle automated Pu-240 mass determination with an information barrier. After a software start command is issued, the system automatically acquires and downloads data, performs an analysis, and displays the results. This system conveys the results of a Pu mass threshold measurements in a way the does not reveal sensitive information. In full IB mode, only the pass/fail result is displayed as a “Mass <= Threshold Amount” or “Mass >= Threshold Amount” as shown in Figure 4. This can easily be adapted to a red/green “lights” display similar to the Detective IB system for Pu isotopics as shown in Figure 6. In test mode, more detailed information is displayed. The code can also read in, analyze, and display results from previously acquired or simulated data. Because the equipment is commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), the system demonstrates a low-cost short-lead-time technology for treaty SNM attribute measurements. A deployed system will likely require integration of additional authentication and tamper-indicating technologies. This will be discussed for the project in this and future progress reports.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2016

Low-resolution gamma-ray spectrometry for an information barrier based on a multi-criteria template-matching approach

Gamma-ray spectrometry has been successfully employed to identify unique items containing special nuclear materials. Template information barriers have been developed in the past to confirm items as warheads by comparing their gamma signature to the signature of true warheads. Their development has, however, not been fully transparent, and they may not be sensitive to some relevant evasion scenarios. Here, we develop a fully open template information barrier concept, based on low-resolution measurements, which, by design, reduces the extent of revealed sensitive information. The concept is based on three signatures of an item to be compared to a recorded template. The similarity of the spectrum is assessed by a modification of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test to confirm the isotopic composition. The total gamma count rate must agree with the template as a measure of the projected surface of the object. In order to detect the diversion of fissile material from the interior of an item, a polyethylene mask is placed in front of the detector. Neutrons from spontaneous and induced fission events in the item produce 2.223 MeV gamma rays from neutron capture by hydrogen-1 in the mask. This peak is detected and its intensity scales with the item's fissile mass. This analysis is based on MCNP Monte Carlo simulations of various plutonium configurations suggests that this concept can distinguish a valid item from a variety of invalid ones. The concept intentionally avoids any assumptions about specific spectral features, such as looking for specific gamma peaks of specific isotopes, thereby facilitating a fully unclassified discussion. Finally, by making all aspects public and allowing interested participants to contribute to the development and benchmarking, we enable a more open and inclusive discourse on this matter.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2017

Fission Meter Information Barrier Attribute Measurement System: Task 1 Report: Document existing Fission Meter neutron IB system

An SNM attribute Information Barrier (IB) system was developed for a 2011 US/UK Exercise. The system was modified and extensively tested in a 2013-2014 US-UK Measurement Campaign. This work demonstrated rapid deployment of an IB system for potential treaty use. The system utilizes an Ortec Fission Meter neutron multiplicity counter and custom computer code. The system demonstrates a proof-of-principle automated Pu-240 mass determination with an information barrier. After a software start command is issued, the system automatically acquires and downloads data, performs an analysis, and displays the results. This system conveys the results of a Pu mass threshold measurements in a way the does not reveal sensitive information. In full IB mode, only red/green ‘lights’ are displayed in the software. In test mode, more detailed information is displayed. The code can also read in, analyze, and display results from previously acquired or simulated data. Because the equipment is commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), the system demonstrates a low-cost short-lead-time technology for treaty SNM attribute measurements. A deployed system will likely require integration of additional authentication and tamper-indicating technologies. This will be discussed for the project in this and future progress reports.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2018

Fission Meter Information Barrier Attribute Measurement System: FY2018 Office of Nuclear Verification FNI/UKC Task 2 Documentation Package

The ORTEC Fission Meter is a neutron multiplicity detector developed by Oak Ridge, TN based Advanced Measurement Technology (AMETEK), ORTEC Division. Data analysis techniques developed for neutron multiplicity detectors allows determination of mass and multiplication of unknown objects of special nuclear material (SNM). This can be done based on the physics of fission neutrons with little or no a priori information about the object. The articulating panel design and “5-Mode Counter” neutron multiplicity data-acquisition hardware were licensed to ORTEC by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 2005 based on a 2004 prototype. The “5-Mode Counter” development started in 2000 in order to produce a compact neutron multiplicity file containing the full neutron count timing distribution. Development of this hardware along with the prototype detector design continued through 2004. Photographs of the Fission Meter are shown in Figure 1. In 2011, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory developed a software-based information barrier (IB) for the Fission Meter to control transmission of some for potential use in treaty applications. This IB was extended over the next several years to include improvements to the algorithms, more automated processing, and list mode data acquisition and processing. This report provides design and operational documentation for the Fission Meter and the Information Barrier additions.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Developing an intrinsically secure information barrier for arms control verification through machine learning

Near-term solutions are needed to allow for flexible engagement in future nuclear arms control discussions. This project developed a method for implementing an information barrier (IB) on commercial systems, shortening the research and development lifecycle for warhead verification technologies while offering improved and inherently flexible capabilities. The crux of the verification challenge remains the difficulty in developing an authenticatable IB which prevents sensitive host country information from inadvertent transmission to an inspector. Many concepts for IB’s rely on dedicated “trusted” processor modules developed with dedicated custom radiation detection systems and associated algorithms. Without a priori knowledge of the treaty item, the parameter space for measurements can be nearly infinite and robustness against spoofing without the ability to view sensitive data is key. This project has produced an unclassified framework capable of ingesting data from common gamma detectors and identifying the presence of weapons grade nuclear material at over 90% accuracy.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2017

Information barrier experimental: Toward a trusted and open-source computing platform for nuclear warhead verification

Trusted measurement systems are critical for the verification of future arms-control treaties that involve confirming the authenticity of nuclear warheads on the basis of their radiation signatures. Several research efforts have produced prototype systems, but their designs are typically not published in detail, making it difficult to enable trust in these devices. The Information Barrier Experimental (IBX) is a new prototype built around the Red Pitaya computing platform using passive gamma spectroscopy. It is the first such platform designed to help a broad research community study vulnerabilities and define the required specifications for a common, trusted inspection system. It is low-cost, simple to assemble, and enables comprehensive hardware and software authentication studies. The device follows a digital data acquisition approach, which significantly reduces the number of components between scintillator and spectrum output. Finally, measurements demonstrate that this approach is technically feasible and produces excellent measurement results.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗