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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Radionuclide measurements of the international monitoring system

The International Monitoring System (IMS) is a unique global network of sensors, tuned to measure various phenomenology, with the common goal of detecting a nuclear explosion anywhere in the world. One component of this network collects measurements of radioactive particulates and gases (collectively known as radionuclides) present in the atmosphere; through this, compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) can be verified. The radionuclide sub-network consists of 120 sensors across 80 locations, supported by 16 measurement laboratories. All radionuclide stations make use of a form of γ-ray spectroscopy to measure radionuclides from samples; this remains largely unchanged since the network was first established 25 years ago. Advances in sampling and spectroscopy systems can yield improvements to the sensitivity of the network to detect a nuclear explosion. This paper summarises the status of the IMS radionuclide network, the current suite of technology used and reviews new technology that could enhance future iterations, potentially improving the verification power of the IMS.

Goodwin, Matthew A.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Modeling of fission and activation products in molten salt reactors and their potential impact on the radionuclide monitoring stations of the International Monitoring System

Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs) are one of six Generation IV reactor designs currently under development around the world. Because of the unique operating conditions of MSRs, which include molten fuel and the continuous removal of gaseous fission products during operation, work was performed to analyze the potential impact of emissions on the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Simulations were performed to predict the production of IMS-relevant radionuclides in four MSR designs operating under two scenarios – (1) a sealed reactor with releases only during operational shutdown and (2) continuous reprocessing or sparging of the fuel salt. From these production estimates the radioxenon and radioiodine signatures were extracted and compared to three current reactor designs (PWR, BWR, RBMK). In the cases where continuous reprocessing of the fuel salt occurred both the radioxenon and radioiodine signatures are nearly indistinguishable from a nuclear explosion. Estimates were also made of the potential emission rate of radioxenon for three reactor designs and it was found that MSRs have the potential to emit radioxenon isotopes at a rate of 1015 – 8×1016 Bq/d for 133Xe if no abatement is used. An assessment was also made of activation products using a candidate fuel salt (FLiBe) mixed with corrosion products for the Thorium Molten Salt Reactor (TMSR-LF1)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Seismic Signal Detection on International Monitoring System 3-Component Stations using PhaseNet

In this report we discuss training a deep learning seismic signal detection model on 3-component stations from the International Monitoring System (IMS) using the PhaseNet architecture. Using 14 years of associated signals from the International Data Centre’s (IDC) Late Event Bulletin (LEB), we auto-curated training data consisting of signal windows containing associated arrivals, and noise windows that contain no LEB-associated signals. We trained several models using different waveform window durations (30 seconds and 100 seconds), with and without bandpass filtering. We evaluated the effectiveness of our models using associated signals from the Unconstrained Global Event Bulletin (UGEB) and found that several of our models outperformed the signal detections from the IDC’s Selected Event List 3 (SEL3) arrival table. The SEL3 bulletin evaluated on the UGEB dataset with 100-second waveform windows registered a precision and recall of .15 and .48, respectively, versus .19 and .59 for our filtered-data model. For the 30-second waveform window dataset, the SEL3 bulletin achieved a precision and recall of .31 and .47, respectively, versus .32 and .60 for our filtered-data model. Finally, our models detected signals from all source-to-receiver distances, suggesting it is feasible to use a single PhaseNet model for the IMS network.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Examining the potential for detecting simultaneous noble gas and aerosol samples in the international monitoring system radionuclide network

The purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to establish a legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) is developing the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes a global network of 80 stations to monitor for airborne radionuclides upon entry into force of the CTBT. All 80 radionuclide stations will monitor for particulate radionuclides and at least half of the stations will monitor for radioxenon. The airborne radionuclide monitoring is an important verification technology both for the detection of a radionuclide release and in the determination of whether the release event originates from a nuclear explosion as opposed to an industrial use of nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and many medical isotope production facilities release radioxenon into the atmosphere. Low levels of a few particulate isotopes, such as iodine, may also be released. Detections of multiple isotopes are useful for screening the radionuclide samples for relevance to the Treaty. This paper examines the anticipated joint detections in the IMS of noble gas and particulate isotopes from underground nuclear explosions where breaches in the underground containment vents from low levels to up to 1% of the radionuclide inventory of the resulting fission products to the atmosphere. Detection probabilities are based on 844 simulated release events spaced out at 17 release locations and one year in time. Six different release (venting) scenarios, including two fractionated scenarios, were analyzed. When ranked by detection probability, 11 particulate isotopes and one noble gas isotope ( 133 Xe) appear in the top 20 isotopes for all six release scenarios. Using the 11 particulate isotopes and the one noble gas isotope, the IMS has nearly the same detection probability as when 45 particulate and 4 noble gas isotopes are used. Thus, a limited list of relevant radionuclides may be sufficient for treaty verification purposes. The probability that at least one particulate and at least one radioxenon isotope would be detected in the IMS from the release events ranged from 0.15 to 0.86 depending on the release scenario.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Modeling of fission and activation products in molten salt reactors and their potential impact on the radionuclide monitoring stations of the International Monitoring System

Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs) are one of six Generation IV reactor designs currently under development around the world. Because of the unique operating conditions of MSRs, which include molten fuel and the continuous removal of gaseous fission products during operation, work was performed to analyze the potential impact of emissions on the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Simulations were performed to predict the production of IMS-relevant radionuclides in four MSR designs operating under two scenarios: (1) a sealed reactor with releases only during operational shutdown, and (2) continuous reprocessing or sparging of the fuel salt. From these production estimates the radioxenon and radioiodine signatures were extracted and compared to three current reactor designs (Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), BWR, RBMK). In cases where continuous reprocessing of the fuel salt occurred, both the radioxenon and radioiodine signatures were nearly indistinguishable from a nuclear explosion. Estimates were also made of the potential emission rate of radioxenon for three reactor designs and it was found that MSRs have the potential to emit radioxenon isotopes at a rate of 10^15-8×10^16 Bq/d for 133Xe if no abatement is used. An assessment was made of activation products using a candidate fuel salt (FLiBe) mixed with corrosion products for the Thorium Molten Salt Reactor (TMSR-LF1).

Johnson, Christine M.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Impacts of future nuclear power generation on the international monitoring system

Many countries are considering nuclear power as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the IAEA (IAEA, 2022) has forecasted nuclear power growth rates up to 224% of the 2021 level by 2050. Nuclear power plants release trace quantities of radioxenon, an inert gas that is also monitored under international agreements as a signature of nuclear weapons tests. To better understand how nuclear energy growth (and resulting Xe emissions) could affect this global nonproliferation architecture, we modeled daily releases of radioxenon isotopes used for nuclear explosion detection in the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe to examine the change in the number of radioxenon detections as compared to the 2021 detection levels. If a 40-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 82% for the low-power scenario to 195% for the high-power scenario, compared to the detections in 2021. If an 80-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 83% of the 2021 detection rate for the low-power scenario to 209% for the high-power scenario. Essentially no detections of 131m Xe and 133m Xe are expected. The high growth scenario could lead to a six-fold increase in 135 Xe detections, but the total number of detections is still small (on the order of 1 detection per day in the entire network).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Possible impacts of molten salt reactors on the International Monitoring System

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) are gaining support as many countries look for ways to increase power generation and replace aging nuclear energy production facilities. MSRs have inherently safe designs, are scalable in size, can burn transuranic wastes from traditional solid fuel nuclear reactors, can store excess heat in thermal reservoirs for water desalination, and can be used to produce medical isotopes as part of the real-time liquid-fuel recycling process. The ability to remove 135 Xe in real time from the fuel improves the power production in an MSR because 135 Xe is the most significant neutron-absorbing isotope generated by nuclear fission. Xenon-135, and other radioactive gases, are removed by sparging the fuel with an inert gas while the liquid fuel is recirculated from the reactor inner core through the heat exchangers. Without effective abatement technologies, large amounts of radioactive gas could be released during the sparging process. This work examines the potential impact of radioxenon releases on samplers used by the International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect nuclear explosions. Here, atmospheric transport simulations from seven hypothetical MSRs on different continents were used to evaluate the holdup time needed before release of radioxenon so IMS samplers would register few detections. Abatement technologies that retain radioxenon isotopes for at least 120 d before their release will be needed to mitigate the impacts from a molten salt breeder reactor used to replace a nuclear power plant. A holdup time of about 150 d is needed to reduce emissions to the average level of current nuclear power plants.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS2016

Life Support and Environmental Monitoring International System Maturation Team Considerations

Human exploration of the solar system is an ambitious goal. Future human missions to Mars or other planets will require the cooperation of many nations to be feasible. Exploration goals and concepts have been gathered by the International Space Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG) at a very high level, representing the overall goals and strategies of each participating space agency. The Global Exploration Roadmap published by ISECG states that international partnerships are part of what drives the mission scenarios. It states "Collaborations will be established at all levels (missions, capabilities, technologies), with various levels of interdependency among the partners." To make missions with interdependency successful, technologists and system experts need to share information early, before agencies have made concrete plans and binding agreements. This paper provides an overview of possible ways of integrating NASA, ESA, and JAXA work into a conceptual roadmap of life support and environmental monitoring capabilities for future exploration missions. Agencies may have immediate plans as well as long term goals or new ideas that are not part of official policy. But relationships between plans and capabilities may influence the strategies for the best ways to achieve partner goals. Without commitments and an organized program like the International Space Station, requirements for future missions are unclear. Experience from ISS has shown that standards and an early understanding of requirements are an important part of international partnerships. Attempting to integrate systems that were not designed together can create many problems. Several areas have been identified that could be important to discuss and understand early: units of measure, cabin CO2 levels, and the definition and description of fluids like high purity oxygen, potable water and residual biocide, and crew urine and urine pretreat. Each of the partners is exploring different kinds of technologies. Different specific parameters may important to define or explore possible ranges depending on the system concepts. Early coordination between technology developers can create new possibilities for collaboration, and provide input to determine what combined options may provide the best overall system architecture.

Anderson, Molly↗
NASA NTRS2016

Life Support and Environmental Monitoring International System Maturation Team Considerations.

Human exploration of the solar system is an ambitious goal. Future human missions to Mars or other planets will require the cooperation of many nations to be feasible. Exploration goals and concepts have been gathered by the International Space Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG) at a very high level, representing the overall goals and strategies of each participating space agency. The Global Exploration Roadmap published by ISECG states that international partnerships are part of what drives the the mission scenarios. It states "Collaborations will be established at all levels (missions, capabilities, technologies), with various levels of interdependency among the partners." To make missions with interdependency successful, technologists and system experts need to share information early, before agencies have made concrete plans and binding agreements. This paper provides an overview of possible ways of integrating NASA, ESA, and JAXA work into a conceptual roadmap of life support and environmental monitoring capabilities for future exploration missions. Agencies may have immediate plans as well as long term goals or new ideas that are not part of official policy. But relationships between plans and capabilities may influence the strategies for the best ways to achieve partner goals. Without commitments and an organized program like the International Space Station, requirements for future missions are unclear. Experience from ISS has shown that standards and an early understanding of requirements are an important part of international partnerships. Attempting to integrate systems that were not designed together can create many problems. Several areas have been identified that could be important to discuss and understand early: units of measure, cabin CO2 levels, and the definition and description of fluids like high purity oxygen, potable water and residual biocide, and crew urine and urine pretreat. Each of the partners is exploring different kinds of technologies. Different specific parameters may important to define or explore possible ranges depending on the system concepts. Early coordination between technology developers can create new possibilities for collaboration, and provide input to determine what combined options may provide the best overall system architecture.

Anderson, Molly↗
DOE OSTI2022

Summary of NDC Capacity Building Workshop and Regional Seismic Travel Time (RSTT) in combination with Data Sharing and Integration Training

The NNSA Seismic Cooperation Program (SCP) sponsored Stephen Myers (LLNL), Michael Begnaud (LANL), Brian Young (SNL) and Istvan Bondar (Research Center for Astronomy and Earth Sciences, Hungary) to serve as a presenters/trainers at the “NDC Capacity Building Workshop and Regional Seismic Travel Time (RSTT) in combination with Data Sharing and Integration Training” September 4-8 2022 in Muscat, Oman (See Appendix A for the agenda). The workshop and training (workshop from here forward) was organized by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS). The first half of the week was devoted to NDC workshop activities, and the second half was devoted to RSTT training. Fifty-five participants from 27 countries and the CTBTO-PTS attended the 5-day workshop (See Appendix B for list of participants and countries of origin). Presentations from the PTS described the International Monitoring System (IMS), International Data Centre (IDC) products, and metrics of regional data utilization. Contributed presentations from each country’s scientists included descriptions of regional and national networks, methods of data analysis, and needs for material and technical assistance. Training included an overview of the RSTT method and instruction on how to locate seismic events with the iLoc program, which utilizes RSTT travel times to reduce bias in event location estimates. Methods of seismic tomography and the need for a high-quality tomographic set, including seismological “ground truth”, were emphasized. Seismological “ground truth” or “GT” is a term that has come to mean both events with known location and events with well-characterized locations that are estimated using seismological data, typically with epicenter accuracy of 5 km or better. Notably, the instructional platform has migrated from UNIX shell scripts to Jupyter Notebooks. Jupyter Notebooks have the advantage being more visually intuitive, including display of graphics within the notebook. Each notebook includes every processing step that participants need to reproduce the entire exercise.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Projected network performance for multiple isotopes using next-generation xenon monitoring systems

Since about 2000 (Bowyer et al., 1998), radioxenon monitoring systems have been under development and testing for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Operation of the systems since then has resulted in development of a next-generation of systems that are nearly ready for operational deployment. By 2010, the need to screen out civilian sources was well known (Auer et al., 2010; Saey, 2009), and isotopic ratio approaches were soon considered (Kalinowski et al., 2014) to identify specific sources. New generation systems are expected to improve the ability to verify the absence of nuclear tests by using isotopic ratios when multiple isotopes are detected. In this work, thousands of releases were simulated to compute the global detection probability of 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe at 39 noble gas systems in the International Monitoring System (IMS) for both current and next-generation systems. Three release scenarios are defined at 1 h, 1 d, and 10 d past a 1 kt TNT equivalent 235U explosion event. Multiple cases using from one part in a million to the complete release of the xenon isotopic activity are evaluated for each scenario. Coverage maps and global integrals comparing current and next-generation monitoring systems are presented showing that next-generation noble gas systems will create measurable improvements in the IMS. The global detection probability for 133 Xe is shown to be strong in all scenarios, but only modestly improved by next-generation equipment. However, the detection probability for 131m Xe and 133m Xe increased to about 50% in different scenarios, providing a second detectable isotope for many events. As anticipated from shorter sampling intervals, the expected number of detecting samples roughly doubled and the expected number of detecting stations rose by approximately 50% for all release scenarios. Thus, it might be anticipated that future events would consist of multiple 133 Xe detections and one or more second isotope detections. In conclusion, signals of this nature should increase detection confidence, tighten release location estimates, improve rejection of civilian signals, and lessen the impacts from individual systems being offline for maintenance or repair reasons.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Abatement Case Study

Radioxenon emissions from industrial sources such as fission based medical isotope production (MIP) facilities and nuclear reactors are generally known to be well below levels of public health and safety concern. However, the global background of radioxenon produced by MIP interferes with nuclear explosion monitoring by the International Monitoring System (IMS) developed for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (CTBTO, 2024). It was calculated that xenon emissions levels of 5×10 9 Bq/day 133 Xe were low enough to have minimal impact on International Monitoring System (IMS) stations (Bowyer et al, 2013). There are several technologies currently used to abate radioactive xenon emissions to meet regulatory release levels, and some alternative methods have been investigated to reduce xenon release levels well below required regulatory levels (Doll et al, 2014, Gueibe, et al, 2014). While MIP producers are sympathetic to the issue of radioxenon interference with IMS monitoring, the cost to implement and maintain additional abatement systems has resulted in limited implementation. Therefore, more cost-effective options for xenon abatement are needed to help reduce the impact of these emissions on nuclear explosion monitoring.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Vision 0.3.2 Users Guide: Revision 0

Vision is a research software application developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) that incorporates the scientific and operational expertise for reviewing data from treaty monitoring radionuclide stations. These stations are part of a worldwide network to monitor for nuclear explosions, and the data they produce are critical to make the determination of whether a sample is from a nuclear explosion or some other source (i.e., nuclear reactor or medical isotope production facility). Stations deliver their measurements and system status to the International Monitoring System (IMS), which forwards it via email to all subscribers. Vision provides tools for viewing and analyzing these stations’ state of health data.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Beowulf v2.5.3 User Guide: Revision 5

This document is a user guide for the Beowulf (rebranding of Watchmen) tool. It describes how operators can access and utilize the application's functionality. Beowulf is a research software application developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) that incorporates the scientific and operational expertise for reviewing data from treaty monitoring radionuclide stations. These stations are part of a worldwide network to monitor for nuclear explosions, and the data they produce are critical to make the determination of whether a sample is from a nuclear explosion or some other source (i.e., nuclear reactor or medical isotope production facility). Stations deliver their measurements and system status to the International Monitoring System (IMS), which forwards it via email to all subscribers. Beowulf is capable of processing data from several radioxenon station types and development is in progress on a solution for particulate stations. Screening of data in Beowulf may be done by a number of different users such as radionuclide analysts, evaluators, and data quality experts. This guide is provided to assist those users in navigating the application. The term Beowulf is used generically throughout this document to refer to any of the various components in the software application. The user interface that is viewed with a web browser is the primary focus of this user guide. Other components include a database to store measurements and state of health (SOH) data; and the data loader that monitors incoming emails, parses the data, populates the database, does the initial analysis, and routes data for review.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

127 Xe quantification method development and intercomparison exercise

Monitoring of the atmosphere for fission products ( 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe) is performed by various laboratories to detect nuclear explosions. Quantification of 127 Xe is not routinely performed by laboratories measuring atmospheric radioxenon because it is not a fission product. 127 Xe was recently detected by a ground-based beta-gamma air monitoring system. When measured using beta-gamma coincidence detector systems, such as those in use on the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 127 Xe can interfere with the quantification of fission product radioxenon due to overlap of the 127 Xe beta-gamma coincidence signatures with those of fission product radioxenon. Here, this work demonstrates quantification of 127 Xe at different laboratories with different measurement techniques. Production and purification of 127 Xe was performed by neutron activation of enriched 126 Xe. The purified 127 Xe was then split between laboratories, and detection and quantification methods were developed. At Idaho National Laboratory, a quantification method involving high purity germanium detectors was devised that included self-attenuation correction. At AWE, a beta-gamma coincidence counting method, as used in support of the IMS, was modified to enable the measurement and analysis of the 127 Xe samples. Corrections were made for self-attenuation, which showed a strong xenon volume dependency, for some coincidence signatures. The gas sample activity concentration was used as the comparison metric and it showed excellent agreement between the methods.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗