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Human beings judge images by complex mental processes, whereas computing machines extract features. By reducing scaled human judgments and machine extracted features to a common metric space and fitting them by regression, the judgments of human experts rendered on a sample of images may be imposed on an image population to provide automatic classification.
A thermal radiation analysis method called Jet Engine IR Analysis Procedure (J-EIRP) was developed to evaluate jet engine cavity hot parts source radiation. The objectives behind J-EIRP were to achieve the greatest accuracy in model representation and solution, while minimizing computer resources and computational time. The computer programs that comprise J-EIRP were selected on the basis of their performance, accuracy, and flexibility to solve both simple and complex problems. These programs were intended for use on a personal computer, but include the ability to solve large problems on a mainframe or supercomputer. J-EIRP also provides the user with a tool for developing thermal design experience and engineering judgment through analysis experimentation, while using minimal computer resources. A sample jet engine cavity analysis demonstrates the procedure and capabilities within J-EIRP, and is compared to a simplified method for approximating cavity radiation. The goal is to introduce the terminology and solution process used in J-EIRP and to provide insight into the radiation heat transfer principles used in this procedure.
Microgravity science studies the influences of gravity on phenomena in fluids, materials processes, combustion, and human cell growth in the low acceleration environment of space flight. During the last decade, the accomplishment of the flight research in the field has evolved into an effective cooperation between the flight crew in the Shuttle and the ground-based investigator using real-time communication via voice and video links. This team structure has led to interactive operations in which the crew performs the experimentation while guided, as necessary, by the science investigator who formulated the investigation and who will subsequently interpret and analyze the data. One of the primary challenges to implementing this interactive research has been the necessity of structuring a means of handling fluids, gases, and hazardous materials in a manned laboratory that exhibits the novelty of weightlessness. Developing clever means of designing experiments in closed vessels is part of the solution- but the space flight requirement for one and two failure-tolerant containment systems leads to serious complications in the physical handling of sample materials. In response to the conflict between the clear advantage of human operation and judgment, versus the necessity to isolate the experiment from the crewmember and the spacecraft environment, the Microgravity Research Program has initiated a series of Gloveboxes in the various manned experiment carriers. These units provide a sealed containment vessel whose interior is under a negative pressure with respect to the ambient environment but is accessible to a crewmember through the glove ports.
A sample of reports relating to operations during winter weather is presented. Several reports involving problems of judgment and decisionmaking have been selected from the numerous reports representative of this area. Problems related to aeronautical charts are discussed in a number of reports. An analytic study of reports involving potential conflicts in the immediate vicinity of uncontrolled airports was performed; the results are discussed in this report. It was found that in three-fourths of 127 such conflicts, neither pilot, or only one of the pilots, was communicating position and intentions on the appropriate frequency. The importance of providing aural transfer of information, as a backup to the visual see and avoid mode of information transfer is discussed. It was also found that a large fraction of pilots involved in potential conflicts on final approach had executed straight-in approaches, rather than the recommended traffic pattern entries, prior to the conflicts. A selection of alert bulletins and responses to them by various segments of the aviation community is presented.
In support of an ESA-funded concept study considering a sample return mission, a simulant of the Martian moon Phobos was needed. There are no samples of the Phobos regolith, therefore none of the four characteristics normally used to design a simulant are explicitly known for Phobos. Because of this, specifications for a Phobos simulant were based on spectroscopy, other remote measurements, and judgment. A composition based on the Tagish Lake meteorite was assumed. The requirement that sterility be achieved, especially given the required organic content, was unusual and problematic. The final design mixed JSC-1A, antigorite, pseudo-agglutinates and gilsonite. Sterility was achieved by radiation in a commercial facility.
Stress corrosion cracking in the relief radius area of a space shuttle primary reaction control thruster is an issue of concern. The current approach for monitoring of potential crack growth is nondestructive inspection (NDI) of remaining thickness (RT) to the acoustic cavities using an eddy current or remote field eddy current probe. EDM manufacturers have difficulty in providing accurate RT calibration standards. Significant error in the RT values of NDI calibration standards could lead to a mistaken judgment of cracking condition of a thruster under inspection. A tool based on eddy current principle has been developed to measure the RT at each acoustic cavity of a calibration standard in order to validate that the standard meets the sample design criteria.
The effects of several characteristics of helicopter blade slap upon human annoyance are examined. Blade slap noise was simulated by using continuous and impulsive noises characterized by five parameters: The number of sine waves in a single impulse; the frequency of the sine waves; the impulse repetition frequency; the sound pressure level (SPL) of the continuous noise; and the idealized crest factor of the impulses. Ten second samples of noise were synthesized with each of the five parameters at representative levels. The annoyance of each noise was judged by 40 human subjects. Analysis of the subjective data indicated that each of the five parameters had a statistically significant effect upon the annoyance judgments. The impulse crest factor and SPL of the continuous noise had very strong positive relationships with annoyance. The other parameters had smaller, but still significant, effects upon the annoyance judgments.
The Capsule Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) Analysis Team is responsible for determining parachute inflation parameters and dispersions that are ultimately used in verifying system requirements. A model memo is internally released semi-annually documenting parachute inflation and other key parameters reconstructed from flight test data. Dispersion probability distributions published in previous versions of the model memo were uniform because insufficient data were available for determination of statistical based distributions. Uniform distributions do not accurately represent the expected distributions since extreme parameter values are just as likely to occur as the nominal value. CPAS has taken incremental steps to move away from uniform distributions. Model Memo version 9 (MMv9) made the first use of non-uniform dispersions, but only for the reefing cutter timing, for which a large number of sample was available. In order to maximize the utility of the available flight test data, clusters of parachutes were reconstructed individually starting with Model Memo version 10. This allowed for statistical assessment for steady-state drag area (CDS) and parachute inflation parameters such as the canopy fill distance (n), profile shape exponent (expopen), over-inflation factor (C(sub k)), and ramp-down time (t(sub k)) distributions. Built-in MATLAB distributions were applied to the histograms, and parameters such as scale (sigma) and location (mu) were output. Engineering judgment was used to determine the "best fit" distribution based on the test data. Results include normal, log normal, and uniform (where available data remains insufficient) fits of nominal and failure (loss of parachute and skipped stage) cases for all CPAS parachutes. This paper discusses the uniform methodology that was previously used, the process and result of the statistical assessment, how the dispersions were incorporated into Monte Carlo analyses, and the application of the distributions in trajectory benchmark testing assessments with parachute inflation parameters, drag area, and reefing cutter timing used by CPAS.
Gross measures of community annoyance with intrusive noises have been made in a number of real environment surveys which indicate that aircraft noise may have to be reduced 30-40 EPNdb before it will generally be considered acceptable. Interview studies, however, cannot provide the precise information which is needed by noise abatement engineers of the variable human response to different types and degrees of noise exposure. A new methodological field-survey approach has been developed to provide such information. The integrated attitudes and experiences of a random sample of subjects in the real environment are obtained by a prior field survey. Then these subjects record their more precise responses to controlled noise exposures in a new realistic laboratory. The laboratory is a sound chamber furnished as a typical living room (18 ft x 14 ft) and subjects watch a color TV program while they judge simulated aircraft flyovers that occur at controlled levels and intervals. Methodological experiments indicate that subjects in the laboratory have the sensation that the airplanes are actually moving overhead across the ceiling of the chamber. It was also determined that annoyance judgments in the laboratory stabilize after three flyovers are heard prior to a judgment of annoyance.
Every day in aviation, pilots, air traffic controllers, and other front-line personnel perform countless correct judgments and actions in a variety of operational environments. These judgments and actions are often the difference between an accident and a non-event. Ironically, data on these behaviors are rarely collected or analyzed. Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. Large volumes of data are collected on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that result in routine successful outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of nonrepresentative safety data. This assessment aimed to find and document “safety successes” made possible by human operators. With many Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Programs and Projects focusing on increased automation and autonomy and decreased human involvement, failure to fully consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a significant risk — a risk that has not been recognized to date. Without understanding how humans contribute to safety, any estimate of predicted safety of autonomous capabilities is incomplete and inherently suspect. Furthermore, understanding the ways in which humans contribute to safety can promote strategic interactions among safety technologies, functions, procedures and the people using them. Without this understanding, the full benefits of an integrated, optimized human/technology or autonomous system will not be realized. Historically, safety has been consistently defined in terms of the occurrence of accidents or recognized risks (i.e., in terms of things that go wrong). These adverse outcomes are explained by identifying their causes, and safety is restored by eliminating or mitigating these causes. An alternative to this approach is to focus on what goes right and identify how to replicate that process. Focusing on the rare cases of failures attributed to “human error” provides little information about why human performance routinely prevents adverse events. Hollnagel has proposed that things go right because people continuously adjust their work to match their operating conditions. These adjustments become increasingly important as systems continue to grow in complexity. Thus, the definition of safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that go wrong” but “ensuring that things go right.” The basis for safety management requires developing an understanding of everyday activities. However, few mechanisms to monitor everyday work exist in the aviation domain, which limits opportunities to learn how designs function in reality. This concept of safety thinking and safety management is reflected in the emerging field of resilience engineering. According to Hollnagel, a system is resilient if it can sustain required operations under expected and unexpected conditions by adjusting its functioning prior to, during, or following changes, disturbances, and opportunities. To explore “positive” behaviors that contribute to resilient performance in commercial aviation, the assessment team examined a range of existing sources of data about pilot and air traffic control (ATC) tower controller performance, including subjective interviews with domain experts and objective aircraft flight data records. These data were used to identify strategies that support resilient performance, methods for exploring and refining those strategies in existing data, and proposed methods for capturing and analyzing new data.