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At least 19 records

Evidence Theory Representations for Properties Associated With Weak Link/Strong Link Systems, Part 1: Loss of Assured Safety

The use of evidence theory in the analysis of loss of assured safety (LOAS) for weak link (WL)/strong link (SL) systems is introduced and illustrated. Furthermore, article content includes (i) an introduction to evidence theory, (ii) definition of two WLs and two SLs used for illustration, (iii) belief and plausibility for the occurrence of LOAS for a one WL/two SL system, and (iv) a sampling-based procedure for the verification of belief and plausibility calculations. The presented results can be generalized to systems with more than one WL and two SLs.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Probability of Loss of Assured Safety in Systems with Multiple Time-Dependent Failure Modes: Incorporation of Delayed Link Failure in the Presence of Aleatory Uncertainty

Probability of loss of assured safety (PLOAS) is modeled for weak link (WL)/strong link (SL) systems in which one or more WLs or SLs could potentially degrade into a precursor condition to link failure that will be followed by an actual link failure after some amount of elapsed time. The descriptor loss of assured safety (LOAS) is used because failure of the WL system places the entire system in an inoperable configuration while failure of the SL system before failure of the WL system, although undesirable, does not necessarily result in an unintended operation of the entire system. Thus, safety is “assured” by failure of the WL system before failure of the SL system. Here, the following topics are considered: (i) Definition of precursor occurrence time cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for individual WLs and SLs, (ii) Formal representation, approximation and illustration of PLOAS with (a) constant delay times, (b) aleatory uncertainty in delay times, and (c) delay times defined by functions of link properties at occurrence times for link failure precursors, and (iii) Procedures for the verification of PLOAS calculations for the three indicated definitions of delayed link failure.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Evidence Theory Representations for Properties Associated With Weak Link/Strong Link Systems, Part 2: Failure Time and Failure Temperature

The use of evidence theory and associated cumulative plausibility functions (CPFs), cumulative belief functions (CBFs), cumulative distribution functions (CDFs), complementary cumulative plausibility functions (CCPFs), complementary cumulative belief functions (CCBFs), and complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) in the analysis of loss of assured safety (LOAS) for weak link (WL)/strong link (SL) systems is introduced and illustrated. Article content includes cumulative and complementary cumulative belief, plausibility, and probability for (i) time at which LOAS occurs for a one WL/two SL system, (ii) time at which a two-link system fails, (iii) temperature at which a two-link system fails, and (iv) temperature at which LOAS occurs for a one WL/two SL system. The presented results can be generalized to systems with more than one WL and two SLs.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Evidence Theory Representations for Properties Associated With Weak Link/Strong Link Systems, Part 3: Margins for Failure Time and Failure Temperature

The use of evidence theory and associated cumulative plausibility functions (CPFs), cumulative belief functions (CBFs), cumulative distribution functions (CDFs), complementary cumulative plausibility functions (CCPFs), complementary cumulative belief functions (CCBFs), and complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) in the analysis of time and temperature margins associated with loss of assured safety (LOAS) for one weak link (WL)/two strong link (SL) systems is illustrated. Article content includes cumulative and complementary cumulative belief, plausibility, and probability for (i) SL/WL failure time margins defined by (time at which SL failure potentially causes LOAS) – (time at which WL failure potentially prevents LOAS), (ii) SL/WL failure temperature margins defined by (the temperature at which SL failure potentially causes LOAS) – (the temperature at which WL failure potentially prevents LOAS), and (iii) SL/SL failure temperature margins defined by (the temperature at which SL failure potentially causes LOAS) – (the temperature of SL whose failure potentially causes LOAS at the time at which WL failure potentially prevents LOAS).

42 ENGINEERING↗

Flat H Frangible Joint Evolution

Space vehicle staging and separation events require pyrotechnic devices. They are single-use mechanisms that cannot be tested, nor can failure-tolerant performance be demonstrated in actual flight articles prior to flight use. This necessitates the implementation of a robust design and test approach coupled with a fully redundant, failure-tolerant explosive mechanism to ensure that the system functions even in the event of a single failure. Historically, NASA has followed the single failure-tolerant (SFT) design philosophy for all human-rated spacecraft, including the Space Shuttle Program. Following the end of this program, aerospace companies proposed building the next generation human-rated vehicles with off-the-shelf, non-redundant, zero-failure-tolerant (ZFT) separation systems. Currently, spacecraft and launch vehicle providers for both the Orion and Commercial Crew Programs (CCPs) plan to deviate from the heritage safety approach and NASA's SFT human rating requirements. Both programs' partners have base-lined ZFT frangible joints for vehicle staging and fairing separation. These joints are commercially available from pyrotechnic vendors. Non-human-rated missions have flown them numerous times. The joints are relatively easy to integrate structurally within the spacecraft. In addition, the separation event is debris free, and the resultant pyro shock is lower than that of other design solutions. It is, however, a serious deficiency to lack failure tolerance. When used for critical applications on human-rated vehicles, a single failure could potentially lead to loss of crew (LOC) or loss of mission (LOM)). The Engineering and Safety & Mission Assurance directorates within the NASA Johnson Space Center took action to address this safety issue by initiating a project to develop a fully redundant, SFT frangible joint design, known as the Flat H. Critical to the ability to retrofit on launch vehicles being developed, the SFT mechanisms must fit within the same three-dimensional envelope as current designs as well as meet structural loads requirements. There is increased mass associated with the redundant design, and the goal is to minimize the weight impact as much as possible. These requirements presented significant challenges, both technically and financially; these challenges will be explored in this paper. Perhaps greater than the technical issues confronted during this design process, were the financial considerations. These were a significant part of the story of this design and development plan. Insufficient financial and labor resources were formidable barriers to completing this project. Nevertheless, JSC personnel successfully conducted several test series at JSC with very useful results. The many lessons learned drove design improvements, performance efficiency, and increased functional reliability. This paper examines the significant technical and financial challenges that these requirements posed to the project team. It discusses the evolution of the SFT frangible joint design, including optimization, testing, and successful partnering of the Johnson Space Center (JSC) engineering and JSC safety organizations, to enhance the flight safety margin for America's next generation of human-rated space vehicles.

Diegelman, Thomas E.↗

SAFEGUARD: An Assured Safety Net Technology for UAS

As demands increase to use unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for a broad spectrum of commercial applications, regulatory authorities are examining how to safely integrate them without loss of safety or major disruption to existing airspace operations. This work addresses the development of the Safeguard system as an assured safety net technology for UAS. The Safeguard system monitors and enforces conformance to a set of rules defined prior to flight (e.g., geospatial stay-out or stay-in regions, speed limits, altitude limits). Safeguard operates independently of the UAS autopilot and is strategically designed in a way that can be realized by a small set of verifiable functions to simplify compliance with regulatory standards for commercial aircraft. A framework is described that decouples the system from any other devices on the UAS as well as introduces complementary positioning source(s) for applications that require integrity and availability beyond what the Global Positioning System (GPS) can provide. Additionally, the high level logic embedded within the software is presented, as well as the steps being taken toward verification and validation (V&V) of proper functionality. Next, an initial prototype implementation of the described system is disclosed. Lastly, future work including development, testing, and system V&V is summarized.

Dill, Evan T.↗

Designing Crane Controls with Applied Mechanical and Electrical Safety Features

The use of overhead traveling bridge cranes in many varied applications is common practice. In particular, the use of cranes in the nuclear, military, commercial, aerospace, and other industries can involve safety critical situations. Considerations for Human Injury or Casualty, Loss of Assets, Endangering the Environment, or Economic Reduction must be addressed. Traditionally, in order to achieve additional safety in these applications, mechanical systems have been augmented with a variety of devices. These devices assure that a mechanical component failure shall reduce the risk of a catastrophic loss of the correct and/or safe load carrying capability. ASME NOG-1-1998, (Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes, Top Running Bridge, and Multiple Girder), provides design standards for cranes in safety critical areas. Over and above the minimum safety requirements of todays design standards, users struggle with obtaining a higher degree of reliability through more precise functional specifications while attempting to provide "smart" safety systems. Electrical control systems also may be equipped with protective devices similar to the mechanical design features. Demands for improvement of the cranes "control system" is often recognized, but difficult to quantify for this traditionally "mechanically" oriented market. Finite details for each operation must be examined and understood. As an example, load drift (or small motions) at close tolerances can be unacceptable (and considered critical). To meet these high functional demands encoders and other devices are independently added to control systems to provide motion and velocity feedback to the control drive. This paper will examine the implementation of Programmable Electronic Systems (PES). PES is a term this paper will use to describe any control system utilizing any programmable electronic device such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), or an Adjustable Frequency Drive (AID) 'smart' programmable motion controller. Therefore the use of the term Programmable Electronic Systems (PES) is an encompassing description for a large spectrum of programmable electronic control devices.

Lytle, Bradford P.↗

Verification and Implementation of Operations Safety Controls for Flight Missions

There are several engineering disciplines, such as reliability, supportability, quality assurance, human factors, risk management, safety, etc. Safety is an extremely important engineering specialty within NASA, and the consequence involving a loss of crew is considered a catastrophic event. Safety is not difficult to achieve when properly integrated at the beginning of each space systems project/start of mission planning. The key is to ensure proper handling of safety verification throughout each flight/mission phase. Today, Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) operations engineers continue to conduct these flight product reviews across all open flight products. As such, these reviews help ensure that each mission is accomplished with safety requirements along with controls heavily embedded in applicable flight products. Most importantly, the S&MA operations engineers are required to look for important design and operations controls so that safety is strictly adhered to as well as reflected in the final flight product.

Smalls, James R.↗

Assessment of the State-of-the-Art of System-Wide Safety and Assurance Technologies

Since its initiation, the System-wide Safety Assurance Technologies (SSAT) Project has been focused on developing multidisciplinary tools and techniques that are verified and validated to ensure prevention of loss of property and life in NextGen and enable proactive risk management through predictive methods. To this end, four technical challenges have been listed to help realize the goals of SSAT, namely (i) assurance of flight critical systems, (ii) discovery of precursors to safety incidents, (iii) assuring safe human-systems integration, and (iv) prognostic algorithm design for safety assurance. The objective of this report is to provide an extensive survey of SSAT-related research accomplishments by researchers within and outside NASA to get an understanding of what the state-of-the-art is for technologies enabling each of the four technical challenges. We hope that this report will serve as a good resource for anyone interested in gaining an understanding of the SSAT technical challenges, and also be useful in the future for project planning and resource allocation for related research.

Roychoudhury, Indranil↗

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitative Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

The theory of System Health Management (SHM) and of its operational subset Fault Management (FM) states that FM is implemented as a "meta" control loop, known as an FM Control Loop (FMCL). The FMCL detects that all or part of a system is now failed, or in the future will fail (that is, cannot be controlled within acceptable limits to achieve its objectives), and takes a control action (a response) to return the system to a controllable state. In terms of control theory, the effectiveness of each FMCL is estimated based on its ability to correctly estimate the system state, and on the speed of its response to the current or impending failure effects. This paper describes how this theory has been successfully applied on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) Program to quantitatively estimate the effectiveness of proposed abort triggers so as to select the most effective suite to protect the astronauts from catastrophic failure of the SLS. The premise behind this process is to be able to quantitatively provide the value versus risk trade‐off for any given abort trigger, allowing decision makers to make more informed decisions. All current and planned crewed launch vehicles have some form of vehicle health management system integrated with an emergency launch abort system to ensure crew safety. While the design can vary, the underlying principle is the same: detect imminent catastrophic vehicle failure, initiate launch abort, and extract the crew to safety. Abort triggers are the detection mechanisms that identify that a catastrophic launch vehicle failure is occurring or is imminent and cause the initiation of a notification to the crew vehicle that the escape system must be activated. While ensuring that the abort triggers provide this function, designers must also ensure that the abort triggers do not signal that a catastrophic failure is imminent when in fact the launch vehicle can successfully achieve orbit. That is, the abort triggers must have low false negative rates to be sure that real crew‐threatening failures are detected, and also low false positive rates to ensure that the crew does not abort from non‐crew‐threatening launch vehicle behaviors. The analysis process described in this paper is a compilation of over six years of lessons learned and refinements from experiences developing abort triggers for NASA's Constellation Program (Ares I Project) and the SLS Program, as well as the simultaneous development of SHM/FM theory. The paper will describe the abort analysis concepts and process, developed in conjunction with SLS Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) to define a common set of mission phase, failure scenario, and Loss of Mission Environment (LOME) combinations upon which the SLS Loss of Mission (LOM) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models are built. This abort analysis also requires strong coordination with the Multi‐Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and SLS Structures and Environments (STE) to formulate a series of abortability tables that encapsulate explosion dynamics over the ascent mission phase. The design and assessment of abort conditions and triggers to estimate their Loss of Crew (LOC) Benefits also requires in‐depth integration with other groups, including Avionics, Guidance, Navigation and Control(GN&C), the Crew Office, Mission Operations, and Ground Systems. The outputs of this analysis are a critical input to SLS S&MA's LOC PRA models. The process described here may well be the first full quantitative application of SHM/FM theory to the selection of a sensor suite for any aerospace system.

Lo, Yunnhon↗

Validation and Verification of Future Integrated Safety-Critical Systems Operating under Off-Nominal Conditions

Loss of control remains one of the largest contributors to aircraft fatal accidents worldwide. Aircraft loss-of-control accidents are highly complex in that they can result from numerous causal and contributing factors acting alone or (more often) in combination. Hence, there is no single intervention strategy to prevent these accidents and reducing them will require a holistic integrated intervention capability. Future onboard integrated system technologies developed for preventing loss of vehicle control accidents must be able to assure safe operation under the associated off-nominal conditions. The transition of these technologies into the commercial fleet will require their extensive validation and verification (V and V) and ultimate certification. The V and V of complex integrated systems poses major nontrivial technical challenges particularly for safety-critical operation under highly off-nominal conditions associated with aircraft loss-of-control events. This paper summarizes the V and V problem and presents a proposed process that could be applied to complex integrated safety-critical systems developed for preventing aircraft loss-of-control accidents. A summary of recent research accomplishments in this effort is also provided.

Belcastro, Christine M.↗

Risk-Based Causal Modeling of Airborne Loss of Separation

Maintaining safe separation between aircraft remains one of the key aviation challenges as the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) emerges. The goals of the NextGen are to increase capacity and reduce flight delays to meet the aviation demand growth through the 2025 time frame while maintaining safety and efficiency. The envisioned NextGen is expected to enable high air traffic density, diverse fleet operations in the airspace, and a decrease in separation distance. All of these factors contribute to the potential for Loss of Separation (LOS) between aircraft. LOS is a precursor to a potential mid-air collision (MAC). The NASA Airspace Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) is committed to developing aircraft separation assurance concepts and technologies to mitigate LOS instances, therefore, preventing MAC. This paper focuses on the analysis of causal and contributing factors of LOS accidents and incidents leading to MAC occurrences. Mid-air collisions among large commercial aircraft are rare in the past decade, therefore, the LOS instances in this study are for general aviation using visual flight rules in the years 2000-2010. The study includes the investigation of causal paths leading to LOS, and the development of the Airborne Loss of Separation Analysis Model (ALOSAM) using Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) to capture the multi-dependent relations of causal factors. The ALOSAM is currently a qualitative model, although further development could lead to a quantitative model. ALOSAM could then be used to perform impact analysis of concepts and technologies in the AOSP portfolio on the reduction of LOS risk.

Geuther, Steven C.↗

Validation of Safety-Critical Systems for Aircraft Loss-of-Control Prevention and Recovery

Validation of technologies developed for loss of control (LOC) prevention and recovery poses significant challenges. Aircraft LOC can result from a wide spectrum of hazards, often occurring in combination, which cannot be fully replicated during evaluation. Technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery must therefore be effective under a wide variety of hazardous and uncertain conditions, and the validation framework must provide some measure of assurance that the new vehicle safety technologies do no harm (i.e., that they themselves do not introduce new safety risks). This paper summarizes a proposed validation framework for safety-critical systems, provides an overview of validation methods and tools developed by NASA to date within the Vehicle Systems Safety Project, and develops a preliminary set of test scenarios for the validation of technologies for LOC prevention and recovery

Belcastro, Christine M.↗

Shuttle Shortfalls and Lessons Learned for the Sustainment of Human Space Exploration

Much debate and national soul searching has taken place over the value of the Space Shuttle which first flew in 1981 and which is currently scheduled to be retired in 2010. Originally developed post-Saturn Apollo to emphasize affordability and safety, the reusable Space Shuttle instead came to be perceived as economically unsustainable and lacking the technology maturity to assure safe, routine access to low earth orbit (LEO). After the loss of two crews, aboard Challenger and Columbia, followed by the decision to retire the system in 2010, it is critical that this three decades worth of human space flight experience be well understood. Understanding of the past is imperative to further those goals for which the Space Shuttle was a stepping-stone in the advancement of knowledge. There was significant reduction in life cycle costs between the Saturn Apollo and the Space Shuttle. However, the advancement in life cycle cost reduction from Saturn Apollo to the Space Shuttle fell far short of its goal. This paper will explore the reasons for this shortfall. Shortfalls and lessons learned can be categorized as related to design factors, at the architecture, element and sub-system levels, as well as to programmatic factors, in terms of goals, requirements, management and organization. Additionally, no review of the Space Shuttle program and attempt to take away key lessons would be complete without a strategic review. That is, how do national space goals drive future space transportation development strategies? The lessons of the Space Shuttle are invaluable in all respects - technical, as in design, program-wise, as in organizational approach and goal setting, and strategically, within the context of the generational march toward an expanded human presence in space. Beyond lessons though (and the innumerable papers, anecdotes and opinions published on this topic) this paper traces tangible, achievable steps, derived from the Space Shuttle program experience, that must be a part of any 2l century initiatives furthering a growing human presence beyond earth.

Zapata, Edgar↗

Validation and Verification (V&V) of Safety-Critical Systems Operating Under Off-Nominal Conditions

Loss of control (LOC) remains one of the largest contributors to aircraft fatal accidents worldwide. Aircraft LOC accidents are highly complex in that they can result from numerous causal and contributing factors acting alone or more often in combination. Hence, there is no single intervention strategy to prevent these accidents. Research is underway at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the development of advanced onboard system technologies for preventing or recovering from loss of vehicle control and for assuring safe operation under off-nominal conditions associated with aircraft LOC accidents. The transition of these technologies into the commercial fleet will require their extensive validation and verification (V&V) and ultimate certification. The V&V of complex integrated systems poses highly significant technical challenges and is the subject of a parallel research effort at NASA. This chapter summarizes the V&V problem and presents a proposed process that could be applied to complex integrated safety-critical systems developed for preventing aircraft LOC accidents. A summary of recent research accomplishments in this effort is referenced.

Belcastro, Christine M.↗

Analysis of Aviation Safety Reporting System Incident Data Associated With the Technical Challenges of the Vehicle Systems Safety Technology Project

This analysis was conducted to support the Vehicle Systems Safety Technology (VSST) Project of the Aviation Safety Program (AVsP) milestone VSST4.2.1.01, "Identification of VSST-Related Trends." In particular, this is a review of incident data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). The following three VSST-related technical challenges (TCs) were the focus of the incidents searched in the ASRS database: (1) Vechicle health assurance, (2) Effective crew-system interactions and decisions in all conditions; and (3) Aircraft loss of control prevention, mitigation, and recovery.

Withrow, Colleen A.↗

Decomposition-Based Failure Mode Identification Method for Risk-Free Design of Large Systems

When designing products, it is crucial to assure failure and risk-free operation in the intended operating environment. Failures are typically studied and eliminated as much as possible during the early stages of design. The few failures that go undetected result in unacceptable damage and losses in high-risk applications where public safety is of concern. Published NASA and NTSB accident reports point to a variety of components identified as sources of failures in the reported cases. In previous work, data from these reports were processed and placed in matrix form for all the system components and failure modes encountered, and then manipulated using matrix methods to determine similarities between the different components and failure modes. In this paper, these matrices are represented in the form of a linear combination of failures modes, mathematically formed using Principal Components Analysis (PCA) decomposition. The PCA decomposition results in a low-dimensionality representation of all failure modes and components of interest, represented in a transformed coordinate system. Such a representation opens the way for efficient pattern analysis and prediction of failure modes with highest potential risks on the final product, rather than making decisions based on the large space of component and failure mode data. The mathematics of the proposed method are explained first using a simple example problem. The method is then applied to component failure data gathered from helicopter, accident reports to demonstrate its potential.

Tumer, Irem Y.↗