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NASA NTRS2016

Effect of Vertical Rate Error on Recovery from Loss of Well Clear Between UAS and Non-Cooperative Intruders

When an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) encounters an intruder and is unable to maintain required temporal and spatial separation between the two vehicles, it is referred to as a loss of well-clear. In this state, the UAS must make its best attempt to regain separation while maximizing the minimum separation between itself and the intruder. When encountering a non-cooperative intruder (an aircraft operating under visual flight rules without ADS-B or an active transponder) the UAS must rely on the radar system to provide the intruders location, velocity, and heading information. As many UAS have limited climb and descent performance, vertical position andor vertical rate errors make it difficult to determine whether an intruder will pass above or below them. To account for that, there is a proposal by RTCA Special Committee 228 to prohibit guidance systems from providing vertical guidance to regain well-clear to UAS in an encounter with a non-cooperative intruder unless their radar system has vertical position error below 175 feet (95) and vertical velocity errors below 200 fpm (95). Two sets of fast-time parametric studies was conducted, each with 54000 pairwise encounters between a UAS and non-cooperative intruder to determine the suitability of offering vertical guidance to regain well clear to a UAS in the presence of radar sensor noise. The UAS was not allowed to maneuver until it received well-clear recovery guidance. The maximum severity of the loss of well-clear was logged and used as the primary indicator of the separation achieved by the UAS. One set of 54000 encounters allowed the UAS to maneuver either vertically or horizontally, while the second permitted horizontal maneuvers, only. Comparing the two data sets allowed researchers to see the effect of allowing vertical guidance to a UAS for a particular encounter and vertical rate error. Study results show there is a small reduction in the average severity of a loss of well-clear when vertical maneuvers are suppressed, for all vertical error rate thresholds examined. However, results also show that in roughly 35 of the encounters where a vertical maneuver was selected, forcing the UAS to do a horizontal maneuver instead increased the severity of the loss of well-clear for that encounter. Finally, results showed a small reduction in the number of severe losses of well-clear when the high performance UAS (2000 fpm climb and descent rate) was allowed to maneuver vertically, and the vertical rate error was below 500 fpm. Overall, the results show that using a single vertical rate threshold is not advisable, and that limiting a UAS to horizontal maneuvers when vertical rate errors are above 175 fpm can make a UAS less safe about a third of the time. It is suggested that the hard limit be removed, and system manufacturers instructed to account for their own UAS performance, as well as vertical rate error and encounter geometry, when determining whether or not to provide vertical guidance to regain well-clear.

detect and avoid↗

NASA NTRS2017

The Effects of Severity of Losses of Well Clear on Minimum Operations Performance Standards End-To-End Verification and Validation Simulation Study for Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace System Using Detect and Avoid Systems

As Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) make their way to mainstream aviation operations within the National Airspace System (NAS), research efforts are underway to develop a safe and effective environment for their integration into the NAS. Detect and Avoid (DAA) systems are required to account for the lack of “eyes in the sky” due to having no human on-board the aircraft. The technique, results, and lessons learned from a detailed End-to-End Verification and Validation (E2-V2) simulation study of a DAA system representative of RTCA Special Committee(SC)-228’s proposed Phase I DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS), based on specific test vectors and encounter cases, will be presented in this paper.

Ghatas, Rania W.↗

NASA NTRS2016

SC-228 Inclusion of DAA Warning Alert for TCAS Interoperability

This white paper summarizes NASA research results that have informed Special Committee 228 (SC-228) discussions and decisions regarding the inclusion of a warning-level alert within the detect and avoid (DAA) alerting structure for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). For UAS, the removal of the pilot from onboard the aircraft has eliminated the ability of the ground-based pilot in command (PIC) to use out-the-window visual information to make judgments about a potential threat of a loss of well clear with another aircraft. As a result, the DAA traffic display will be the primary source of information that the PIC can use to execute the three primary well clear functions: 1) detect a potential loss of well clear, 2) determine a resolution maneuver, and 3) upload that maneuver to the aircraft via the ground control station (GCS). In addition, pilots are required to coordinate with air traffic control (ATC) prior to maneuvering off of their approved flight plan. In determining an appropriate resolution maneuver to avoid a loss of well clear, the PIC must decide both when and how to maneuver, and both the timeliness and the accuracy (i.e., correctness) of the maneuver are critical to reducing the likelihood and/or severity of a loss of well clear. Alerting information is one of three critical components of the DAA display, along with traffic information elements (e.g., relative heading, speed and altitude) and maneuver guidance. Alerting information and maneuver guidance, in particular, have been found to have a significant impact, both statistically and practically, on pilots' ability to avoid and minimize the severity of losses of well clear While all three display components are key to pilots performing the traffic avoidance task of remaining well clear, in general, alerting information provides crucial information about when a resolution maneuver is required while maneuver guidance assists the pilot in determining how best to maneuver. A fundamental task of the DAA alerting system is to provide critical timing information to the pilot about the potential for a loss of well clear with another aircraft. This is done by employing both temporal and spatial thresholds that indicate to the pilot the likelihood and imminence of a loss of well clear. The design of the DAA alerting thresholds is a balancing act between eliciting the desired pilot response in real loss of well clear threat events and reducing excessive, unnecessary, and/or uncoordinated UAS maneuvering within the air traffic environment; larger thresholds, both spatially and temporally, may increase the likelihood of a pilot avoiding a loss of well clear, but it can also increase the frequency of maneuvering - especially in cases where a maneuver is not actually needed to maintain well clear. A series of human in the loop (HITL) simulations have been conducted as part of NASA's Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project. The purpose of these HITLs has been to provide empirical results in order to inform development of the minimum human-machine interface requirements for the DAA system. This white paper will present those results which provide evidence of a human performance benefit (in terms of response times and ability to remain well clear of other aircraft) of the DAA warning alert both with and without a collision avoidance system on board the aircraft.

TCAS interoperability↗

NASA NTRS2014

Investigating the Impacts of a Separation Standard for UAS Operations in Enroute and Transition Airspace

Unmanned aircraft systems will be required to equip with a detect and avoid system in order to satisfy the federal aviation regulations to remain well clear of other aircraft. To comply with regulations in today’s operations manned aircraft must “see and avoid” other aircraft and use subjective judgment to determine whether those aircraft are well clear. For a detect-and- avoid (DAA) system to satisfy the requirement to stay well clear, a quantitative definition of well clear needs to be defined and evaluated. Definitions for the boundary of well clear have been proposed by the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Executive Committee Science and Research Panel (SaRP) and the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Special Committee 228 on Detect and Avoid Systems. This study investigates the interoperability implications of UAS using proposed well clear definitions as a separation standard for conducting operations in the national airspace system. The first analysis in the study focuses on the effect of variations in well clear definition parameters on the rate of losses of well clear per flight hour. The second analysis considers three well clear definitions and presents the relative state conditions of intruder aircraft as they encroach upon the well clear boundary. The third analysis focuses on the definition of the alerting criteria needed to inform the UAS operator of a potential loss of well clear. All three analyses are conducted in a NAS-wide fast-time simulation environment using UAS aircraft models, proposed UAS missions, and historical air defense radar data to populate the background traffic operating under visual flight rules. The results from the three analyses presented in this study inform the safety case, requirements development, and the operational environment for the DAA minimum operational performance standards.

UAS Seperation Standard↗

NASA NTRS2015

Pilot Evaluation of a UAS Detect-and-Avoid System's Effectiveness in Remaining Well Clear

Unmanned aircraft will equip with a detect-and-avoid (DAA) system that allows them to comply with the requirement to see and avoid other aircraft, an important layer in the overall set of procedural, strategic and tactical separation methods designed to prevent mid-air collisions. Although the effectiveness of the DAA system will be set to a minimum threshold by regulators, different combinations of algorithms, displays and procedures could be used to meet that minimum. The research presented in this paper indicates the effectiveness of the combined pilot-DAA system as a function of the DAA design requirements and provides data that may be used to model the behavior of pilots when employing such systems. Over the course of two simulations 21 professional UAS pilots evaluated eight different DAA system designs and metrics were collected on their ability to maintain the well clear separation standard. The independent variables were the time horizon at which pilots were alerted to potential losses of well clear, the location of the traffic display, and the tools and informational elements available on the display to aid the pilot in detecting and resolving those potential losses. In the second experiment the UAS encountered two categories of aircraft: those equipped with simulated transponders that could be seen dozens of miles away and those without that were only detectable by a simulated radar within a range of six nautical miles. The data indicate that integrating the traffic display with the primary mission map directly in front of the pilot reduced the frequency of losses of well clear. Improved detection and resolution tools, including explicit maneuver guidance and a trial planning capability, had less of an effect in reducing the frequency of losses but significantly reduced the time in loss when they occurred. The amount of warning time provided to the pilot had a strong effect on their ability to remain well clear: when alerts were first presented with less than about 15 seconds to a predicted loss of well clear pilots were able to maneuver successfully in only 26 percent of encounters, whereas they were about 83 percent successful when they had more than 15 seconds. Pilots' ability to separate from the two categories of aircraft was nearly the same after accounting for the amount of alert time provided in each encounter, although the limited surveillance volume for the non-transponder equipped aircraft meant alerts tended to occur later and therefore were more difficult to resolve.

loss of well clear↗

NASA NTRS2018

En Route Detect and Avoid Well Clear in Terminal Area Landing Pattern

A fast time simulation was conducted to test the detect and avoid Well Clear definition designed for en route use when an unmanned aircraft (UA) is approaching the landing pattern of the terminal area. Measures focused on were loss of well clear and alerts intended to help the pilot avoid loss of well clear. Data indicated warning-level alerts will occur outside the typical Class D airspace which may prevent the UA from normal operations in the terminal airspace. Other aircraft on 45o entry could result in “nuisance” alerts which may also prevent the UA from normal operations in the terminal airspace. However, eliminating horizontal proximity (τmod) has the potential to increase “nuisance” alerts on the 45o entry and downwind legs. Overall, this suggests that a more stringent definition of Well Clear may be advisable in the landing pattern of the terminal area.

Trujillo, Anna C.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Piloted "Well Clear" Performance Evaluation of Detect-and-Avoid Systems with Suggestive Guidance

This study evaluated the performance of four prototype unmanned aircraft detect-and-avoid (DAA) display configurations, each with different informational elements driven by alerting and guidance algorithms. Sixteen unmanned aircraft pilots flew each combination of the display configurations, with half being given zero DAA surveillance sensor uncertainty and the other half experiencing errors that were comparable, and in some cases slightly better than, errors that were measured in DAA system flight tests. The displays that showed intruder alert information in altitude and heading bands had significantly fewer losses of well clear compared with alternative displays that lacked that information. This difference was significant from a statistical and practical perspective: those losses that did occur lasted for shorter periods and did not penetrate as far into the geometric "separation cylinder" as those in the non-banded displays. A modest level of DAA surveillance sensor uncertainty did not affect the proportion of losses of well clear or their severity. It is recommended that DAA traffic displays implement a band-type display in order to improve the safety of UAS operations in the National Airspace System. Finally, this report provides pilot response time distributions for responding to DAA alerts.

unmanned aircraft system↗

NASA NTRS2019

A Detect and Avoid System in the Context of Multiple-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations

NASA's Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration into the National Airspace System (UAS in the NAS) project examines the technical barriers associated with the operation of UAS in civil airspace. For UAS, the removal of the pilot from onboard the aircraft has eliminated the ability of the ground-based pilot in command (PIC) to use out-the-window visual information to make judgements about a potential threat of a loss of well clear with another aircraft. NASA's Phase 1 research supported the development of a Detect and Avoid (DAA) system that supports the ground-based pilot's ability to detect potential traffic conflicts and determine a resolution maneuver, but existing display/alerting requirements did not account for multiple UAS control (1:N). Demands for increased scalability of UAS in the NAS operations are expected to create a need for simultaneous control of UAs, and thus, a new DAA HMI design will likely be necessary. Previous research, however, has found performance degradations as the number of vehicles under operator control has increased. The purpose of the current human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulation was to examine the viability of 1:N operations with the Phase 1 DAA alerting and guidance. Sixteen UAS pilots flew three scenarios with varying number of UAs under their control (1:1, 1:3, 1:5). In addition to their supervisory and sensor mission responsibilities, pilots were to utilize the DAA system to remain DAA well clear (DWC) during scripted conflicts of mixed severity. Measured response times, separation performance, mission task data, and subjective feedback were collected to assess how the multi-UAS control configuration impacted pilots' ability to maintain DAA well clear and perform the mission tasks. Overall, the DAA system proved surprisingly adaptive to multi-UAS control for preventing losses of DAA well clear (LoDWC). The findings suggest that, while multi-UAS operators are able to maintain safe separation (DWC) from other traffic, their ability to efficiently perform missions drastically decreases with their number of controlled vehicles. Pilot feedback indicated that, for this context, the use of automation support tools for completing and managing mission tasks would be appropriate and desired, especially for ensuring efficient use of assets. Finally, human-machine interface (HMI) design considerations for multi-UAS operations are discussed.

Monk, Kevin J.↗

NASA NTRS2016

ACES M and S: Unmitigated Factorial Encounter Study on DAA/TCAS Interoperability

Realization of the expected proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) depends on the development and validation of standards for UAS Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems. The RTCA Special Committee 228 is charged with leading the development of draft Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA Systems. NASA, as a participating member of RTCA SC-228 is committed to supporting the development and validation of draft requirements for DAA alerting and guidance systems. This presentation contains the results of two combinatorial encounter analysis studies using NASA's SAA Control fast-time simulation capability for this purpose. In these studies, encounters between two aircraft were simulated one at a time for the full factorial combination of encounter geometries (e.g., encounter angle, CPA offset) and aircraft performance (e.g., ownership and intruder ground speeds and vertical rates). The first study analyzes the relationships (e.g., timeline) between the different alerting-safety regions in the SC-228 MOPS (in order of increasing severity): 1) DAA warning alert, 2) well clear recovery (WCR) guidance, 3) DAA-Collision Avoidance (CA), and 4) TCAS RA. This study will focus primarily on encounter situations in which TCAS RA occurs prior to any of the other alerting-safety boundaries. In particular, this study will investigate whether using vertical distance or vertical distance at closest point of approach (i.e., vertical miss distance or VMD) is more appropriate for the definition of the DAA-CA region. In addition, cases where transitions between different regions skip an intermediate region will be analyzed. The second study in this presentation explores a proposal to use an altitude rate error threshold to determine if vertical maneuvers are acceptable for DAA WCR guidance against non-cooperative intruders. This study incorporates the radar from the Honeywell sensor model and examines a series of pairwise encounters between a non-cooperative intruder and a UAS ownship, with different combinations of intruder states and ownship performance levels. The study uses SAA Control as a simulation platform and pilot model, and Omnibands to provide DWC recovery guidance. Two simulation sets, one that allows vertical DWC recovery guidance and one that does not, are compared to determine if encounters with altitude rate errors above 250 feet-per-minute are more likely to have more severe losses of well clear, as determined by the Loss of Well-Clear Severity metric.

SaaControl↗

NASA NTRS2017

UAS Well Clear Recovery Against Non-Cooperative Intruders Using Vertical Maneuvers

This paper documents a study that drove the development of a mathematical expression in the minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) of detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This equation describes the conditions under which vertical maneuver guidance could be provided during recovery of well clear separation with a non-cooperative VFR aircraft in addition to horizontal maneuver guidance. Although suppressing vertical maneuver guidance in these situations increased the minimum horizontal separation from 500 to 800 feet, the maximum severity of loss of well clear increased in about 35 of the encounters compared to when a vertical maneuver was preferred and allowed. Additionally, analysis of individual cases led to the identification of a class of encounter where vertical rate error had a large effect on horizontal maneuvers due to the difficulty of making the correct left-right turn decision: crossing conflict with intruder changing altitude. These results supported allowing vertical maneuvers when UAS vertical performance exceeds the relative vertical position and velocity accuracy of the DAA tracker given the current velocity of the UAS and the relative vertical position and velocity estimated by the DAA tracker. Looking ahead, these results indicate a need to improve guidance algorithms by utilizing maneuver stability and near mid-air collision risk when determining maneuver guidance to regain well clear separation.

detect and avoid↗

NASA NTRS2015

Characteristics of a Well Clear Definition and Alerting Criteria for Encounters Between UAS and Manned Aircraft in Class E Airspace

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) will be required to equip with a detect-and-avoid (DAA) system in order to satisfy the federal aviation regulations to remain well clear of other aircraft. For a DAA system to satisfy the requirement to stay well clear of other airborne traffic, a quantitative definition of well clear needs to be defined and evaluated. This study investigates the implications of UAS using proposed well clear definitions as a separation standard for conducting operations in the National Airspace System (NAS). The first analysis considers three well clear definitions and presents the relative state conditions of intruder aircraft as they encroach upon the well clear boundary. The second analysis focuses on the definition of the alerting criteria needed to inform the UAS operator of a potential loss of well clear. All analyses are conducted in a NAS-wide fast-time simulation environment using UAS aircraft models, proposed UAS missions, and historical air defense radar data to populate the background traffic operating under visual flight rules. The results presented in this study inform the safety case, requirements development, and the operational environment for DAA minimum operational performance standards.

Safety↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Impact of Airborne Radar Uncertainties on Detect-and-Avoid Systems’ Performance

Impact of sensor uncertainty on Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) systems’ performance is investigated. Key metrics analyzed are the loss of DAA well clear ratio, the near-mid-air-collision risk ratio, the alert ratio, and the number of maneuvers per loss of DAA well clear. Sensitivity of these metrics to the magnitude of sensor uncertainty, pilots’ selection of maneuver, and surveillance range is investigated. Benefits of a dynamic buffer around the DAA well clear separation boundary, computed based on track accuracies, are also analyzed. These metrics are computed from open- and closed-loop simulations of a large number of representative encounters between an unmanned aircraft system and a manned aircraft. Results show that sensor uncertainty degrades safety metrics considerably but has only a minor effect on the number of maneuvers per loss of DAA well clear. The number of maneuvers, nonetheless, can be reduced by a 5◦ buffer away from the edge of the range of conflict-resulting heading in pilots’ selection of maneuver.

UAS↗

NASA NTRS2012

Concepts of Integration for UAS Operations in the NAS

One of the major challenges facing the integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) is the lack of an onboard pilot that can comply with the legal requirement identified in the US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) that pilots see and avoid other aircraft. UAS will be expected to demonstrate the means to perform the function of see and avoid while preserving the safety level of the airspace and the efficiency of the air traffic system. This paper introduces a Sense and Avoid (SAA) concept for integration of UAS into the NAS that is currently being developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and identifies areas that require additional experimental evaluation to further inform various elements of the concept. The concept design rests on interoperability principles that take into account both the Air Traffic Control (ATC) environment as well as existing systems such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). Specifically, the concept addresses the determination of well clear values that are large enough to avoid issuance of TCAS corrective Resolution Advisories, undue concern by pilots of proximate aircraft and issuance of controller traffic alerts. The concept also addresses appropriate declaration times for projected losses of well clear conditions and maneuvers to regain well clear separation.

Consiglio, Maria C.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) Integration into the National Airspace System (NAS)

NASA's Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) integration into the National Air Space (NAS) project has been working closely with the FAA and RTCA Special Committee 228 to identify and break down barriers to UAS integration. A focus of this work is on detect and avoid (DAA) technologies. A pilot has responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft and to remain "well clear," using their best judgment (Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Sec. 91.113). For UAS to perform this function, the see function is replaced by sensors to detect the other aircraft. Secondly, the pilot judgment of well clear has to be replaced by a mathematical expression. For Phase 1 of this effort, a well clear violation was defined if all three of these conditions are true: a) the horizontal clearance is less than 4000 ft., and b) the vertical clearance is less than 450 ft., and c) the time to loss of well clear is less than 35 seconds. This definition was developed with a great deal of community input and testing to ensure interoperability with Air Traffic Control (ATC) and pilots of manned aircraft. Appropriate guidance, alerting and displays were developed to allow UAS, with the appropriate sensors, to effectively maintain well clear. This work contributed to FAA Technical Standard Orders: TSO-C211, Detect and Avoid and TSO-C212, ATAR for Traffic Surveillance. Phase 2 of this work extends the operational environment to include the terminal area and lesser capable aircraft that might not have the payload capability to carry the RADAR defined in Phase 1. This session reports on work from Phase 1 and initial work in Phase 2.

UAS↗

NASA NTRS2018

Detect and Avoid: Efforts from NASA's UAS Integration into the NAS Project

Detect and Avoid (DAA)↗

NASA NTRS2019

Detect-and-Avoid Alerting Performance for High-Speed UAS and Non-Cooperative Aircraft

This paper presents a set of experiments designed to assess the viability of using a smaller Detect and Avoid (DAA) volume for large Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) when they are trying to remain well clear of non-cooperative visual flight rules (VFR) aircraft, in compliance with Federal regulations. The current DAA volume was defined for both cooperative and non-cooperative VFR traffic by the work of RTCA Special Committee 228 in 2017, in what is referred to in this paper as the Phase 1 standards. Subsequent work by the committee has been focused on enabling operations by smaller UAS that cannot carry the heavy radars required for the Phase 1 DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). The work discussed in this paper will explore whether a Phase 1 UAS using a Phase 1 radar can use the reduced non-cooperative DAA alerting volume being studied for smaller, slower Phase 2 UAS without significantly degrading system safety. The study uses UAS models and background traffic from previous Phase 1 and Phase 2 research to run an unmitigated simulation that will examine alerting performance using different DAA well clear definitions. The primary metrics are also tied to the alerting performance of the DAA system, and include average alerting times, probabilities of missed and late alerts, and the probability of a near mid-air collision given a loss of "well clear," as defined by the DAA system. Results are expected to help RTCA make the determination whether or not the DAA well clear definition for Phase 1 UAS can be reduced for non-cooperative VFR aircraft.

Cone, Andrew C.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Detect-and-Avoid Alerting Performance for High-Speed UAS and Non-Cooperative Aircraft

This paper presents a set of experiments designed to assess the viability of using a smaller Detect and Avoid (DAA) volume for large Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) when they are trying to remain well clear of non-cooperative visual flight rules (VFR) aircraft, in compliance with Federal regulations. The current DAA volume was defined for both cooperative and non-cooperative VFR traffic by the work of RTCA (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) Special Committee 228 in 2017, in what is referred to in this paper as the Phase 1 standards. Subsequent work by the committee has been focused on enabling operations by smaller UAS that cannot carry the heavy radars required for the Phase 1 DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). The work discussed in this paper will explore whether a Phase 1 UAS using a Phase 1 radar can use the reduced non-cooperative DAA alerting volume being studied for smaller, slower Phase 2 UAS without significantly degrading system safety. The study uses UAS models and background traffic from previous Phase 1 and Phase 2 research to run an unmitigated simulation that will examine alerting performance using different DAA well clear definitions. The primary metrics are also tied to the alerting performance of the DAA system, and include average alerting times, probabilities of missed and late alerts, and the probability of a near mid-air collision given a loss of "well clear," as defined by the DAA system. Results are expected to help RTCA make the determination whether or not the DAA well clear definition for Phase 1 UAS can be reduced for non-cooperative VFR aircraft.

UAS↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Helicopter Pilot Assessments of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System XR With Automated Maneuvering

The Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X) is a next-generation collision avoidance tool developed to support different aircraft types and operations. The rotorcraft variant – referred to as ACAS XR – is designed to accommodate existing helicopter platforms as well as in-development, electric vertical takeoff and landing concepts, which are critical to the emerging concept of operations referred to as Advanced Air Mobility. The fundamental role of ACAS XR is to provide Detect and Avoid (DAA) and/or Collision Avoidance (CA) protection against airborne traffic. DAA alerting and guidance in the context of ACAS XR is caution-level and “suggestive,” and is to be used by the pilot if, and when, they decide to maneuver against an identified threat to DAA “well clear.” The CA alerting, by contrast, is warning-level and “directive,” with the pilot required to comply with the associated guidance to prevent a predicted Near Midair Collision (NMAC). The CA alerts generated by ACAS XR are referred to as Resolution Advisories (RAs) consistent with previous CA systems. Unlike earlier CA systems, ACAS XR issues RAs in the horizontal and vertical dimensions as well as multi-axis RAs (referred to as “Blended” RAs). According to the Minimal Operational Performance Standards of DAA systems for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, maneuvers to comply with RAs may be automated, whereas maneuvers based on DAA alerting assume a manual response. The current study was a human-in-the-loop simulation that presented rotorcraft pilots with ACAS XR alerts and guidance in a fixed-base eVTOL simulator with varying levels of automation. Objective results showed that pilots complied with all RAs within the expected 5-second time window and responded to DAA alerts quicker than in earlier studies with ACAS XU. Pilots often made larger horizontal deviations during Manual RAs, but often favored vertical and blended maneuvers. No NMACs occurred, and losses of well clear were mainly attributed to the obligation of the pilots and system to maneuver only after the CA phase of the encounter had begun. Other losses were due to pilots’ noncompliance or disregard for ACAS XR’s alerting and guidance. Noncompliance with RAs most frequently occurred when pilots determined they were too close to the terrain to continue to follow Descend RAs, performing vertical maneuvers instead of following Horizontal RAs, or rejecting Horizontal RA updates because they felt that enough maneuvering had been performed. Subjectively, pilots found the DAA and RA alerting and guidance intuitive and useful for VFR helicopter operations. Slightly more pilots preferred the Automated RA condition to the Manual RA condition. Lastly, they also felt that ACAS led to occasional unsafe Descend RAs. Caveats and future implications are discussed.

eVTOL↗