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Materials inventory management manual

This NASA Materials Inventory Management Manual (NHB 4100.1) is issued pursuant to Section 203(c)(1) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (42 USC 2473). It sets forth policy, performance standards, and procedures governing the acquisition, management and use of materials. This Manual is effective upon receipt.

Source record↗

Materials Inventory Database for the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program

Scientific research involves the purchasing, processing, characterization, and fabrication of many sample materials. The history of such materials can become complicated over their lifetime – materials might be cut into pieces or moved to various storage locations, for example. A database with built-in functions to track these kinds of processes facilitates well-organized research. The Material Inventory Database Accounting System (MIDAS) is an easy-to-use tracking and reference system for such items. The Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program (LWRS), which seeks to advance the long-term reliability and productivity of existing nuclear reactors in the United States through multiple research pathways, proposed MIDAS as an efficient way to organize and track all items used in its research. The database software ensures traceability of all items used in research using built-in functions which can emulate actions on tracked items – fabrication, processing, splitting, and more – by performing operations on the data. MIDAS can recover and display the complete history of any item as a simple report. To ensure the database functions suitably for the organization of research, it was developed alongside a specific experiment to test accident tolerant nuclear fuel cladding under the LWRS Advanced Light Water Reactor Nuclear Fuels Pathway. MIDAS kept track of materials used in this experiment from receipt at the laboratory through all processes, test conduct and, ultimately, post-test analysis. By the end of this process, the database proved to be right tool for this program. The database software will help LWRS more efficiently conduct research experiments, from simple characterization tests to in-reactor experiments. Furthermore, MIDAS is a universal tool that any other research team could use to organize their material inventory.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Radioactive Material Inventory Optimization Using the Plutonium-239 Equivalent Curie Methodology

ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to provide the technical basis for application of the Plutonium 239 equivalent curies (PEC) concept used to optimize and limit the material-at-risk (MAR) in the Irradiated Materials Characterization Laboratory (IMCL) located at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC). The PEC concept offers a method to normalize all radionuclides to a common radiotoxic hazard index that can be summed to a single value. This paper describes the technical approach to applying the PEC concept, documents the weighting factors and specific activities to be utilized in the calculation, and provides an example of the application of the concept to a radionuclide distribution that is representative of materials encountered in the IMCL. The IMCL is operated to provide a dynamic, re-configurable capability to analyze and characterize irradiated or non-irradiated radioactive material samples. The operations unique to the IMCL include sample storage, preparation, and analysis using experiment-specific instrumentation such as, Electron probe micro-analyzer (EPMA), Focused ion beam (FIB), Transmission electron microscope (TEM), and Scanning electron microscope (SEM). The methodology used to characterize the radioactive material inventory enables the IMCL to operate in such a way that complements their capability and program goals without compromising the safety of the worker, co-located worker, or the general public. The PEC concept offers a method in which all radionuclide inventory is normalized to a common radiotoxic hazard index that can be summed to a single value. The PEC concept is useful in the comparison of various material types for hazard categorization and for identifying worst-case and bounding inventory.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Characterization of Tank 9H Annulus Sample in Support of Residual Material Inventory Determinations

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was requested by Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC) to provide sample preparation and characterization of the Tank 9H annulus sample in support of Residual Material Inventory Determinations. One Tank 9H sample in three vials [HTF-9-25-13, HTF-9-25-14 and HTF-9-25-15], with each vial containing approximately 200 mL of the Tank 9H annulus salt solution, were delivered to the SRNL Shielded Cells for sample preparation and characterizations in February 2025. The density of the “as-received” solution contained in each of the three Tank 9H annulus sample vials were determined followed by a solid-liquid separation on each one using 0.45-micron Nalgene® nylon filter membranes. The resulting filtrates were combined to form the Tank 9H annulus sample with a total volume of about 600 mL. The combined wet solid fractions, about a total of 4.8 grams of salt material, remaining on the filter membranes were air-dried in the Shielded Cells for 72 hours. The total weight of the air-dried solids was 2.1 grams. These air-dried solids were washed with deionized water (DI water) at a phase ratio of 60 mL DI water/gram of solids to recover insoluble solids, if any. No visible or measurable quantity of insoluble solids were recovered after DI water washing of the air-dried solids because the air-dried solids completely dissolved in the DI water. The solid fraction-wash water was not combined with the 600 mL of the filtrate solution, and the resulting solution was not screened or analyzed for radionuclides. Aliquot sample volumes of the undiluted Tank 9H annulus sample were sent to the SRNL analytical services groups for radionuclides, elementals, anions and total mercury analysis by various methods including radiochemical separations/counting methods, inductively coupled plasma-atomic emission spectroscopy (ICP-AES), and Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectroscopy (ICP-MS) and special preparations. All sample analyses were performed in triplicate. This report presents the analytical characterization results for the Tank 9H annulus sample. The results are also reported where analytical methods yielded additional analytes, other than those requested by SRMC. In the characterization of the Tank 9H annulus sample, the detection limits for all the analytes, as specified in the Technical Task Request (TTR) and Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan (TTQAP), were met.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Calculation of the nuclear material inventory in a sealed vault by 3D radiation mapping

The paper relates to the determination of the amount of nuclear material contained in a closed, concrete lined vault at the Aktau fast breeder reactor in Kazakhstan. This material had been disposed into the vault after examination in an experimental hot cell directly above the vault. In order to comply with IAEA Safeguards requirements it was necessary to determine the total quantities of nuclear materials - enriched uranium and plutonium - that were held with Kazakhstan. Although it was possible to determine the inventory of all of the accessible nuclear material - the quantity remaining in the vault was unknown. As part of the Global Threat Reduction Programme the UK Government funded a project to determine the inventory of these nuclear materials in this vault. This involved drilling three penetrations through the concrete lined roof of the vault; this enabled the placement of lights and a camera into the vault through two penetrations; while the third penetration enabled a lightweight manipulator arm to be introduced into the vault. This was used to provide a detailed 3D mapping of the dose rate within the vault and it also enabled the collection of samples for radionuclide analysis. The deconvolution of the 3D dose rate profile within the vault enabled the determination of the gamma emitting source distribution on the floor and walls of the vault. The samples were analysed to determine the fingerprint of those radionuclides producing the gamma dose - namely {sup 137}Cs and {sup 60}Co - to the nuclear materials. The combination of the dose rate source terms on the surfaces of the vault and the fingerprint then enabled the quantities of nuclear materials to be determined. The project was a major success and enabled the Kazakhstan Government to comply with IAEA Safeguards requirements. It also enabled the UK DECC Ministry to develop a technology of national (and international) use. Finally the technology was well received by IAEA Safeguards as an acceptable methodology for future studies. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Technical Evaluation of Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Material Addition to Sludge Batch 11 (Rev. 1)

The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program involves discarding spent nuclear fuel that is currently stored in L-Basin to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for vitrification. The first ABD discards will occur during the preparation of Sludge Batch (SB) 11. Savannah River Mission Completion has requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory assess the technical gaps related to the increased gadolinium poisoning requirement and the impacts of performing the Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) process in Tank 51 with H-Canyon discards present. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of increasing the quantity of gadolinium (and related topics) from what was previously evaluated in the SRNL studies of gadolinium-poisoned ABD material solubility, the overall ABD flowsheet review, and increasing the fissile mass loading in glass: 1) Based on literature surveys, there is no indication that organic interactions with gadolinium will be significant at the high pH (typically >13) conditions of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities. Any interactions of gadolinium with organics in DWPF are not expected to adversely impact DWPF or downstream facilities. Thus, there is little-to-no residual risk from organic interactions with gadolinium [Gap closed]; 2) Adding depleted uranium to ABD material, targeting 235 U enrichment of 4.90% within each transfer window, will mitigate potential impacts from an increase in soluble 235 U enrichment during sludge washing and LTAD. The plan to take advantage of previous transfers and allow 235 U enrichment of >5% during the final transfer window carries a risk that Tank 51 supernate will have a 235 U enrichment of >5%, which should be evaluated for acceptance; 3) Increasing the gadolinium mass ratio to 3.0:1 Gd: 235 U(eq SLU ) should lead to the same or higher partitioning of gadolinium into the solid phase within the DWPF Chemical Process Cell, resulting in both liquid and solid phases with expected partitioning of Gd consistent with the prior solubility study [Gap closed for SB11]; 4) There are no expected impacts on DWPF melt temperature and melter operations due to the minimal ~0.2 weight percent (wt%) increase in Gd concentration relative to previous sludge batches [Gap closed for SB11]; 5) As observed previously, Gd is expected to enter the off-gas system via physical entrainment, but at a slightly higher concentration than what was observed for SB9 melter off-gas pluggage deposits (0.07 wt%) [Gap closed for SB11] ; 6) There are no expected impacts on DWPF recycle or the Recycle Collection Tank glycolate destruction process. [Gap closed for SB11]; 7) Gd is projected to be a trace component in the SB11 glass (<0.5 wt%) and can be ignored for process control. Trace components do not significantly impact glass durability, thus the conclusions of the previous Product Consistency Test evaluation at a fissile mass loading of 2,500 g fissile/m3 glass still applies to SB11. The ~0.1 wt% increase in Gd2O3 concentration relative to the previous study will not impact the predictability of SB11 glass with the DWPF Product Composition Control System (PCCS) models for durability or the acceptability of glass according to the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS) criterion for product consistency [Gap closed for SB11]; 8) No additional Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure testing is necessary for SB11 and the hazardous waste specification of the SB11 DWPF waste form is unchanged after the addition of the ABD stream [Gap closed for SB11]. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of adding two-thirds of the ABD material to Tank 51 prior to LTAD: 1) The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall aluminum mass from 1.39×10 4 kg to 1.64×10 4 kg (15.5% ABD Al). The form of the insoluble portion of the Al resulting from ABD addition should be the more readily dissolved Al(OH) 3 and amorphous forms. The portion of the ABD aluminum that is processed by LTAD is expected to be completely soluble, thus requiring that less of the boehmite in the sludge be dissolved to reach the same Al target in the SB. [Gap closed for SB11]; The expected LTAD impact on other components, as related primarily to the components in ABD, are discussed. Gd is expected to remain insoluble during LTAD and not impact the solubility of other components. [Gap closed for SB11]; The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 13,100 kg (63% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 89.5 kg (3.9% ABD Pu). The addition of all of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 16,100 kg (70% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 90.4 kg (5.3% ABD Pu). The 235 U enrichment will be ≤5%. The fissile uranium will be adequately poisoned by Gd and the fissile Pu will be adequately poisoned by Fe from the sludge. [Gap closed for SB11]; There is a low risk that ABD addition will impact the rheology or pumpability of the slurry. There is a low but higher risk of ABD addition prior to LTAD impacting the settling rate; Based on the evaluation of adding two-thirds of the ABD material and all of the ABD material prior to the LTAD process, there is no volume or mass limit that would need to be imposed on ABD additions prior to LTAD. [Gap closed for SB11]. Revision 1 of this report addresses a variation on the ABD additions and LTAD strategy where sodium hydroxide additions for LTAD may be performed intermittently or concurrently with an ABD addition window. The proposed change does not alter the conclusions of this evaluation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Leveraging Radiofrequency Identification Success Beyond Hazardous Material Inventory Management at a National Laboratory

Effective inventory management can be overshadowed by conflicting priorities in organizational procedures, particularly in research-focused institutions such as national laboratories that handle expensive, delicate, and hazardous materials. Here, this study investigated the potential of radiofrequency identification (RFID) technology, currently used for hazardous chemical inventory, in applications with higher metal interference and absorption, specifically pressure release device (PRD) compliance and nuclear container management, at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). This study was done to document best practices to enhance inventory identification speeds for inventory reconciliation and inventory recall and to explore optimal configurations for RFID implementation compared to traditional manual methods of equipment management. Tests were conducted to determine the ideal RFID tag orientation (read at angles of 0°, 90°, and 270°), various container layouts (linear, separated, curved, operational), and ID methods such as manual, barcode, and RFID performing three trials per method per orientation. Results indicated that 0° was the optimal read angle for minimizing metallic interference, and the operational and curved arrangements significantly outperformed the linear and separated configurations in read speed. 3D printed mounts were developed and tested, increasing the read range of the RFID reader by up to 235% in cases of high metallic interference. The RFID technology demonstrated an average speed increase of 65% over a simplified manual identification, which supports the conclusion that RFID is a more efficient method for large hazardous inventory management and equipment reconciliation. Additionally, capturing meta-data, such as location and date, can be used to query for inventory recall and automated updating of record information.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Technical Evaluation of Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Material Addition to Sludge Batch 11

Savannah River Nuclear Solutions has a need to discard spent nuclear fuel (SNF), currently stored in L Basin, to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for vitrification. The Department of Energy (DOE) has approved the Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) Program for discarding SNF via transfers from H-Canyon to the Savannah River Site (SRS) Liquid Waste (LW) system. The first ABD discards will occur during the preparation of Sludge Batch (SB) 11. An initial impact evaluation of the LW flowsheet was performed by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) prior to the approval of the ABD Program. This evaluation addressed the LW downstream facilities based on the current H-Canyon flowsheet sequence for the average ABD discard. The flowsheet evaluation only included aluminum-clad SNF, specifically Materials Test Reactor (MTR) fuel and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) fuel similar to the planned SB11 discard. Following this evaluation, the flowsheet has been slightly altered to address (i) new nuclear criticality safety controls for DWPF that credit a higher amount of gadolinium as a neutron poison for all of the enriched uranium contained in a SB and (ii) potential additions of the H-Canyon neutralized fuel stream prior to the Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) process in Tank 51. The early introduction of ABD material into the SB assembly process is being investigated to provide flexibility regarding transfer opportunities for H-Canyon to Tank 51 for SB11 and future sludge batches.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

LCA (Life Cycle Assessment) of Parabolic Trough CSP: Materials Inventory and Embodied GHG Emissions from Two-Tank Indirect and Thermocline Thermal Storage (Presentation)

In the United States, concentrating solar power (CSP) is one of the most promising renewable energy (RE) technologies for reduction of electric sector greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and for rapid capacity expansion. It is also one of the most price-competitive RE technologies, thanks in large measure to decades of field experience and consistent improvements in design. One of the key design features that makes CSP more attractive than many other RE technologies, like solar photovoltaics and wind, is the potential for including relatively low-cost and efficient thermal energy storage (TES), which can smooth the daily fluctuation of electricity production and extend its duration into the evening peak hours or longer. Because operational environmental burdens are typically small for RE technologies, life cycle assessment (LCA) is recognized as the most appropriate analytical approach for determining their environmental impacts of these technologies, including CSP. An LCA accounts for impacts from all stages in the development, operation, and decommissioning of a CSP plant, including such upstream stages as the extraction of raw materials used in system components, manufacturing of those components, and construction of the plant. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is undertaking an LCA of modern CSP plants, starting with those of parabolic trough design.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Tritium accountancy in fusion systems

The US Department of Energy (DOE) has clearly defined requirements for nuclear material control and accountability (MCA) of tritium whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not since tritium is not a fissile material. MCA requirements are expected for tritium fusion machines and will be dictated by the host country or regulatory body where the machine is operated. Material Balance Areas (MBA) are defined to aid in the tracking and reporting of nuclear material movements and inventories. Material sub-accounts (MSA) are established along with key measurement points (KMP) to further subdivide a MBA to localize and minimize uncertainties in the inventory difference (ID) calculations for tritium accountancy. Fusion systems try to minimize tritium inventory which may require continuous movement of material through the MSA. The ability of making meaningful measurements of these material transfers is described in terms of establishing the MSA structure to perform and reconcile ID calculations. For fusion machines, changes to the traditional ID equation will be discussed which includes breeding, burn-up, and retention of tritium in the fusion device. The concept of 'net' tritium quantities consumed or lost in fusion devices is described in terms of inventory taking strategies and how it is used to track the accumulation of tritium in components or fusion machines. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Flowsheet for the Neutralization of Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) Material

Under the Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program H-Canyon will be dissolving aluminum spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) and then neutralizing that solution without performing head-end strike or uranium recovery operations. After dissolution in H-Canyon the material will be neutralized to a free hydroxide concentration of either 0.6 M or 1.2 M to meet the waste acceptance criteria for transfer to the SRS Concentration, Storage and Transfer Facility (CSTF). In order to ensure the material could be successfully neutralized and transferred, SRNL completed experiments with simulated H-Canyon dissolver solutions. Two bounding simulants were developed based on the expected compositions of ASNF to be dissolved, one containing only Gd as the neutron poison and one containing Fe as an additional poison.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Review of non destructive assay techniques utilised for decommissioning of plutonium facilities at AWE - 14418

Over the past fifteen years AWE has decommissioned and size reduced a large number of glove boxes that contained a wide spectrum of equipment that ranged from highly radiation attenuating structures, such as furnaces and lathes, to other less radiation attenuating apparatus, such as small discrete tools or simple work benches. In order to generate meaningful glove box residual fissile material inventory data, which can constructively inform the selection of measures needed to underwrite the criticality safety of size reduction and consignment to waste activities, several different types of Non Destructive Assay (NDA) measurement techniques are available at AWE. These are deployed for the estimate of the residual fissile material inventory prior to decommissioning activities and for the final NDA of waste containers, post decommissioning. The techniques range from the Decommissioning In-Situ Plutonium Inventory Monitor (DISPIM), through other Neutron Coincidence Counting (NCC) techniques (Neutron Panel monitoring) and gamma measurements to consideration of Thermo Luminescent Detector (TLD) data. This paper will present a comparison of the fissile material identified in the waste generated post decommissioning operations to the NDA estimate of the residual fissile material inventory for the glove boxes, as well as provide a direct comparison between the different NDA techniques available at AWE. The findings to date indicate that the glove box residual fissile material inventory used for criticality safety purposes bounds the decommissioning process, subject to the suitable deployment of the NDA technique and the inclusion of appropriate uncertainties. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Waste Compliance and Tracking System (WCATS) Version 3 Requirements Document

This document describes the end-user requirements for the Waste Compliance and Tracking System (WCATS) project in accordance with the WCATS Software Quality Management Plan, EPC-WMP-WCATSPLAN-001. The WCATS application shall support the generation, characterization, processing, and shipment of LANL radioactive, hazardous, and industrial waste. Regulatory drivers include RCRA hazardous waste, DOT shipping, NNSA nuclear material control and accountability, DOE nuclear safety, TSDF permit, and transuranic waste certification requirements. The system will utilize a task-based architecture that supports the spectrum of treatment, storage, disposal, administrative, and characterization based unit operations necessary to manage waste from cradle to grave. The application design shall readily accommodate new facilities, processes, workflow, signature requirements, and so forth, via end-user established metadata. WCATS will provide support for representing waste storage and disposal facilities, buildings, rooms, and grid layouts (x, y, z) to support waste and radioactive material inventory management. Nuclear material at risk (MAR), DOE hazard rating (e.g., Category II facility) compliance per DOE-STD-1027, and permit inventory requirements will be configurable for any storage or disposal facility, or waste operation, and the system will automatically evaluate and enforce those requirements. In addition, the application will support the characterization and management of the entire range of hazardous and radioactive wastes (TRU, MTRU, LLW, MLLW, hazardous waste, etc.) that might be colocated or processed at a permitted facility. Some capabilities not found in traditional systems include user-defined tank systems for liquid waste, user-defined work paths (i.e., sequence of operations), and an equipment subsystem for tracking the calibration, maintenance, and inspection of tools used to process waste, such as torque wrenches, scales, pH probes, etc. The application incorporates a desktop and mobile user interface as shown in Figure 1. The mobile interface supports field operations, such as waste item characterization, intra-facility transfers, internal and external audits, and shipment preparation and receipt.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

New Capability at ORNL: High Precision Uranium Titration

Destructive analytical measurements establish a nuclear facility’s nuclear material inventory and inventory differences for Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control. A nuclear laboratory’s ability to perform accurate high-precision analytical measurements is key for tracking large inventories within a facility’s material balance areas and during production to track material movement through dynamic processes. For uranium, these measurements are made by using several established high-precision measurement protocols. These include isotope dilution mass spectrometry, gravimetry, and potentiometric titrations. Whatever measurement technique a nuclear lab chooses to use, reference materials (RMs) with certified attributes and accompanying uncertainties are used to calibrate measurement systems, and are the cornerstone for accurate results. In addition to calibration, RMs provide for metrological traceability, are used for method development and validation, and thus provide critical evaluations of the appropriateness and performance of analytical processes used. Evaluations may include validation that a method is fit-for-purpose, quantification of systematic and random biases, and the evaluation of long-term and short-term performance metrics. High-precision measurement techniques require that measured attributes be certified to a high degree of precision in the RMs used—ultimately, to a higher degree than that of the measurement technique itself. The US authority on the production of special nuclear material Certified Reference Materials is the NBL Program Office (NBLPO), formally known as New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL). The NBLPO is responsible for the sales and distribution of existing NBL certified reference materials (CRMs) and for the production of the next generation of nuclear RMs. To accomplish its mission, NBLPO is establishing key base capabilities within the DOE laboratory complex that formerly existed at the NBL laboratory. The Nuclear Analytical Chemistry (NAC) section within the Chemical Sciences Division (CSD) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is currently working with NBLPO to set up laboratory and measurement capabilities to provide measurements and capabilities for production and/or recertification of existing and future CRMs for uranium assay. The NBL-developed high-precision titration (HPT) method is a critically-evaluated, extremely precise and accurate primary method utilized for the determination of uranium content in a variety of uranium materials. The HPT method, combined with detailed balance weighing protocols, provides for an analytical methodology that is unsurpassed in precision and one in which all sources of error have been evaluated, a requirement of CRM certification. HPT capability within the United States was lost with the closure of the labs at NBL. The NAC has been collaborating with NBLPO to stand up and demonstrate the capability to perform uranium assay via HPT at ORNL. HPT can produce results with an expanded uncertainty of approximately 0.01% for pure uranium compounds, with typical precisions of <0.006%. The major tasks required to stand up the method at ORNL were the refurbishment of a dedicated lab and equipment setup, procedure development, analyst training, establishing method-specific quality assurance, and qualification of an analyst to perform the method. This report summarizes these tasks, outlines the documents drafted, and gives the outcome of the qualification titrations.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Advanced Algorithms for Scrutiny of Mandatory State Reports Declarations to the IAEA (Final Project Report)

In compliance with their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, based on INFCIRC/153 (corrected) (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1972), States Party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are obligated to declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all changes in their nuclear material inventory as well as movement of the material across boundaries of IAEA recognized material balance areas (MBA), inventories and nuclear material balances. This project addresses capabilities to detect irregularities in State reports, thus ensuring their accuracy and completeness, and in the broader context, States’ compliance with safeguards obligations of the NPT. A recent study (Henzl et al., 2022) (lead by this project’s PI) demonstrated how analysis of dynamic correlations in nuclear material movement within the entire fuel cycle of a State (viewed as a single system) can reveal variances consistent with and indicative of “irregular” activities. Expanding on this concept, novel ways to analyze State declarations themselves—again, for the State as a whole entity—will help the IAEA draw accurate safeguards conclusions and trust the validity and authenticity of Stategenerated declaration reports. Introducing new declaration analyses capabilities explored in this project will help to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State in general.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗