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At least 19 records

The 7 Year Evolution of EOS CA Support for Planning & Executing Risk Mitigation Maneuvers

This presentation will discuss the evolution of Collision Avoidance (CA) support for planning and executing Risk Mitigation Maneuvers (RMMs) for the Earth Observing System (EOS) Aqua, Aura, and Terra satellites within the seven-year period of January 2015 through December 2021. Several enhancements were implemented by the EOS team to expedite and improve the RMM planning and execution process, including updates to High Interest Event (HIE) analysis, maneuver preparation, maneuver ephemeris generation, conjunction event data screening, and maneuver commanding. As of 2022, these advancements allow the EOS team to plan and execute an RMM within 5 hours of identification with an accurate and low-risk solution. This represents a vast improvement from the 30 hours required to turn around an RMM back in 2015. In addition, the current process is substantially less error prone. Details of this progression and the specific aspects of each supporting component are explicated in the content of the presentation.

Syed Hasan

Maneuver Planning for Conjunction Risk Mitigation with Ground-track Control Requirements

The planning of conjunction Risk Mitigation Maneuvers (RMM) in the presence of ground-track control requirements is analyzed. Past RMM planning efforts on the Aqua, Aura, and Terra spacecraft have demonstrated that only small maneuvers are available when ground-track control requirements are maintained. Assuming small maneuvers, analytical expressions for the effect of a given maneuver on conjunction geometry are derived. The analytical expressions are used to generate a large trade space for initial RMM design. This trade space represents a significant improvement in initial maneuver planning over existing methods that employ high fidelity maneuver models and propagation.

McKinley, David

Testing of Advanced Capabilities to Enable In-time Safety Management and Assurance for Future Flight Operations

In order to refine an initial Concept of Operations, explore Concepts of Use, and expose/validate requirements for future In-Time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS), testing architectures were created, along with a set of capabilities and underlying information exchange protocols. These systems were conceived and developed based on hazards associated with two envisioned urban area flight domains: (1) highly autonomous small uncrewed aerial systems (sUAS) operating at low altitudes, and (2) highly autonomous air taxis. The initial scope of this development is described in [1]; this report provides an update, focusing on the subsequent developments and test activities. As stated in [1], it is important to note that there are many capabilities already in use by the industry (or soon to be in use) that will play critical roles in future IASMS designs. Those reported here were developed to address a gap in the current state-of-the-art regarding specific hazards/risks, and/or to allow for investigation of the interplay between and across hazard types — particularly regarding how overall safety risk can be reduced or managed effectively. Results of testing and development activities are organized by the operational phase wherein a particular capability would be employed (i.e., preflight, in-flight, and post-flight/off-line). Pre-flight: A set of capabilities were developed to help mitigate safety risk prior to flight (e.g., during flight and mission planning). Results of testing summarize (1) validation activities to raise the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and (2) evaluation activities where the capabilities were applied to flight/mission planning procedures and used by operators/pilots. For the latter, flight plans were automatically assessed, and operators/pilots were notified of hazardous flight segments so as to enable adjustment of the flight plan and re-evaluation, and/or to better inform go/no-go decisions. Capabilities addressed hazards associated with power consumption, third-party risk, wind, navigation system performance, radiofrequency interference, and proximity to geo-spatial threats (e.g., buildings, trees, and no-fly zones). In-flight: Flight experiments tested capabilities that detect and respond to hazards encountered during flight. In the first series, safety hazards were monitored and assessed onboard, and system-generated mitigation maneuvers were recorded (but not acted upon by the vehicle). In the second series, mitigation maneuver commands directed the aircraft in response to safety hazards (i.e., auto-mitigation). The sUAS used for testing is described in full, as is the test architecture, which included commercial avionics, research avionics, and onboard software designed to detect, assess, and respond to hazards. The onboard system was designed as a run-time assurance framework, consistent with [2] and supportive of both supervisory and automated modes. The primary functions included: real-time risk assessment (RTRA), auto-pilot monitoring, constraint monitoring, and contingency select/triggering. RTRA performs integrated risk assessment considering data from several hazard-related monitors (e.g., battery, motors, navigation, communications, population density, and loss-of-control). Post-flight/off-line: Data monitored and recorded during flights can enable IASMS capabilities that execute after flights have completed (or “off-line”). These include: (1) the ability to identify anomalies and trends that may only be observable when comparing data spanning a number of similar flights; (2) the ability to update and validate pre-flight and in-flight capabilities and any underlying models to improve their performance; (3) the ability to report anomalies/off-nominals that may indicate design changes or maintenance actions are needed; and (4) the ability for humans involved in operations to report safety-relevant observations to help in understanding the flight data and/or the operational context of a flight. Progress on three such capabilities is summarized; the first investigates anomaly detection given a limited set of flight logs and applies an approach previously used for space operations. The second explores what could be identified using a larger set of flight logs, including from web-based forums where flight logs are posted by sUAS autopilot users. The third creates a new means of collecting information on UAS incidents and accidents via the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS).

sUAS

Wald Sequential Probability Ratio Test for Space Object Conjunction Assessment

This paper shows how satellite owner/operators may use sequential estimates of collision probability, along with a prior assessment of the base risk of collision, in a compound hypothesis ratio test to inform decisions concerning collision risk mitigation maneuvers. The compound hypothesis test reduces to a simple probability ratio test, which appears to be a novel result. The test satisfies tolerances related to targeted false alarm and missed detection rates. This result is independent of the method one uses to compute the probability density that one integrates to compute collision probability. A well-established test case from the literature shows that this test yields acceptable results within the constraints of a typical operational conjunction assessment decision timeline. Another example illustrates the use of the test in a practical conjunction assessment scenario based on operations of the International Space Station.

Navigation

Establishment and Implementation of a Close Approach Evaluation and Avoidance Process for Earth Observing System Missions

In the fall of 2004, the Earth Science Mission Operations Project tasked the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSPC) Flight Dynamics Analysis Branch with establishment of a process to protect the high-value Earth Observing System (EOS) missions (Terra, Aqua, and Aura) from close approaches with space debris and other orbiting objects. An agreement between GSFC and the United States Strategic Command was put in place so that close approach predictions would be routinely generated. This paper describes the ESMO conjunction assessment process for the EOS satellites. Process details, including tools and algorithms developed, are discussed. Particular details for a predicted close approach between Terra and a piece of space debris that resulted in the execution of a debris avoidance maneuver are included. This close approach example is described in detail fiom the first screening identification through execution of the mitigation maneuver to illustrate both the process and lessons learned fiom its implementation.

Newman, Lauri

Conjunction Assessment and Deconfliction Paradigm for Co-Located Satellite Constellations With on-Spacecraft “Autonomous” Flight Dynamics Control

Satellite constellations that employ on-spacecraft flight dynamics and conjunction assessment (CA) approaches face particular challenges. First, they must arrange to obtain and upload to the constellation satellite close approach information, such as Conjunction Data Messages, so that their on-board systems will have the data they need to make informed CA decisions. Second, given current latencies in obtaining CA screening information, such systems often cannot obtain dedicated screenings of their proposed maneuvers before they are executed. Third, they usually cannot engage in real time with owner/operators (O/Os) with whom they may come into conjunction, relying instead on pre-arranged courses of action that may or may not fit a given situation well. Despite these difficulties, it is nonetheless possible, as operators such as SpaceX have demonstrated, to operate safely using on-board CA calculations, in the presence of a largely collaborative operating environment. The situation breaks down, however, when two constellations that operate with such a paradigm are placed in the same orbital region and will experience conjunctions with each other. Each may have a vague idea of where the other’s satellites are, or perhaps even a somewhat precise idea if they exchange O/O ephemerides, but neither will know the other’s more immediate maneuver intentions, especially for situations in which they are in a high-risk conjunction with each other and a mitigation maneuver is required. As there is no formalized way for these automated systems to ascertain each other’s intentions for this type of conjunction, it is quite possible that each spacecraft may choose a maneuver that results in the two objects’ colliding. An opportunity to develop a solution to this problem was presented by the NASA “Starling” project, a small experimental constellation developed to demonstrate autonomous satellite control and constellation reconfiguration and for which a launch was obtained that, serendipitously, will place this constellation close to the SpaceX Starlink constellation. Because the NASA constellation is experimental, an extended mission part of the mission has been negotiated to implement and test mechanisms for resolving the problem of co-located constellations with on-board flight dynamics control. For the last eighteen months, a consortium among NASA Ames (the Starling satellite providers), NASA CARA (the Agency organization responsible for conjunction assessment), Space X, and the Department of Commerce (in observer status) has met regularly to assemble a concept of operations for a robust solution to this problem and has developed a prototype ground node that will serve as a needed CA screening and information dispensary. The approach and methods, as well as the active employment of the developed ground node, will be tested both in simulation before actual use and then in actual spacecraft operations, which are anticipated to begin in January 2024. This paper will describe the co-located autonomously-controlled constellation problem and the developed solution in detail, outlining what ground node (i.e., government) infrastructure and features are required, what particular capabilities are needed by the constellations themselves in order to make use of this deconfliction paradigm, and the migration path forward to allow such a capability set to be incorporated by the Department of Commerce’s space traffic coordination system.

Conjunction Assessment

Decision Aid for Conjunction Risk Mitigation by Differential Drag

In the previous five years, the rate of conjunctions that the NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) team processed and analyzed has more than tripled. (NASA CARA, 2024) New missions in the early development phases are now required to plan for dealing with conjunctions under the present space environment, and also projecting forward into a future likely with even further increased utilization of the space environment. Some missions are investigating the possibility of using differential drag to remediate conjunctions without expending limited fuel or for missions without propulsive capabilities. The NASA CARA team studied the historical record of conjunctions to evaluate the circumstances under which differential drag may be successfully applied and have developed a series of tables to use as a decision aid for missions considering differential drag. CARA records all conjunctions of their protected payloads, with historical records starting in 2005 (with significant conjunction events starting to occur on or after 2013). From this record, approximately 7,300 had a probability of collision (Pc) greater than 1 in 10,000, the nominal requirement for a risk mitigation maneuver (RMM) to be made per NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8079.1 (NASA, 2023), at 3 days prior to the time of closest approach, the time analyzed for differential drag efficacy. CARA’s maneuver trade space tool (MTS) was used to prop-agate the primary satellite forward from that decision point with varying degrees of increase to ballistic coefficient (BC), and then recalculate the Pc to evaluate whether or not the conjunction was mitigated (Pc < 3E-6). These results were then binned and sorted along several axes, including altitude, amount of delta-BC, and (pre-maneuver) rate of energy dissipation, to identify underlying patterns. The altitude plot is shown in Figure 1. We found that differential drag was most successful for satellites with perigees below 560 km, and which could adopt an average delta-BC of 2 or greater (that is, increasing their ballistic coefficient by a factor of 3). However, this is a difficult threshold for a mission to clear; very few spacecraft are capable of adopting a high-drag configuration for 72 hours continuously. Planet’s Dove spacecraft use differential drag to remediate conjunctions (Griffith, et al., 2021), and they have a maximum delta-BC factor of 9, but in practice (with mission and charging constraints) they achieve a time-averaged delta-BC that is closer to 2 (Foster, et al., 2017). In contrast, a NASA mission in development reached out to CARA to evaluate the utility of differential drag to remediate potential conjunctions for a spacecraft which is capable of a similar high delta-BC, but with operational constraints that limit their time-averaged delta-BC to less than 1. CARA has developed tables that can be used as decision aids to advise missions-in-development about the best way to utilize their differential drag capabilities. For missions below 560 km with the operational flexibility to devote multiple days to holding a high-drag configuration (or a sufficiently high drag ratio to compensate for limitations on that time), they are able to successfully remediate high-risk conjunctions. Conversely, missions that do not meet these ex-acting criteria – most missions – can instead be advised to use on-board propulsion systems to perform RMMs or to turn their minimum-area face towards the approach vector, thereby reducing Pc at the moment of conjunction. (NASA, 2023)

risk mitigation

Aeroservoelastic Control Law Development for the Integrated Adaptive Wing Technology Maturation Wind-Tunnel Test

The NASA Advanced Air Transport Technology (AATT) Project seeks to “explore and develop technologies and concepts for improved energy efficiency and environmental compatibility for fixed wing subsonic transports” [1]. The IAWTM project is a subproject within AATT and is a joint Boeing/NASA effort to, in part, demonstrate the active control systems necessary to employ high-aspect ratio wings for improved aerodynamic efficiency. The aircraft configuration under study for the IAWTM project is a generic jet transport based on the NASA Common Research Model (CRM) whose wing aspect ratio has been increased to 13.5 (as opposed to nominal CRM aspect ratio of 9) and whose development is given in Ref. [2]. A semi-span model of the high-aspect-ratio CRM with 10 trailing edge control surfaces is currently being fabricated and will be delivered to the NASA Langley Transonic Dynamics Tunnel (TDT). There, several tests will be conducted to demonstrate maneuver load alleviation (MLA), gust load alleviation (GLA), active flutter suppression (AFS), and drag reduction, all at transonic conditions. A layout of the wind tunnel model is shown in Fig. 1. The wind-tunnel model is a spar/pod wing design with a relatively rigid fuselage attached to a mounting structure (seen in Fig. 1), which in turn is attached to a load balance behind the tunnel wall. Shims exist that can be attached to force the load to go through the fuselage rather than through the balance so as not to damage the balance in the event of flutter. The spar/pod design is similar to that used in the Boeing truss-braced wing aeroelastic model tested in the TDT in 2013 [3]. There is a central spar running the span of the wing to which the pods are attached that form the aerodynamic shape of the wing. The pods are constructed of ribs for attachment to the spar and skins to create the outer mold line. There are ten active control surfaces that will be used for the test objectives discussed above. Three of these (two outboard ailerons and one inboard aileron) are high-speed electrohydraulic actuators, and the remaining seven are low-speed mini-plane flaps, which have slower servo motors that will be used primarily for drag and maneuver load reductions. Control laws must be developed for each test (MLA, GLA, AFS, and drag reduction) and must be able to work in tandem when two or more control strategies are being tested simultaneously (e.g., when control laws to mitigate maneuver loads and gust loads operate simultaneously). The development of these control laws requires accurate mathematical representations of the aerodynamics, structural dynamics, and control surface dynamics of the system. Taken together, this mathematical representation—which is often in state-space form— is the ASE model. Three low-order ASE models of differing fidelities were developed for the IAWTM test and will be presented here. The differences in fidelity appeared in the aerodynamic modeling—one model assumed purely linear aerodynamics, while the other two models used different techniques to linearize the aerodynamics about a nonlinear mean. Furthermore, simple observer-based full-state feedback controllers for each test (MLA, GLA, AFS, and drag reduction) were designed from these low-order ASE models and implemented in a higher-order, nonlinear computational ASE simulation to assess the effectiveness of each controller. Observers were designed from each of the three lower-order ASE models, and each (linear) observer was then used as an estimate of the nonlinear dynamics of the system. Using the estimated states and the full-state feedback controller, control surface commands were fed back to the higher-order, nonlinear ASE system. The insight gained during this development will be applied to control law development for the physical IAWTM wind-tunnel test.

Josiah M Waite

Conjunction Assessment Techniques and Operational Results from the Magnetospheric Multiscale Mission

This paper will describe the results that have been obtained to date during the MMS mission concerning conjunction assessment. MMS navigation makes use of a weak-signal GPS-based system: this allows signals to be received even when MMS is flying above the GPS orbits, producing a highly accurate determination of the four MMS orbits. This data is downlinked to the MMS Mission Operations Center (MOC) and used by the Flight Dynamics Operations Area (FDOA) for both maneuver design and conjunction assessment. The MMS fly in tetrahedron formations around apogee, in order to collect simultaneous particles and fields science data. The original plan was to fly tetrahedra between 10 and 160 km in size; however, after Phase 1a of the mission, the science team requested that smaller sizes be flown if feasible. After analysis (to be detailed in a companion paper), a new minimum size of 7 km was decided upon. Flying at this reduced scale size makes conjunction assessment between the MMS spacecraft even more important: the methods that are used by the MMS FDOA to address this problem will be described in the paper, and a summary given of the previous analyses that went into the development of these techniques. Details will also be given of operational experiences to date. Finally, two CA mitigation maneuver types that have been designed (but never yet required to actually be performed) will also be outlined.

conjunction Assessment

Current-State Constrained Filter Bank for Wald Testing of Spacecraft Conjunctions

We propose a filter bank consisting of an ordinary current-state extended Kalman filter, and two similar but constrained filters: one is constrained by a null hypothesis that the miss distance between two conjuncting spacecraft is inside their combined hard body radius at the predicted time of closest approach, and one is constrained by an alternative complementary hypothesis. The unconstrained filter is the basis of an initial screening for close approaches of interest. Once the initial screening detects a possibly risky conjunction, the unconstrained filter also governs measurement editing for all three filters, and predicts the time of closest approach. The constrained filters operate only when conjunctions of interest occur. The computed likelihoods of the innovations of the two constrained filters form a ratio for a Wald sequential probability ratio test. The Wald test guides risk mitigation maneuver decisions based on explicit false alarm and missed detection criteria. Since only current-state Kalman filtering is required to compute the innovations for the likelihood ratio, the present approach does not require the mapping of probability density forward to the time of closest approach. Instead, the hard-body constraint manifold is mapped to the filter update time by applying a sigma-point transformation to a projection function. Although many projectors are available, we choose one based on Lambert-style differential correction of the current-state velocity. We have tested our method using a scenario based on the Magnetospheric Multi-Scale mission, scheduled for launch in late 2014. This mission involves formation flight in highly elliptical orbits of four spinning spacecraft equipped with antennas extending 120 meters tip-to-tip. Eccentricities range from 0.82 to 0.91, and close approaches generally occur in the vicinity of perigee, where rapid changes in geometry may occur. Testing the method using two 12,000-case Monte Carlo simulations, we found the method achieved a missed detection rate of 0.1%, and a false alarm rate of 2%.

Carpenter, J. Russell

Sequential Wald Test Employing a Constrained Filter Bank: Application to Spacecraft Conjunctions

A binary Wald sequential probability ratio test that uses the residuals of norm-inequality-constrained Kalman filters for its likelihood ratio may be employed for a class of compound hypothesis tests on non-stationary systems. The hypotheses concern an inequality constraint on the norm of some elements of the system state. Each of two filters minimizes the summed-squares of its estimation errors subject to one or the other direction of the inequality constraint. This solution is motivated by the problem of satellite conjunction assessment, wherein the constraint concerns the close approach distance between two space objects. The outcome of the test can inform decisions concerning risk mitigation maneuvers.

J. Russell Carpenter

In-flight Testing of the Injection of the LISA Pathfinder Test Mass into a Geodesic

LISA Pathfinder is a technology demonstrator space mission, aimed at testing key technologies for detecting gravitational waves in space. The mission is the precursor of LISA, the first space gravitational waves observatory, whose launch is scheduled for 2034. The LISA Pathfinder scientific payload includes two gravitational reference sensors (GRSs), each one containing a test mass (TM), which is the sensing body of the experiment. A mission critical task is to set each TM into a pure geodesic motion, i.e. guaranteeing an extremely low acceleration noise in the sub-Hertz frequency bandwidth. The grabbing positioning and release mechanism (GPRM), responsible for the injection of the TM into a geodesic trajectory, was widely tested on ground, with the limitations imposed by the 1-g environment. The experiments showed that the mechanism, working in its nominal conditions, is capable of releasing the TM into free-fall fulfilling the very strict constraint imposed on the TM residual velocity, in order to allow its capture on behalf of the electrostatic actuation. However, the first in-flight releases produced unexpected residual velocity components, for both the TMs. Moreover, all the residual velocity components were greater than maximum value set by the requirements. The main suspect is that unexpected contacts took place between the TM and the surroundings bodies. As a consequence, ad hoc manual release procedures had to be adopted for the few following injections performed during the nominal mission. These procedures still resulted in non compliant TM states which were captured only after impacts. However, such procedures seem not practicable for LISA, both for the limited repeatability of the system and for the unmanageable time lag of the telemetry/telecommand signals (about 4400 s). For this reason, at the end of the mission, the GPRM was deeply tested in-flight, performing a large number of releases, according to different strategies. The tests were carried out in order to understand the unexpected dynamics and limit its effects on the final injection. Some risk mitigation maneuvers have been tested aimed at minimizing the vibration of the system at the release and improving the alignment between the mechanism and the TM. However, no overall optimal release strategy to be implemented in LISA could be found, because the two GPRMs behaved differently.

LISA

Integration of Automated Systems (IAS) Flight Test Overview

The Integration of Automated Systems (IAS) Project is conducting a series of 2023 flight tests supporting NASA's Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) and National Campaign efforts. These flights include crewed, test (i.e., ownship) and traffic (i.e., intruder) aircraft that will fly with unique technologies onboard. The presentation will include overviews of the Hazard Perception and Avoidance (HPA) and Flight Path Management (FPM) technical areas but will focus primarily on HPA. HPA will test the FAA's Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X), a next-generation collision avoidance tool developed to support different aircraft types and operations. The rotorcraft variant, ACAS Xr, is designed to accommodate existing helicopter platforms and in-development, vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) concepts, which are critical to the emerging AAM concept of operations. Two configurations of ACAS Xr will be examined: Collision Avoidance System (CAS, similar to the Traffic Collision Avoidance System [TCAS] II) and Detect and Avoid (DAA, previously developed to provide added situational awareness for uncrewed aircraft). Additionally, this system will be explored during cruise and low-speed flight as well as flights within en-route, structured (i.e., dense/urban), and terminal airspaces. Scripted flight conflicts will be conducted, and these conflicts will be mitigated through maneuvers that are manual (i.e., performed by the pilots) or automated (i.e., achieved by the cooperation of the program middleware and onboard ownship systems). Objective data will be collected involving system and pilot performance as well as pilot decisions; subjective data will include pilot opinions of ACAS Xr's alerting and guidance as well as the automated maneuvers.

detect and avoid

G-Guidance Interface Design for Small Body Mission Simulation

The G-Guidance software implements a guidance and control (G and C) algorithm for small-body, autonomous proximity operations, developed under the Small Body GN and C task at JPL. The software is written in Matlab and interfaces with G-OPT, a JPL-developed optimization package written in C that provides G-Guidance with guaranteed convergence to a solution in a finite computation time with a prescribed accuracy. The resulting program is computationally efficient and is a prototype of an onboard, real-time algorithm for autonomous guidance and control. Two thruster firing schemes are available in G-Guidance, allowing tailoring of the software for specific mission maneuvers. For example, descent, landing, or rendezvous benefit from a thruster firing at the maneuver termination to mitigate velocity errors. Conversely, ascent or separation maneuvers benefit from an immediate firing to avoid potential drift toward a second body. The guidance portion of this software explicitly enforces user-defined control constraints and thruster silence times while minimizing total fuel usage. This program is currently specialized to small-body proximity operations, but the underlying method can be generalized to other applications.

Acikmese, Behcet

NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.

conjunction assessment

NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.

conjunction assessment

Decision Support Tool for Risk Assessment & Maneuver Planning in Collision Avoidance

As the quantity of orbital debris continues to grow, so too does the rate of conjunction messages that suggest possible collisions between high value payloads and debris. The abundance of these conjunction messages, and eventual misses, has led to a culture of ignored alerts, and an increase in satellite operation costs as a result of the frequent need to plan resources for maneuver planning and execution. The loss of “trust” in conjunction alerts is due to the poorly characterized evolution in probability of collision (Pc) as time approaches the time of closest approach (TCA) between two objects, as well as the interpretation of Pc in the context of maneuver planning. To address these problems, and in collaboration with the NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) program, the Industrial Sciences Group has developed a novel Maneuver Decision Support System (MDSS) to assist satellite operations in conjunction assessment and Maneuver planning. It provides a meaningful and intuitive Urgency metric for actionable maneuver decisions, based on the physical dynamics of conjunctions. It is based on a forecast of the evolution of Pc over time and represents an advance over current methods that are in use for satellite conjunction monitoring and planning. The result is to give satellite operators a validated decision support systems to plan for maneuver execution or mitigation or monitoring up to 3 days before TCA.

Decision Support Tool