Model checking for network security requirements via a flexible modeling framework
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model checking formal methods network security↗
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Model checking for network security requirements via a flexible modeling framework
This paper proposes an approach that mitigates the problem of verification of network security system properties over concurrent processes.
model checking formal methods networking↗
Proceedings of the Second NASA Formal Methods Symposium
This publication contains the proceedings of the Second NASA Formal Methods Symposium sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and held in Washington D.C. April 13-15, 2010. Topics covered include: Decision Engines for Software Analysis using Satisfiability Modulo Theories Solvers; Verification and Validation of Flight-Critical Systems; Formal Methods at Intel -- An Overview; Automatic Review of Abstract State Machines by Meta Property Verification; Hardware-independent Proofs of Numerical Programs; Slice-based Formal Specification Measures -- Mapping Coupling and Cohesion Measures to Formal Z; How Formal Methods Impels Discovery: A Short History of an Air Traffic Management Project; A Machine-Checked Proof of A State-Space Construction Algorithm; Automated Assume-Guarantee Reasoning for Omega-Regular Systems and Specifications; Modeling Regular Replacement for String Constraint Solving; Using Integer Clocks to Verify the Timing-Sync Sensor Network Protocol; Can Regulatory Bodies Expect Efficient Help from Formal Methods?; Synthesis of Greedy Algorithms Using Dominance Relations; A New Method for Incremental Testing of Finite State Machines; Verification of Faulty Message Passing Systems with Continuous State Space in PVS; Phase Two Feasibility Study for Software Safety Requirements Analysis Using Model Checking; A Prototype Embedding of Bluespec System Verilog in the PVS Theorem Prover; SimCheck: An Expressive Type System for Simulink; Coverage Metrics for Requirements-Based Testing: Evaluation of Effectiveness; Software Model Checking of ARINC-653 Flight Code with MCP; Evaluation of a Guideline by Formal Modelling of Cruise Control System in Event-B; Formal Verification of Large Software Systems; Symbolic Computation of Strongly Connected Components Using Saturation; Towards the Formal Verification of a Distributed Real-Time Automotive System; Slicing AADL Specifications for Model Checking; Model Checking with Edge-valued Decision Diagrams; and Data-flow based Model Analysis.
Munoz, Cesar↗
Toward Synthesis, Analysis, and Certification of Security Protocols
Implemented security protocols are basically pieces of software which are used to (a) authenticate the other communication partners, (b) establish a secure communication channel between them (using insecure communication media), and (c) transfer data between the communication partners in such a way that these data only available to the desired receiver, but not to anyone else. Such an implementation usually consists of the following components: the protocol-engine, which controls in which sequence the messages of the protocol are sent over the network, and which controls the assembly/disassembly and processing (e.g., decryption) of the data. the cryptographic routines to actually encrypt or decrypt the data (using given keys), and t,he interface to the operating system and to the application. For a correct working of such a security protocol, all of these components must work flawlessly. Many formal-methods based techniques for the analysis of a security protocols have been developed. They range from using specific logics (e.g.: BAN-logic [4], or higher order logics [12] to model checking [2] approaches. In each approach, the analysis tries to prove that no (or at least not a modeled intruder) can get access to secret data. Otherwise, a scenario illustrating the &tack may be produced. Despite the seeming simplicity of security protocols ("only" a few messages are sent between the protocol partners in order to ensure a secure communication), many flaws have been detected. Unfortunately, even a perfect protocol engine does not guarantee flawless working of a security protocol, as incidents show. Many break-ins and security vulnerabilities are caused by exploiting errors in the implementation of the protocol engine or the underlying operating system. Attacks using buffer-overflows are a very common class of such attacks. Errors in the implementation of exception or error handling can open up additional vulnerabilities. For example, on a website with a log-in screen: multiple tries with invalid passwords caused the expected error message (too many retries). but let the user nevertheless pass. Finally, security can be compromised by silly implementation bugs or design decisions. In a commercial VPN software, all calls to the encryption routines were incidentally replaced by stubs, probably during factory testing. The product worked nicely. and the error (an open VPN) would have gone undetected, if a team member had not inspected the low-level traffic out of curiosity. Also, the use secret proprietary encryption routines can backfire, because such algorithms often exhibit weaknesses which can be exploited easily (see e.g., DVD encoding). Summarizing, there is large number of possibilities to make errors which can compromise the security of a protocol. In today s world with short time-to-market and the use of security protocols in open and hostile networks for safety-critical applications (e.g., power or air-traffic control), such slips could lead to catastrophic situations. Thus, formal methods and automatic reasoning techniques should not be used just for the formal proof of absence of an attack, but they ought to be used to provide an end-to-end tool-supported framework for security software. With such an approach all required artifacts (code, documentation, test cases) , formal analyses, and reliable certification will be generated automatically, given a single, high level specification. By a combination of program synthesis, formal protocol analysis, certification; and proof-carrying code, this goal is within practical reach, since all the important technologies for such an approach actually exist and only need to be assembled in the right way.
Schumann, Johann↗
Automatic Generation of Algorithms for the Statistical Analysis of Planetary Nebulae Images
Analyzing data sets collected in experiments or by observations is a Core scientific activity. Typically, experimentd and observational data are &aught with uncertainty, and the analysis is based on a statistical model of the conjectured underlying processes, The large data volumes collected by modern instruments make computer support indispensible for this. Consequently, scientists spend significant amounts of their time with the development and refinement of the data analysis programs. AutoBayes [GF+02, FS03] is a fully automatic synthesis system for generating statistical data analysis programs. Externally, it looks like a compiler: it takes an abstract problem specification and translates it into executable code. Its input is a concise description of a data analysis problem in the form of a statistical model as shown in Figure 1; its output is optimized and fully documented C/C++ code which can be linked dynamically into the Matlab and Octave environments. Internally, however, it is quite different: AutoBayes derives a customized algorithm implementing the given model using a schema-based process, and then further refines and optimizes the algorithm into code. A schema is a parameterized code template with associated semantic constraints which define and restrict the template s applicability. The schema parameters are instantiated in a problem-specific way during synthesis as AutoBayes checks the constraints against the original model or, recursively, against emerging sub-problems. AutoBayes schema library contains problem decomposition operators (which are justified by theorems in a formal logic in the domain of Bayesian networks) as well as machine learning algorithms (e.g., EM, k-Means) and nu- meric optimization methods (e.g., Nelder-Mead simplex, conjugate gradient). AutoBayes augments this schema-based approach by symbolic computation to derive closed-form solutions whenever possible. This is a major advantage over other statistical data analysis systems which use numerical approximations even in cases where closed-form solutions exist. AutoBayes is implemented in Prolog and comprises approximately 75.000 lines of code. In this paper, we take one typical scientific data analysis problem-analyzing planetary nebulae images taken by the Hubble Space Telescope-and show how AutoBayes can be used to automate the implementation of the necessary anal- ysis programs. We initially follow the analysis described by Knuth and Hajian [KHO2] and use AutoBayes to derive code for the published models. We show the details of the code derivation process, including the symbolic computations and automatic integration of library procedures, and compare the results of the automatically generated and manually implemented code. We then go beyond the original analysis and use AutoBayes to derive code for a simple image segmentation procedure based on a mixture model which can be used to automate a manual preproceesing step. Finally, we combine the original approach with the simple segmentation which yields a more detailed analysis. This also demonstrates that AutoBayes makes it easy to combine different aspects of data analysis.
Fischer, Bernd↗
Integrating a flexible modeling framework (FMF) with the network security assessment instrument to reduce software security risk
This paper presents a portion of an overall research project on the generation of the network security assessment instrument to aid developers in assessing and assuring the security of software in the development and maintenance lifecycles.
security model checking formal methods↗
Using software security analysis to verify the secure socket layer (SSL) protocol
nal Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have tens of thousands of networked computer systems and applications. Software Security vulnerabilities present risks such as lost or corrupted data, information the3, and unavailability of critical systems. These risks represent potentially enormous costs to NASA. The NASA Code Q research initiative 'Reducing Software Security Risk (RSSR) Trough an Integrated Approach '' offers, among its capabilities, formal verification of software security properties, through the use of model based verification (MBV) to address software security risks. [1,2,3,4,5,6] MBV is a formal approach to software assurance that combines analysis of software, via abstract models, with technology, such as model checkers, that provide automation of the mechanical portions of the analysis process. This paper will discuss: The need for formal analysis to assure software systems with respect to software and why testing alone cannot provide it. The means by which MBV with a Flexible Modeling Framework (FMF) accomplishes the necessary analysis task. An example of FMF style MBV in the verification of properties over the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) communication protocol as a demonstration.
software↗
Recommendations on Evidence and Process for Certification of Learning-enabled Components in Aerospace Systems
This report primarily identifies a collection of relevant and necessary evidence for assurance of machine learnt components (MLCs)—also known as learning-enabled components—integrated into aircraft systems, and gives preliminary suggestions on the elements of a certification process that invoke the identified evidence. The main focus is on feedforward neural networks that are static and trained offline through supervised learning. A brief background on the generic elements of the lifecycle of an MLC is given to contextualize the assurance considerations and, consequently, the evidence that is relevant and necessary to support certification. At the level of an MLC, those considerations relate to: (i) the consistency and correctness of MLC contributions to system functions in the context of a validated functional intent; and (ii) the absence of MLC contributions to aircraft-level failure conditions. At an ML model level, confidence in model and data properties contribute to assurance of the containing MLC, in particular: (a) generalizability and robustness of models, in the presence of inputs not previously seen during training, disturbances to inputs, and unexpected inputs; and (b) valid data, i.e., data that are at least representative, relevant, complete, and accurate. Evidence for the above span the elements of the ML lifecycle, and includes, at a minimum, lifecycle artifacts that pertain to: (1) properties of requirements capturing functional intent, safety constraints, and aspects of the intended use and operating environment; (2) model performance, model complexity and design, and algorithm choice; (3) achievement of required performance at the levels of a trained model during model development, a trained model after model development is complete, and a trained model that is transformed into an executable equivalent; (4) model implementation aspects necessary for transforming a trained model into the executable equivalent; (5) integration of the executable trained model into the containing MLC, and eventually the larger system; and, (6) lastly, the verification and validation (V&V) of each of the above. Such V&V lifecycle artifacts themselves include: aspects of coverage, e.g., of various levels of requirements by the input space of the model and the data; traceability (where applicable); application of formal methods for property specification, analysis, and checking. Examples of evidence generation methods and tools further ground the discussion on what constitutes evidence, and the contribution to assurance during certification. The identified assurance considerations and supporting evidence is not a comprehensive set. Additionally, neither what should be considered as sufficient evidence relative to the assigned criticality of an MLC, nor how criticality ought to be determined and adjusted, have been considered in this report. However, suggestions are made for potential activities of the ML lifecycle that are aimed at providing confidence that an MLC can be relied upon when integrated into its containing (aircraft) system. Those activities are proposed as candidate elements of a certification process for MLCs. The main purpose of this report to inform regulatory guidance and consensus standards that may be used to meet the safety intent of the applicable regulations.
Aviation safety↗