Results for “multi-programming”

NASA NTRS1986

Meeting today's requirements for large thermal vacuum test facilities

The Lockheed Thermal Vacuum Facility at Sunnyvale, California, completed in late 1986, one of the largest multi-program facilities constructed to date is described. The horizontal 12.2 m diameter by 24.4 m long chamber has removable heads at each end and houses a thermal shroud providing a test volume 10.4 m diameter by 24.4 m long. The chamber and thermal shroud are configured to permit the insertion of a 6.1 m wide by 24.4 m long vibration isolated optical bench. The pumpimg system incorporates an internal cryopumping array, turbomolecular pumps and cryopumps to handle multi-program needs and ranges of gas loads. The high vacuum system is capable of achieving clean, dry and empty pressures below 1.3 times 10 to the minus 6 power Pa (10 to the minus 8 power torr.)

Corinth, R. L.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Concepts for a NASA Applied Spaceflight Environments Office

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is launching a bold and ambitious new space initiative. A significant part of this new initiative includes exploration of new worlds, the development of more innovative technologies, and expansion our presence in the solar system. A common theme to this initiative is the exploration of space beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO). As currently organized, NASA does not have an Agency-level office that provides coordination of space environment research and development. This has contributed to the formation of a gap between spaceflight environments knowledge and the application of this knowledge for multi-program use. This paper outlines a concept to establish a NASA-level Applied Spaceflight Environments (ASE) office that will provide coordination and funding for sustained multi-program support in three technical areas that have demonstrated these needs through customer requests. These technical areas are natural environments characterization and modeling, materials and systems analysis and test, and operational space environments modeling and prediction. This paper will establish the need for the ASE, discuss a concept for organizational structure and outline the scope in the three technical areas

Edwards, David L.↗

NASA NTRS2011

A NASA Applied Spaceflight Environments Office Concept

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is launching a bold and ambitious new space initiative. A significant part of this new initiative includes exploration of new worlds, the development of more innovative technologies, and expansion our presence in the solar system. A common theme to this initiative is the exploration of space beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO). As currently organized, NASA does not have an Agency-level office that provides coordination of space environment research and development. This has contributed to the formation of a gap between spaceflight environments knowledge and the application of this knowledge for multi-program use and for use outside NASA. This paper outlines a concept to establish a NASA-level Applied Spaceflight Environments (ASE) office that will provide coordination and funding for sustained multi-program support in three technical areas that have demonstrated these needs through customer requests. These technical areas are natural environments characterization and modeling, materials and systems analysis and test, and operational space environments modeling. Additionally the ASE office will serve as an entry point of contact for external users who wish to take advantage of data and assets associated with space environments, including space weather. This paper will establish the need for the ASE, discuss a concept for organizational structure and outline the scope in the three technical areas.

Spann, James F.↗

NASA NTRS1987

NASA Marshall Space Flight Center atomic oxygen investigations

An overview of the MSFC atomic oxygen investigations is provided, including descriptions of flight studies, ground-based testing, contractual efforts, and future focus. Summary results of flight experiments on STS-5, STS-8, and STS 41-G are presented. The development of the MSFC Atomic Oxygen Resistive Monitor for the upcoming EOIM-3 (Evaluation of Oxygen Interaction with Materials 3) flight experiment is reviewed. Materials characterization work and ground-based testing are described. Contractual efforts, such as the development of atomic oxygen resistant coatings for the space station, are discussed. Future emphasis is placed on ground-based testing via the development and operation of a state-of-the-art atomic oxygen simulation system and on the continuation of flight studies in support of multi-programs.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1989

Space station dynamics, attitude control and momentum management

The Space Station Attitude Control System software test-bed provides a rigorous environment for the design, development and functional verification of GN and C algorithms and software. The approach taken for the simulation of the vehicle dynamics and environmental models using a computationally efficient algorithm is discussed. The simulation includes capabilities for docking/berthing dynamics, prescribed motion dynamics associated with the Mobile Remote Manipulator System (MRMS) and microgravity disturbances. The vehicle dynamics module interfaces with the test-bed through the central Communicator facility which is in turn driven by the Station Control Simulator (SCS) Executive. The Communicator addresses issues such as the interface between the discrete flight software and the continuous vehicle dynamics, and multi-programming aspects such as the complex flow of control in real-time programs. Combined with the flight software and redundancy management modules, the facility provides a flexible, user-oriented simulation platform.

Sunkel, John W.↗

NASA NTRS1992

High pressure turbomachinery ground test facility

Turbomachinery test facilities are at present scarce to non-existent world-wide. The turbomachinery test facility at Stennis Space Center will provide for advanced development and research and development capabilities for liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen propellant rocket engine components. The facility will provide ultra-high pressure via gas generators to deliver the needed turbine drive on various turbomachinery. State of the art process control systems will provide the vital pressure, temperature and flow requirements during tests. These systems will better control adverse transient conditions during start-up and shutdown, and by using advanced control theory, as well as incorporate test article health monitoring. Also, digital data acquisition systems will obtain high frequency (up to 20 KHz) and low frequency (up to 1 KHz) data during the test. Pressures of up to 15,000 psi will be generated to pressurize high pressure tanks supplying cryogens to various test article inlets thus pushing turbopump materials and manufacturing processes to their limits. By planning for future projects the test facility will be easily adaptable to multi-program test configurations over a range of thermodynamic positions.

Scheuermann, Patrick E.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Scheduling: A guide for program managers

The following topics are discussed concerning scheduling: (1) milestone scheduling; (2) network scheduling; (3) program evaluation and review technique; (4) critical path method; (5) developing a network; (6) converting an ugly duckling to a swan; (7) network scheduling problem; (8) (9) network scheduling when resources are limited; (10) multi-program considerations; (11) influence on program performance; (12) line-of-balance technique; (13) time management; (14) recapitulization; and (15) analysis.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1995

A Loader for Executing Multi-Binary Applications on the Thinking Machines CM-5: It's Not Just for SPMD Anymore

The Thinking Machines CM-5 platform was designed to run single program, multiple data (SPMD) applications, i.e., to run a single binary across all nodes of a partition, with each node possibly operating on different data. Certain classes of applications, such as multi-disciplinary computational fluid dynamics codes, are facilitated by the ability to have subsets of the partition nodes running different binaries. In order to extend the CM-5 system software to permit such applications, a multi-program loader was developed. This system is based on the dld loader which was originally developed for workstations. This paper provides a high level description of dld, and describes how it was ported to the CM-5 to provide support for multi-binary applications. Finally, it elaborates how the loader has been used to implement the CM-5 version of MPIRUN, a portable facility for running multi-disciplinary/multi-zonal MPI (Message-Passing Interface Standard) codes.

Becker, Jeffrey C.↗

NASA NTRS2010

A Coordinated Effort to Address Space Weather and Environment Needs

The growing need for coordination of the many aspects of space environments is directly related to our increasing dependence on space assets. An obvious result is that there is a need for a coordinated effort to organize and make accessible the increasing number of space environment products that include space environment models and observations, material testing, and forecasting tools. This paper outlines a concept to establish a NASA-level Applied Spaceflight Environments (ASE) office that will provide coordination and funding for sustained multi-program support in three technical areas; (1) natural environments characterization and modeling, (2) environmental effects on materials and systems, (3) and operational and forecasting space environments modeling. Additionally the ASE office will serve as an entry point of contact for external users who wish to take advantage of data and assets associated with space environments, including space weather.

Minow, Joe↗

NASA NTRS2019

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Failure Tolerance, High Reliability and Correlated Failure History

In a half century of human spaceflight, NASA has continuously refined agency safety and reliability requirements in response to mission demands, critical failures, and technology development. Early spacecraft, including Mercury, Gemini and Apollo vehicles, were highly reliant on dissimilar redundancy and demonstrated test margins. Later programs, such as the reusable Space Transportation System (STS) and International Space Station (ISS), introduced probabilistic studies and isolated two-failure tolerance to improve robustness at the expense of added complexity. More recently, the Orion Multi-Program Crew Vehicle (MPCV) program adopted universal single-failure tolerance with two categorical exceptions; Zero-Failure Tolerant (0FT) and Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) hardware. Failure tolerance variances are defined and managed in accordance with agency human-rating requirements, and require concurrence from program Technical Authorities (TA) as well as the MPCV Safety and Mission Assurance Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP). To understand and reaffirm standards applied to Apollo, Space Shuttle and Orion vehicles, Orion and Deep Space Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) representatives conducted accelerated research to compare unique safety and reliability criteria against ground and flight anomalies, based on information contained in post-mission reports and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database. In some cases, high-profile failures and narrow escapes have reinforced decisions to maintain or adapt safety requirements. In others, empirical trends have highlighted the need for vigilance and innovative safety guidelines. Given the inability to achieve absolute compliance with evolving safety and reliability requirements, the team conducted a targeted review of DFMR and 0FT propulsion elements within the framework of changing system design, inspection, materials and process developments to formulate conclusions on technological maturity, failure density, and net changes in safety risk. Based on the aggregate performance of high-reliability and failure-tolerant systems, the authors have attempted to establish best practices and guidelines to inform future program decisions. On a somewhat cautionary note, this study is not intended to direct a universal set of requirements for future missions based on prior lessons learned. Spacecraft safety is a multi-variable problem, and attempts to mitigate past failures will not guarantee future success. However, this assessment offers a retrospective review of policy changes, implementation and effectiveness. In the future, NASA, European Space Agency (ESA) and industry partners may benefit from a more robust correlation between requirements and performance, as space-faring nations work toward more challenging, complex and long-duration commercial and deep-space ventures.

Green, Carrie↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek Whitman↗