Portable Active Neutron Interrogation System Report
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Rapid localization of radiation sources is critical for applications including nuclear emergency response, safeguards, and security. However, conventional imaging systems such as neutron scatter cameras and Compton cameras depend on rare coincidence events, which often result in long acquisition times. In this work, we address the challenge of rapid source localization by developing a machine learning approach to predict the direction of a single radiation source using only count rates from an array of neutron and gamma-ray detectors. The proposed model is a fully connected neural network (FCNN) trained using Monte Carlo simulation data from a 252 Cf source. The model hyperparameters are optimized with a small set of routine 252 Cf measurements. We benchmarked the performance of the trained and optimized machine learning model using additional 252 Cf , 137 Cs , and PuBe measurements under laboratory conditions with varying source-detector configurations. For these measurements, the machine learning model achieved a mean localization error smaller than 30° with 3 x 10 3 system counts, corresponding to 8 s measurement time for the imaging system used in this work. In this low-statistics regime, the method outperformed traditional scatter-based imaging by more than 75% in localization accuracy for the evaluated measurement configurations. These results demonstrate that a machine learning-based approach can significantly reduce the time required for accurate single-source localization, providing a robust and computationally efficient alternative to traditional imaging systems in time-critical nuclear security and emergency response scenarios.
There is no abstract for this work. It is only a short set of slides to show the other participants some of the projects we are working on in Neutron Activation analysis.
Visual inspection makes easier to ensure the integrity and safety of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) than any classical techniques. Various classical techniques have been applied but there are no reliable methods to qualitatively and quantitatively verify spent fuel in dry storage. Thus, the present authors have developed the prototype safeguards apparatus for dry storage employing the array of He-4 gas scintillation detectors (S670E, Arktis Radiation Detectors Ltd., Switzerland), newly designed to simultaneously measure thermal and fast neutrons without any moderators. The S670E detector has a cylindrical shape with a diameter of 52 mm and active length of 600 mm (total length: 875 mm). The detector is filled by He-4 gas with an approximate pressure of 180 bar for fast neutron detection, and its inner wall is coated by Li-6 for thermal neutron detection. The scintillation lights generated via Li-6 nuclear reaction and elastic scattering are collected by 24 SiPMs linearly paired at the center of the detector. The detector delivers a TTL (Transistor-Transistor Logic) output for pulse readout and UART (Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter) for device control. In order to assess feasibility of the apparatus, an experimental system has been designed, built, and optimized via computational studies. Cf-252 neutron sources and linearly arrayed detectors, working as a single detector, were occupied for this study due to the difficulties in working with SNF. The laboratory scale cask (diameter: 0.67 m, height: 1.5 m), minimized by a factor of 10 compared to the actual thickness of a commercial TN-32 cask, was also manufactured. The detector array was designed to rotate the lab-scale cask and obtain 36 image profiles at every 10 degrees. All profiles were aligned in single frame image called a sinogram, and the cross-sectional image was then fabricated by the inverse radon transform algorithm. These experiments have been repeated with different configurations and numbers of sources. Some gamma-ray sources were also measured with neutron sources in order to distinguish between neutron and gamma-ray pulses. Basically, a He-4 detector is designed to run on Linux OS so it is difficult to directly apply to Windows-based equipment widely used in S. Korea. Therefore, a new data acquisition board working on Windows OS was designed and built. The board mainly consists of FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) and SoC (System on Chip) for TTL pulse readout, sorting measured data, and transferring data to a user interface. In conclusion, the tomographic system at lab-scale has shown considerable potential to detect a partial or gross defect of encapsulated assemblies in dry storage. Next steps of this study will be to 1) repeatedly carry out experiments to demonstrate scientific reliability and validity, and 2) numerically integrate signals with weight factors to enhance the image quality since the suggested system based on passive interrogation method requires longer measurement time. Finally, the system will apply to a commercial dry storage phased out soon in S. Korea. (authors)
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The US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) are collaborating with the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority in Finland to assess spent fuel verification methods for potential application to measurements at the planned spent fuel encapsulation plant and geological repository prior to final disposal in Finland. The fork detector (FDET) used to measure the neutron and gamma radiation from a given spent fuel assembly is an existing technology widely used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Euratom for the safeguards verification of spent fuel operator declaration. Recently, an FDET data analysis software, referred to as the ORIGEN module, was developed and incorporated into the IAEA/Euratom Integrated Review and Analysis Program. This module uses the ORIGEN burnup code to calculate the nuclide concentrations and the neutron and gamma source terms in the spent fuel based on operator declarations. Then, to predict the expected FDET signals for a given fuel assembly, the module combines the source terms calculated by ORIGEN with FDET response functions that were pre-generated using MCNP models. The inspector can compare the calculated signals to the measured values in real time to identify possible anomalies in fuel assembly’s operator declaration, integrity, or measurement. In this work, the capability of the ORIGEN module was extended from application to typical light water reactor fuels to use for VVER-440 assembly types. The accuracy of ORIGEN for this type of fuel assembly calculations was assessed by comparing calculated nuclide concentrations against destructive assay measurements for VVER-440 spent fuel. The performance of the ORIGEN module for FDET safeguards verification in routine inspections was assessed using FDET measurement data for 13 spent VVER-440 assemblies that were measured at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in Finland, by comparing the calculated signals to the measured quantities. The results show that the calculated FDET neutron and gamma detector signals are generally within 12% of the measurements except for one assembly. Thus, these results are applicable to future safeguards verification in the planned Finland encapsulation plant, such as for passive neutron albedo reactivity safeguards measurements.
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Fast-neutron transmission imaging provides complementary information to x-ray transmission imaging. While fast neutron imaging resolution is generally below x-ray imaging, 14-MeV neutrons have an advantage over portable x-ray systems. Neutrons have higher transmission through high-Z materials due to a more uniform attenuation as a function of material atomic number Z compared to X-rays, and can therefore image low-Z materials inside high-Z materials. As a result, portable neutron transmission imaging has many applications, including inspection of concrete and welds for corrosion in vehicles, bridges, and other infrastructure, measurement of material levels in containers, and inspection of suspicious packages. Fast-neutron imaging is also more practical for field use than thermal-neutron imaging due to the size and shielding requirements typical of thermal-imaging systems compared to the availability of small 14.1 MeV D-T neutron generators. However, there are limitations in portable fast-neutron imaging systems, including limited neutron output, limited light produced by neutron scintillators, and lower resolution due to neutron source spot size and 2-3 mm scintillator thickness. In addition, digital-panel dark-noise is roughly 100x higher than neutron scintillator light, and variations in noise across the panel and in time is comparable to the imaging signal. Here we discuss recent efforts in developing a portable fast-neutron radiography system, including an improved neutron scintillator, mitigation of panel noise, and new commercial portable D-T neutron generators. We also present MCNP efforts to model neutron imaging, including scintillator resolution and the effects of neutron scattering from the object and surrounding materials.
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A Nuclear Accident Dosimetry program is a federal requirement for all facilities that have the potential to have a criticality accident. Personnel Nuclear Accident Dosimeter (PNAD) theory and analytical procedures are driven by various scientific needs and interacting regulations. A brief history of the status of USA Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear accident dosimetry regulations, recommendations, and performance testing criteria are given. Then, the history of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) PNAD is explored, including changes in the physical dosimeter and adjustments of the analysis method through the last four decades. Finally, the performance of LLNL’s PNAD at criticality accident intercomparison training exercises since 2009 is explored. In general, reported neutron doses have been within or close to DOE-STD-1098 performance criteria while reported gamma doses have been outside of DOE-STD-1098 performance criteria. Reported total absorbed doses have varied in meeting ANSI/HPS N13.3 and ANSI/HPS N13.3 (R2019) performance criteria. Dosimetry staff retirement and turnover have left historical knowledge gaps, yet provided opportunities within the NAD program at LLNL. This review paper serves as an overview of the history and status of the NAD program. Brief technical, procedural and programmatic recommendations to improve LLNL’s NAD program are given. Technical recommendations include investigating orientation factors through modeling or empirical experimentation, investigating gamma dosimetry methods for high-dose scenarios, and exploring other dosimetric methods for simpler, quicker NAD analysis. Procedural recommendations include better documentation of conversion factor (activity-to-fluence and fluence-to-dose) derivations and spectrum uses, and updated analysis spreadsheets or simple Graphic User Interfaces for dose calculations. In conclusion, programmatic recommendations include formalized training for NAD analysts, and having multiple SMEs trained on the NAD program.
Modern nuclear safeguards require detection and characterization capabilities suitable for a wide variety of radiation sources and applications. Field-deployable detection systems have also had to modernize to meet changing needs. Recent developments in organic scintillator technology have resulted in the creation of an organic glass scintillator (OGS) at Sandia National Laboratory which is composed of a 9:1 mixture of glass compounds C42H36Si and C51H44Si. The novel scintillator composition was implemented into the design for a dual-particle capable imaging system at the University of Michigan. This work presents new results from two experiments demonstrating the gamma-ray and fast-neutron imaging capabilities of the organic glass system. Gamma spectroscopy was also performed using CeBr3 scintillators that are part of the imager design. Measurements were performed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory using 232Th metal hemishells and an encapsulated 244Cm oxide source. Successful gamma-ray imaging of the 232Th distributed sources is demonstrated with the glass imager, but there were no appreciable neutrons from the 232Th for neutron imaging. Promising neutron and gamma-ray imaging results of 244Cm are demonstrated despite limited imaging event statistics available in this measurement. Gamma-ray spectroscopy results were able to identify 232Th using prominent emissions at 239, 338, 583, and 911 keV. 244Cm was identified from emissions of 43, 99, and 153 keV. These results demonstrate the potential of organic glass imaging for nuclear nonproliferation or characterization efforts.
MCNP6 simulations were performed to assess the anticipated capability of the Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity technique for nuclear safeguards measurements of irradiated pebble/pebbles. Two physical setups were examined. One with a single pebble of three different burnups and one with 27 pebbles in a cube. For all cases the sensitivity to removing all the fissile material was examined. For both of the physical setups, 4 assay cases were examined: (a) singles count rates for which the only source neutrons were the inherent neutrons in the fuel, (b) singles count rates again except this time two relatively weak AmLi sources were placed above and below the top central pebble and the combined effect of both neutron source terms were examined, (c) doubles count rates for which the only source neutrons were the inherent neutrons in the fuel, and (d) doubles count rates again except this time two relatively weak AmLi sources were placed above and below the top central pebble and the combined effect of both neutron source terms were examined. Finally, a few parameters such as Cd near the 3 He tubes were perturbed to see if the results could be improved.
The Multiplicity Counter 15 tube detector or MC-15 is an optimized detector designed for use in the field. It is composed of 15 3 He tubes embedded in high density polyethylene (HDPE). Recent work has explored expanding the use of the MC-15 beyond multiplicity counting to neutron dosimetry applications. Knowledge of the neutron energy spectrum information is required to use a detector as a neutron dosimeter. The MC-15 tube layout is shown in Figure 1. The unique layout makes it possible to use the detector for neutron spectroscopy via spectrum unfolding. Spectrum unfolding requires (1) energy dependence of the detector response, (2) a detector response matrix that precisely quantifies the response to mono-energetic neutrons, (3) an initial guess spectrum, (4) an unfolding algorithm, and (5) measured data (counts in the case of the MC-15). An energy dependent detector response matrix (DRM) can be constructed by considering either each of the three rows of 3 He tubes as a distinct detector or each individual tube as a distinct detector. The HDPE separating the 3 He in the MC-15 provides the distinct energy dependent response for the rows and individual tubes. In this report we detail the development of detector response matrices for the MC-15 and the application of the Los Alamos Unfolding Code (LUC) to both simulated and measured data. Three MC-15 orientations were studied: (1) standard orientation with the MC-15 front facing the source, (2) standard orientation with Cd sheet, (3) 90° orientation with the side of the MC-15 facing the source.
The thorium fuel cycle is emerging as an attractive alternative to conventional nuclear fuel cycles, as it does not require the enrichment of uranium for long-term sustainability. The operating principle of this fuel cycle is the irradiation of 232 Th to produce 233 U, which is fissile and sustains the fission chain reaction. 233 U poses unique challenges for nuclear safeguards, as it is associated with a uniquely extreme γ-ray environment from 232 U contamination, which limits the feasibility of the γ-ray-based assay, as well as more conservative accountability requirements than for 235 U set by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Consequently, instrumentation used for safeguarding 235 U in traditional fuel cycles may be inapplicable. It is essential that the nondestructive signatures of 233 U be characterized so that nuclear safeguards can be applied to thorium fuel-cycle facilities as they come online. In this work, a set of 233 U 3 O 8 plates, containing 984 g 233 U, was measured at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center. A high-pressure 4 He gaseous scintillation detector, which is insensitive to γ-rays, was used to perform a passive fast neutron spectral signature measurement of 233 U 3 O 8 , and was used in conjunction with a pulsed deuterium-tritium neutron generator to demonstrate the differential die-away signature of this material. Furthermore, an array of 3 He detectors was used in conjunction with the same neutron generator to measure the delayed neutron time profile of 233 U, which is unique to this nuclide. These measurements provide a benchmark for future nondestructive assay instrumentation development, and demonstrate a set of key neutron signatures to be leveraged for nuclear safeguards in the thorium fuel cycle.
Abstract not provided.
Advances in radiation shielding technologies are needed to protect humans and electronic components from all threats of space radiation over long durations. In this paper, we report on the use of the innovative and novel fabrication technology known as Field Assisted Sintering Technology (FAST) to fabricate lightweight material with enhanced radiation shielding strength to safeguard humans and electronics suitable for next generation space exploration missions. The base materials we investigated were aluminum (Al), the current standard material for space hardware, and Ultra-High Molecular Weight Polyethylene (UHMWPE), which has high hydrogen content and resistance to nuclear reaction from neutrons, making it a good shielding material for both gamma radiation and particles. UHMWPE also has high resistance to corrosive chemicals, extremely low moisture sensitivity, very low coefficient of friction, and high resistance to abrasion. We reinforced the base materials by adding high density (ie, high atomic weight) metallic material into the composite. These filler materials included: boron carbide (B4C), tungsten (W), tungsten carbide (WC) and gadolinium (Gd).
In this FY19 study, a range of possible measurement systems for confirming a U-235 mass attribute were identified. The systems were reviewed for their applicability in a potential future arms control agreement, and a subset of the eight most plausible systems were selected for further evaluation against the Arms Control Evaluation Criteria (ACEC). The evaluation results were then used to identify a primary and secondary recommended measurement system for confirming a U-235 mass attribute on warheads, nuclear components of warheads, and/or materials as part of a hypothetical arms control agreement.
This report was prepared for the Safeguards Program of the US Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D). The report presents the development of the neutron nondestructive assay system, the List Mode Collar (LMCL) for the project OR16-List Mode for Collar-PD1La “List Mode Response Matrix for Advanced Correlated Neutron Analysis for Nuclear Safeguards.” The new list mode electronics developed under this project, and a spatial analysis concept called the List Mode Response Matrix are also described in this report. Analysis algorithms based on classification methods are published in a separate report. This research addresses the need to expand the capabilities of current nondestructive assay systems used for nuclear safeguards applications and considers the sustainability of safeguards technologies by the development of a “retrofit” concept using electronics based on modern standards. Furthermore, employing list mode data acquisition enabled the development of a spatial analysis concept and empirical measurement of a spatial response not previously used for safeguards neutron counting applications or measured in a traditional neutron collar detector and, therefore, provides new capability.