Results for “no cloning theorem”

NASA NTRS2005

All about Eve: Secret Sharing using Quantum Effects

This document discusses the nature of light (including classical light and photons), encryption, quantum key distribution (QKD), light polarization and beamsplitters and their application to information communication. A quantum of light represents the smallest possible subdivision of radiant energy (light) and is called a photon. The QKD key generation sequence is outlined including the receiver broadcasting the initial signal indicating reception availability, timing pulses from the sender to provide reference for gated detection of photons, the sender generating photons through random polarization while the receiver detects photons with random polarization and communicating via data link to mutually establish random keys. The QKD network vision includes inter-SATCOM, point-to-point Gnd Fiber and SATCOM-fiber nodes. QKD offers an unconditionally secure method of exchanging encryption keys. Ongoing research will focus on how to increase the key generation rate.

no cloning theorem↗

NASA NTRS2001

Automated Theorem Proving in High-Quality Software Design

The amount and complexity of software developed during the last few years has increased tremendously. In particular, programs are being used more and more in embedded systems (from car-brakes to plant-control). Many of these applications are safety-relevant, i.e. a malfunction of hardware or software can cause severe damage or loss. Tremendous risks are typically present in the area of aviation, (nuclear) power plants or (chemical) plant control. Here, even small problems can lead to thousands of casualties and huge financial losses. Large financial risks also exist when computer systems are used in the area of telecommunication (telephone, electronic commerce) or space exploration. Computer applications in this area are not only subject to safety considerations, but also security issues are important. All these systems must be designed and developed to guarantee high quality with respect to safety and security. Even in an industrial setting which is (or at least should be) aware of the high requirements in Software Engineering, many incidents occur. For example, the Warshaw Airbus crash, was caused by an incomplete requirements specification. Uncontrolled reuse of an Ariane 4 software module was the reason for the Ariane 5 disaster. Some recent incidents in the telecommunication area, like illegal "cloning" of smart-cards of D2GSM handies, or the extraction of (secret) passwords from German T-online users show that also in this area serious flaws can happen. Due to the inherent complexity of computer systems, most authors claim that only a rigorous application of formal methods in all stages of the software life cycle can ensure high quality of the software and lead to real safe and secure systems. In this paper, we will have a look, in how far automated theorem proving can contribute to a more widespread application of formal methods and their tools, and what automated theorem provers (ATPs) must provide in order to be useful.

Schumann, Johann↗