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This course applies to persons performing work under P-330-6, Nonconformance Control and Reporting(NCR), who will be assigned the NCR Coordinator role. Upon completion of the course, employees will have a clear understanding of the unique role and responsibilities of an NCR Coordinator during the Initiation, Investigation and Closure Processes.
Nonconformances generated during manufacture and existing at time of acceptance testing of Saturn S-4B-209 Flight Stage
Nonconformances generated during manufacture and existing at time of acceptance testing of Saturn S-4b-5o4N Flight Stage
This course applies to persons performing work under P330-6, Nonconformance Control and Reporting (NCR), who will be assigned the NCR Owning Manager role. Upon completion of the course, employees will have a clear understanding of the unique role and responsibilities of an NCR Manager during the Initiation, Investigation, Disposition and Closure Processes.
This report, presented in three volumes, provides the results of a two-motor Delta Qualification 2 program conducted in 1993 to certify the following enhancements for incorporation into booster separation motor (BSM0 flight hardware: vulcanized-in-place nozzle aft closure insulation; new iso-static ATJ bulk graphite throat insert material, adhesive EA9394 for bonding the nozzle throat, igniter grain rod/centering insert/igniter case; deletion of the igniter adapter insulator ring; deletion of the igniter adapter/igniter case interface RTV; and deletion of loctite from igniter retainer plate threads. The enhancements above directly resulted from (1) the BSM total quality management (TQM) team initiatives to enhance the BSM producibility, and (2) the necessity to qualify new throat insert and adhesive systems to replace existing materials that will not be available. Testing was completed at both the component and motor levels. Component testing was accomplished to screen candidate materials (e.g., throat materials, adhesive systems) and to optimize processes (e.g., aft closure insulator vulcanization approach) prior to their incorporation into the test motors. Motor testing--consisting of two motors, randomly selected by USBI's on-site quality personnel from production lot AAY, which were modified to accept the enhancements -- was completed to provide the final qualification of the enhancements for incorporation into flight hardware. Volume 3, Book 2 provides various supporting documentation to the previous volumes with regards to the testing of the two Delta qualification units: data acceptance records, thermal conditioning analysis, igniter adapter thermal flake analysis, laboratory adhesive (EA-9394) qualification report, throat insert thermal/structural analysis, Delta Qualification Nonconformance Reports (NCR's), O-ring seating tests, and interim test report for vulcanization process qualification.
The NASA Office of Inspector General is the Federal Law Enforcement Agency at NASA which conducts criminal and regulatory investigations in which NASA is a victim. The OIG prevents and detects crime, fiaud, waste and abuse and assists NASA management in promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in its programs and operations. Investigations (OI) and the Office of Audits (OA). The investigations side deals with criminal Investigations, administrative investigations, and civil investigations. The Audits side deals with inspections and assessments as well as the Auditing of NASA Programs and Activities. Our mission at the OIG is to conduct and supervise independent and objective audits and investigations relating to agency programs and operations; to promote economy, effectiveness and efficiency within the agency; to prevent and detect crime, fraud, waste and abuse in agency programs and operations; to review and make recommendations regarding existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to agency programs and operations. We are also responsible for keeping the agency head and the Congress fully and currently informed of problems in agency programs and operations. deal with False Claims, False Statements, Conspiracy, Theft, Computer Crime, Mail Fraud, the Procurement Integrity Act, the Anti-Kickback Act, as well as noncompliance with NASA Management Instructions, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), and the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Most of the casework that is dealt with in our office is generated through gum shoe work or cases that we generate on our own. These cases can come from Law Enforcement Referrals, GIDEP Reports, EPlMS (NASA Quality System), Defense Contract Audit Agency, Newspaper Articles, and Confidential Information. In many cases, confidentiality is the biggest factor to informants coming forward. We are able to maintain confidentiality because the 01 is independent of NASA Management and doesn t report to the Center Directors, therefore the informant s mangers and supervisors are unaware of the informants actions. The only time when an informant s confidentiality may be compromised is when it is needed in a Court of Law and is released through a Judicial Court Order. During my tenure here at the NASA OIG/OI at Glenn Research Center, I have been involved in many different tasks. They have ranged from updating Suspected Unapproved Parts case files to independently interviewing NASA employees to turn up general background information. The 01 has the duty of informing NASA aeronautical safety managers of potential Nonconforming products. My mission is to compile a database of Nonconformance reports for distribution. The background information that I turn up from my interviews is then used to determine NASA s susceptibility to acceptance of unapproved parts. The IG organization is divided up into two separate disciplines, the Office of 01 investigations primarily focus on violations of Federal laws. Some of these violations
Coordinate Measuring Machines (CMM) are widely used in industry, throughout the Nuclear Weapons Complex and at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to verify part conformance to design definition. Calibration cycles for CMMs at LANL are predominantly one year in length. Unfortunately, several nonconformance reports have been generated to document the discovery of a certified machine found out of tolerance during a calibration closeout. In an effort to reduce risk to product quality two solutions were proposed – shorten the calibration cycle which could be costly, or perform an interim check to monitor the machine’s performance between cycles. The CMM interim check discussed makes use of Renishaw’s Machine Checking Gauge. This off-the-shelf product simulates a large sphere within a CMM’s measurement volume and allows for error estimation. Data was gathered, analyzed, and simulated from seven machines in seventeen different configurations to create statistical process control run charts for on-the-floor monitoring.
A nonconformance report (NCR) was not generated to document the original Beryllium (Be) positive result being changed to negative due to an oversight by the lab. The sample was re-analyzed on the Agilent ICP-OES which includes software to deal with interferences and resulted in a negative for Be. In order to determine the cause of the false positive, which was originally thought to be due to the Titanium interference in the sample, the laboratory analyzed a blank and a reporting limit standard with 5 ppm and 10 ppm of Titanium added in. These were analyzed on the Perkin Elmer ICP 5 instrument to see if the positive Be was reproducible.
This standard specifies the software assurance program for the provider of software. It also delineates the assurance activities for the provider and the assurance data that are to be furnished by the provider to the acquirer. In any software development effort, the provider is the entity or individual that actually designs, develops, and implements the software product, while the acquirer is the entity or individual who specifies the requirements and accepts the resulting products. This standard specifies at a high level an overall software assurance program for software developed for and by NASA. Assurance includes the disciplines of quality assurance, quality engineering, verification and validation, nonconformance reporting and corrective action, safety assurance, and security assurance. The application of these disciplines during a software development life cycle is called software assurance. Subsequent lower-level standards will specify the specific processes within these disciplines.
HB-Line and H-Canyon will handle and process plutonium material to produce plutonium oxide for feed to the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). However, the plutonium oxide product will not be transferred to the MFFF directly from HB-Line until it is packaged into a qualified DOE-STD-3013-2012 container. In the interim, HB-Line will load plutonium oxide into an inner, filtered can. The inner can will be placed in a filtered bag, which will be loaded into a filtered outer can. The outer can will be loaded into a certified 9975 with getter assembly in compliance with onsite transportation requirement, for subsequent storage and transfer to the K-Area Complex (KAC). After DOE-STD-3013-2012 container packaging capabilities are established, the product will be returned to HB-Line to be packaged into a qualified DOE-STD-3013-2012 container. To support the transfer of plutonium oxide to KAC and then eventually to MFFF, various material and packaging data will have to be collected and retained. In addition, data from initial HB-Line processing operations will be needed to support future DOE-STD-3013-2012 qualification as amended by the HB-Line DOE Standard equivalency. As production increases, the volume of data to collect will increase. The HB-Line data collected will be in the form of paper copies and electronic media. Paper copy data will, at a minimum, consist of facility procedures, nonconformance reports (NCRs), and DCS print outs. Electronic data will be in the form of Adobe portable document formats (PDFs). Collecting all the required data for each plutonium oxide can will be no small effort for HB-Line, and will become more challenging once the maximum annual oxide production throughput is achieved due to the sheer volume of data to be collected. The majority of the data collected will be in the form of facility procedures, DCS print outs, and laboratory results. To facilitate complete collection of this data, a traveler form will be developed which identifies the required facility procedures, DCS print outs, and laboratory results needed to assemble a final data package for each HB-Line plutonium oxide interim oxide can. The data traveler may identify the specific values (data) required to be extracted from the collected facility procedures and DCS print outs. The data traveler may also identify associated criteria to be checked. Inevitably there will be procedure anomalies during the course of the HB-Line plutonium oxide campaign that will have to be addressed in a timely manner.
Report discusses advances in knowledge of lubrication of nonconformal contacts in bearings and other machine elements. Reviews previous developments in theory of lubrication, presents advances in theory of lubrication to determine minimum film thickness, and describes experiments designed to investigate one of regimes of lubrication for ball bearings.
The purpose of this program guidance document is to provide the technical requirements for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) 72-B Waste Shipping Package (also known as the "RH-TRU 72-B") and directly related components. This document complies with the requirements as specified in the RH-TRU 72-B Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9212. If there is a conflict between this document and the SARP and/or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of C states, "each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application." It further states: "…each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application." Chapter 9.0 of the SARP tasks the Department of Energy Carlsbad Field Office or the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Management and Operating (M&O) Contractor with assuring the packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §71.8, "Deliberate Misconduct." Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, "Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material," certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliances," regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these regulations are conducted. This document details the instructions to be followed to operate, maintain, and test the RH-TRU 72-B packaging. This Program Guidance standardizes instructions for all users. Users shall follow these instructions or equivalent approved instructions. Following these instructions assures that operations meet the requirements of the SARP.
This document provides instructions for performing (1) Inner containment vessel (IV) and outer containment vessel (OC) maintenance leakage rate test on packaging seals and corresponding seal surfaces using a nondestructive helium (He) leak test; (2) IV and OC periodic leakage rate test using nondestructive He leak test; and (3) IV and OC structural pressure tests.
Performance and acceptance data are presented for the multiplexer, scan mirror, power supply, mainframe/top mechanical and the aft optics, assemblies. Other major subsystems evaluated include the relay optics, the electronic module, the radiative cooler, and the cable harness. Reference lists of nonconforming materials reports, failure reports, and requests for deviation/waiver are also given.
Summarized performance data are presented for the following major subsystems of the thematic mapper: the focal plane assembly, the radiative cooler, the radiative cooler door assembly, the top optical assembly, and the telescope assembly. Reference lists of the configurations status and of nonconforming material reports, failure reports, and requests for deviation/waiver are included.
Goal was to reduce the overall cost of human space flight while maintaining the most demanding standards for safety and mission success. In support of this goal, a project team was chartered to replace 18 legacy Space Shuttle nonconformance processes and systems with one fully integrated system Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) processes provide a closed-loop system for the identification, disposition, resolution, closure, and reporting of all Space Shuttle hardware/software problems PRACA processes are integrated throughout the Space Shuttle organizational processes and are critical to assuring a safe and successful program Primary Project Objectives Develop a fully integrated system that provides an automated workflow with electronic signatures Support multiple NASA programs and contracts with a single "system" architecture Define standard processes, implement best practices, and minimize process variations
The purpose of the Taxonomy Working Group was to develop a proposal for a common taxonomy to be used by all NASA projects in the classifying of nonconformances, anomalies, and problems. Specifically, the group developed a recommended list of data elements along with general suggestions for the development of a problem reporting system to better serve NASA's need for managing, reporting, and trending project aberrant events. The Group's recommendations are reported in this document.
Thermal, mechanical, and physical properties have been measured on fiberboard samples following accelerated aging for up to 16 years. The aging environments include elevated temperature up to 250 ºF (the maximum allowed service temperature for fiberboard in 9975 packages) and elevated humidity. Accelerated aging results have been analyzed and used to build aging models. Correlations relating several properties (thermal conductivity, energy absorption, weight, dimensions, and density) to their rate of change in potential storage environments have been developed. Combined with an estimate of the actual conditions the fiberboard experiences in K-Area Complex (KAC), these models allow development of service life predictions. KAC completed calculations that supported extending the service life of 9975 packages with 3013 and non3013 containers in storage from 15 years to 20 years. These calculations addressed the potential for degraded fiberboard properties following 20 years in storage using degradation models developed previously. The updated degradation models developed in this report have been compared to the assumptions in these calculations, and the current results for fiberboard dimensions, density, radial thermal conductivity, and energy absorption remain consistent with those calculations. The axial thermal conductivity degradation rate slightly exceeds calculations estimate of 0.5% per year between 130 and 160 °F. Additional data will continue to be collected to permit future refinements to the models and assumptions. Some of the predicted degradation rates presented in this report are extreme. However, these relate to environments that do not exist within KAC or would be postulated only as upset conditions that would not likely persist for an extended period. For a typical package stored in KAC with approximately 10-12 watts internal heat load or less, and ambient temperatures below 90 ºF, the fiberboard assemblies experience storage conditions less severe than any of the aging environments. Fiberboard in conforming packages with lower internal heat loads should experience little or no degradation and is expected to provide a service life beyond the currently approved 20 year storage period. Packages with higher internal heat loads may not continue to perform their required safety functions beyond 20 years. Ultimately, service life will be determined by the cumulative effect of degradation from all the conditions these packages might encounter. The results and model predictions presented in this report are applicable to 9975 packages with cane or softwood fiberboard overpack assemblies. These degradation models do not address the effects of nonconforming conditions such as the presence of excess moisture and mold or beetle infestations.