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This course applies to persons performing work under P-330-6, Nonconformance Control and Reporting(NCR), who will be assigned the NCR Coordinator role. Upon completion of the course, employees will have a clear understanding of the unique role and responsibilities of an NCR Coordinator during the Initiation, Investigation and Closure Processes.
This course applies to persons performing work under P330-6, Nonconformance Control and Reporting (NCR), who will be assigned the NCR Owning Manager role. Upon completion of the course, employees will have a clear understanding of the unique role and responsibilities of an NCR Manager during the Initiation, Investigation, Disposition and Closure Processes.
Coordinate Measuring Machines (CMM) are widely used in industry, throughout the Nuclear Weapons Complex and at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to verify part conformance to design definition. Calibration cycles for CMMs at LANL are predominantly one year in length. Unfortunately, several nonconformance reports have been generated to document the discovery of a certified machine found out of tolerance during a calibration closeout. In an effort to reduce risk to product quality two solutions were proposed – shorten the calibration cycle which could be costly, or perform an interim check to monitor the machine’s performance between cycles. The CMM interim check discussed makes use of Renishaw’s Machine Checking Gauge. This off-the-shelf product simulates a large sphere within a CMM’s measurement volume and allows for error estimation. Data was gathered, analyzed, and simulated from seven machines in seventeen different configurations to create statistical process control run charts for on-the-floor monitoring.
A nonconformance report (NCR) was not generated to document the original Beryllium (Be) positive result being changed to negative due to an oversight by the lab. The sample was re-analyzed on the Agilent ICP-OES which includes software to deal with interferences and resulted in a negative for Be. In order to determine the cause of the false positive, which was originally thought to be due to the Titanium interference in the sample, the laboratory analyzed a blank and a reporting limit standard with 5 ppm and 10 ppm of Titanium added in. These were analyzed on the Perkin Elmer ICP 5 instrument to see if the positive Be was reproducible.
HB-Line and H-Canyon will handle and process plutonium material to produce plutonium oxide for feed to the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). However, the plutonium oxide product will not be transferred to the MFFF directly from HB-Line until it is packaged into a qualified DOE-STD-3013-2012 container. In the interim, HB-Line will load plutonium oxide into an inner, filtered can. The inner can will be placed in a filtered bag, which will be loaded into a filtered outer can. The outer can will be loaded into a certified 9975 with getter assembly in compliance with onsite transportation requirement, for subsequent storage and transfer to the K-Area Complex (KAC). After DOE-STD-3013-2012 container packaging capabilities are established, the product will be returned to HB-Line to be packaged into a qualified DOE-STD-3013-2012 container. To support the transfer of plutonium oxide to KAC and then eventually to MFFF, various material and packaging data will have to be collected and retained. In addition, data from initial HB-Line processing operations will be needed to support future DOE-STD-3013-2012 qualification as amended by the HB-Line DOE Standard equivalency. As production increases, the volume of data to collect will increase. The HB-Line data collected will be in the form of paper copies and electronic media. Paper copy data will, at a minimum, consist of facility procedures, nonconformance reports (NCRs), and DCS print outs. Electronic data will be in the form of Adobe portable document formats (PDFs). Collecting all the required data for each plutonium oxide can will be no small effort for HB-Line, and will become more challenging once the maximum annual oxide production throughput is achieved due to the sheer volume of data to be collected. The majority of the data collected will be in the form of facility procedures, DCS print outs, and laboratory results. To facilitate complete collection of this data, a traveler form will be developed which identifies the required facility procedures, DCS print outs, and laboratory results needed to assemble a final data package for each HB-Line plutonium oxide interim oxide can. The data traveler may identify the specific values (data) required to be extracted from the collected facility procedures and DCS print outs. The data traveler may also identify associated criteria to be checked. Inevitably there will be procedure anomalies during the course of the HB-Line plutonium oxide campaign that will have to be addressed in a timely manner.
The purpose of this program guidance document is to provide the technical requirements for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) 72-B Waste Shipping Package (also known as the "RH-TRU 72-B") and directly related components. This document complies with the requirements as specified in the RH-TRU 72-B Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9212. If there is a conflict between this document and the SARP and/or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of C states, "each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application." It further states: "…each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application." Chapter 9.0 of the SARP tasks the Department of Energy Carlsbad Field Office or the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Management and Operating (M&O) Contractor with assuring the packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §71.8, "Deliberate Misconduct." Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required. In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, "Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material," certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliances," regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these regulations are conducted. This document details the instructions to be followed to operate, maintain, and test the RH-TRU 72-B packaging. This Program Guidance standardizes instructions for all users. Users shall follow these instructions or equivalent approved instructions. Following these instructions assures that operations meet the requirements of the SARP.
This document provides instructions for performing (1) Inner containment vessel (IV) and outer containment vessel (OC) maintenance leakage rate test on packaging seals and corresponding seal surfaces using a nondestructive helium (He) leak test; (2) IV and OC periodic leakage rate test using nondestructive He leak test; and (3) IV and OC structural pressure tests.
Thermal, mechanical, and physical properties have been measured on fiberboard samples following accelerated aging for up to 16 years. The aging environments include elevated temperature up to 250 ºF (the maximum allowed service temperature for fiberboard in 9975 packages) and elevated humidity. Accelerated aging results have been analyzed and used to build aging models. Correlations relating several properties (thermal conductivity, energy absorption, weight, dimensions, and density) to their rate of change in potential storage environments have been developed. Combined with an estimate of the actual conditions the fiberboard experiences in K-Area Complex (KAC), these models allow development of service life predictions. KAC completed calculations that supported extending the service life of 9975 packages with 3013 and non3013 containers in storage from 15 years to 20 years. These calculations addressed the potential for degraded fiberboard properties following 20 years in storage using degradation models developed previously. The updated degradation models developed in this report have been compared to the assumptions in these calculations, and the current results for fiberboard dimensions, density, radial thermal conductivity, and energy absorption remain consistent with those calculations. The axial thermal conductivity degradation rate slightly exceeds calculations estimate of 0.5% per year between 130 and 160 °F. Additional data will continue to be collected to permit future refinements to the models and assumptions. Some of the predicted degradation rates presented in this report are extreme. However, these relate to environments that do not exist within KAC or would be postulated only as upset conditions that would not likely persist for an extended period. For a typical package stored in KAC with approximately 10-12 watts internal heat load or less, and ambient temperatures below 90 ºF, the fiberboard assemblies experience storage conditions less severe than any of the aging environments. Fiberboard in conforming packages with lower internal heat loads should experience little or no degradation and is expected to provide a service life beyond the currently approved 20 year storage period. Packages with higher internal heat loads may not continue to perform their required safety functions beyond 20 years. Ultimately, service life will be determined by the cumulative effect of degradation from all the conditions these packages might encounter. The results and model predictions presented in this report are applicable to 9975 packages with cane or softwood fiberboard overpack assemblies. These degradation models do not address the effects of nonconforming conditions such as the presence of excess moisture and mold or beetle infestations.
The fiberboard assembly within a 9975 shipping package contains a modest amount of moisture, which can migrate to the cooler regions of the package when an internal heat load is present. Typically, this leads to increased moisture levels in the bottom fiberboard layers, along with elevated chloride levels which can leach from the fiberboard. Concerns have been raised that this condition could lead to corrosion of the stainless steel drum. It has been postulated that checking the axial gap at the top of the package against the current 1 inch maximum criterion provides a sufficient indication regarding the integrity of the fiberboard and drum. This report estimates the increase in axial gap that might be expected for a given moisture increase in the bottom fiberboard layers, and the likelihood that the increase will create a nonconforming condition that will lead to identification of the moisture increase. Using data relating the fiberboard moisture content with the degree of compaction under load, the present analysis indicates that the axial gap will increase by 0.282 inch as the bottom fiberboard layers approach the saturation point. This increase will cause approximately 58% of packages with otherwise nominal package component dimensions to fail the axial gap criterion, based on a survey of axial gap values recorded in K-Area surveillance activities. As the moisture content increases above saturation, the predicted increase in axial gap jumps to 0.405 inch, which would result in 92% or more of all packages failing the axial gap criterion. The data and analysis described in this report are specific to cane fiberboard. While it is expected that softwood fiberboard will behave similarly, such behavior has not yet been demonstrated.
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL, Berkeley Lab) is a multi-program scientific facility operated by the University of California (UC) for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Berkeley Lab’s research is focused on the physical, biological, environmental, and computational sciences, with the objective of delivering scientific knowledge and discoveries pertinent to DOE’s mission. This annual report describes environmental protection activities and potential impacts resulting from LBNL operations conducted in 2018. The format and content of this report satisfy the requirements of both DOE Order 231.1B, Administrative Change 1 (Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting) and the operating contract between UC and DOE (DOE Contract No. DE-AC02-05CH11231, also known as Contract 31). LBNL activities are planned and conducted with full regard to protecting employees, the public, and the environment, as well as complying with all applicable environmental, safety, and health laws and regulations. As presented in Chapter 2, Berkeley Lab implements an Environmental Management System (EMS) to oversee environmental compliance activities and continually improve overall environmental performance while maintaining operational capability and sustaining its overall mission. The effectiveness of the EMS and environmental programs is reviewed annually as part of the performance evaluation process of Contract 31. For fiscal year (FY) 2018, which began October 1, 2017, and ended September 30, 2018, the EMS was given a performance rating of B plus for its management of environmental activities (on a scale from A plus as the highest grade, to F as the lowest). The measurement and rating system was developed jointly by Berkeley Lab, UC, and DOE. The FY 2018 rating was based on how Berkeley Lab met the objective in DOE’s FY 2018 Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan (Appendix B in Contract 31, Section J) of providing an efficient and effective EMS. Six significant accomplishments, which ranged from effective teaming on projects and with regulatory agencies to improved program assessment approaches, were factors in the rating. The EMS was also graded through the federal Office of Management and Budget’s annual EMS performance metrics, in which a reporting scorecard rates elements of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001 standard and the degree of integration between the EMS and Berkeley Lab’s sustainable practices. Overall scores fall into one of three categories: green (highest), yellow (middle), or red (lowest). For FY 2018, Berkeley Lab received a score of green. A week-long formal conformity audit of the EMS was conducted at the end of July by a qualified external party, as is required every three years. The audit team found that Berkeley Lab’s EMS continues to conform to the ISO standard with no major nonconformance. An overview of environmental protection and restoration programs is provided in Chapter 3, including information about compliance activities, operating permits, and regulatory agency inspections and audits that occurred during 2018. Twenty-one minor violations and two Class II violations were issued during agency inspections of programs governing aboveground and underground storage tanks, hazardous waste treatment units, hazardous waste storage areas, hazardous materials management, and wastewater, stormwater, and air emission sources. This report also includes information on environmental monitoring performed in 2018 (Chapter 4). The results of these monitoring activities confirmed that groundwater cleanup actions have been effective in reducing concentrations of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the groundwater, although concentrations appear to be reaching asymptotic levels in some areas. Site groundwater plumes are stable or are attenuating, and VOCs are not migrating off site. All emissions and discharges from LBNL operations were within environmental compliance release limits except oxides of nitrogen and carbon monoxide from boilers (under 5 million BTUs) from Buildings 2, 66, and 88. The radiological dose assessments (Chapter 5) performed in 2018 concluded that the maximum potential dose to a hypothetical resident from Berkeley Lab’s airborne radionuclide releases was approximately 0.04% of the DOE and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency annual limit of 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr); the potential dose from all radiation sources at Berkeley Lab was approximately 0.15% of the average natural background radiation dose of 310 mrem/yr in the United States, and about 0.5% of the DOE annual limit of 100 mrem/yr from all sources.
Two closure welds on filled Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canisters failed to be within the acceptance criteria in the DWPF operating procedure SW4-15.80-2.3 (1). In one case, the weld heat setting was inadvertently provided to the canister at the value used for test welds (i.e., 72%) and this oversight produced a weld at a current of nominally 210 kA compared to the operating procedure range (i.e., 82%) of 240 kA to 263 kA. The second weld appeared to experience an instrumentation and data acquisition upset. The current for this weld was reported as 191 kA. Review of the data from the Data Acquisition System (DAS) indicated that three of the four current legs were reading the expected values, approximately 62 kA each, and the fourth leg read zero current. Since there is no feasible way by further examination of the process data to ascertain if this weld was actually welded at either the target current or the lower current, a test plan was executed to provide assurance that these Nonconforming Welds (NCWs) meet the requirements for strength and leak tightness. Acceptance of the welds is based on evaluation of Test Nozzle Welds (TNW) made specifically for comparison. The TNW were nondestructively and destructively evaluated for plug height, heat tint, ultrasonic testing (UT) for bond length and ultrasonic volumetric examination for weld defects, burst pressure, fractography, and metallography. The testing was conducted in agreement with a Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan (TTQAP) (2) and applicable procedures.
The next-to-next-to-leading-order (NNLO) perturbative QCD (pQCD) predictions for both the decay width and the transition form factor in the η c → γ γ process, based on nonrelativistic QCD (NRQCD), deviate from precise experimental measurements. These significant discrepancies have cast doubt on the applicability of NRQCD to charmonium processes. In this paper, we analyze the η c → γ γ process by applying the principle of maximum conformality (PMC), a systematic method for eliminating renormalization scheme-and-scale ambiguities. The PMC renormalization scales are determined by absorbing the nonconformal β -terms that govern the behavior of the QCD running coupling via the renormalization group equation. We obtain the PMC scale Q ⋆ = 4.49 m c for the η c → γ γ decay width. Even after using the PMC method, the convergence of the pQCD series is still poor, which indicates the importance of uncalculated next-to-next-to-next-to-leading-order and higher-order terms. The resulting value for Γ η c → γ γ is in agreement with the Particle Data Group’s reported value of Γ η c → γ γ = 5.1 ± 0.4 keV within the bounds of uncertainties. Moreover, the transition form factor obtained using the PMC is also in good agreement with precise experimental measurements. The application of the PMC suggests a potential resolution to η c → γ γ puzzle and supports the applicability of NRQCD to charmonium processes. Published by the American Physical Society 2025
Low-enriched fuel compacts fabricated for the AGR-5/6/7 irradiation experiments did not conform to all fuel specifications. Reasons why the fuel is acceptable for use in the AGR-5/6/7 irradiation are discussed. Revision 1 alters the characterization data for the dispersed uranium and exposed kernel defect fractions. Additional characterization data was obtained for fuel compacts analyzed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This enabled statistical outliers to be rejected and to confirm that results obtained from BWX Technologies Nuclear Operations Group were statistically independent of the Oak Ridge results and should be excluded from the analyses. Revision 2 alters the characterization data for the TRISO lot, J52R-16-98005, used in the fabrication of the AGR-5/6/7 fuel. Data from the BWXT J52R-16-98005 Certification package is used to calculate the reported values.
In this study, we propose a general algorithm for nonconforming adaptive mesh refinement (AMR) of unstructured meshes in high-order finite element codes. Our focus is on $h$-refinement with a fixed polynomial order. The algorithm handles triangular, quadrilateral, hexahedral, and prismatic meshes of arbitrarily high-order curvature, for any order finite element space in the de Rham sequence. We present a flexible data structure for meshes with hanging nodes and a general procedure to construct the conforming interpolation operator, both in serial and in parallel. The algorithm and data structure allow anisotropic refinement of tensor product elements in two and three dimensions and support unlimited refinement ratios of adjacent elements. We report numerical experiments verifying the correctness of the algorithms and perform a parallel scaling study to show that we can adapt meshes containing billions of elements and run efficiently on 393,000 parallel tasks. Finally, we illustrate the integration of dynamic AMR into a high-order Lagrangian hydrodynamics solver.