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A highly-enriched 244 Pu reference material for nuclear safeguards and nuclear forensics measurements

A highly-enriched 244 Pu isotope dilution reference material has been prepared and characterized for metrologically traceable measurements of very small quantities of plutonium. The amount of plutonium in samples associated with nuclear safeguards and nuclear forensic measurements can be significantly less than 1 ng. Accordingly, the ability to quantify the amount and isotopic composition of plutonium from a single mass-spectrometric analysis is particularly desirable. The highly-enriched 244 Pu reference material, described here, will minimize the magnitude of spike corrections necessary to obtain accurate information on plutonium isotopic composition from isotope dilution measurements.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Application of a Triple Bubbler Inside Molten Salt for Pyroprocessing Safeguards Purposes

The application of a triple bubbler system within molten salt environments, specifically a eutectic mixture of LiCl-KCl, is explored for nuclear safeguards purposes, focusing on nuclear material accountancy (NMA) and holdup accountancy in pyroprocessing techniques. Traditional holdup accountancy methods, which involve periodic sampling and lengthy lead times, are being supplemented by the development of actinide sensors using electrochemistry. However, these methods alone are insufficient to meet regulatory requirements set by agencies like NRC and IAEA. The triple bubbler device measures salt level, density, and surface tension simultaneously using three dip tubes of varying diameters and heights. This study investigates the accuracy and robustness of the triple bubbler in molten salt conditions at temperatures ranging from 450-550°C. The updated bubbler design, utilizing tantalum metal and larger tube geometry, demonstrated minimal plugging and maintained measurement accuracy within acceptable uncertainties: 0.611% for depth, 1.34% for density, and approximately 40% for surface tension. Results indicate that the triple bubbler system is effective for real-time, accurate measurements in pyroprocessing environments, making it a promising tool for ensuring compliance with nuclear safeguards and supporting nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Direct isotopic analysis of solid uranium particulates on cotton swipes by microextraction-ICP-MS

Direct isotope ratio analysis of solid uranium particulates on cotton swipes was achieved using a solution-based microextraction technique, coupled to a quadrupole inductively coupled plasma - mass spectrometer (ICP-MS). This microextraction-ICP-MS methodology provides rapid isotopic analysis which could be applicable to nuclear safeguards measurements. Particulates of uranyl nitrate hexahydrate (UO 2 (NO 3 ) 2 ·6H 2 O) and uranyl fluoride (UO 2 F 2 ) ranging from 6 μm to 40 μm in length were transferred to cotton swipes with a particle manipulator. The microextraction probe then delivers a 5% nitric acid (HNO3) solvent onto the swipe surface to extract the uranium species. The extracted sample is then delivered to the ICP-MS for isotopic determination. The majority of uranium signal (~99% and ~94% for UO2(NO3)2·6H2O and UO 2 F 2 , respectively) was detected in the first 15 s extraction, while subsequent extractions on the same location had low or no U signal, suggesting near complete removal of the solid uranium compounds from the swipe surface. Ten samples (for each of the uranium compounds), were analyzed for their isotopic composition. For UO 2 (NO 3 ) 2 ·6H 2 O, the determined isotope ratios resulted in a % relative difference (% RD) from the referenced isotope ratios of 0.97, 1.0, and 7.3% for 234 U/ 238 U, 235 U/ 238 U, and 236 U/ 238 U, respectively. The % RD of the UO 2 F 2 isotope ratios were 1.9 and 0.60% for 234 U/ 238 U and 235 U/ 238 U, respectively. The preliminary limits of detection were determined to be 0.002, 0.4, and 60 pg for 234 U, 235 U and 238 U, respectively This work demonstrates that microextraction ICP-MS is a rapid and sensitive method that could directly determine uranium isotope ratios of UO 2 (NO 3 ) 2 ·6H 2 O and UO 2 F 2 particulates on cotton swipes.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Molten Salt Reactor Signatures and Modeling Study

Molten salt reactor (MSR) technologies, either liquid fueled and cooled or only liquid cooled, pose specific, unique challenges for safeguards of the special nuclear material during the operation, fueling, and maintenance of the reactor. MSRs are one type of Generation IV technologies being invested in and considered for U.S. domestic fabrication primarily for electricity and process heat production. These designs have generated growing commercial interest for several reasons, including high (≈40%) thermal efficiency, ease of fueling, improved use of uranium fuel, potential utilization of thorium fuel, and proposed inherent safety features. U.S. companies have several planned designs that differ in fuel, cooling, and neutron energy spectrum. Driven by commercial interest and the intent of licensing MSRs, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has developed a vision and strategy to accommodate non-light water reactors (LWR), which include MSRs (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2019). In addition, the Department of Energy (DOE) through the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) Office of Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART), …sponsors research, development and deployment (RD&D) activities through its Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP), Advanced Reactor Concepts (ARC), and Advanced Small Modular Reactor (aSMR) programs to promote safety, technical, economical, and environmental advancements of innovative Generation IV nuclear energy technologies. Reactor types considering the use of salts, liquid metals, or gases for coolant fall under both ARC and aSMR. Therefore, Research Design & Development is being pursued by DOE-NE through national laboratories, universities, and international and industrial collaborations. Additionally, the U.S. is a member of the Gen IV International Forum (GIF). The GIF is a cooperative, multinational organization to guide and carry out research and development needed for the GEN IV reactor systems (Forum 2018). GIF evaluated numerous reactor concepts and down-selected to the six most feasible advanced reactor technologies: gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR), lead-cooled fast reactor (LFR), MSR, supercritical watercooled reactor (SCWR), sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR), and very high temperature reactor (VHTR). In support of the growing interest domestically and internationally, the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign, under the DOE-NE Fuel Cycle Technologies (FCT) program, engages in R&D activities by developing advanced instrumentation and analysis for safeguards and security of modern, advanced nuclear fuel cycle (non-LWR) facilities. Because of the historic experience in the operation of the Aircraft Reactor Experiment (ARE) and the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) (Robertson, MSRE Design and Operations Report Part I 1965), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is heavily engaged in the various R&D activities through the DOE complex related to MSRs including national technical leadership of the DOE-NE MSR campaign. This report discusses and presents the outcomes of the FY19 MPACT MSR Safeguards task. The challenges presented by MSRs for nuclear material accountancy and control (NMAC) and associated safeguards will be investigated. The objective of this research is to explore and compile the safeguards requirements and identify measurement signatures through an initial high-level MSR design and develop complementary advanced simulation and modeling capabilities. A high-level ORNL-developed MSR design called the Molten Salt Demonstration Reactor (MSDR) (Bettis, Alexander and Watts 1972) was used as the target reactor design for this research. The MSDR model incorporates technology from the MSRE and the Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (Robertson, Conceptual Design of a Single-Fluid Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor 1971). But the MSDR is a 750 MWth graphite moderated liquid fueled (low-enriched uranium) MSR compared to the MSRE’s of 7.5 MWth. The focus of this report is to discuss the evaluation of novel signatures, correlations, and indicators to understand the applicability of current safeguards instrumentation to MSRs using the modeling results from the MSDR.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Characterization of High-Temperature SiPM Noise

Introduction • Background: Silicon photomultipliers (SiPMs) are compact, low-power, and high-efficiency detectors that are increasingly used in radiation detection applications like medical imaging and nuclear safeguards. The have advantages of PMTs because they are smaller, operate at lower voltages, and offer high photon detection efficiency. • Challenges: SiPMs suffer from increased dark count rate (DCR) and optical crosstalk (OCT), which degrades performance. • Purpose of study: This study compares the Advansid ASD-NUV3S-P-40, Broadcom AFBR-S4K33C0147L, and Onsemi MicroFJ-30035-TSVTR under four different temperatures to compare their performance in harsh environments.

Fritchie, Jacob↗

Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)

Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Performance of 8 × 8 × 32 and 10 × 10 × 32 mm 3 CdZnTe position-sensitive virtual Frisch-grid detectors for high-energy gamma ray cameras

CdZnTe (CZT) crystals with thicknesses up to 20 mm and diameters up to 75 mm have become available from Redlen Technologies, Inc. for making large-volume gamma-ray detectors. The modified growth and optimized annealing conditions allowed Redlen to minimize the dark current and improve the uniformity of CZT crystals. Two detector designs, pixelated (H3D) and position-sensitive virtual Frisch-grid (VFG), have greatly benefitted from the availability of such big crystals. Encouraging results from testing of 40×40×15 mm 3 pixelated detectors were recently reported by the University of Michigan. In this work, we evaluated the spectroscopic properties of 8×8×32 and 10×10×32 mm 3 crystals configured as position-sensitive VFG detectors. Both digitized waveforms and an analog ASIC were used to read and process the signals from the detectors and test their spectral- and spatial-resolution. The VFG design provides the flexibility to scale-up the dimensions of the detectors for the desired efficiency, while the position information allows for correcting the detectors' response non-uniformity caused by crystal defects and devices geometry, thereby reducing the instrument cost and making them more feasible for emerging applications in gamma-ray astronomy, nonproliferation, portal screening and nuclear safeguards, where large detector arrays are often required.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Measurement of AmLi Sources for Active Well Coincidence Counter

To support the use of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) large-volume active well coincidence counter (LV-AWCC) in material control and accountancy (MC&A) measurements, a set of AmLi neutron sources was acquired from Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). These sources were measured to verify their suitability for use in the ORNL LV-AWCC. The sources produce neutrons at a rate that is within 4% of the rate for one set of AmLi sources already in use and 40% higher than the rate for the other set. These measurements indicate that the SRNL sources are suitable for use in the LV-AWCC because their sensitivity and measurement precision will be similar to those of the sets already in use. However, the SRNL sources still need to be evaluated for MC&A use.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A Conceptual Design for a Mobile Application to Support Infield Inventory Activities

This paper introduces an inventory assistant being developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) that we believe will empower users to perform inventory activities at nuclear facilities more accurately, reliably, and quickly. Inventory activities at nuclear facilities are often conducted using pen and paper, which can be time-consuming, tedious, and susceptible to reading or transcription errors. The proposed inventory assistant would replace the paper-based process used by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, nuclear facility operators, or verification monitors to complete an inventory of nuclear and non-nuclear items. In general, the inventory assistant would ingest an inventory list, distribute assigned items from the inventory list to one or more mobile devices, enable inventory teams to record their observations in the field, and then enable an inventory lead to integrate and reconcile the observations to produce a final report. The assistant consists of two software components—one for the inventory teams to record observations in the field (In-Field Observations App [IFOA]) and one for the inventory lead to reconcile the inventory list with observations (Distribution, Integration, and Reconciliation Application [DIRA]). This paper introduces the overall workflow of the inventory assistant and describes the IFOA user experience in more detail. To demonstrate the concept, the authors present a use case of IAEA inspectors conducting item counting and tag checking activities of UF6 cylinders at a gas centrifuge enrichment plant with a large number of UF6 cylinders (e.g., thousands). These activities can currently require 30–40 person-days of inspection to complete. Based on experiences during an exercised performed at the IAEA by the ORNL team in 2016, we believe an inventory assistant could allow the IAEA to complete item counting and tag checking using the global identifier or the operator’s barcode in 8–10 person-days of inspection. We would expect other users (e.g., facility operators or verification monitors) to also benefit from significant time savings.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Using Deep Learning to Develop a High Resolution Planetary Boundary Layer Model for Infrasound Propagation

Infrasound, with frequencies less than 20 Hz, is generated by both natural and anthropogenic sources. When one of these sources exerts a force on the atmosphere, infrasonic waves are generated. The propagation of these waves largely depends on temperature, wind speed, and wind direction. Previous work has used deep learning to accurately predict atmospheric specifications to altitudes of ~40 km. However, this model breaks down for local distances because it is too low resolution. Here we use a high-resolution meteorological dataset collected in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA to develop a deep learning model that can predict temperature, wind speed, and wind direction. Predictions are compared to ground truth observations to show that the model performs well at predicting temperature and wind direction but struggles with prediction wind speed. Model limitations and improvements are also discussed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Drones for Decommissioning

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has responsibility for regulating the safe decommissioning of facilities and sites to meet the License Termination Rule in 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation, Subpart E “Radiological Criteria for License Termination.” Decommissioning is performed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, as part of license termination (§50.82) and release of the facility or site for unrestricted use (§50.83). The guidance currently demonstrates the minimum requirements and necessary conditions for conducting radiological surveys by a person carrying a radiation detector(s). The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) evaluated the use of an unoccupied aerial vehicle (UAV) to conduct radiological surveys that could be used in decommissioning to potentially reduce time, cost, and worker safety compared to current survey methods. The objective of this project was to evaluate the performance and limitations of a UAV to support a decommissioning radiological survey and compare it to a radiological survey conducted by a human. The primary research questions of interest evaluated were: 1. Did observed UAV paths differ from human paths and, if so, how much? 2. Did survey path deviation affect survey results and, if so, how? 3. Were radiological measurements from human and UAV surveys significantly different? To answer these research questions, an experimental field was set up at PNNL’s 3440 test track, and it included radiological sources commonly surveyed during decommissioning: cobalt-60 (Co-60), cesium-137 (Cs-137), and americium-241 (Am-241). Nine check sources (three each of Am-241, Cs-137, and Co-60) with activities ranging from 3.54 µCi to 39.34 µCi were set over a path that also included an area for measuring background radiation. An Aurelia X6 UAV coupled with a GPS and lidar unit was used to conduct the radiological surveys. UAV and human surveys were conducted using two different NaI(Tl) scintillation radiation detectors (2 in. × 2 in. Ludlum, Inc. and 2 in. × 0.04 in. Alpha Spectra, Inc.) at a travel velocity of approximately 0.2 m/s at a low (15–40 cm median altitude) or high (87–105 cm median altitude) survey altitude. Since the survey velocity and altitude parameters were atypical for normal UAV operations, testing was done prior to conducting the radiological surveys to establish airworthiness, evaluate the navigation system, and establish flight control. Human and UAV surveys were paired according to the detector type and altitude regime to compare the survey data. The results of this proof-of-concept research determined that the UAV and human surveys followed similar survey paths and detected the radiological sources with no significant statistical difference (in 33 out of 36 surveys). However, further research is needed prior to deploying UAVs for decommissioning surveys.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Colloquium : Neutrino detectors as tools for nuclear security

For over 40 years, physicists have discussed possible uses for neutrino detectors in nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and fissile materials security. Neutrinos are an attractive fission signature because they readily pass through matter. The same property makes neutrinos challenging to detect in systems that would be practical for nuclear security applications. This Colloquium presents a broad overview of several potential neutrino applications, including the near-field monitoring of known reactors, far-field monitoring of known or discovery of undeclared reactors, detection of reactor waste streams, and detection of nuclear explosions. Recent detector advances have made near-field monitoring feasible, whereas farther-field reactor detection and waste stream detection monitoring may be possible in some cases with further research and development. Very long-range reactor monitoring and nuclear explosion detection do not seem feasible for the foreseeable future due to considerable physical and/or practical constraints.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Impacts of future nuclear power generation on the international monitoring system

Many countries are considering nuclear power as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the IAEA (IAEA, 2022) has forecasted nuclear power growth rates up to 224% of the 2021 level by 2050. Nuclear power plants release trace quantities of radioxenon, an inert gas that is also monitored under international agreements as a signature of nuclear weapons tests. To better understand how nuclear energy growth (and resulting Xe emissions) could affect this global nonproliferation architecture, we modeled daily releases of radioxenon isotopes used for nuclear explosion detection in the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe to examine the change in the number of radioxenon detections as compared to the 2021 detection levels. If a 40-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 82% for the low-power scenario to 195% for the high-power scenario, compared to the detections in 2021. If an 80-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 83% of the 2021 detection rate for the low-power scenario to 209% for the high-power scenario. Essentially no detections of 131m Xe and 133m Xe are expected. The high growth scenario could lead to a six-fold increase in 135 Xe detections, but the total number of detections is still small (on the order of 1 detection per day in the entire network).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Data Driven Analysis for Modernization Program Management

NNSA is responsible for managing national nuclear security missions: ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; supplying nuclear fuel to the Navy; and supporting the nation’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts. However, over half of NNSA’s facilities are more than 40 years old, and roughly one-third date back to the Manhattan Project. To execute its critical nuclear security missions, NNSA is making large investments to modernize its nuclear production capabilities. This ramp up represents NNSA’s largest modernization effort since the Cold War. Given the scale of these efforts, NNSA’s Office of Secondary Stage Production Modernization has implemented data driven techniques to prioritize investments and inform strategic decision making. NNSA, with support from its site managing contractors, has developed and implemented an integrated schedule and risk management system to address the issues and limitations with the traditional approach. The multi-year integrated schedules are key to identifying program linkages and managing large portfolios comprised of many different projects and efforts. In conjunction with the integrated schedule, a new program risk management system has also been developed and implemented, which manages program risks and opportunities, along with specific mitigation strategies to reduce or eliminate the risks per timelines that are tracked in the integrated schedule. This paper is supplemented with a follow-on presentation on effective management of program material and throughput modeling.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of Naturally Occurring Be-7 Activity on LANL Stack Filter Clumps

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is responsible for providing solutions to challenging issues through multidisciplinary science, engineering, and technology that impact national security. As part of the Radioactive Air Emissions Management (RAEM) Team, it is our responsibility to ensure LANL operates within the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 40 CFR 61, Subpart H, National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (Rad-NESHAP). The standard states, “Emissions of radionuclides to the ambient air from Department of Energy facilities shall not exceed those amounts that would cause any member of the public to receive in any year an effective dose equivalent of 10 mrem/yr” (EPA, 2002) During a routine assessment of LANL’s Rad-NESHAP compliance program, an opportunity for improvement was identified that addresses the evaluation of routine stack samples which potentially have naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) on the filter media. In the past and based on professional judgment, detections of NORM such as K-40 and Be-7 typically were rejected from the analytical results. The assessment finding suggested developing a technical criterion to ensure that such rejections were justified, comparing actual measured values with anticipated NORM concentrations for various stacks located at LANL. The significance of accepting or rejecting samples as “true” or “NORM” and its impact on the RAEM’s mission and compliance to the regulations is explained later in the document. Additionally, this document will describe the process and calculations for how such results are to be accepted as actual samples “true positive” or rejected as NORM.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗