Liquid Scintillation Alpha Spectrometry for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Forensics - FY2021 LDRD Poster
This is a poster about a current LDRD project, it is intended for the FY2021 review meeting.
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This is a poster about a current LDRD project, it is intended for the FY2021 review meeting.
This is a poster about a current LDRD project, it is intended for the FY2020 NHSS&T Strategic Advisory Committee review meeting.
Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.
Presentation in nuclear nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and disarmament.
The nuclear nonproliferation regime is facing a crisis of effectiveness. During the Cold War, the regime was relatively effective in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and building an institutional structure that could, under certain conditions, ensure continued success. However, in the evolving global context, the traditional approaches are becoming less appropriate. Globalization has introduced new sets of stresses on the nonproliferation regime, such as the rise of non-state actors, broadening extensity and intensity of supply chains, and the multipolarization of power. This evolving global context demands an analytical and political flexibility in order to meet future threats. Current institutional capabilities established during the Cold War are now insufficient to meet the nonproliferation regime’s current and future needs. The research was based on information gathered through interviews and reviews of the relevant literature, and two dominant themes emerged. First, that human security should be integrated into the regime to account for the rise of non-state actors and networked violence. Second, confidence in the regime’s overall effectiveness has eroded at a time where verification-based confidence is becoming more essential. The research postulates that a critical analysis of the regime that fully utilizes institutional theory, with its focus on rules, normative structures, and procedures will be essential to adapting the regime to the current global context, building mechanisms for generating trust, creating better enforcement, and providing flexibility for the future.
The Nexus of Nonproliferation, Nuclear Energy and Safeguards Projects – A Scientist Perspective is a presentation focused on various projects form the nuclear nonproliferation division
Abstract Not Provided
In October 2013, Los Alamos National Laboratory, with sponsorship and support from the NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, Office of Nuclear Controls (NA-242), hosted representatives from various agencies of the Swedish Government for a Nuclear Nonproliferation Workshop (NNPW). The purpose of the visit was to further promote the strong and mutually beneficial working relationship between the U.S. and Sweden on nuclear nonproliferation and related nuclear export control and safeguards subjects. Sweden is an important “like-minded” partner in the NSG and in other multilateral activities, such as implementation of special nuclear trade sanctions against Iran and North Korea, which work to combat the global nuclear proliferation problem. Sweden has been especially active in policy and technical initiatives in the NSG that serve to make the NSG’s export control lists better and more effective in combating nuclear proliferation activities.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security (NNS) Program Office within the Global Security Directorate at Los Alamos supports the Laboratory’s mission of strategic deterrence through activities aimed at detecting and preventing nuclear proliferation and improving nuclear and radiological security. The program portfolio includes research and development, deployment activities, and policy support. In FY17, work for NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation office (DNN, or “NA-20”) made up 80% of the NNS portfolio; therefore, most of our work is aligned with DNN’s mission.
In the past few years, efforts to develop new measurement systems to support nuclear nonproliferation and homeland security have increased substantially. Monte Carlo radiation transport is one of the simulation methods of choice for the analysis of data from existing systems and for the design of new measurement systems; it allows for accurate description of geometries, detailed modeling of particle-nucleus interactions, and event-by-event detection analysis. This paper describes the use of the Monte Carlo code MCNPX-PoliMi for nuclear-nonproliferation applications, with particular emphasis on the simulation of spontaneous and neutron-induced nuclear fission. In fact, of all possible neutron-nucleus interactions, neutron-induced fission is the most defining characteristic of special nuclear material (such as U-235 and Pu-239), which is the material of interest in nuclear-nonproliferation applications. The MCNP-PoliMi code was originally released from the Radiation Safety Shielding Center (RSSIC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 2003 [1]; the MCNPX-PoliMi code contains many enhancements and is based on MCNPX ver. 2.7.0. MCNPX-PoliMi ver. 2.0 was released through RSICC in 2012 as a patch to MCNPX ver. 2.7.0 and as an executable [2].
The Laboratory’s nuclear nonproliferation and security portfolio is managed by the GS-NNS program office: NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation office (DNN) makes up ~80% of our work. We also support State Dept activities closely aligned with our work for DNN and NASAprograms. Our work is executed across the entire Laboratory, approximately half in the Global Security directorate and a third in the Weapons Program.
The nuclear industry is continuing to grow and adopt new technologies to manufacture components. One of the technologies under consideration is additive manufacturing (AM). AM could make production of components at lower cost and could lessen lead times significantly. However, AM could be prone to proliferation risks. AM machines give off signatures during the manufacturing process, and these signatures offer an alternative means of observing the component. Correlations between these signatures and the geometry being manufactured could be developed; enabling proliferators as they could take advantage of these correlations to steal AM manufacturing instructions relating to nuclear technology. This work pertains to preliminary work exploring the feasibility of tapping into AM side channels to predict geometries being manufactured on AM machines. The feasibility of utilizing vibration to draw geometric correlations will be assessed on an Ultimaker 2 + thermoplastic 3D printer.
The Ontology Assessment Team began in May 2009 and concluded in September 2011. During this two-year time frame, the Ontology Assessment team had two objectives: (1) Assessing the utility of knowledge representation and semantic technologies for addressing nuclear nonproliferation challenges; and (2) Developing ontological support tools that would provide a framework for integrating across the Simulation, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) program. The SAM Program was going through a large assessment and strategic planning effort during this time and as a result, the relative importance of these two objectives changed, altering the focus of the Ontology Assessment Team. In the end, the team conducted an assessment of the state of art, created an annotated bibliography, and developed a series of ontological support tools, demonstrations and presentations. A total of more than 35 individuals from 12 different research institutions participated in the Ontology Assessment Team. These included subject matter experts in several nuclear nonproliferation-related domains as well as experts in semantic technologies. Despite the diverse backgrounds and perspectives, the Ontology Assessment team functioned very well together and aspects could serve as a model for future inter-laboratory collaborations and working groups. While the team encountered several challenges and learned many lessons along the way, the Ontology Assessment effort was ultimately a success that led to several multi-lab research projects and opened up a new area of scientific exploration within the Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Verification.
Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.
The detection and characterization of special nuclear materials is a high priority area for applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. We are developing new instruments based on organic scintillators to detect and characterize the emissions from special nuclear materials. This paper describes some of the gaps and challenges in nuclear safeguards and proposed approaches.
Problems are discussed with regard to nuclear fuel cycle resistance in fast reactors to nuclear proliferation risk due to the potential for use in military programs of the knowledge, technologies and materials gained from peaceful nuclear power applications. Advantages are addressed for fast reactors in the creation of a more reliable mode of nonproliferation in the closed nuclear fuel cycle in comparison with the existing fully open and partially closed fuel cycles of thermal reactors. Advantages and shortcomings are also discussed from the point of view of nonproliferation from the start with fast reactors using plutonium of thermal reactor spent fuel and enriched uranium fuel to the gradual transition using their own plutonium as fuel. (authors)
Herein, this article describes the physics and nonproliferation goals of WATCHMAN, the WAter Cherenkov Monitor for ANtineutrinos. The baseline WATCHMAN design is a kiloton scale gadolinium-doped (Gd) light water Cherenkov detector, placed 13 kilometers from a civil nuclear reactor in the United States. In its first deployment phase, WATCHMAN will be used to remotely detect a change in the operational status of the reactor, providing a first- ever demonstration of the potential of large Gd-doped water detectors for remote reactor monitoring for future international nuclear nonproliferation applications. During its first phase, the detector will provide a critical large-scale test of the ability to tag neutrons and thus distinguish low energy electron neutrinos and antineutrinos. This would make WATCHMAN the only detector capable of providing both direction and flavor identification of supernova neutrinos. It would also be the third largest supernova detector, and the largest underground in the western hemisphere. In a follow-on phase incorporating the IsoDAR neutrino beam, the detector would have world-class sensitivity to sterile neutrino signatures and to non-standard electroweak interactions (NSI). WATCHMAN will also be a major, U.S. based integration platform for a host of technologies relevant for the Long-Baseline Neutrino Facility (LBNF) and other future large detectors. This white paper describes the WATCHMAN conceptual design,and presents the results of detailed simulations of sensitivity for the project's nonproliferation and physics goals. Furthermore, it describes the advanced technologies to be used in WATCHMAN, including high quantum efficiency photomultipliers, Water-Based Liquid Scintillator (WbLS), picosecond light sensors such as the Large Area Picosecond Photo Detector (LAPPD), and advanced pattern recognition and particle identification methods.
To provide a brief overview of key arms control and nonproliferation arrangements for the layperson that may be relevant to the Commission's comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Primer would be published by the Commission and made publicly available, probably as an appendix to a larger Commission report.