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This report gives a brief overview of the DOE Triage and JTOT programs, gamma and neutron signatures in select measurements, software demos of FRAM and PeakEasy, and discussions of GADRAS as an analysis tool.
When Elena Guardincerri was a physics PhD student at the University of Genova, she considered muons a nuisance. She built muon detectors to snare these secondary cosmic rays, which were interfering with her experiments to study elusive neutrinos.
The Lawrence Livermore National Labs clinic team was asked to design a repeatable, portable procedure that would incentivize participants to carry detectors that form a radiation sensor network along repeated paths, to precisely known locations and past known radioactive sources. To achieve these goals, the team designed day-long and week-long data collection procedures in the form of puzzle hunt events. The team also created an Android app in order to support this measurement campaign and foster engagement. A ground truth collection method was constructed and validated through repeated use. Information concerning effective deployment of the data-collection procedure was gathered for future iterations. Over the course of procedural testing, 6 de 17 HMC students participated and collected 250 hours of data. 3 deployments of the procedure were conducted in each semester. A total of 63 students participated and collected 300 hours of data over the year. Deployment 1: 16 students, Deployment 2: 17 students, Deployment 3: 8 users, ~18 active hours, Deployment 4: 4 students, ~10 active hours, and Deployment 5: 18 students, ~40 active hours.
This module is designed to enhance awareness regarding radiological and nuclear security threats and the types of radioactive materials that can be used for criminal purposes or terrorist acts. The goals are to: (1) Review the Threat Assessment Process for MPEs, (2) Recognize Potential Radiological and Nuclear Security Threats, (3) Understand the basics of Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) and Radiological Exposure Devices (RED), (4) Learn about Medical, Commercial, and Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) sources, and (5) Understand the term Material Out of Regulatory Control (MORC).
Cadmium manganese telluride (CdMnTe) is one of the ternary compounds of cadmium telluride (CdTe) that has shown great potential applications in the development of X-ray and gamma-ray detectors used in medical imaging and in the detection of radiological and nuclear threats. CdMnTe nuclear detectors are capable of operating at room temperature without cryogenic cooling. The goal of this project is to design and fabricate CdMnTe detection system that can be used in laboratory experiments for characterizing detector materials and for identification of radionuclides. The engineering design objectives include a spring-based sample holder, ability to measure electrical properties of CdTe-based semiconductor nuclear detectors, and the detection of nuclear radiations. This paper presents the design of the sample holder and the fabrication of a CdMnTe detector. The current-voltage characterization experimental results showed that the CdMnTe has the high resistivity needed for CdTe-based nuclear detectors. The results also include the response of the CdMnTe detector to the 59.5-keV gamma peak of Am-241 nuclear radiation source.
Insider threats are perhaps the most serious challenges that nuclear and radiological security systems face. Insiders pose such a great threat due to their access, authority, and knowledge, granting them opportunities to bypass dedicated nuclear and radiological security elements. For example, in one of the latest major insider threat incidents to nuclear security, the Doel-4 nuclear powerplant in Belgium suffered a shutdown, the threat of nuclear materials diversion, and long-term loss of tens of millions of dollars. Seven years of investigation concluded that it was an inside job and attempted sabotage. In this regard, there is an immediate need for R&D and technology integration in the domain of modeling indoor Patterns-of-Life (PoL) and anomaly detection. This can be achieved by using datasets of facility users’ mobility and activity, which can support the design of algorithms for insider threat modeling and detection. However, due to classification, privacy, sensitivity, and safety protocols, such datasets from real physical nuclear reactor facilities are not only hard to share, but also not always feasible to deploy and collect. Aiming to find an alternate solution, our proposed demonstration work - MetaPoL, is the first-ever (for the application space) immersive VR (virtual reality) environment of a real-world secure facility and allows users to move-and-stay through the designed indoor physical layout and also encounter NPCs (non-player characters) that emulate other facility users. In the MetaPoL an interactive user performs realistic spatio-temporal movement, dwelling and activities using a Meta Quest Pro VR headset, and that generates high-frequency (in time) high-resolution (in space) indoor spatial-temporal datasets that are valuable for PoL modeling and anomaly detection research specifically for insider threat modeling and detection mission. Such generated realistic, rich in context, and mission specific datasets can boost AI/Machine Learning based research for modeling and detecting insider threats in nuclear security and nonproliferation.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the countries of Europe face a renewed challenge from the east vis-à-vis the Putin regime in Moscow. In the face of these new challenges, NATO must reconsider its deterrence and defense posture in order to deter conflict in Europe. Unfortunately, Russian attempts to rewrite the rules of the post-Cold War international order by force have been coupled with nuclear saber rattling and overt nuclear threats. Russia’s nuclear threats, in addition to provocative changes to Russia’s nuclear posture in its Military Doctrine, are methods to make up for Russia’s conventional military inferiority relative to NATO and the United States. Some have described Moscow’s actions as laying the groundwork for a nuclear coercion strategy. While the decrease in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States has reduced the likelihood of nuclear annihilation to an all-time low since the height of the Cold War, Russia’s nuclear coercion strategy is increasing the probability of nuclear employment in Europe. The probability of nuclear use is compounded by Russia’s tremendous local military advantage around its periphery in spite of U.S. global military primacy. This military advantage increases the incentive to use military force if Russian decision-makers conclude that a quick military victory is possible, or if Russian leaders miscalculate based on an incorrect assessment of military force balance or resolve of their adversary. The integration of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (referred to as the Baltics in this paper) into the NATO alliance in 2004 makes Russia’s military advantage in its periphery increasingly relevant. Each NATO state is required to assist any NATO state that comes under attack per Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Baltic states’ proximity to Russia, their weak indigenous militaries, their former status as Soviet Republics, large population of ethnic Russians, and Russian President Vladimir V. Putin’s claim that he will protect Russians wherever they are makes the Baltics the most likely flashpoint for conflict between NATO and Russia. This analysis will tackle the problem of reshaping NATO’s deterrence and defense posture in light of the new Russian threat and its obligation to defend its most vulnerable members. Specifically, it will assess the suitability of NATO’s “appropriate mix” of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities to deterring conventional conflict with Russia and, if conventional deterrence fails, preventing Russian nuclear escalation. It will use a scenario-based approach informed by a deterrence model to explore how changes to NATO’s posture and policy could impact the deterrence of Russian aggression.
The International Radiological/Nuclear Training for Emergency Response - Major Public Event (IRAD-MPE) Virtual Workshop is an advanced training course designed to provide international partners with specialized training on best practices for conducting nuclear security planning and operations at a Major Public Event. This presentation will provide an overview of the following: (1) Historical perspective on past MPE events, (2) National strategy and integrated security operations, (3) Best practices for nuclear security operations, (4) Radiological/nuclear threats and common alarms, (5) Lessons Learned and Challenges, and (5) IAEA NSS-18 publication: Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for Major Public Events.
This year’s summary report updates the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (FY 2016 SSMP), the 25-year strategic program of record that captures the plans developed across numerous NNSA programs and organizations to maintain and modernize the scientific tools, capabilities, and infrastructure necessary to ensure the success of NNSA’s nuclear weapons mission. The SSMP is a companion to the Prevent, Counter, and Respond: A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2017-2021) report, the planning document for NNSA’s nuclear threat reduction mission. New versions of both reports are published each year in response to new requirements and challenges. Much was accomplished in FY 2015 as part of the program of record described in this year’s SSMP. The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program allowed the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to certify for the twentieth time that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective without the need for underground nuclear explosive testing. The talented scientists, engineers, and technicians at the three national security laboratories, the four nuclear weapons production plants, and the national security site are primarily responsible for this continued success. Research, development, test, and evaluation programs have advanced NNSA’s understanding of weapons physics, component aging, and material properties through first-of-a-kind shock physics experiments, along with numerous other critical experiments conducted throughout the nuclear security enterprise. The multiple life extension programs (LEPs) that are under way made progress toward their first production unit dates. The W76-1 LEP is past the halfway point in total production, and the B61-12 completed three development flight tests. Critical to this success is the budget. The Administration’s budget request for NNSA’s Weapons Activities has increased for all but one of the past seven years, resulting in a total increase of approximately 45 percent since 2010. If adopted by Congress, the FY 2017 budget request will increase funding by $396 million (about 4.5 percent) from the enacted FY 2016 level. A significant portion of the increase would fund the research for multiple life extension programs, support the programs in Directed Stockpile Work, and modernize the physical infrastructure of the nuclear security enterprise.
Nuclear security is one of the defining challenges of our time. Nuclear threats range from deliberate dispersal of radioactive material to contaminate the vital infrastructure to diversion and smuggling of special nuclear material for clandestine nuclear programs and nuclear terrorism, respectively. There is an associated need to develop and sustain the nuclear forensics capabilities, which requires the understanding of complex processes that occur in plasmas of nuclear materials. The area of nuclear safety has seen a resurgence of public interest, and there is a concomitant need to safely store used nuclear fuel and detect structural material failure in nuclear power systems, especially in innovative reactor designs envisioned for future adoption. Laser-produced plasmas are complicated extreme environments that can generate intense and rich, highly specific signatures of nuclear and radiological materials, which can then be explored in a wide range of applications. They include interdiction and rapid detection of nuclear materials, including their isotopic composition, detection over long distances, laboratory simulation of weapons effects, monitoring the condition of structural materials in dry cask storage containers, and novel instrumentation for nuclear power systems. We present a compilation of recent representative examples of the application of laser spectroscopy, and laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy in particular, to nuclear safety and security problems. A case is made that spectroscopic techniques based on laser-produced plasmas offer complementary, and sometimes unique, capabilities that motivate the continued exploration of their efficient production and understanding of the signatures they produce
Presentation for the DOE/NNSA/NA-81 International IRAPTER Course conducted at RSLA during June 11-15, 2018.
The National Nuclear Security Administration’s enduring mission is to protect our nation by maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, reducing global nuclear threats, and providing our submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective nuclear propulsion. Although we have numerous strategic partners that enable, contribute to, and benefit from our efforts, no other organization, government or civilian, can accomplish our unique mission on behalf of the American people. In this area, we stand alone. This strategic vision pursues urgent change at a significant scale to develop creative approaches, make sustained investments, and be disciplined in our approach to develop a nuclear capability for our time and for the foreseeable future. It is incumbent on us to anticipate our future security challenges and ensure our country is ready to meet them. Not doing so would have far-reaching consequences. Failure to meet our vital mission objectives will erode confidence in the security that the United States strategic deterrent umbrella provides. In assessing the current mission environment in NNSA, we can count on one thing—change: The geopolitical environment for our deterrent is ever-changing Threats from rogue states and terrorists are evolving Our nuclear weapons and the infrastructure that supports them are aging Science and technology continue to move forward at an ever-increasing pace In this dynamic environment, it is not sufficient to remedy today’s situation and meet our current mission requirements. We must lean forward in the development, planning, and execution of programs that address our current challenges while developing the workforce, infrastructure, tools, and governance systems that will enable us to meet our deterrence, non-proliferation, and naval propulsion mission requirements for the next 50 years. We must embrace a next-generation enterprise that is flexible enough to respond to future challenges. With decades of stagnation following the end of the Cold War, we find ourselves in the unenviable position of implementing near-term fixes while using those lessons learned to better prepare for the future. Without sustained and predictable investments to restore and modernize our infrastructure, we will rapidly lose our ability to deliver on our promise of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile, which will degrade our deterrent capability and render legacy weapon systems irrelevant to the defense of our nation. We must not and will not allow the next generation of our nuclear security enterprise to simply maintain the status quo. We have a storied past that guides us. For 75 years our enterprise has overcome every challenge, led the country in incredible scientific and engineering endeavors and discoveries, and successfully ensured constant vigilance in maintaining an effective deterrent, reducing global nuclear threats, and powering our nuclear navy. Now is the time for us to take decisive action in forging the enterprise of the future. As I have traveled to all of our labs, plants, and sites and met with people across our complex, I have been left with one overwhelming impression: the incredible workforce that makes up our nuclear security enterprise is up to all of the challenges we have before us. Together we can and will ensure that those in the future workforce have the resources and the responsive, agile infrastructure they need to maintain the systems of today and to design and field the systems of tomorrow.
The Radionuclide Analysis Kit (RNAK), my team’s most recent nuclide identification software, is entering the testing phase. A question arises: will removing rare nuclides from the software’s library improve its overall performance? An affirmative response indicates fundamental errors in the software’s framework, while a negative response confirms the effectiveness of the software’s key machine learning algorithms. After thorough testing, I found that the performance of RNAK cannot be improved with the library choice effect, thus verifying the effectiveness of RNAK’s algorithms—multiple linear regression, Bayesian network using the Viterbi algorithm, and branch and bound search.
The Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) are both developing optimization software to fulfill the objective of Phase III of the Replacement Portal Monitoring (RPM) Program for the Department of Homeland Security. The objective of the Phase III of the RPM Program is to conduct an evaluation of three RPM systems designed to enhance mission effectiveness, gain operational efficiencies, and to address emerging mission needs against the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD ) nuclear threat basis and special nuclear material (SNM) used in performance testing. As such this task involves the use of global optimization algorithms.
The emerging multipolar international security environment represents a fundamental restructuring of global nuclear balance of power to include two nuclear peer competitors, growing non-peer nuclear threats, and concerns of nuclear latency from both allies and adversaries. Conflicts in the grey zone, cyber operations, mis- and disinformation campaigns, and emerging disruptive technologies like drones, and hypersonic missiles are becoming more prevalent. These present a risk of cross-domain and multi-domain conflicts that may not follow known escalatory patterns. In order to prepare for the new deterrence environment, it is critical to have quantitative and qualitative understandings of these cross-domain conflicts, their potential for escalation, and which systems they may impact. To that end, our team created a Multi-Layer Network (MLN) model of ‘integrated deterrence’ where instruments of national power are modeled as individual network graph layers that include efforts from all domains. We then evaluate the potential for escalation against escalation scenarios. Analysis of the escalation scenarios is then used to identify insights of potential risk and escalation within integrated deterrence.
Abstract not provided.
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