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This brief report describes the major operational changes resulting from accelerator design and implementation of the LAMP scope. Improvements in operational performance are discussed, along with implications for integration with the existing LANSCE accelerator complex. Potential impacts to the present LANSCE operational modes and integration with the existing personnel and machine protection systems are also discussed.
An initial thermal power dispatch (TPD) concept of operations was evaluated that couples a nuclear power plant to a nearby hydrogen production plant. GSE Systems’ generic pressurized water reactor full-scope simulator was modified with a TPD model comprised of a thermal power extraction and delivery system. A prototype human-system interface (HSI) was developed to interact with the TPD model and allow participants to execute the basic operating scenarios for normal operations. Four retired operators performed the evaluation, and due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, the original in-person experimental design was restructured to support a remote participator evaluation using a web meeting platform. Data from operator feedback, observations from the research team, and quantitative survey responses revealed that the initial TPD concept of operations is feasible. The operators were comfortable with the engineered system and HSI and could manage it without adverse impacts to reactor power, plant safety, or equipment. Findings are discussed in terms of both the TPD system design and HSI performance.
The AGN-201 is a nuclear reactor at Idaho State University (ISU) and is currently being used in the development of a digital twin (DT) with Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The goal is to create a DT (called the AGN-201 DT) which can monitor an operating nuclear reactor to determine when the reactor is being operated normally; normal operations are any operations that is declared by the ISU staff. To accomplish this, researchers at INL developed a DT ecosystem which can ingest data from the AGN-201 reactor. This data is fed into a series of machine learning (ML) and reactor physics models. The ML and reactor physics models assess the data and determine if the reactor is operating normally. Event(s) that are flagged as anomalies are investigated by the INL staff to determine if any undeclared experiments were conducted. The AGN-201 DT was verified in July/August 2023, when the ISU staff performed undeclared experiments and the INL staff were able to assess the anomalous events and determine what likely caused each event. This project was a steppingstone to promote the use of DTs for international safeguards and marks the first time a DT was able to monitor a nuclear reactor for this purpose. This document provides the concept of operations (CONOPS) for the AGN-201 digital twin (DT). The CONOPS describes how the AGN-201 and AGN-201 DT are expected to operate and details how each are established.
Here, we present an imaging system that employs zero-knowledge protocols to protect sensitive geometrical information, along with procedures to increase confidence in the result. The goal of this work is to enable the inclusion of warhead confirmation measurements in future arms control treaties. We present a demonstration of both true positive and true negative measurements that validate models and establish authenticating procedures toward meeting acceptance requirements for use in nuclear facilities. We use a two-dimensional time-encoded fast neutron imaging system with an anti-symmetric mask pattern; the fast neutron count values exceeding minimum or maximum thresholds indicate that two measured items are not identical. Laboratory measurements over twenty trials show that alarm rates for negative confirmation measurements are within uncertainties of model predictions. Positive confirmation measurements indicate that alarm rates are large enough to encourage treaty compliance.
The objective of this report is examine anticipated advanced reactor designs that incorporate high levels of autonomy in operation of advanced reactor systems or facilities, and to begin identifying the human factors engineering (HFE) considerations relevant to those designs. The insights gained will help identify areas where U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) may need to develop or update review guidance to adequately address HFE considerations essential for safe operation. The adequacy of existing guidance, along with recommendations for updates or new guidance, may be addressed in future reports. We use the term “landscape analysis” to describe the review, analysis, and characterization of publicly available information on the anticipated future state of the industry regarding particular technologies or operational concepts. This landscape analysis considers the potential range of advanced reactor automation concepts that may be used for monitoring and controlling nuclear systems and facilities, including the potential for highly automated, near autonomous, or fully autonomous operation of advanced nuclear reactors.
JET, the only tokamak capable of operating with deuterium–tritium (D–T) fuel (since TFTR was shutdown in 1999), has provided essential experimental data to support ITER and DEMO design and operation. Within the EUROfusion Tokamak Exploitation Work Package, JET completed its final campaigns (2022–2023), culminating in the third D–T campaign (DTE3). These experiments addressed key challenges in plasma scenarios, exhaust control, and tritium management under reactor-relevant conditions. Significant progress was achieved in demonstrating ITER-like integrated scenarios with impurity seeding, achieving partial divertor detachment and high confinement ($H_{98}(y,2)$ ≈ 0.85) at 3 MA in D–T plasmas. Advanced exhaust regimes such as quasi-continuous exhaust (QCE) and X-point radiator (XPR) were successfully achieved first in D–D and then extended to D–T operation, confirming their relevance for mixed isotope operation. Operational milestones included a new world record of 69 MJ fusion energy in tritium-rich hybrid plasmas and long-pulse H-mode operation up to 60 s, contributing with unique data to the CICLOP database. Physics studies focused on peeling-limited pedestals in support of ITER and improved understanding of edge stability and impurity screening in metallic environments. Extensive usage of the shattered pellet injector (SPI) on JET provided critical information for the design of the ITER disruption mitigation system (DMS). Real-time control systems for D/T ratio control and plasma exhaust were deployed and demonstrated in D–D and D–T, while energetic particle physics investigations unfolded the role of fast ions in turbulence suppression mechanisms. Comprehensive tritium retention studies using gas balance method, post-mortem analysis, and ITER-relevant laser induced desorption spectroscopy (LIDS) diagnostics provided essential input for tritium accountancy strategies. These results are validating the ITER operational concepts, inform DEMO design, and deliver critical experience in nuclear operation and scenario integration.
This work reports on the development of two robust, heavy-ion beam tracking concepts operating at low pressure (< 15 Torr) for high rate applications (> 200 kHz). The first concept consists of a Multi-Wire Proportional Counter (MWPC) with a central anode consisting of 12 μm Au-plated Tungsten wires spaced 1 mm from each other. The anode grid is sandwiched between two segmented cathodes aligned orthogonally in the two dimensions for (x,y) particle localization. The second detector is a Parallel-Plate Avalanche Counter (PPAC) that uses the same readout geometry as the MWPC, but replaces the wire anode with a 150 nm silver layer deposited on both sides of a thin (< 1 mg/cm 2 ) polypropylene foil. Additionally, the bias circuitry for the PPAC anode central foil is equipped with an Anti-Discharge Unit (ADU) to prevent transitions from proportional operation to streamer formation, thereby avoiding damaging discharges. The localization capability of both detectors was tested with a low-rate alpha-particle source (241-Am). A position resolution of < 1 mm (FWHM) was achieved under stable, high-gas-gain (> 1000) operating conditions. Their performance in terms of detection efficiency as a function of the isotope charge (Z) was determined by irradiating the detectors with a cocktail beam (Z ≤ 15) with energy of ∼ 100 MeV/u. Full detection efficiency is maintained for all available fragments under optimal operational conditions (i.e., voltage bias). Full detection efficiency was achieved at rates above 200 kHz by irradiating the detectors with a 1 cm diameter 238 U beam at an energy of 143 MeV/u.
Increasingly, coal-fired power plants are required to balance power grids by compensating for the variable electricity supply from renewable energy sources. Fossil-fueled power plants, originally designed to be base loaded, will increasingly need to operate on a load following or cyclic basis. This demanding requirement for operational flexibility will need to be evaluated for resilience to frequent start-ups, meeting major and rapid load changes, and providing frequency control duties. Our research objective was to evaluate and improve flexibility of existing power plants by improving and redesigning components and defining new operational strategies, with acceptable impacts on component life, efficiency and emissions.
A study was designed for a reconfigurable, full-scale, full-scope nuclear power plant control room simulator to compare two different thermal power dispatch systems, on separate simulator platforms, demonstrating a TPD concept of operation. A TPD system can provide a desirable alternative revenue source for utilities but requires addressing new and unique operational issues. The selection of representative scenarios and the scenario-based experimental design are presented as key elements to capture evidence for validating the developed TPD concept of operations overcome these operational issues.
The Rancor Microworld Simulator is a simplified, pressurized water, small modular reactor simulator that includes a multi-unit plant model server, an advanced digital human-machine control interface, and the Rancor Integrated Procedure System (RIPS). Rancor provides a research and development tool that can be used for collecting operator performance data and for prototyping concepts of operations (ConOps) for advanced reactor development. RIPS is meant as a research tool and includes many unique features: (1) RIPS has a robust procedure authoring system. (2) RIPS has the capability to run any of the three IEEE-Std-1786 computer-based procedure types. (3) RIPS can be configured to take on the look and feel of different vendors’ computer-based procedure systems for the purpose of developing and evaluating different ConOps for plant upgrades or new builds. (4) RIPS includes the capability for logging operator procedure use, including integrating procedure logs with Rancor simulator logs, thereby allowing automated data collection of operator scenario runs. (5) RIPS integrates with the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER), a dynamic human reliability analysis environment that creates a digital human twin or virtual operator to mimic reactor operator performance. (6) RIPS includes support for automation of plant monitoring and control functions. While RIPS is explicitly built into Rancor, it may also be used with full-scope training simulators. This functionality allows RIPS to be used for existing plants and advanced reactors under development.
The increasing number of air travelers each year presents a challenge as many airports are near their capacity in terms of resources and space for passenger screening. Fortunately, advancements in technologies like next-generation millimeter wave scanning offer solutions to ease this strain. The focus remains on managing risk while enhancing the passenger experience for the traveling public. The risk model presented in this paper known as the Aviation Security Screening Optimizer for Risk and Throughput (ASSORT) is designed to assess risk-based approaches for passenger screening and checkpoint operations. Additionally, ASSORT is exploring various traveler categories — general, trusted, and trusted-plus — along with different checkpoint screening Concept of Operations tailored to each traveler type. For instance, travelers with a higher trust level may experience fewer screening technologies, resulting in quicker processing times at the checkpoint. The output of ASSORT provides a risk score for predefined threat scenarios, as well as the overall risk to the checkpoint, aircraft, and airport by traveler type. In conclusion, benefits of using this tool include assessing the trade-offs between the overall risk associated with checkpoints and the throughput rate of passengers screened. We show for example the impact that different passenger volumes at the checkpoint can have on risk.
The Aviation Security Screening Optimizer for Risk and Throughput (ASSORT) is designed to assess risk-based approaches for passenger screening and checkpoint operations. Additionally, ASSORT is exploring various traveler categories — general, trusted, and trusted-plus — along with different checkpoint screening Concept of Operations tailored to each traveler type
The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation
This session will provide insight into how future energy deployments, critical to national-level programs focused on reducing carbon emissions, can be secured-by-design using lessons learned from current energy infrastructure. It will begin with an overview of current threats and risks associated with renewable energy assets and systems, primarily wind and solar, focusing on their control architecture and key system functions for both efficient and safe operations. This talk will then translate the key takeaways from current renewable infrastructure into applications for securing future energy systems, including microreactors and small modular reactors (SMRs), based on planned concepts of operations and control. Microreactors and SMRs are intended to be factory-assembled with commercially available components and deployed in more remote or distributed environments, necessitating centralized control centers, remote monitoring, and offsite maintenance and technical support. All of these factors lead these assets to a security posture and controls more similar to today's renewable energy assets than today's nuclear reactors, which represents a significant shift in mindset for the nuclear industry. This talk will provide justification for this shift as well as a path forward to motivate securing these groundbreaking technologies from the outset of their design and deployment.
The "density limit'' is one of the fundamental bounds on tokamak operating space, and is commonly estimated via the empirical Greenwald scaling. This limit has garnered renewed interest in recent years as it has become clear that ITER and many tokamak pilot plant concepts must operate near or above the widely-used Greenwald limit to achieve their objectives. Evidence has also grown that the Greenwald scaling - in its remarkable simplicity - may not capture the full complexity of the disruptive density limit. In this study, we assemble a multi-machine database to quantify the effectiveness of the Greenwald limit as a predictor of the L-mode density limit and identify alternative stability metrics. We find that a two-parameter dimensionless boundary in the plasma edge, $\nu_{*\rm, edge}^{\rm limit} = 3.0 \beta_{T,{\rm edge}}^{-0.4}$, achieves significantly higher accuracy (true negative rate of 97.7\% at a true positive rate of 95\%) than the Greenwald limit (true negative rate 86.1\% at a true positive rate of 95\%) across a multi-machine dataset including metal- and carbon-wall tokamaks (AUG, C-Mod, DIII-D, and TCV). The collisionality boundary presented here can be applied for density limit avoidance in current devices and in ITER, where it can be measured and responded to in real time.
Electric grid operators are adept at handling complexity and uncertainty. However, with increasing introduction of renewable generation, distributed energy resources, and more frequent severe weather events, operators will experience new workload and challenging decision scenarios. Here, this paper quantifies risks and benefits from an operator's perspective of introducing weather based forecast Dynamic Line Ratings (DLR) using variable wind conditions in addition to ambient temperature to relieve transmission congestion and facilitating more offshore wind (OSW). A concept of operations (CONOPS) applied to a forecast DLR implementation and its integration with OSW is defined. A method for evaluating tradeoffs of derating to make the rating more conservative but decreasing the benefit was developed and applied to a case study for two existing overhead transmission lines on Long Island, New York. The CONOPS uses historical day-ahead and hour-ahead High Resolution Rapid Refresh weather forecasts and weather station data to support planning and real-time operations. The analysis determines the risk of downgrades in real-time operational rating compared to the forecast and quantifies the frequency and severity of last-minute downgrades. The risk is compared against the benefits in increased capacity to provide insights on the additional amount of uncertainty DLR and OSW will add to the operator's workload.
The verification of warhead dismantlement is expected to be an important component in future arms reduction treaties. Historic approaches developed with future arms control treaty verification in mind often involve intrusive measurements, process monitoring, and/or inspector presence to provide confidence that an authentic warhead has been dismantled. This work explores the possibility of reducing the negative impacts of these invasive approaches while also delivering a method that is more likely to provide non-sensitive data that can be shared with not only other nuclear weapons states but also non-nuclear weapons states partners. This work explores a novel approach for verifying dispositioned non-nuclear weapon components, providing confidence post-dismantlement that a treaty accountable item that was dismantled was in fact a treaty-relevant nuclear weapon system as declared. This method provides an alternative to intrusive inspection processes in nuclear weapons production environments, which would require significant changes to the host’s operational behaviors. It achieves this by identifying intrinsic neutron-induced signatures of non-nuclear components to determine their authenticity and estimate the duration they were exposed within a nuclear weapons system using technologies that are already in use for other national security applications. Intrinsic radiation effects studies are already a part of the stockpile aging and surveillance evaluations. However, none of these technologies and approaches have been previously considered for verification applications of non-nuclear component disposition. In this report, we introduce modeling studies that have been used to identify the most promising candidate parts and materials with signatures that are measurable and actionable. These models have been validated with laboratory measurements of signatures induced by the exposure of candidate materials to neutrons over a range of times. Predictive modeling then demonstrates the methodology for estimating exposure times and/or limits. Laboratory measurements of authentic non-nuclear parts from a dismantled warhead demonstrate the feasibility of employing these signature measurements. And finally, a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the potential use of this methodology is presented.
A novel optical gas analyser, designed for isotope-resolved exhaust composition measurement, was field-tested at Wendelstein 7-X (W7-X) to validate its laboratory-proven concept under operational fusion experiment conditions. The system, Optix, comprises a cold cathode remote plasma generator and a high-resolution Fabry–Perot spectrometer and was deployed in the exhaust line of W7-X during the OP2.3 campaign. The injection of 3 He and 4 He for minority ion-cyclotron heating provided a test case for helium isotope discrimination. Despite limitations due to background gas and low partial pressures of the target species, isotope-resolved spectral signatures were successfully observed, demonstrating the fundamental viability of the Optix approach. Additionally, the spectrometer was evaluated for plasma emission measurements from both core and edge sightlines. While helium line emission was detectable, interpretation was hindered by complex background signals, highlighting the benefits of controlled remote plasma generators for spectroscopy. This first deployment provides critical insight into pressure requirements, spectral resolution, and operational constraints, informing future applications of optical exhaust diagnostics in fusion devices.