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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2000

A strategic systems perspective of organizational learning theory: models for a case study at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Organizational learning is an umbrella term that covers a variety of topics including; learning curves, productivity, organizational memory, organizational forgetting, knowledge transfer, knowledge sharing and knowledge creation. This treatise will review some of these theories in concert with a model of how organizations learn.

organizational learning strategy innovation design↗

NASA NTRS2006

Near-Miss Evaluation Bias as an Obstacle to Organizational Learning: Lessons from NASA

After the Shuttle Columbia catastrophe, the investigation board (CAIB) stated that NASA needs to develop a "learning culture", meaning a capability to learn from past failures by understanding the technical and organizational causes of these mistakes (CAIB report, 2003). While many organizations learn from obvious failures, we argue that it is harder for organizations to learn from near-miss events (i.e., situations where a failure does not occur but nearly did), because these near-misses are processed as successes. For the shuttle program, prior debris problems could have caused a similar failure as on the Columbia mission except that the large pieces missed the highly sensitive portions of the orbiter. This acceptance of foam debris was adopted as a normal occurrence by the shuttle program managers similar to the problems at the time of the Challenger Disaster (detailed in Vaughan, 1996). We extend that work to show that an outcome bias influences people's evaluation of project managers, such that managers of failed missions were perceived more poorly than managers who made the same decisions but whose mission ended in either success or a near-miss. The similarity of ratings between the near-miss and success condition imply that even when a problem occurs that is clearly linked to prior managerial decisions, if the project is not harmed because of good luck, that manager is not held accountable for faculty decision making and neither the individual manager nor the organization learn from the experience potentially increasing the likelihood of a failure in the future.

Dillon, Robin L.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Using CASE to Adopt Organizational Learning at NASA

The research direction was articulated in a statement of work created in collaboration between two program colleagues, an outside researcher and an internal user. The researcher was to deliver an implemented CASE tool (CasewiseTM) that was to be used to serve non-traditional (i.e., not software development related) organizational purposes. The explicitly stated functions of the tool were the support of 1) ISO-9000 compliance in the documentation of processes and 2) the management of process improvement. The collaborative team consisted of the researcher (GT), a full-time accompanying student (CRO), and the user (JD). The team originally focused on populating the CASE repository for the purpose of solving the two primary objectives. Consistent with the action research approach, several additional user requirements emerged as the project evolved, needs became apparent in discussions about how the tool would be used to solve organizational problems. These deliverables were contained within the CASE repository: 1) the creation of a paradigm diagram 2) the creation of a context diagram 3) the creation of child diagrams 4) the generation of 73 issues relating to organizational change 5) a compendium of stakeholder interview transcripts All record keeping was done manually and then keyed into the CASE interface. An issue is the difference between an organization s current situation (action) and its collective ideals.

Templeton, Gary F.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Using Knowledge-Based Systems to Support Learning of Organizational Knowledge: A Case Study

This paper describes the deployment of a knowledge system to support learning of organizational knowledge at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), a US national research laboratory whose mission is planetary exploration and to 'do what no one has done before.' Data collected over 19 weeks of operation were used to assess system performance with respect to design considerations, participation, effectiveness of communication mechanisms, and individual-based learning. These results are discussed in the context of organizational learning research and implications for practice.

knowledge management↗

NASA NTRS2010

The Value of Identifying and Recovering Lost GN&C Lessons Learned: Aeronautical, Spacecraft, and Launch Vehicle Examples

Within the broad aerospace community the importance of identifying, documenting and widely sharing lessons learned during system development, flight test, operational or research programs/projects is broadly acknowledged. Documenting and sharing lessons learned helps managers and engineers to minimize project risk and improve performance of their systems. Often significant lessons learned on a project fail to get captured even though they are well known 'tribal knowledge' amongst the project team members. The physical act of actually writing down and documenting these lessons learned for the next generation of NASA GN&C engineers fails to happen on some projects for various reasons. In this paper we will first review the importance of capturing lessons learned and then will discuss reasons why some lessons are not documented. A simple proven approach called 'Pause and Learn' will be highlighted as a proven low-impact method of organizational learning that could foster the timely capture of critical lessons learned. Lastly some examples of 'lost' GN&C lessons learned from the aeronautics, spacecraft and launch vehicle domains are briefly highlighted. In the context of this paper 'lost' refers to lessons that have not achieved broad visibility within the NASA-wide GN&C CoP because they are either undocumented, masked or poorly documented in the NASA Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS).

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗

DOE OSTI2025

From clutter to clarity: Emergent neural operators via questionnaire metrics

Real-world datasets in chemical engineering and bioengineering processes—such as those from catalytic reactors, multiphase flows, polymerization reactors, bioreactors, and clinical trials—can often be unlabeled or disorganized, rendering the training of existing supervised learning models ineffective at learning the underlying dynamics. To salvage these datasets for decision-making, we first seek to obtain clarity from the cluttered data. Here, we present a framework for developing “structural” generative models, discovering emergent equations, and constructing efficient emulators from scrambled datasets by integrating unsupervised organizational learning techniques (Questionnaires) with advanced deep learning architectures (Deep Hidden Physics Models and Deep Operator Networks). Our approach is demonstrated on two illustrative model systems: (a) a 1D advection–diffusion partial differential equation representing a winding underground pipe and (b) an ensemble of Stuart–Landau oscillators, an agent-based system of coupled ordinary differential equations. In both cases, we successfully reconstruct meaningful spatial, temporal, and parameter embeddings from scrambled data, enabling good predictions of system dynamics. As a result, we highlight the framework’s potential for broader applications, enabling data-driven system identification in fields with inherently disorganized or hidden parameter spaces.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS2003

Managing a project's legacy: implications for organizations and project management

Organizations that rely on projects to implement their products must find effective mechanisms for propagating lessons learned on one project throughout the organization. A broad view of what constitutes a project's 'legacy' is presented that includes not just the design products and leftover parts, but new processes, relationships, technology, skills, planning data, and performance metrics. Based on research evaluating knowledge reuse in innovative contexts, this paper presents an approach to project legacy management that focuses on collecting and using legacy knowledge to promote organizational learning and effective reuse, while addressing factors of post-project responsibility, information obsolescence, and the importance of ancillary contextual information. .

risk management↗

NASA NTRS2008

Best Practices for Researching and Documenting Lessons Learned

Identification, resolution, and avoidance of technical and programmatic issues are important for ensuring safe and successful space missions. Although the importance of applying lessons learned to reduce risk is frequently stressed, there is little material available to help technical and management personnel research and document lessons learned. Collecting, researching, identifying, and documenting lessons learned that will be useful to current and future management and engineering personnel is not always a straightforward task. This white paper presents lessons learned and best practices concerning the research and documentation of technical and organizational lessons learned. It is intended to enable organizations to initiate or improve lessons learned research and documentation efforts. The content of this white paper is based on four technical lessons learned projects conducted by the United Space Alliance (USA) Flight Design and Dynamics Department, in support of the NASA/Johnson Space Center (JSC) Flight Design and Dynamics Division. Each project published a report, titled as follows: (1) GPS Lessons Learned From the ISS, Space Shuttle and X-38; (2) Lessons Learned From Seven Space Shuttle Missions; (3) Space Shuttle Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Experience Report; and (4) Navigation Technical History with Lessons Learned. The four projects were different in availability of subject matter experts and primary source material, subject scope, and the level of effort required to produce the final report. However, generic lessons can be drawn from all of them. The best practices will be discussed by the phases of report research and development: (1) Defining Report Requirements, Project Organization, and Schedule; (2) Collection and Analysis of Source Material; (3) Writing and Integrating the Report; and (4) Review and Revision of the Report.

Goodman, John L.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Making Sense of Rocket Science - Building NASA's Knowledge Management Program

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has launched a range of KM activities-from deploying intelligent "know-bots" across millions of electronic sources to ensuring tacit knowledge is transferred across generations. The strategy and implementation focuses on managing NASA's wealth of explicit knowledge, enabling remote collaboration for international teams, and enhancing capture of the key knowledge of the workforce. An in-depth view of the work being done at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) shows the integration of academic studies and practical applications to architect, develop, and deploy KM systems in the areas of document management, electronic archives, information lifecycles, authoring environments, enterprise information portals, search engines, experts directories, collaborative tools, and in-process decision capture. These systems, together, comprise JPL's architecture to capture, organize, store, and distribute key learnings for the U.S. exploration of space.

knowledge management organizational learning NASA ↗

NASA NTRS2003