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Gamma-Ray and Cosmic Ray Muon Modalities for Cargo Inspection

Screening and inspection of cargo containers are two essential methods to nondestructively examine the contents of shipment. These methods enable the detection of illicit transportation of unauthorized materials such as nuclear and radioactive materials, explosives, drugs, and so on, typically at borders or secure facilities. Although high-energy X-ray transmission is a standard system and is widely used for cargo inspection, the inherent challenges of high false-positive rates and high attenuation factors necessitate the development of complementary techniques that can increase the detection efficiency and accuracy in large and dense materials. Gamma-rays, which possess higher penetration characteristics because of their high energy, offer an alternative nonintrusive modality for cargo scanning. They represent a promising inspection method when compared to X-rays for three reasons: (1) improved ability to detect nuclear and radioactive materials, (2) higher inspection throughput rates, and (3) lower false-positive rates. Currently, there are two main gamma-ray inspection techniques, active and passive interrogation. Active interrogation can be further grouped into (1) gamma-ray transmission imaging and (2) neutron-induced gamma-ray emission detection. Gamma-ray transmission imaging utilizes differences in material densities for mapping the shipment contents and detecting anomalies. It is analogous to the X-ray transmission method; however, the high-energy photons make it more difficult to shield against, which enables more efficient performance in large and dense material inspection. Neutron-induced gamma-ray emission inspection is designed for the detection of nuclear and radioactive material because those materials emit characteristic gamma-rays when they are activated by neutron absorption. On the other hand, passive interrogation techniques rely on high-efficiency detectors to detect radiation emitted from hidden special nuclear or other radioactive materials. Similar to passive interrogation, cosmic ray muon monitoring and imaging are relatively new techniques that do not require external radioactive sources. These techniques have received attention as a potential next-generation radiographic probe to identify illicit transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials in cargo containers. Cosmic ray muons have unique features, (1) much higher energies than X-rays or gamma-rays (on the order of 10−1—104 GeV), (2) enhanced penetration capability, and (3) natural occurrence, thereby eliminating the need for induced radiation sources. These features enable cosmic ray muons to be utilized for detection of special nuclear materials in high-background-noise environments. By analyzing incoming and outgoing muon trajectories, scattering angles, and energies, it has been shown that it would be possible to locate hidden and well-shielded materials in cargo containers via three-dimensional muon tomography images or signal analysis. Gamma-rays, cosmic ray muons, and other nonintrusive cargo inspection modalities are complementary to each other, allowing them to address various cargo inspection conditions (i.e., scanning time, cost, radiation exposure level, and types of target materials). This chapter presents a detailed review of the theoretical fundamentals and technical principles behind the current gamma-ray and cosmic ray muon modalities for cargo inspection. Additionally, critical assessments and suggestions for the future directions to advance the use of gamma and muon modalities are discussed.

Bae, Junghyun↗

Personnel Dose Assessment during Active Interrogation

A leading candidate in the detection of special nuclear material (SNM) is active interrogation (AI). Unlike passive interrogation, AI uses a source to enhance or create a detectable signal from SNM (usually fission), particularly in shielded scenarios or scenarios where the SNM has a low activity. The use of AI thus makes the detection of SNM easier or, in some scenarios, even enables previously impossible detection. During the development of AI sources, significant effort is put into determining the source strength required to detect SNM in specific scenarios. Usually during this process, but not always, an evaluation of personnel dose is also completed. In this instance personnel dose could involve any of the following: (1) personnel performing the AI; (2) unknown stowaways who are inside the object being interrogated; or (3) in clandestine interrogations, personnel who are known to be inside the object being interrogated but are unaware of the interrogation. In most instances, dose to anyone found smuggling SNM will be a secondary issue. However, for the organizations performing the AI, legal if not moral considerations should make dose to the personnel performing the AI, unknown stowaways, or innocent bystanders in clandestine interrogations a serious concern.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

NMIS with Imaging and Gamma Ray Spectrometry for Pu, HEU, HE and Other Materials

The Nuclear Material Identification System (NMIS) has been under development at ORNL and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Y-12 National Security Complex since 1984. In the mid-1990s, what is now the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Verification (ONV) realized that it was a useful technology for future arms control treaty applications and supported further development of the system. In 2004, fast-neutron imaging was incorporated into the system. In 2007, the ONV decided to develop a fieldable version of the system, designated as FNMIS, for potential use in future treaties. The FNMIS is being developed to be compatible with the eventual incorporation of gamma-ray spectrometry and an information barrier. This report addresses how and what attributes could be determined by the FNMIS system with gamma-ray spectrometry. The NMIS is a time-dependent coincidence system that incorporates tomographic imaging (including mapping of the fission sites) and gamma-ray spectrometry. It utilizes a small, lightweight (30 lb), portable deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron (14.1 MeV) generator (4 x 10 7 neutrons/second) for active interrogation and can also perform passive interrogation. A high-purity germanium (HPGe) gamma-ray detector with multichannel analysis can be utilized in conjunction with the source for active interrogation or passively. The system uses proton recoil scintillators: 32 small 2.5 x 2.5 x 10.2-cm-thick plastic scintillators for imaging and at least two 2 x 2 arrays of 27 x 27 x 10-cm-thick plastic scintillators that detect induced fission radiation. The DT generator contains an alpha detector that time and directionally tags a fan beam of some of the neutrons emitted and subdivides it into pixels. A fast (1 GHz) time correlation processor measures the time-dependent coincidence among all detectors in the system. A computer-controlled scanner moves the small detectors and the source appropriately for scanning a target object for imaging. The system is based on detection of transmitted 14.1 MeV neutrons, fission neutrons, and gamma rays from spontaneous, inherent source fission of the target, fission neutrons and gamma rays induced by the external DT source, gamma rays from natural emissions of uranium and plutonium, and induced gamma-ray emission by the interaction of the 14.1 MeV neutrons from the DT source. The NMIS can and has been used with a time-tagged californium spontaneous fission source. It has also been used with pulsed interrogation sources such as LINACs, DT, and deuterium-deuterium (DD) sources. This system is uniquely suited for detection of shielded highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, and other special nuclear materials and detection of high explosives (HE) and chemical agents. The NMIS will be adapted to utilize a trusted processor that incorporates information barrier and authentication techniques using open software and then be useful in some international applications for materials whose characteristics may be classified. The proposed information barrier version of the NMIS system would consist of detectors and cables, the red (classified side) computer system, which processes the data, and the black (unclassified side) computer, which handles the computer interface. The system could use the 'IB wrapper' concept proposed by Los Alamos National Laboratory and the software integrity (digital signatures) system proposed by Sandia. Since it is based entirely on commercially available components, the entire system, including NMIS data acquisition boards, can be built with commercial off-the-shelf components. This system is being developed into a fieldable system (FNMIS) for potential arms control treaties by the ONV. The system will be modularly constructed with the RF shielded modules connected to the processor by appropriate control and signal cable in metal conduit. The FNMIS is presently being designed for eventual incorporation of gamma-ray spectrometry and an information barrier to protect classified information. The system hardware and software can be configured to obtain the following: plutonium presence, plutonium mass, Pu-240/239 ratio, plutonium geometry, plutonium metal vs non-metallic (absence of metal), time (age) since processing for plutonium (or last purification), uranium presence, uranium mass, uranium enrichment, uranium geometry, uranium metal vs non-metallic compound (absence of metal), beryllium presence and mass, tritium and deuterium gas bottle presence, HE, and chemical weapons. A matrix of the quantities determined, the method of determination, whether active (external neutron source) or passive, and the measurement equipment involved is given in the Tables 1-4. Some of these attributes can be obtained by multiple data analysis methods. The gamma-ray spectrometry methods for HEU, plutonium, and HE have been developed by other laboratories, are well known, and will be incorporated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Activities for the Spent Fuel Nondestructive Assay Project

The main focus of research in the NA-241 spent fuel nondestructive assay (NDA) project in FY17 has been completing the fabrication and testing of two prototype instruments for upcoming spent fuel measurements at the Clab interim storage facility in Sweden. One is a passive instrument: Differential Die-away Self Interrogation-Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity (DDSI), and one is an active instrument: Differential Die-Away-Californium Interrogation with Prompt Neutron (DDA). DDSI was fabricated and tested with fresh fuel at Los Alamos National Laboratory in FY15 and FY16, then shipped to Sweden at the beginning of FY17. Research was performed in FY17 to simplify results from the data acquisition system, which is complex because signals from 56 different 3He detectors must be processed using list mode data. The DDA instrument was fabricated at the end of FY16. New high count rate electronics better suited for a spent fuel environment (i.e., KM-200 preamplifiers) were built specifically for this instrument in FY17, and new Tygon tubing to house electrical cables was purchased and installed. Fresh fuel tests using the DDA instrument with numerous configurations of fuel rods containing depleted uranium (DU), low enriched uranium (LEU), and LEU with burnable poisons (Gd) were successfully performed and compared to simulations.1 Additionally, members of the spent fuel NDA project team travelled to Sweden for a “spent fuel characterization and decay heat” workshop involving simulations of spent fuel and analysis of uncertainties in decay heat calculations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A compact neutron spectrometer system

A portable neutron spectrometer, nSpec, has been developed for passive interrogation of fast neutrons ( 1 MeV) from neutron sources. The design of the system includes four EJ-301 liquid scintillation cells, a custom stand, and tungsten caps for gamma-ray shielding. Data acquisition settings were optimized to provide a dynamic range of up to > 15 MeV neutron energy. Additionally, the detector response matrix was characterized using a time-of-flight method based on gamma-ray tagged neutron emission from 252 Cf. The spectrum unfolding was characterized using measured and simulated spectra of AmBe and 252 Cf with the GRAVEL and MLEM methods. Monte Carlo methods were used to examine the uncertainty propagation and determine sufficient counts for a measurement.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Investigation of Active Interrogation Techniques to Detect Special Nuclear Material in Maritime Environments

The detection and interdiction of special nuclear material (SNM) is still a high-priority focus area for many organizations around the world. One method that is commonly considered a leading candidate in the detection of SNM is active interrogation (AI). AI is different from its close relative, passive interrogation, in that an active source is used to enhance or create a detectable signal (usually fission) from SNM, particularly in shielded scenarios or scenarios where the SNM has a low activity. The use of AI thus makes the detection of SNM easier or, in some scenarios, even enables previously impossible detection. In this work the signal from prompt neutrons and photons as well as delayed neutrons and photons will be combined, as is typically done in AI. In previous work AI has been evaluated experimentally and computationally. However, for the purposes of this work, past scenarios are considered lightly shielded and tightly coupled spatially. At most, the previous work interrogated the contents of one standard cargo container (2.44 x 2.60 x 6.10 m) and the source and detector were both within a few meters of the object being interrogated. A few examples of this type of previous work can be found in references 1 and 2. Obviously, more heavily shielded AI scenarios will require larger source intensities, larger detector surface areas (larger detectors or more detectors), greater detector efficiencies, longer count times, or some combination of these.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

An Evaluation of a Neutron Time Correlated Interrogation Method for Measurement of Fissile Content in Research Reactor Spent Fuel Assemblies

There are many research reactors worldwide that have been, or are being converted from the use of high enrichment uranium (HEU) to low enrichment uranium (LEU, < 20% enriched). The verification of fissile content and initial enrichment of the spent fuel is needed for the effective safeguards of the fuel. The advanced experimental fuel counter (AEFC) was developed for the measurement of spent fuel rods and assemblies from research reactors for safeguards verification. This measurement system contains components for active neutron interrogation, passive neutron totals counting, neutron coincidence counting, and gross gamma-ray counting. This report presents the first application of the time correlated interrogation technique for the measurement of the 235 U content in research reactor spent fuel assemblies. The technique, called time correlated induced fission (TCIF), uses a 252 Cf neutron source to irradiate the fuel assembly, and the subsequent induced fission events in the fissile material are measured by coincidence counting. The doubles rates are enhanced by having the neutron trigger events from both the 252 Cf source and the induced fission neutrons in the same time gate in the coincidence analysis. The average neutrons per fission of the 252 Cf source is 3.76 and the induced fission neutrons for 235 U is 2.44, so the number of neutrons that are produced is higher than for random neutron interrogation. This high effective neutron number increases the multiplicity counting rates and reduces the statistical error. The background coincidence counts from the 252 Cf are reduced by the water in the sample cavity and the polyethylene surrounding the 3 He detector tubes. This method of active neutron interrogation has been applied to the measurement of spent research reactor (IRT) fuel assemblies. The advanced experimental fuel counter (AEFC) was used to compare the TCIF method with the typically used AmLi neutron interrogation source that emits neutrons that are random in time. The statistical uncertainty for the use of the random neutron source (AmLi) and the time correlated source ( 252 Cf) for spent fuel interrogations was evaluated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Detection of Special Nuclear Material in Cargo using Continuous Neutron Interrogation and Tension Metastable Fluid Detectors

This paper presents results using a novel technique for detecting special nuclear materials (SNMs) based on interrogation with a continuous beam of 2.45 MeV neutrons coupled with high intrinsic efficiency tensioned metastable fluid detectors (TMFDs) operated in threshold rejection mode. While passive interrogation may be utilized for detecting SNMs such as {sup 239}Pu from their strong spontaneous fission neutron signatures, this is not so for highly-enriched uranium (HEU), the timely detection of which has been identified as a grand challenge by the U.S. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). Active (neutron and/or photon based) interrogation represents the only viable means for detecting HEU either shielded or unshielded within cargo containers. Active interrogation by neutrons or photons leads to unequivocal induced fission based signatures in terms of neutron energy and multiplicity. The main challenge under such circumstances pertains to being able to discern the relatively weak emission signatures from the intense interrogation pulses of neutrons and/or photons. Purdue University together with Sagamore Adams Laboratories, LLC (SAL) has been developing the TMFD sensor system that promises to provide high neutron detection efficiency for fast and thermal neutrons while remaining gamma-beta blind. As described in these references, the TMFD sensor system works on the principle of transient cavitation detection events (CDEs) caused by ionizing particles such as neutrons, alphas and fission fragments in fluids that have been placed in various states of tensioned (sub-zero) pressure states of fluid metastability. Such CDEs result in recordable signatures - both electronically as for conventional detectors, but also in the form of audio-visual signals. One key advantage that the TMFD holds over conventional neutron detectors is that it has proven gamma-beta 'blindness' and indeed, confirmed to possess GARRn = 1.0 to γ photons (tested in up to 10{sup 11} γ/s field from a 3 Ci {sup 137}Cs source). Such an enablement allows for detection without saturation from background, interrogating and fission created γ photons. Another key attribute is up to 60 % intrinsic fission spectrum neutron detection efficiency which, furthermore, is amenable to tailoring for threshold based rejection. That is, to be able to detect neutrons at or above a desired energy with good efficiency, while remaining relatively blind to neutrons below the chosen threshold. This research is the subject of our ongoing DNDO project at Purdue University, the results of which form the basis of this paper. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

FY25 Mid-Year Report: FNCL Enhancements Implementation

During the first half of FY25 the FNCL team has made consistent progress toward the completion of our project goals. The FNCL prototype panel design has been successfully applied to a fully instrumented 3-panel system which is actively under construction. The FNCL Demonstrator System contains solid scintillators instrumented with SiPMs, which operate on an updated CAEN digitizer, requires no high-voltage, and has a smaller overall footprint. The onboard software will include the LLNL-developed GMM-PSD signal processing. Later this year the system will be experimentally tested alongside the baseline FNCL instrument at LLNLs ISSA facility. In addition to a full systems test, the performance of a DD generator for active interrogation measurements compared to the standard AmLi source will be established for both systems. The data collected at the ISSA facility will be used to experimentally validate the FNCL-Fast Isotopic Fuel Assay’s (FIFA) capability to measure U-235 loading and to predict gadolinium poison content with passive interrogation. The FNCL-FIFA modal was benchmarked with simulation-based data and a user-friendly GUI was added earlier this year. Three separate codes have been submitted to the LLNL ESW system for review prior to their transfers. These include the Predictive Modeling Response toolkit, GMM-PSD firmware beta version, and the FNCL-FIFA analysis package with GUI and user documentation.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

High-resolution magnetic microscopy applications using nitrogen-vacancy centers in diamond

Magnetic microscopy with high spatial resolution helps to solve a variety of technical problems in condensed-matter physics, electrical engineering, biomagnetism, and geomagnetism. In this work we used quantum diamond magnetic microscope (QDMM) setups, which use a dense uniform layer of magnetically-sensitive nitrogen-vacancy (NV) centers in diamond to image an external magnetic field using a fluorescence microscope. We used this technique for imaging few-micron ferromagnetic needles used as a physically unclonable function (PUF) and to passively interrogate electric current paths in a commercial 555 timer integrated circuit (IC). As part of the QDMM development, we also found a way to calculate ion implantation recipes to create diamond samples with dense uniform NV layers at the surface. This work opens the possibility for follow-up experiments with 2D magnetic materials, ion implantation, and electronics characterization and troubleshooting.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Determining plutonium mass in spent fuel with non-destructive assay techniques - NGSU research overview and update on 6 NDA techniques

This poster is one of two complementary posters. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) of the U.S. DOE has initiated a multi-lab/university collaboration to quantify the plutonium (Pu) mass in, and detect the diversion of pins from, spent nuclear fuel assemblies with non-destructive assay (NDA). This research effort has the goal of quantifying the capability of 14 NDA techniques as well as training a future generation of safeguards practitioners. By November of 2010, we will be 1.5 years into the first phase (2.5 years) of work. This first phase involves primarily Monte Carlo modelling while the second phase (also 2.5 years) will focus on experimental work. The goal of phase one is to quantify the detection capability of the various techniques for the benefit of safeguard technology developers, regulators, and policy makers as well as to determine what integrated techniques merit experimental work, We are considering a wide range of possible technologies since our research horizon is longer term than the focus of most regulator bodies. The capability of all of the NDA techniques will be determined for a library of 64 17 x 17 PWR assemblies [burnups (15, 30, 45, 60 GWd/tU), initial enrichments (2, 3, 4, 5%) and cooling times (1, 5, 20, 80 years)]. The burnup and cooling time were simulated with each fuel pin being comprised of four radial regions. In this paper an overview of the purpose will be given as well as a technical update on the following 6 neutron techniques: {sup 252}Cf Interrogation with Prompt Neutron Detection, Delayed Neutrons, Differential Die-Away, Differential Die-Away Self-Interrogation, Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity, Self-Integration Neutron Resonance Densitometry. The technical update will quantify the anticipated performance of each technique for the 64 assemblies of the spent fuel library.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Neutron Number Probability Distributions in a Subcritical System Using the Forward Master Equation

The subject of this paper is the determination of the equilibrium probability distribution function (PDF) of the neutron population within a subcritical multiplying system in the presence of an intrinsic random source as a result of spontaneous fission (SF). Such systems are strongly stochastic and low order moments such as the mean and variance of the neutron number are not sufficient to characterize the true state of the neutron population. We base our work on the forward Master equation in a lumped model formulation for P{sub n} (t), n = 0, 1, 2,..., the probability of there existing η neutrons at time t and obtain solutions for the steady state distributions. The key parameters in this model, neutron lifetime and fission probability, are rigorously obtained by numerically solving the k-eigenvalue problem in a one-dimensional spherical system and using standard definitions of lumped parameters in terms of production and loss rates in finite systems. Previous work has examined single-chain PDFs (a single fission and the resulting progeny) for neutrons, uncoupled neutron-photon single-chain PDFs, both using a lumped backward Master equation formulation, as well as neutron PDFs in supercritical systems. In this paper, we analyze strictly subcritical systems, for which we compare analytically derived solutions with numerical computations for different multiplicity distribution models. For subcritical systems where the neutron population remains finite at steady state, we show that the forward Master equation can be very efficiently solved numerically to obtain the equilibrium distributions. Finally, this work is motivated by potential application to passive interrogation for detection of diverted nuclear materials as well to criticality safety. The equilibrium neutron number probability distribution in subcritical systems has been numerically investigated for several models of the induced and spontaneous fission multiplicity distribution. A well known approximate but closed form solution, namely the quadratic model, was shown to be unacceptably accurate for subcritical media. The matrix inversion and the recursion methods agree well and were benchmarked with the binary fission model, but the recursion formulation proves far more computationally efficient. A qualitative change in the shape of the neutron PDF is observed for increasing source strength, as expected, and a transition from a stochastic to a deterministic system is expected for a sufficiently strong source. We are currently extending this approach to obtain the equilibrium joint distribution of neutrons within the system and those that have leaked, to explicitly represent the neutron PDF as observed by an external detector. (authors)

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

An Experimental Feasibility Study on Applying Neutron Tomography to Encapsulated Spent Nuclear Fuel - 20050

Visual inspection makes easier to ensure the integrity and safety of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) than any classical techniques. Various classical techniques have been applied but there are no reliable methods to qualitatively and quantitatively verify spent fuel in dry storage. Thus, the present authors have developed the prototype safeguards apparatus for dry storage employing the array of He-4 gas scintillation detectors (S670E, Arktis Radiation Detectors Ltd., Switzerland), newly designed to simultaneously measure thermal and fast neutrons without any moderators. The S670E detector has a cylindrical shape with a diameter of 52 mm and active length of 600 mm (total length: 875 mm). The detector is filled by He-4 gas with an approximate pressure of 180 bar for fast neutron detection, and its inner wall is coated by Li-6 for thermal neutron detection. The scintillation lights generated via Li-6 nuclear reaction and elastic scattering are collected by 24 SiPMs linearly paired at the center of the detector. The detector delivers a TTL (Transistor-Transistor Logic) output for pulse readout and UART (Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter) for device control. In order to assess feasibility of the apparatus, an experimental system has been designed, built, and optimized via computational studies. Cf-252 neutron sources and linearly arrayed detectors, working as a single detector, were occupied for this study due to the difficulties in working with SNF. The laboratory scale cask (diameter: 0.67 m, height: 1.5 m), minimized by a factor of 10 compared to the actual thickness of a commercial TN-32 cask, was also manufactured. The detector array was designed to rotate the lab-scale cask and obtain 36 image profiles at every 10 degrees. All profiles were aligned in single frame image called a sinogram, and the cross-sectional image was then fabricated by the inverse radon transform algorithm. These experiments have been repeated with different configurations and numbers of sources. Some gamma-ray sources were also measured with neutron sources in order to distinguish between neutron and gamma-ray pulses. Basically, a He-4 detector is designed to run on Linux OS so it is difficult to directly apply to Windows-based equipment widely used in S. Korea. Therefore, a new data acquisition board working on Windows OS was designed and built. The board mainly consists of FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) and SoC (System on Chip) for TTL pulse readout, sorting measured data, and transferring data to a user interface. In conclusion, the tomographic system at lab-scale has shown considerable potential to detect a partial or gross defect of encapsulated assemblies in dry storage. Next steps of this study will be to 1) repeatedly carry out experiments to demonstrate scientific reliability and validity, and 2) numerically integrate signals with weight factors to enhance the image quality since the suggested system based on passive interrogation method requires longer measurement time. Finally, the system will apply to a commercial dry storage phased out soon in S. Korea. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

A new method to measure the U-235 content in fresh LWR fuel assemblies via fast-neutron passive self-interrogation

The purpose of this paper is to provide a solution to a decades old safeguards problem in the verification of the fissile concentration in fresh light water reactor (LWR) fuel assemblies. The problem is that the burnable poison (e.g. Gd 2 O 3 ) addition to the fuel rods decreases the active neutron assay for the fuel assemblies. This paper presents a new innovative method for the verification of the 235 U linear mass density in fresh LEU fuel assemblies that is insensitive to the burnable poison content. The technique makes use of the 238 U atoms in the fuel rods to self-interrogate the 235 U mass. The innovation for the new approach is that the 238 U spontaneous fission (SF) neutrons from the rods induces fission reactions (IF) in the 235 U that are time correlated with the SF source neutrons. Thus, the coincidence gate counting rate benefits from both the nu-bar of the 238 U SF (2.07) and the 235 U IF (2.44) for a fraction of the IF reactions. Whereas, the 238 U SF background has no time-correlation boost. The higher the detection efficiency, the higher the correlated boost because background neutron counts from the SF are being converted to signal doubles. This time-correlation in the IF signal increases signal/background ratio that provides a good precision for the net signal from the 235 U mass. The hard neutron energy spectrum makes the technique insensitive to the burnable poison loading where a Cd or Gd liner on the detector walls is used to prevent thermal-neutron reflection back into the fuel assembly from the detector. Here, we have named the system the fast-neutron passive collar (FNPC).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A more accurate and penetrating method to measure the enrichment and mass of UF6 storage containers using passive neutron self-interrogation

This paper describes an unattended mode neutron measurement that can provide the enrichment of the uranium in UF{sub 6} cylinders. The new passive neutron measurement provides better penetration into the uranium mass than prior gamma-ray enrichment measurement methods. The Passive Neutron Enrichment Monitor (PNEM) provides a new measurement technique that uses passive neutron totals and coincidence counting together with neutron self-interrogation to measure the enrichment in the cylinders. The measurement uses the neutron rates from two detector pods. One of the pods has a bare polyethylene surface next to the cylinder and the other polyethylene surface is covered with Cd to prevent thermal neutrons from returning to the cylinder. The primary neutron source from the enriched UF{sub 6} is the alpha-particle decay from the {sub 234}U that interacts with the fluorine to produce random neutrons. The singles neutron counting rate is dominated by the {sub 234}U neutrons with a minor contribution from the induced fissions in the {sub 235}U. However, the doubles counting rate comes primarily from the induced fissions (i.e., multiplication) in the {sub 235}U in enriched uranium. The PNEM concept makes use of the passive neutrons that are initially produced from the {sub 234}U reactions that track the {sub 235}U enrichment during the enrichment process. The induced fission reactions from the thermal-neutron albedo are all from the {sub 235}U and provide a measurement of the {sub 235}U. The Cd ratio has the desirable feature that all of the thermal-neutron-induced fissions in {sub 235}U are independent of the original neutron source. Thus, the ratio is independent of the uranium age, purity, and prior reactor history.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Using anisotropies in prompt fission neutron coincidences to assess the neutron multiplication of highly multiplying subcritical plutonium assemblies

There is a significant and well-known anisotropy between the prompt neutrons emitted from a single fission event; these neutrons are most likely to be observed at angles near 0° or 180° relative to each other. However, the propagation of this anisotropy through different generations of a fission chain re-action has not been previously studied. We have measured this anisotropy in neutron–neutron coincidences from a subcritical highly-multiplying assembly of plutonium metal. The assembly was a 4.5 kg α-phase plutonium metal sphere composed of 94% 239 Pu and 6% 240 Pu by mass. Data were collected using two EJ-309 liquid scintillators and two EJ-299 plastic scintillators. The angular distribution of neutron–neutron coincidences was measured at 90° and 180° and found to be largely isotropic. Simulations were performed using MCNPX-PoliMi of similar plutonium metal spheres of varying sizes and a correlation between the neutron multiplication of the assembly and the anisotropy of neutron–neutron coincidences was observed. In principle, this correlation could be used to assess the neutron multi-plication of an unknown assembly.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Californium interrogation prompt neutron (CIPN) instrument for non-destructive assay of spent nuclear fuel – design concept and experimental demonstration

Our paper presents results of the first experimental demonstration of the Californium Interrogation Prompt Neutron (CIPN) instrument developed within a multi-year effort launched by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Spent Fuel Project of the United States Department of Energy. The goals of this project focused on developing viable non-destructive assay techniques with capabilities to improve an independent verification of spent fuel assembly characteristics. For this purpose, the CIPN instrument combines active and passive neutron interrogation, along with passive gamma-ray measurements, to provide three independent observables. We describe the initial feasibility demonstration of the CIPN instrument, which involved measurements of four pressurized-water-reactor spent fuel assemblies with different levels of burnup and two initial enrichments. The measurements were performed at the Post-Irradiation Examination Facility at the Korea Atomic Energy Institute in the Republic of Korea. The key aim of the demonstration was to evaluate CIPN instrument performance under realistic deployment conditions, with the focus on a detailed assessment of systematic uncertainties that are best evaluated experimentally. The measurements revealed good positioning reproducibility, as well as a high degree of insensitivity of the CIPN instrument's response to irregularities in a radial burnup profile. Systematic uncertainty of individual CIPN instrument signals due to assembly rotation was found to be <4.5%, even for assemblies with fairly extreme gradients in the radial burnup profile. Lastly, these features suggest that the CIPN instrument is capable of providing a good representation of assembly average characteristics, independent of assembly orientation in the instrument.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗