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DOE OSTI2023

252 Cf yield calibration method for nuclear material accountancy and safeguards practitioners

Californium-252 is an isotope commonly encapsulated as a physically small but strong spontaneous fission neutron source for applications in industry, academia, and research. Within the nuclear safeguards community, a well-characterized 252 Cf source is often used as an accessible alternative for plutonium in calibrations measurements, which require the absolute source strength. Current methods of source strength quantification can provide an accurate estimate, approximately 1% uncertainty under optimal conditions, but are typically costly and time consuming. An alternative method was developed to determine 252 Cf source strength using passive neutron correlation counting (PNCC). The PNCC method enables institutions and facilities to perform 252 Cf source calibration measurements in-house using detection systems that are common within the nuclear safeguards community. This novel method was previously successfully demonstrated using neutron multiplicity well counters. However, the previous evaluation utilized detection systems with high neutron detection efficiencies, greater than 60%. The purpose of the current study is to extend the previous evaluation and demonstrate the feasibility of the PNCC 252 Cf calibration method for suite of coincidence counters with lower neutron detection efficiencies, between 15% and 35%, which are more commonly encountered in the field, as well as to provide a step-by-step guide to using the method. The neutron source used in this evaluation was previously certified by the National Institutes of Science and Technology (NIST), which provides a reference for the accuracy of the PNCC method. In conclusion, the present source yield calculations demonstrate excellent agreement with a NIST calibration technique and achieve a standard uncertainty below the target 1%.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2022

The calculation of light element impurity (α, n) yield curves in a PuO 2 matrix and associated specific yield coefficients: Influence of the reaction cross sections

Most of the Pu separated from irradiated commercial nuclear fuel is stored as PuO 2 . The primary quantitative nondestructive measurement technique used to verify the amount of Pu in storage containers is passive neutron correlation counting. An important physical property of the oxide material is the ratio, α, of the rate of (α, n) neutrons produced inside the item to the rate of neutrons produced by spontaneous fission. This ratio influences the precision of the correlated counting method and affects the interpretation of the data because of how it changes both the primary total neutron production rate and the rate of induced fission events taking place inside the item. In addition to the main O(α, n) contribution, additional contributions come from α-particle interactions with light element impurities that are inevitably present. In this work, we calculate specific (α, n) yield coefficients, expressed in units of neutrons per second per gram of α-emitting nuclide per part per million by mass of the specified impurity element distributed in a pure PuO 2 matrix, for some key α-emitting actinides commonly present in reprocessed Pu ( 238–242 Pu+ 241 Am). These coefficients are directly applicable to nuclear safeguards verification work in which the α ratio is often calculated from the Pu-isotopic composition and chemical information obtained by other means. Further, they also provide a convenient up-to-date reference set against which values generated by other methods can be compared. Results are presented for impurities with atomic number from 3 to 17 inclusive, plus K and Fe. In most cases, these coefficients are not expected to change by more than 5%–10% at any time in the future. However, as new data become available, changes as large as 20% may be needed for some targets (e.g., F). The present yield calculations are limited by the general shortage of quality experimental total (α, n) reaction cross section data, which, together with unexplained variation between determinations, means that an objective and coherent evaluation is not possible. The situation is even less satisfactory for the partial differential cross section needed to calculate neutron spectra.

(𝛼, n) reactions↗

NASA NTRS2024

Observed Correlation Between Local Topography and Passive Neutron Measurements from the Dynamic Albedo of Neutrons (DAN) Instrument on the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) Rover

The Dynamic Albedo of Neutrons (DAN) instrument on the Mars Science Laboratory Curiosity rover primarily measures neutrons that have undergone interactions with rocks and materials in the rover's local environment. As the rover ascends Aeolis Mons, it may encounter more extreme local topography (e.g., cliffs, gullies, canyons). We present three parts of the rover's traverse in which local topography, expressed as the average local relief relative to the rover, is moderately to strongly correlated with an increase in passive thermal neutron count rates. These increases in count rates are consistent with results from radiation transport models of the instrument's performance near simulated topographic features. Additional DAN measurements in areas of high average local relief (>0.25 m) within 5 m of the instrument could bolster this correlation. DAN's sensitivity to topography in its passive mode could be utilized as a new measurement capability and has implications for the operation of future landed missions carrying neutron spectrometers (e.g., VIPER, MoonRanger, Lunar-VISE).

Steven D Dibb↗

DOE OSTI2020

An Evaluation of a Neutron Time Correlated Interrogation Method for Measurement of Fissile Content in Research Reactor Spent Fuel Assemblies

There are many research reactors worldwide that have been, or are being converted from the use of high enrichment uranium (HEU) to low enrichment uranium (LEU, < 20% enriched). The verification of fissile content and initial enrichment of the spent fuel is needed for the effective safeguards of the fuel. The advanced experimental fuel counter (AEFC) was developed for the measurement of spent fuel rods and assemblies from research reactors for safeguards verification. This measurement system contains components for active neutron interrogation, passive neutron totals counting, neutron coincidence counting, and gross gamma-ray counting. This report presents the first application of the time correlated interrogation technique for the measurement of the 235 U content in research reactor spent fuel assemblies. The technique, called time correlated induced fission (TCIF), uses a 252 Cf neutron source to irradiate the fuel assembly, and the subsequent induced fission events in the fissile material are measured by coincidence counting. The doubles rates are enhanced by having the neutron trigger events from both the 252 Cf source and the induced fission neutrons in the same time gate in the coincidence analysis. The average neutrons per fission of the 252 Cf source is 3.76 and the induced fission neutrons for 235 U is 2.44, so the number of neutrons that are produced is higher than for random neutron interrogation. This high effective neutron number increases the multiplicity counting rates and reduces the statistical error. The background coincidence counts from the 252 Cf are reduced by the water in the sample cavity and the polyethylene surrounding the 3 He detector tubes. This method of active neutron interrogation has been applied to the measurement of spent research reactor (IRT) fuel assemblies. The advanced experimental fuel counter (AEFC) was used to compare the TCIF method with the typically used AmLi neutron interrogation source that emits neutrons that are random in time. The statistical uncertainty for the use of the random neutron source (AmLi) and the time correlated source ( 252 Cf) for spent fuel interrogations was evaluated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Nondestructive measurements of residual 235 U mass of Israeli Research Reactor-1 fuel using the Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter

In 2018, a measurement campaign took place with participants from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the Nuclear Research Centre-Negev (NRCN) and Soreq Nuclear Research Center (SNRC) at the Israeli Research Reactor-1 (IRR-1) in which 14 of the reactor’s used fuel assemblies (FAs) with varied amount of depletion were measured with the nondestructive assay instrument Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter (AEFC). Designed for safeguards purposes, the AEFC measures both neutrons emitted from the FA (passive neutrons) and fission neutrons induced by an external neutron source (in this experiment, 252 Cf). Signals recorded with the AEFC include total neutron count rates (Singles), time-correlated neutron count rates (Doubles), and total gamma-ray count rates. The 235 U content of the FAs was previously assessed by two independent methods: (1) measurement of the transparency of the FA to low-energy gamma rays from an activated rhenium source (rhenium gamma transmission, or the RGT method) and (2) calculation of the 30-year burnup history of the core using detailed three-dimensional Monte-Carlo core depletion calculations. The results from the FAs that had been measured via the RGT method were used to construct the calibration curves, which translate the AEFC count rates to 235 U mass. Then, the calibration was evaluated using AEFC measurements of six additional FAs that were not measured via the RGT method. From the results, it was determined the Doubles calibration curve was more reliable than that of the Singles and follows a simple second-order polynomial fit for the whole range of residual 235 U mass content, albeit with larger statistical uncertainty. Detailed uncertainties quantification was conducted for both the AEFC Singles and Doubles. This includes the analysis of statistical uncertainties, calibration uncertainty, and random uncertainties due to the sensitivity of the AEFC to several sources of uncertainty, namely the FA position, FA orientation, interrogation source position, and ambient pool temperature. Finally, an overall total uncertainty of 6 g of 235 U is estimated for the Singles and Doubles, which is mainly due to calibration uncertainty (for the Singles) and statistical uncertainty (for the Doubles), and which constitutes 3%–6% of the 235 U total mass in the FAs, depending on their level of depletion.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2023

Correlated Signal Analysis for Nuclear Emergency Response

In the context of nuclear emergency response (NER) scenarios, the critical task is to quickly identify a "black box" as a potential threat, as failing to do so could have catastrophic consequences. Techniques for passive assay of a “black box” typically include gamma-ray spectroscopy and neutron coincidence/multiplicity counting. However, there are significant challenges associated with these type of measurements. First, the presence of intervening materials can obstruct the detection of relevant signatures. Second, the presence of strong non-fission neutron sources, like (α, n) emitters, can add uncertainties to the neutron multiplicity analysis. In our LDRD-MFR Phase II work, a portable neutron spectrometer, called the Compact Fast Neutron Spectrometer (CFNS), was developed for NER applications. The CFNS system leverages information-rich neutron energy spectra to derive actionable information. This work investigates the use of correlated signals in the CFNS from special nuclear material (SNM) to characterize physical properties, such as intervening shielding material and fission to non-fission neutron contributions. In this report, the Phase II results from bulk SNM measurements at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) are briefly discussed along with the motivation for this work. Afterwards, simulations using the MCNPX-PoliMi transport code are discussed, which were used to expand our correlated signal study. Signal triggered analysis for neutron multiplicity extraction will also be discussed. Lastly, the use neutron-photon correlations for intervening material identification are shown, along with the use of correlated neutron energy spectra for α-ratio extraction.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2020

Verification of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) using Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) and a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) Detector

SNM verification can be accomplished via two methods i.e. destructive analysis (DA) or nondestructive analysis (NDA). The DA modes are much more accurate compared to NDA modes; nevertheless, the sample's physical integrity is destroyed in the process. Techniques such as ICP-MS, ID-ICP-MS, TI-MS are few examples of DA, where a bulk material is ground and mixed with a solution (some form of acid) to acquire a homogenous sample. In contrast, NDA modes utilize signals emitted by the sample such as gamma, neutrons, light, or heat to analyze samples under investigation. HPGe detectors are some of the most frequently used gamma detectors to assay SNM. However, in a high activity scenario it provides a large uncertainty and sometimes becomes unfeasible to measure low energy gamma rays. Meanwhile, neutron detectors are not affected by the gamma background, therefore they can be used in addition to the gamma detectors to verify total fissile mass ({sup 235}U + {sup 239}Pu) of SNM. The AWCC is one of the thermal neutron NDA systems developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). It consists of 42 {sup 3}He detectors to measure gross neutrons (singles), coincidence neutrons (doubles), higher order multiplicity counting (triples, quadruples, etc.). It can effectively operate in both active and passive neutron interrogation modes. It can utilize AmLi, AmBe, or {sup 252}Cf active interrogation neutron sources. It is used to verify declared fissile mass ({sup 235}U or {sup 239}Pu) present in SNM. Objectives: Calibrate HPGe and AWCC for lightly irradiated (with enough {sup 137}Cs gamma background) ∼93% enriched HEU fuels; Verify fissile mass ({sup 235}U +{sup 239}Pu) content using AWCC and HPGe; Model and benchmark AWCC in MCNP6. Neutron coincidence and multiplicity counting: Two or more neutrons are coincident if they are detected by the system within the specified gate window; In AWCC: Gate window is 128 μsec; Induced fission in fissile material such as {sup 235}U and {sup 239}Pu - emission of time correlated neutrons - Singles, Doubles, Triples, or Quadruples; No induced fission in non-fissile materials- no correlated neutrons - only singles. SNM can be verified with high accuracy and precision using gamma and neutron NDA instruments such as HPGe and AWCC. Interaction with thermal neutrons. Non-fissile atoms - do not emit correlated neutrons. Fissile atoms - emit correlated neutrons during induced fission events. The time correlated neutrons can be detected by using coincidence or multiplicity counters such as AWCC. Likewise, {sup 235}U produces 186 keV gamma peak that can be measured by a HPGe gamma detector. Counts under 186 keV gamma peak provide information about {sup 235}U content. Combining AWCC and HPGe results can provide better understanding of special nuclear material under investigation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

Analysis of PNAR Spent Fuel Safeguards Measurements using the ORIGEN Data Analysis Module

This paper summarizes the analysis of the Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity (PNAR) measurements using the ORIGEN data analysis module for 23 boiling water reactor spent fuel assemblies that were performed in Finland under an international collaboration on spent fuel safeguards verification methods. PNAR is part of the proposed integrated nondestructive system to be used for safeguards verifications at the planned Finnish encapsulation facility. Besides measuring passive neutron and gamma emission rates from an assembly like a Fork detector, PNAR also measures the PNAR ratio, which is expected to correlate with the fissile content in the assembly. The emission rates and PNAR ratio can be used to verify the operator declarations and the fissile content of an assembly, respectively. The analysis was performed using the ORIGEN Data Analysis Module, which was originally developed for predicting Fork detector neutron and gamma signals for spent fuel measurements and has been integrated into the Integrated Review and Analysis Package developed by Euratom and the IAEA. The Module includes the ORIGEN burnup analysis code and integrates detector response functions pre-generated using MCNP to predict detector signals in several seconds per assembly. In this study, new response functions specific to PNAR measurements were generated for ORIGEN Module. The study also analyzes impacts of using detailed fuel design and operation information vs. standard safeguards information on results calculated by ORIGEN Module. Using detailed information reduced the standard deviation of relative differences between calculated and measured neutron count rates among the 23 assemblies from ~10% to ~4%. The results obtained using standard safeguards information for these PNAR measurements were similar to those obtained for the Fork detector. A clear trend was found between the calculated net neutron multiplications and the measured PNAR ratios of the 23 assemblies. This paper describes how ORIGEN Module calculates the expected PNAR neutron and gamma signals and PNAR ratio and how they compare with corresponding measured values.

Ilas, Germina↗

DOE OSTI2020

Analysis with the ORIGEN Module of PNAR Spent Fuel Measurements for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

This report documents the analysis of the Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity (PNAR) measurements for 23 boiling water reactor spent fuel assemblies that were performed in Finland under Action Sheet 65, which is an international collaboration on spent fuel safeguards verification methods in the context of the Finnish spent fuel encapsulation/repository system. PNAR measures the passive neutron and gamma emission rates from each of the spent fuel assemblies like a Fork detector, and it also measures the PNAR ratio, which is expected to correlate with the net neutron multiplication of the measured fuel assembly. The analysis was performed with the Oak Ridge Isotope Generation and Depletion (ORIGEN) Data Analysis Module, which was originally developed for predicting Fork detector spent fuel measurement signals in real time and has been integrated into the Integrated Review and Analysis Package developed by Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The module includes the ORIGEN burnup analysis code and integrates detector response functions pregenerated using the MCNP Monte Carlo transport code to predict the detector signals in several seconds per assembly. In this study, new response functions specific to the analyzed PNAR measurements were generated for the ORIGEN Module. The study also analyzes the impact of using detailed fuel design and operation information vs. standard safeguards information on the results calculated with the ORIGEN Module. Using detailed information reduced the standard deviation of the relative differences between calculated and measured neutron count rates among the 23 assemblies from ~10% to ~4%. The results obtained using standard safeguards information for these PNAR measurements were similar to those obtained for the Fork detector. A clear trend was found between the calculated net neutron multiplications and the measured PNAR ratios of the 23 assemblies. An uncertainty assessment of the calculations was also performed to estimate the potential impact of the accuracy and the completeness of declaration information on the calculated results for the count rates and net neutron multiplications. The ORIGEN Module predictions for PNAR signals and net neutron multiplication are expected to directly support the safeguards inspectors’ efforts to verify operator declarations of a spent fuel assembly in real time in safeguards practices.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗