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Software process assessments (SPA's) are part of an ongoing program of continuous quality improvements in AT&T. Their use was found to be very beneficial by software development organizations in identifying the issues facing the organization and the actions required to increase both quality and productivity in the organization.
Hazard assessment is an engineering activity that produces insight into which states of thing being engineered might be hazardous. In aviation contexts, it is often performed for certification credit at both the aircraft and system levels during the early design phase of the system’s lifecycle. However, novel aircraft paradigms such as urban air mobility (UAM)operations might either violate assumptions on which traditional aviation hazard assessment is based or simply possess attributes that would make other approaches more effective. In this paper, we define the key concepts under pinning hazard assessment and identify the limitations and assumptions inherent in hazard analysis. We analyze popular techniques to show how they embody these key concepts. We identify ways in which hazard assessment may be scoped and tailored to an application. And, using worked examples, we discuss how, where, and why such tailoring might be needed, especially in novel contexts.
Hazard assessment is an engineering activity that produces insight into which states of thing being engineered might be hazardous. In aviation contexts, it is often performed for certification credit at both the aircraft and system levels during the early design phase of the system’s lifecycle. However, novel aircraft paradigms such as urban air mobility (UAM) operations might either violate assumptions on which traditional aviation hazard assessment is based or simply possess attributes that would make other approaches more effective. In this paper, we define the key concepts underpinning hazard assessment and identify the limitations and assumptions inherent in hazard analysis. We analyze popular techniques to show how they embody these key concepts. We identify ways in which hazard assessment may be scoped and tailored to an application. And, using worked examples, we discuss how, where, and why such tailoring might be needed, especially in novel contexts.
The Change Request (CR) assessment process is essential in the display development cycle. The assessment process is performed to ensure that the changes stated in the description of the CR match the changes in the actual display requirements. If a discrepancy is found between the CR and the requirements, the CR must be returned to the originator for corrections. Data was gathered from each of the developers to determine the type of discrepancies and the amount of time spent assessing each CR. This study sought to determine the most common types of discrepancies, and the amount of time required to assessing those issues. The study found that even though removing discrepancy before an assessment would save half the time needed to assess an CR with a discrepancy, the number of CR's found to have a discrepancy was very small compared to the total number of CR's assessed during the data gathering period.
The Change Request (CR) assessment process is essential in the display development cycle. The assessment process is performed to ensure that the changes stated in the description of the CR match the changes in the actual display requirements. If a discrepancy is found between the CR and the requirements, the CR must be returned to the originator for corrections. Data will be gathered from each of the developers to determine the type of discrepancies and the amount of time spent assessing each CR. This study will determine the most common types of discrepancies and the amount of time spent assessing those issues. The results of the study will provide a foundation for future improvements as well as a baseline for future studies.
A software process assessment procedure, refined by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), has been introduced into NASA. The techniques were extended to cover contract management and especially software quality assurance organizations. A preliminary assessment questionnaire consisting of 98 items was introduced and found to be a useful tool at a series of on-site surveys.
This paper talks about the Mars Odyssey's risk assessment process and its use of fault trees as an enabling tool.
Orbital debris poses a significant threat to spacecraft health and safety. Recent events such as China's anti-satellite test and the Breeze-M rocket explosion have led to an even greater awareness and concern in the satellite community. Therefore, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has established requirements that routine conjunction assessment screening shall be performed for all maneuverable spacecraft having perigees less than 2000 km or within 200 km of geosynchronous altitude. NASA s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) has developed an operational collision risk assessment process to protect NASA s high-value unmanned (robotic) assets that has been in use since January 2005. This paper provides an overview of the NASA robotic conjunction assessment process, including descriptions of the new tools developed to analyze close approach data and of the risk mitigation strategies employed. In addition, statistical data describing the number of conjunctions experienced are presented. A debris avoidance maneuver performed by Aura in June of 2008 is described in detail to illustrate the process.
This informational paper discusses the risk assessment process conducted to analyze Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) architectures for integrating civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). The assessment employs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management framework to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to these architectures and recommends corresponding mitigating security controls. This process builds upon earlier work performed by RTCA Special Committee (SC) 203 and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to roadmap the risk assessment methodology and to identify categories of information security risks that pose a significant impact to aeronautical communications systems. A description of the deviations from the typical process is described in regards to this aeronautical communications system. Due to the sensitive nature of the information, data resulting from the risk assessment pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks is beyond the scope of this paper
This informational paper discusses the risk assessment process conducted to analyze Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) architectures for integrating civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). The assessment employs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management framework to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to these architectures and recommends corresponding mitigating security controls. This process builds upon earlier work performed by RTCA Special Committee (SC) 203 and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to roadmap the risk assessment methodology and to identify categories of information security risks that pose a significant impact to aeronautical communications systems. A description of the deviations from the typical process is described in regards to this aeronautical communications system. Due to the sensitive nature of the information, data resulting from the risk assessment pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks is beyond the scope of this paper.
NASA's environment mirrors the changes taking place in the nation at large, i.e. workers are being asked to do more work with fewer resources. For software developers at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), the effects of this change are that we must continue to produce quality code that is maintainable and reusable, but we must learn to produce it more efficiently and less expensively. To accomplish this goal, the Data Systems Technology Division (DSTD) at GSFC is trying a variety of both proven and state-of-the-art techniques for software development (e.g., object-oriented design, prototyping, designing for reuse, etc.). In order to evaluate the effectiveness of these techniques, the Software Process Assessment (SPA) program was initiated. SPA was begun under the assumption that the effects of different software development processes, techniques, and tools, on the resulting product must be evaluated in an objective manner in order to assess any benefits that may have accrued. SPA involves the collection and analysis of software product and process data. These data include metrics such as effort, code changes, size, complexity, and code readability. This paper describes the SPA data collection and analysis methodology and presents examples of benefits realized thus far by DSTD's software developers and managers.
The Satellite Needs Working Group (SNWG), part of the U.S. Group on Earth Observations (USGEO), surveys agencies across the U.S. Government to identify the satellite Earth observations each agency needs to fulfill its high-priority objectives and responsibilities. Around 20 civilian agencies participate in the SNWG survey every two years. After receiving the surveys, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts an in-depth evaluation of each agency's needs in collaboration with fellow satellite Earth data providers, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). This assessment process, which takes place over an eight-month period, is divided into distinct phases. NASA first assembles an assessment team with the necessary subject matter expertise to evaluate each submitted need. An in-depth interview with each submitting agency then follows, featuring discussion of current and upcoming satellite missions as well as potential new activities that NASA, NOAA, and/or USGS could undertake to meet the agency's needs. The assessment teams then further evaluate these potential activities or solutions to identify how many agencies would benefit and estimate how much their level of satisfaction would increase. Solutions expected to have broad-reaching and significant agency benefits are proposed by NASA for funding. SNWG agencies receive an assessment report for each submitted need, in which the tri-agency assessment teams provide a detailed evaluation of the agency need, information on relevant satellite missions, and links to specific datasets or training resources. The SNWG Management Office at NASA’s Interagency Implementation and Advanced Concepts Team (IMPACT) contributes to NASA’s SNWG assessment in a variety of capacities, including statistical analysis of the survey responses to identify trends and similar needs across multiple agencies. The Management Office also provides analytics for the new proposed solutions, demonstrating and quantifying their potential value. For activities that receive funding, the Management Office manages the implementation process and works to maximize the benefit to SNWG agencies via a Stakeholder Engagement Program.
In order to improve software maintenance processes, we first need to be able to characterize and assess them. These tasks must be performed in depth and with objectivity since the problems are complex. One approach is to set up a measurement-based software process improvement program specifically aimed at maintenance. However, establishing a measurement program requires that one understands the problems to be addressed by the measurement program and is able to characterize the maintenance environment and processes in order to collect suitable and cost-effective data. Also, enacting such a program and getting usable data sets takes time. A short term substitute is therefore needed. We propose in this paper a characterization process aimed specifically at maintenance and based on a general qualitative analysis methodology. This process is rigorously defined in order to be repeatable and usable by people who are not acquainted with such analysis procedures. A basic feature of our approach is that actual implemented software changes are analyzed in order to understand the flaws in the maintenance process. Guidelines are provided and a case study is shown that demonstrates the usefulness of the approach.
Technology assessments of fourteen science instruments were conducted within NASA using the NASA Technology Readiness Level (TRL) Metric. The instruments were part of three NASA Earth Science Decadal Survey missions in pre-formulation. The Earth Systematic Missions Program (ESMP) Systems Engineering Working Group (SEWG), composed of members of three NASA Centers, provided a newly modified electronic workbook to be completed, with instructions. Each instrument development team performed an internal assessment of its technology status, prepared an overview of its instrument, and completed the workbook with the results of its assessment. A team from the ESMP SEWG met with each instrument team and provided feedback. The instrument teams then reported through the Program Scientist for their respective missions to NASA's Earth Science Division (ESD) on technology readiness, taking the SEWG input into account. The instruments were found to have a range of TRL from 4 to 7. Lessons Learned are presented; however, due to the competition-sensitive nature of the assessments, the results for specific missions are not presented. The assessments were generally successful, and produced useful results for the agency. The SEWG team identified a number of potential improvements to the process. Particular focus was on ensuring traceability to guiding NASA documents, including the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook. The TRL Workbook has been substantially modified, and the revised workbook is described.
NASA utilizes an evidence based system to perform risk assessments for the human system for spaceflight missions. The center of this process is the multi-disciplinary Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The HSRB is chartered from the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) at NASA Headquarters. The HSRB reviews all human system risks via an established comprehensive risk and configuration management plan based on a project management approach. The HSRB facilitates the integration of human research (terrestrial and spaceflight), medical operations, occupational surveillance, systems engineering and many other disciplines in a comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB considers all factors that influence human risk. These factors include pre-mission considerations such as screening criteria, training, age, sex, and physiological condition. In mission factors such as available countermeasures, mission duration and location and post mission factors such as time to return to baseline (reconditioning), post mission health screening, and available treatments. All of the factors influence the total risk assessment for each human risk. The HSRB performed a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30, where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research and, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit for 6 and 12 months, deep space for 30 days and 1 year, a lunar mission for 1 year, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary two-page assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence of that risk, available risk mitigations, traceability to the Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS) and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the Human Research Program, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets to provide the most economical and timely mitigations. The risk assessments were completed for the 6 DRMs and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB reviews each risk at least annually or when new evidence/information is available that adds to the body of evidence. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.
There is often skepticism about the need for Conjunction Assessment from mission operators that invest in the "big sky theory", which states that the likelihood of a collision is so small that it can be neglected. On 10 February 2009, the collision between Iridium 3; and Cosmos 2251 provided an indication that this theory is invalid and that a CA process should be considered for all missions. This paper presents statistics of the effect of the Iridium/Cosmos collision on NASA's Earth Science Constellation as well as results of analyses which characterize the debris environment for NASA's robotic missions.
The Materials and Processes Laboratory evaluation of Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) and Solid Rocket Motors (SRM) candidate material, both in-house and with ocean exposure tests at Panama City and Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida is presented. Early sample tests showed excellent seawater corrosion resistance for inconel 718 and titanium 6A1-4V alloys. Considerable corrosion and biofouling occurred with bare 2219-T87 aluminum. Subsequent tests conclusively demonstrated that epoxy coatings prevented corrosion of 2219-T87 aluminum as long as the coatings stays intact. The results and assessment of the series of ocean environmental tests that were conducted are also presented.
This thesis investigated the communication and decision making process as part of the Systems Engineering practices at the NASA/Marshall Center to determine its level of effectiveness. Data was collected across three change requests to assess how decisions were made, how the decisions were communicated, and whether a process mattered in the formulation and dissemination of those decisions. Data results revealed the comprehensive decision making process for the technical change requests to be effective. Evidence revealed that the process was sufficiently tailored to accommodate the need of each individual technical change which promoted effective communication amongst the stakeholders in the formulation of the strategic decision recommendations elevated to upper management. However, data results also revealed the dissemination of the final decision and approval of the change requests from the higher organizational level down to all stakeholders was less effective. An establishment of a culmination meeting at the end of the change request decision process in which to close the communication loop with all entities would be beneficial.