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At least 19 records

Financial incentives for reducing proliferation risks

This article submitted for publication to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists explains the possible financial incentives for financial institutions and large integrators to reduce nuclear proliferation risks by including anti-proliferation measures in their due diligence and requiring their suppliers to meet heightened compliance standards. Because manufacturers of dual-use nuclear goods are diverse and numerous outreach is difficult. However, financial institutions and large integrators work with nearly all dual-use manufacturers, making financial institutions and integrators well-positioned to increase awareness of proliferation and trafficking risks throughout the nuclear supply chain

anti-proliferation↗

Proliferation Risks of Fusion Energy: Clandestine Production, Covert Production, and Breakout

Nuclear proliferation risks from fusion associated with access to weapon-usable material can be divided into three main categories: 1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, 2) covert production of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and 3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state begins production of fissile material without concealing the effort. In this paper we address each of these categories of risk from fusion. For each case, we find that the proliferation risk from fusion systems can be much lower than the equivalent risk from fission systems, if commercial fusion systems are designed to accommodate appropriate safeguards.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Proliferation Risks of Magneetic Fusion Energy: Clandestine Production, Covert Production and Breakout

Nuclear proliferation risks from magnetic fusion energy associated with access to weapon-usable materials can be divided into three main categories: (1) clandestine production of weapon-usable material in an undeclared facility, (2) covert production of such material inn a declared facility, and (3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state begins production of fissile material without concealing the effort. In this paper we address each of these categories of risks from fusion. For each case, we find that the proliferation risk from fusion systems can be much lower than the equivalent risk from fission systems, if the fusion system is designed to accommodate appropriate safeguards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Approach to proliferation risk assessment based on multiple objective analysis framework

The approach to the assessment of proliferation risk using the methods of multi-criteria decision making and multi-objective optimization is presented. The approach allows the taking into account of the specifics features of the national nuclear infrastructure, and possible proliferation strategies (motivations, intentions, and capabilities). 3 examples of applying the approach are shown. First, the approach has been used to evaluate the attractiveness of HEU (high enriched uranium)production scenarios at a clandestine enrichment facility using centrifuge enrichment technology. Secondly, the approach has been applied to assess the attractiveness of scenarios for undeclared production of plutonium or HEU by theft of materials circulating in nuclear fuel cycle facilities and thermal reactors. Thirdly, the approach has been used to perform a comparative analysis of the structures of developing nuclear power systems based on different types of nuclear fuel cycles, the analysis being based on indicators of proliferation risk.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Solution of resource allocation problem for identification of cost-effective measures to reduce nuclear proliferation risks

This report presents a methodology of selection of cost-effective measures to reduce nuclear proliferation risks. The methodology relies on a graded security model used in practice in different applications. The method is based on the controlled finite Markov chain approach set in combination with discrete dynamic programming and MCDM (Multi Criteria Decision Making) techniques that enables the expert to select the cost-effective measures to reduce nuclear proliferation risks depending on availability of resources. The analysis performed with different number of possible measures confirms the conclusions that the implementation of extra-large costs may not produce the required effect, and the increase in resources above a certain level does not appear sensitive. Diversification in improving the effectiveness of other measures seems more rational and efficient for the whole system than the unlimited improvement of the effectiveness of only one measure.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

MARKOV Model Application to Proliferation Risk Reduction of an Advanced Nuclear System

The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) emphasizes proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR&PP) as a main goal for future nuclear energy systems. The GIF PR&PP Working Group has developed a methodology for the evaluation of these systems. As an application of the methodology, Markov model has been developed for the evaluation of proliferation resistance and is demonstrated for a hypothetical Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR) system. This paper presents the case of diversion by the facility owner/operator to obtain material that could be used in a nuclear weapon. The Markov model is applied to evaluate material diversion strategies. The following features of the Markov model are presented here: (1) An effective detection rate has been introduced to account for the implementation of multiple safeguards approaches at a given strategic point; (2) Technical failure to divert material is modeled as intrinsic barriers related to the design of the facility or the properties of the material in the facility; and (3) Concealment to defeat or degrade the performance of safeguards is recognized in the Markov model. Three proliferation risk measures are calculated directly by the Markov model: the detection probability, technical failure probability, and proliferation time. The material type is indicated by an index that is based on the quality of material diverted. Sensitivity cases have been done to demonstrate the effects of different modeling features on the measures of proliferation resistance.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Trade Compliance Insurance Product: Revisiting the feasibility of an insurance product to strengthen trade compliance and reduce proliferation risks

In October 2018, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) published a report (PNNL-28094) in collaboration with the Stimson Center on the feasibility of an insurance product that would reduce proliferation risks associated with small and medium-sized enterprises by encouraging stronger trade control compliance. This preliminary report concluded that a Trade Compliance Insurance Product (TCIP) is feasible and identified existing insurance analogs, challenges, and outstanding questions for further industry outreach. From October 2018 to September 2019, PNNL attempted to validate this preliminary report through a series interviews with representatives from the manufacturing, finance, insurance and shipping industries. This report follows up on the initial 2018 Report and summarizes the findings of the industry interviews related to the TCIP and makes recommendations for the next steps and insurance incentives more broadly.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Meeting Summary of Kitchen Cabinet on Financial Due Diligence to Reduce Proliferation Risks

The U.S. Department of Energy’s Pacific Northwest National Laboratory convened the Kitchen Cabinet (KC) to facilitate a candid discussion about the role of financial institutions (FIs) in antiproliferation efforts to reduce nuclear proliferation risks by identifying suspicious business transactions and exports when making lending or insurance decisions. The meeting brought together a group of export control specialists, largely representatives from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Participating Governments (PGs) and finance experts representing banks and insurance companies. By assembling a KC of experts, the group could understand what suspicious transactions look like from each other’s perspectives and better inform each of their operations. The goal was to develop red flags FIs could use to identify suspicious proliferation-related transactions and to help governments gain a clearer picture of proliferation using financial information.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Power of Integrators, Financiers, and Insurers to Reduce Proliferation Risks: Nuclear Dual-Use Goods

Globalization of manufacturing supply chains has changed the nature of nuclear proliferation. Before 1991, nonproliferation efforts focused almost exclusively on limiting the spread of materials and equipment specifically designed for nuclear use -- reactors, centrifuges, and fissile material. Dual-use items, those items with both nuclear and non-nuclear applications, were not closely scrutinized or controlled. However, in 1991 the international community discovered that Iraq had developed a fairly sophisticated nuclear weapons program by importing dual-use items; this discovery spurred the international community to increase controls on dual-use technologies. Despite these international efforts, dual-use items are still a challenge for those seeking to limit proliferation.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Proliferation resistance assessments during the design phase of a recycling facility as a means of reducing proliferation risks

The sustainability criterion for Gen IV nuclear energy systems inherently presumes the availability of efficient fuel recycling capabilities. One area for research on advanced fuel recycling concerns safeguards aspects of this type of facilities. Since a recycling facility may be considered as sensitive from a non-proliferation perspective, it is important to address these issues early in the design process, according to the principle of Safeguards By Design. Presented in this paper is a mode of procedure, where assessments of the proliferation resistance (PR) of a recycling facility for fast reactor fuel have been performed so as to identify the weakest barriers to proliferation of nuclear material. Two supplementing established methodologies have been applied; TOPS (Technological Opportunities to increase Proliferation resistance of nuclear power Systems) and PR-PP (Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection evaluation methodology). The chosen fuel recycling facility belongs to a small Gen IV lead-cooled fast reactor system that is under study in Sweden. A schematic design of the recycling facility, where actinides are separated using solvent extraction, has been examined. The PR assessment methodologies make it possible to pinpoint areas in which the facility can be improved in order to reduce the risk of diversion. The initial facility design may then be slightly modified and/or safeguards measures may be introduced to reduce the total identified proliferation risk. After each modification of design and/or safeguards implementation, a new PR assessment of the revised system can then be carried out. This way, each modification can be evaluated and new ways to further enhance the proliferation resistance can be identified. This type of iterative procedure may support Safeguards By Design in the planning of new recycling plants and other nuclear facilities. (authors)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Economics of nuclear power and proliferation risks in a carbon-constrained world

U.S. net nuclear capacity likely will rise very slightly over the next 15 years. EU nuclear capacity will in all likelihood fall. Growth in China and India will be significant, but may also fall short of expectations, primarily because both use extremely optimistic cost estimates. After 2030, the problem becomes even more complicated, because the pace of nuclear retirements accelerates. (author)

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Development and Examination of a Proliferation Trade Risk Metric

A Proliferation Trade Risk metric has been calculated for each country represented in a publicly-available trade dataset. This metric, comprising both direct and indirect proliferation trade risk components, represents the risk that each country’s proliferation-relevant exports will go to a designated set of proliferation threat countries. This metric can serve to prioritize nonproliferation export control capacity building engagement. Further, within such engagement, the decomposition of the proliferation trade risk metric can identify specific industrial sectors and trade relationships of greatest importance for outreach and enforcement measures. Finally, these supply-side perspectives can be complemented by threat-based profiles identifying the most important suppliers to each threat country.

export control, trade analysis↗

Intent, Capability and Opportunity: A Holistic Approach to Addressing Proliferation as a Risk Management Issue

Currently, proliferation risk assessment models are designed to evaluate only a portion of the overall risk, focusing exclusively on either technological or social factors to determine the extent of a threat. Many of these models are intended to act as a means of predicting proliferation potential rather than assessing the system as a whole, ignoring the ability to enhance mitigating factors and manage, rather just establish the presence of, the threat. While the information garnered through these forms of analysis is necessary, it remains incomplete. By incorporating political, social, economic and technical capabilities as well as human factors such as intent into a single, multi-faceted risk management model, proliferation risk can be evaluated more effectively. Framing this information around how to improve and expand the Regime already in place and establishing where there are gaps in the system allows for a more complete approach to risk management, mitigation and resource allocation. The research conducted here seeks to combine all three elements (intent, capability and opportunity) in a comprehensive evaluation which incorporates an assessment of state-level variables, possible proliferation pathways and technical capability. Each portion of the analysis is carried out independently then combined to illustrate the full scope of a State's nuclear infrastructure while showing areas of weakness in the institutional framework.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗