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At least 19 records

Dose Modeling for Harborview Research and Training Facility

The Harborview Research and Training (R&T) Facility at the University of Washington (UW) was accidently contaminated from a breached sealed source of Cesium-137. The release occurred during removal of the sealed source from its holder within a portable hot cell in the loading dock area near room 220. The loading dock and northeast corner of the building above the ground floor were impacted by the release, whereas the remaining portions of the R&T Facility were minimally affected. Detailed descriptions of the R&T Facility and the affected area/rooms are included in Section 2. The RESRAD Team in the Environmental Science Division of Argonne National Laboratory visited the site on August 12, 2019, and interviewed the R&T Facility building manager and staff working in the building at that time. Site- and building-specific data were collected including building floor plan CAD drawings, building occupants’ working hours, contaminated rooms photos and their dimensions, building air exchange rates, building materials and “curtain wall” details, and so forth. These data are being used in the dose modeling for potential occupants of the building after it is remediated. The dose modeling was performed using the RESRAD-BUILD computer code, which is designed for the evaluation of radiologically contaminated buildings (Yu et al. 2003). Two hypothetical building occupants of the Harborview R&T Facility were evaluated: a researcher occupying room 726 (a research laboratory on the seventh floor) and a custodian occupying room 220 (loading dock and trash compactor room with a rollup door). A maintenance worker that will be spending less time in impacted areas was not modeled because it will be bounded by other two hypothetical building occupants modeled. A summary description of the RESRAD-BUILD is provided in Appendix A, and the modeling of potential doses to a researcher and a custodian is described in detail in Section 3. A summary and a discussion of the dose modeling results are included in Section 4. The parameters used in the RESRAD-BUILD modeling are included in Appendix B. This report documents the dose modeling results; it does not describe measurements of the actual radioactivity levels at the Harborview R&T Facility, nor does it set any expectation for the actual final radioactivity levels. The radiation doses presented are modeling results based on the generic screening values of Cs-137 and several conservative assumptions and are meant only to assist in decision making regarding decontamination of the Harborview R&T Facility.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

U.S. EPA Superfund Program's Policy for Risk and Dose Assessment

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Office of Superfund Remediation and Technology Innovation (OSRTI) has primary responsibility for implementing the long-term (non-emergency) portion of a key U.S. law regulating cleanup: the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, CERCLA, nicknamed 'Superfund'. The purpose of the Superfund program is to protect human health and the environment over the long term from releases or potential releases of hazardous substances from abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. The focus of this paper is on risk and dose assessment policies and tools for addressing radioactively contaminated sites by the Superfund program. EPA has almost completed two risk assessment tools that are particularly relevant to decommissioning activities conducted under CERCLA authority. These are the: 1. Building Preliminary Remediation Goals for Radionuclides (BPRG) electronic calculator, and 2. Radionuclide Outdoor Surfaces Preliminary Remediation Goals (SPRG) electronic calculator. EPA developed the BPRG calculator to help standardize the evaluation and cleanup of radiologically contaminated buildings at which risk is being assessed for occupancy. BPRGs are radionuclide concentrations in dust, air and building materials that correspond to a specified level of human cancer risk. The intent of SPRG calculator is to address hard outside surfaces such as building slabs, outside building walls, sidewalks and roads. SPRGs are radionuclide concentrations in dust and hard outside surface materials. EPA is also developing the 'Radionuclide Ecological Benchmark' calculator. This calculator provides biota concentration guides (BCGs), also known as ecological screening benchmarks, for use in ecological risk assessments at CERCLA sites. This calculator is intended to develop ecological benchmarks as part of the EPA guidance 'Ecological Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund: Process for Designing and Conducting Ecological Risk Assessments'. The calculator develops ecological benchmarks for ionizing radiation based on cell death only.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Proposed Disposition of Large-Scale Artifacts Associated with Idaho National Laboratory's Nuclear Reactor Testing Historic Context

As an active scientific and engineering laboratory with a historic mission of testing and development of nuclear power, INL presents unique challenges to historic preservation. These challenges include radiologically contaminated buildings and equipment, security restrictions, and the nearly constant modification, demolition, and replacement of structures and equipment to meet changing programmatic and mission needs. Because of these challenges, what began in 1966 as a building-by-building approach to historic preservation of the INL built environment has evolved into a more holistic management strategy and systematic procedures for identifying, evaluating, and protecting important properties within a historic contextual framework. The development of contexts, identification of historic themes, and inventories of historic INL architectural properties have been expanded following the strategies and procedures outlined within the INL Cultural Resource Management Plan (CRMP). Inventories are ongoing to catalog other important INL architectural properties that may or may not be eligible to the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP), such as nuclear-era artifacts, and photographic and engineering collections.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Decommissioning the physics laboratory, building 777-10A, at the Savannah River Site (SRS)

SRS recently completed a four year mission to decommission {approx}250 excess facilities. As part of that effort, SRS decommissioned a 48,000 ft{sup 2} laboratory that housed four low-power test reactors, formerly used by SRS to determine reactor physics. This paper describes and reviews the decommissioning, with a focus on component segmentation and handling (i.e. hazardous material removal, demolition, and waste handling). The paper is intended to be a resource for engineers, planners, and project managers, who face similar decommissioning challenges. Building 777-10A, located at the south end of SRS's A/M-Area, was built in 1953 and had a gross area of {approx}48,000 ft{sup 2}. Building 777-10A had two main areas: a west wing, which housed four experimental reactors and associated equipment; and an east wing, which housed laboratories, and shops, offices. The reactors were located in two separate areas: one area housed the Process Development Pile (PDP) reactor and the Lattice Test Reactor (LTR), while the second area housed the Standard Pile (SP) and the Sub-critical Experiment (SE) reactors. The west wing had five levels: three below and three above grade (floor elevations of -37', -28', -15', 0', +13'/+16' and +27' (roof elevation of +62')), while the east wing had two levels: one below and one above grade (floor elevations of -15' and 0' (roof elevation of +16')). Below-grade exterior walls were constructed of reinforced concrete, {approx}1' thick. In general, above-grade exterior walls were steel frames covered by insulation and corrugated, asbestos-cement board. The two interior walls around the PDP/LTR were reinforced concrete {approx}5' thick and {approx}30' high, while the SP/SE reactors resided in a reinforced, concrete cell with 3.5'-6' thick walls/roof. All other interior walls were constructed of metal studs covered with either asbestos-cement or gypsum board. In general, the floors were constructed of reinforced concrete on cast-in-place concrete beams below-grade and concrete on metal beams above-grade. The roofs were flat concrete slabs on metal beams. Building 777-10A was an important SRS research and development location. The reactors helped determine safe operational limits and loading patterns for fuel used in the SRS production reactors, and supported various low power reactor physics studies. All four reactors were shut down and de-inventoried in the 1970's. The building was DD and R 2007, Chattanooga, Tennessee, September 16-19, 2007 169 subsequently used by various SRS organizations for office space, audio/visual studio, and computer network hub. SRS successfully decommissioned Building 777-10A over a thirty month period at a cost of {approx}$14 M ({approx}$290/ft{sup 2}). The decommissioning was a complex and difficult effort due to the building's radiological contamination, height, extensive basement, and thick concrete walls. Extensive planning and extensive hazard analysis (e.g. of structural loads/modifications leading to unplanned collapse) ensured the decommissioning was completed safely and without incident. The decommissioning met contract standards for residual contamination and physical/chemical hazards, and was the last in a series of decommissioning projects that prepared the lower A/M-Area for SRS's environmental restoration program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Verification of RESRAD-BUILD Code Version 4

This report documents the verification of the RESRAD-BUILD code, Version 4.0, which was released on December 22, 2022. Two earlier reports verifying Versions 3.0 and 3.1, respectively, were published in 2001 (Kamboj, et al. 2001) and 2003 (Tetra Tech NUS 2003). Version 4.0 of the RESRAD-BUILD code has many new features and modeling enhancements over the earlier versions, including the previously released Version 3.5. Chapter 2 of this report focuses on verifying the external dose and risk modeling for point, line, area, and volume sources, as well as for floor deposition. Besides verification, the external radiation doses calculated by RESRAD-BUILD were also benchmarked with those calculated by the MCNP code (Briemeister 1993). Section J.3 of the RESRAD-BUILD User’s Manual Vol. 1 (Yu et al. 2022) documents the results of that benchmarking effort. Chapter 3 of this report focuses on verifying the ventilation modeling, from checking the remaining source inventory, releases of radionuclides to the air, air concentrations and deposited floor concentrations over time, to the radiation dose and risk associated with inhalation, ingestion, and air submersion, with and without vacuuming. The verification efforts involve designing spreadsheets to perform calculations the same as or like those performed by the RESRAD-BUILD code and then comparing the spreadsheet results with those produced by the code. When the results agree or the differences are within acceptable range, the accuracy of model implementation in the code is verified. In addition to model implementation, the implementation of key functions and features that facilitate the modeling or the use of the code were also verified during the release testing of the code. Appendix A presents the test cases developed for these verification testing, and Appendix B presents the testing results that verify proper implementation of key functions and features.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

I Asked 30,000 People in the Nuclear Industry About Safety Culture; This is What I Learned - 19204

Organizations in the nuclear industry place a high value on maintaining the safety of the workforce and community. Some of these organizations do a better job than others when it comes to developing and sustaining a healthy safety culture. We spent six years studying nuclear organizations to better understand the factors that influence safety culture. We used mixed methods to evaluate perceptions of safety culture in these organizations including administering a valid and reliable safety culture survey, conducting one-on-one interviews with managers, and facilitating focus groups with members of the workforce. We analyzed the quantitative and qualitative data collected from more than 30,000 workers in U.S. based organizations. All of the organizations had a nuclear component to their operations. They operated nuclear reactors, processed nuclear materials, decontaminated and decommissioned buildings with radiological contamination, cleaned-up hazardous/mixed waste, and conducted basic science research and development. We talked to craft workers, technicians, engineers, scientific professionals, support personnel, production workers, supervisors and managers. We conducted extensive statistical analysis and learned that, with rare exception, there is a gap between the perceptions of managers and the workforce that they manage. Managers almost always have a more positive perception of safety culture than the people that are actually performing the work. It is not a question of whether there will be a gap; it is simply a matter of the magnitude of the gap. We also learned through exploratory factor analysis that there is one dominant factor that accounted for almost all (75%) of the variance in the perceptions of safety culture. It was the behavior of the leaders, the decisions they made, and the systems they implemented that most influenced the workforce's perception of safety culture. Personal accountability for safety accounted for 14% of the variance, communication and reporting accounted for another 6%. Everything else accounted for the remaining 5%. Management systems, decision making and behavior is the dominant factor and managers almost always have a more positive perception than the people that work for them. People that work in organizations where management exhibits positive decision-making and safety-related behaviors tend to have more positive perceptions of safety culture. Based upon these results, we developed a theory that there were a few important factors on which management could focus on if they sought to influence the safety culture in their organization. Our experience and research suggests that management often fails to recognize five root causes of employee discontent. Employees seek: - To be recognized as an individual; - To be respected; - A sense of stability; - Fairness; - To make a difference. Understanding the perceptions of the workforce is critical because perceptions influence attitudes, which contribute to behaviors that determine individual performance. An organisation's performance is simply the sum of the performance of all of the members of that organization. To change an organisation's safety culture, interventions should target management behavior and decision making for the greatest return on investment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Demonstration of Wide Area Radiological Decontamination and Mitigation Technologies for Building Structures and Vehicles - 16508

Researchers at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security conducted the 'Wide-Area Urban Radiological Contaminant, Mitigation, and Clean-Up Technology Demonstration' in Columbus, Ohio on June 22-25, 2015. EPA's National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) demonstrated five wide-area radiological decontamination technologies (including strippable coatings, gels, and chemical foam technologies) on an urban building. Decontamination technologies were applied to remove the contaminants from the building's surfaces by physical, chemical, or other methods, which in practice could reduce radiation exposure level. In addition, NHSRC teamed with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to demonstrate several radiological contaminant mitigation technologies including building and vehicle wash technologies, as well as several approaches to contain wash water and radioactive particles. 'Radiological contaminant mitigation' technologies are measures taken to reduce adverse impacts of radiological contamination on people and the environment, and facilitate such purposes as restoration of first responder services and critical infrastructure. Radiological contaminant mitigation technologies are designed for containing and removing radiological contamination on the surface in the first hours or days following a radiological event (early phase response). Such technologies include 'radiological particle containment', which is design to prevent the spread of particles which might result from vehicle or foot traffic. Radiological particle containment technologies are applicable for early phase response to contain the radionuclides and to reduce radiation dose to responders and the public. Mitigation also includes 'gross decontamination' technologies, which perform a type of decontamination that is conducted with the goal of reducing contamination levels. This reduction may not meet final cleanup levels, but may be useful to mitigate some public hazard or contain contamination. The purpose of the demonstrations was to educate potential end-users and stakeholders of this technology about a 'Toolbox of Options' for radiological decontamination, as well as radiological contaminant mitigation. Both demonstrations were conducted using a 75-year old brick building and the surrounding area (including parking lots) in Columbus, OH. No radioactive contaminants were applied during either demonstration, as the objective was to duplicate and implement realistic operational conditions for these technologies. Surrogate contaminants such as particle tracers were used in several demonstrations. The decontamination technologies were used in a scaled-up setting with application to the building. Contaminant mitigation technologies were demonstrated on the building as well as on vehicles. Example technology application techniques/accessories included an articulating boom lift, repelling boatswain chair, stand-alone surface material structures, high-volume foam applicators, fire truck foam applicator, a vehicle wash tent for vehicles, particle tracers to simulate radiological contaminants, and high- and low-technology liquid containment approaches. Results and stakeholder observations from the demonstration are now publically in a report entitled 'Technical Report for the Demonstration of Radiological Decontamination and Mitigation Technologies for Building Structures and Vehicles' available at http://www.epa.gov/hsresearch Example information that was obtained included decontamination rate, contaminant mitigation and containment capacity, user friendliness of each technology, the required utilities (electric, water, etc.) for each technology, skill of worker required, and the cost. The condition (color, texture, integrity, etc.) of each building material present on the structure along with all structural components such as gutters, windows, doors, etc. were carefully examined and documented. All demonstrations were open to individuals, organizations, and local, state, federal, tribal, and international governments who may be involved with implementing or planning radiological incident response. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Preparing for safe and compliant open air demolition at Hanford's plutonium finishing plant - 15100

The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), located in the 200 West Area of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site, began operations in 1949 and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1989, the facility was formally shut-down in 1996, and material stabilization completed in 2004. DOE contractor CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M HILL) is tasked with the plant's deactivation, decommissioning, decontamination and demolition, to be completed by September 30, 2016. The project team, partnering with DOE-Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL), is exploring, evaluating and implementing efficiencies to safely and compliantly prepare the facility for demolition. Since 2008, employees have prepared approximately 75 percent of the complex for demolition. More than 90 percent of the 232 glove boxes have been removed from ventilation and more than 80 percent of pencil tank units have been dispositioned. As decontamination, deactivation and removal nears completion on the remaining glove boxes, pencil tanks and other radiological and chemical processing infrastructure, CH2M HILL and DOE-RL are making preparations to demolish PFP itself, a Hazardous Category II nuclear facility (HazCat II). Conventional techniques used to demolish buildings heavily contaminated with radiological hazards typically involve extensive hands-on work to remove Material at Risk (MAR) and decontaminate the building to low levels before conventional demolition techniques can be used to remove the building. A safe and more cost effective approach is packaging MAR located in hard to access areas of the plant and removing it during demolition. That process, combined with affixing remaining contamination to walls, floors and equipment, performing detailed air dispersion modeling before demolition and air monitoring and dust suppression during demolition, will reduce employee risk and is more efficient in demolishing a HazCat II facility. (authors)

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Radioactive Contamination Tenacity on Building Substrate – 17417

Radiological decontamination is an essential enterprise that has become more important over the last four decades due to unfortunate accidents and the threat of terrorist actions. Decontamination can be an effective, beneficial alternative for the cleanup of radiological contamination events; however, the costs and benefits need to be balanced against those for complete removal and demolition of contaminated areas or facilities. Demolition and removal are often the first options considered in such circumstances as decontamination may be thought of as slow and costly. Decontamination has advantages, including significant waste reduction over demolition. In areas with buildings of cultural or societal importance, demolition may not be an option. Three decontamination evaluation test series are the focus of this article: SIMCON 1 and 2 (i.e., simulated contamination), and Urban RDD (radiological dispersal device, i.e., a dirty bomb detonation). These test series revealed that different contaminants respond differently during decontamination. This was found to be true with both SIMCON and Urban RDD simulant tests. SIMCON 2 especially demonstrated that chemically different contaminants respond differently to different decontamination methods: cesium appears to be less tenacious (more easily removed) than zirconium using chemical methods. These differences were underscored by the Urban RDD tests where americium and cobalt tended to precipitate on high pH surfaces (such as concrete), making them easier to remove, while cesium and strontium were essentially unaffected by surface pH and were imbibed more strongly into the substrate pore structure. While authorities argue over the contributions of contaminant chemistry and substrate morphology, the clear answer is that each has a contribution to the tenacity of a contaminant. Knowing how these characteristics interact will make us better at decontamination in the field. This knowledge refutes the efforts of perhaps well-meaning marketers to define our decontamination problems by what products they are trying to sell; often a “one size fits all” type approach. Knowing even a little bit about the character of the decontamination problem will save time and money and increase the efficacy of decontamination.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radioactive Contamination Tenacity on Building Substrate - 17417

Radiological decontamination is an essential enterprise that has become more important over the last four decades due to unfortunate accidents and the threat of terrorist actions. Decontamination can be an effective, beneficial alternative for the cleanup of radiological contamination events; however, the costs and benefits need to be balanced against those for complete removal and demolition of contaminated areas or facilities. Demolition and removal are often the first options considered in such circumstances as decontamination may be thought of as slow and costly. Decontamination has advantages, including significant waste reduction over demolition. In areas with buildings of cultural or societal importance, demolition may not be an option. Three decontamination evaluation test series are the focus of this article: SIMCON 1 and 2 (i.e., simulated contamination), and Urban RDD (radiological dispersal device, i.e., a dirty bomb detonation). These test series revealed that different contaminants respond differently during decontamination. This was found to be true with both SIMCON and Urban RDD simulant tests. SIMCON 2 especially demonstrated that chemically different contaminants respond differently to different decontamination methods: cesium appears to be less tenacious (more easily removed) than zirconium using chemical methods. These differences were underscored by the Urban RDD tests where americium and cobalt tended to precipitate on high pH surfaces (such as concrete), making them easier to remove, while cesium and strontium were essentially unaffected by surface pH and were imbibed more strongly into the substrate pore structure. While authorities argue over the contributions of contaminant chemistry and substrate morphology, the clear answer is that each has a contribution to the tenacity of a contaminant. Knowing how these characteristics interact will make us better at decontamination in the field. This knowledge refutes the efforts of perhaps well-meaning marketers to define our decontamination problems by what products they are trying to sell; often a 'one size fits all' type approach. Knowing even a little bit about the character of the decontamination problem will save time and money and increase the efficacy of decontamination. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Road to 2020: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA): Cleanup of the East Tennessee Technology Park - 17425

Uranium enrichment activities at the 890-ha (2,200-acre) East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP), formerly the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, date back to the World War II Manhattan Project. The site produced nuclear fuel for weapons and reactors for four decades. Because of these operations, ETTP has a legacy of radiologically and chemically contaminated buildings, soil, sediment, and groundwater that required remedial action to reduce the risk to human health and the environment. Since the early 1990's, the DOE Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (OREM) has directed the environmental cleanup of this contaminated site through the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) process. Cleanup activities have included the demolition of contaminated facilities and structures, including five gaseous diffusion buildings; remediation of contaminated soils; disposal of associated waste; and treatment of contaminated groundwater. In August 2016, DOE realized its Vision 2016, demolition of all five gaseous diffusion buildings at ETTP. This milestone marked the first time that an entire uranium enrichment complex has been demolished. The landmark cleanup included deactivation and demolition of 418,064 m{sup 2} (4.5 million ft{sup 2}) of radiologically and chemically contaminated facilities, and disposal of more than 55,000 truckloads of debris. Fulfillment of Vision 2016 was a major step toward completing ETTP cleanup by 2020. To attain 2020 cleanup, DOE and its cleanup contractor, URS - CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR), must complete demolition of the following areas: - Poplar Creek Facilities; - K-731 Switch House; - Building K-1037; - Central Neutralization Facility; - K-1200 Complex; - Toxic Substances Control Act Incinerator facilities; - Balance of Site Facilities. In addition, DOE will complete all remedial actions in accordance with current Records of Decision (RODs); as well as cleanup activities involving surface water, sediment, and groundwater that will be addressed in a final site-wide ROD. All waste, including soils, debris, and rubble from demolition and remediation activities, will be dispositioned. Final cleanup of ETTP further advances DOE's goal for re-industrialization of the site as a private sector industrial park. With risks reduced, hazards removed, and the environment restored, DOE can transfer usable ETTP building and land assets to the community for redevelopment and reuse. A history center, equipment building, viewing tower, and wayside exhibits will tell the story of the site, honoring its contributions to the nation's defense and energy needs. Approximately 1,214 ha (3,000 acres) of adjoining lands, now the Black Oak Ridge Conservation Easement (BORCE), will be used for conservation and recreational purposes, including green-ways and trail systems. (authors)

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User's Manual for RESRAD-BUILD Code Version 4: Vol. 2 - User's Guide for RESRAD-BUILD Code Version 4

The RESRAD-BUILD computer code is designed to assess radiological doses to individuals who live or work in a building contaminated with radioactive material. The code is equipped with a user-friendly interface that has many features to facilitate using the computer code and understanding the results. The design of the interface provides various options, from entering data and performing calculations to displaying calculation results. General and context-specific help are available, providing information on editing and viewing the radionuclide database, the definitions of input parameters and their use in the calculations, and the selection of the calculation results for placement into other applications. Two types of sensitivity analysis are supported by the code, i.e., deterministic and probabilistic, that can be used to study the influence of input parameters on the calculation results. This user’s guide provides instructions to help users on how to install the RESRAD-BUILD code, navigate the interface, and use the various features to set up a dose/risk analysis and to view/print the results in text and graphical outputs.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

User’s Manual for RESRAD-BUILD Code V.4: Vol. 1 – Methodology and Models Used in RESRAD-BUILD Code

The RESRAD-BUILD computer code models radionuclide release and transport in indoor environments and performs pathway analyses to evaluate the potential radiological dose and risk incurred by an individual who works or lives in a building contaminated with radioactive material or housing radioactively contaminated furniture or equipment. The code provides four geometries to characterize a radiation source: point, line, area, and volume, in which radionuclides are homogeneously distributed. Radionuclides contained in a source are considered to be released to the indoor air due to various processes including erosion (mechanically or weathering), diffusion (for tritium and radon in a volume source), or emanation (radon in a point, line, or area source). The release can proceed through different time phases with different rates. In RESRAD-BUILD Version 4.0, a dynamic ventilation model is implemented to simulate the fate and transport of source material particles and radionuclides after their releases. This dynamic ventilation model considers (1) air exchange between rooms in the building and between the rooms and the outdoor environment, (2) deposition from air to floor, (3) resuspension from the floor to the air, and (4) periodical vacuuming that reduces the floor deposition. The fate and transport modeling provides estimates of radionuclide concentrations in the source, in the air, and on the floor at different times, which are then integrated over the exposure duration for the calculation of radiation doses and cancer risks. A single run of the RESRAD-BUILD code can model a building with up to 9 rooms, 10 sources, and 10 receptors. The potential radiation dose and cancer risk incurred by each receptor are calculated for seven exposure pathways: (1) external radiation directly from the sources (accounting for shielding), (2) external radiation from radioactive particles deposited on the floors, (3) external radiation from airborne radionuclides, (4) inhalation of airborne radionuclides, (5) inhalation of radon and radon progenies, (6) inadvertent ingestion of radioactive particles directly from the source, and (7) ingestion of radioactive particles deposited on the floors. Various exposure scenarios can be modeled with RESRAD-BUILD, including but are not limited to, office worker, renovation worker, decontamination worker, building visitor, and resident. Both deterministic and probabilistic analyses can be performed to obtain results in both text reports and graphic displays.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Structural Characterization of the 216-Z-9 Crib Prior to Decontamination and Demolition Using Robot Crawler and High Resolution Photography

The Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office is preparing to conduct a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) removal action for the decontamination and demolition of the above-grade mining structures and equipment at the 216-Z-9 Crib. An investigation of the condition of the mining complex was initiated to determine constraints necessary for safely conducting the removal of the buildings. While crib headspace chemical analysis and nondestructive analysis of the interior of the buildings was completed to address radiological contamination concerns, the primary concern regarding the removal of the above-grade structures located on the crib cover involves determining the loading capacity and structural integrity of the crib cover slab. Additional concerns included headspace gases and radionuclide contamination. Until the structural analysis was completed, loading limits on the crib cover had been restricted. Photographic documentation revealed the loss of protective tiles and acid resistant coating from the underside of the cover raising a question of concrete stability. The investigation relied heavily on the use of high resolution photography with high intensity lighting for photographic documentation of the underside of the crib cover, followed by structural analysis of the documentation by a team of qualified engineers. Deployment of a robot crawler with attached camera and positioning of a fixed camera were integral to this structural characterization effort. Results of the photographic documentation were of sufficient quality to allow for bounding decisions to be made regarding the loading of the crib cover while performing the demolition of the mining structures (glovebox, excavator, bucket) and the associated buildings. The 216-Z-9 Crib, also known as the 216 Z-9 Recuplex CAW (CA column waste) Waste Disposal Cavern, the Z-9 Trench and the Z-9 Crib was constructed as an engineered trench with an open area beneath a concrete slab. The crib is located near the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) facility, at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Eastern Washington State. The crib was used as a disposal site for effluent chemical and radiological wastes from the recovery of uranium and plutonium through extraction or RECUPLEX process, a method that recovered uranium and plutonium from liquid and solid wastes and scraps from other PFP processes. During its operating life, from 1955 through 1962, the Z-9 Crib received liquid wastes totaling approximately four million liters, or one million gallons. Analyses of the crib soil in seven locations to a depth of up to two meters (six feet) beneath the crib floor indicated that the plutonium content of the crib soil ranged from 50 to 150 kg (the highest concentration measured was 34.5 g/L of soil). While performing the structural evaluation of the crib cover, additional characterization information was obtained on the radiological and chemical conditions of the crib and structures. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

TA-03-0035 Press Building – D&D

The Press Building was constructed in 1954 with 15,073 ft 2 of floor space. It was built to house a 5000 ton double action Lake Erie hydraulic press and a uranium casting area. Missions included uranium activities associated with the Nuclear Weapons and Rover Rocket programs. At the end of the Rover program, the building continued to support various uranium materials science projects until the building was placed into a cold and dark status in 2013 and then was demolished in 2017. The building interior, the press, and associated systems were radiological contaminated and disposed of as low level waste. The demolition of this building opened up valuable real estate in the TA-3 area for the future construction of an ~11,000 Sq. Ft. Biosafety Level 2 laboratory and office building. This building will support the ongoing Bioscience Division mission at the laboratory.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Decommissioning of a facility in a historical reactor at SRS: achieving both historical significance preservation and effective in-situ decommissioning - 15275

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is an 802 square-kilometer United States Department of Energy (US DOE) nuclear facility located along the Savannah River near Aiken, South Carolina, where Management and Operations are performed by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC (SRNS). In 2004, US DOE recognized SRS as a structure within the Cold War Historic District of national, state and local significance because it is composed of the first generation of facilities constructed and operated from 1950 through 1989 to produce plutonium and tritium for our nation's defense. US DOE agreed to manage the SRS 105-C Reactor Facility as a potentially historic property due to its significance in supporting the U.S. Cold War Mission and for potential for future interpretation. The Disassembly Basin (DB) in C Reactor was evaluated for action under CERCLA. Data indicated there were over 830 curies of radioactivity associated with the basin sediments and approximately 9.1 million (M) liters (L) of contaminated water, not including a large quantity of activated reactor equipment, scrap metal, and debris on the basin floor. The release of DB water could potentially migrate to the aquifer and contaminate groundwater. The need for an action was identified to reduce risks to personnel in the facility and to eliminate the possible release of contaminants into the environment. In-situ decommissioning was selected as the remedy. The remedial action proceeded in stages: -Above-grade modifications to the interior of DB building -Relocation of irradiated scrap and reactor components to the deepest segments of the DB - Construction of a metal building to house evaporators - Forced evaporation of the DB's radiologically contaminated water - Grouting with special hybrid grouts - Removal of the evaporators and temporary building. Since the building itself was not demolished and will remain unchanged in appearance with the exception of filling the DB with grout, this ISD removal action/methodology did not adversely impact the historical significance of the 105-C Reactor Building, in accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act, nor did it adversely affect the ability to determine the full extent and details of preservation at some later date. Both special hybrid grout materials met all requirements. Overall average 7-day compressive strength for the dry area mix was 1.54 MPa (223 psi) and for the underwater mix 2.94 MPa (427 psi).Overall 28-day compressive strength for the dry area mix was 2.88 MPa (417 psi) and for the underwater mix 4.99 MPa (724 psi). A limited amount of testing was also performed at 91 days, where the overall compressive strength for the dry area mix was found to be 9.40 MPa (1363 psi) and for the underwater mix 13.98 MPa (2028 psi). All compressive strength values far exceeded the 0.34 MPa (50 psi) minimum requirements. The special, flowable-fill grouts designed and used for P- and R-Reactor ISD and used again for this 105-C ISD removal action resulted in considerable labor, cost, and schedule savings versus conventional materials. As an added bonus/benefit, the CO{sub 2} footprint of the SRS C-Reactor DB ISD was minimized by using a small amount of cement and byproduct material to produce the structural fill materials. (authors)

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Final Status Survey Report for Corrective Action Unit 117 - Pluto Disassembly Facility, Building 2201, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This document contains the process knowledge, radiological data and subsequent statistical methodology and analysis to support approval for the radiological release of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 117 – Pluto Disassembly Facility, Building 2201 located in Area 26 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Preparations for release of the building began in 2009 and followed the methodology described in the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM). MARSSIM is the DOE approved process for release of Real Property (buildings and landmasses) to a set of established criteria or authorized limits. The pre-approved authorized limits for surface contamination values and corresponding assumptions were established by DOE O 5400.5. The release criteria coincide with the acceptance criteria of the U10C landfill permit. The U10C landfill is the proposed location to dispose of the radiologically non-impacted, or “clean,” building rubble following demolition. However, other disposition options that include the building and/or waste remaining at the NNSS may be considered providing that the same release limits apply. The Final Status Survey was designed following MARSSIM guidance by reviewing historical documentation and radiological survey data. Following this review a formal radiological characterization survey was performed in two phases. The characterization revealed multiple areas of residual radioactivity above the release criteria. These locations were remediated (decontaminated) and then the surface activity was verified to be less than the release criteria. Once remediation efforts had been successfully completed, a Final Status Survey Plan (10-015, “Final Status Survey Plan for Corrective Action Unit 117 – Pluto Disassembly Facility, Building 2201”) was developed and implemented to complete the final step in the MARSSIM process, the Final Status Survey. The Final Status Survey Plan consisted of categorizing each individual room into one of three categories: Class 1, Class 2 or Class 3 (a fourth category is a “Non-Impacted Class” which in the case of Building 2201 only pertained to exterior surfaces of the building.) The majority of the rooms were determined to fall in the less restrictive Class 3 category, however, Rooms 102, 104, 106, and 107 were identified as containing Class 1 and 2 areas. Building 2201 was divided into “survey units” and surveyed following the requirements of the Final Status Survey Plan for each particular class. As each survey unit was completed and documented, the survey results were evaluated. Each sample (static measurement) with units of counts per minute (cpm) was corrected for the appropriate background and converted to a value with units of dpm/100 cm2. With a surface contamination value in the appropriate units, it was compared to the surface contamination limits, or in this case the derived concentration guideline level (DCGLw). The appropriate statistical test (sign test) was then performed. If the survey unit was statistically determined to be below the DCGLw, then the survey unit passed and the null hypothesis (that the survey unit is above limits) was rejected. If the survey unit was equal to or below the critical value in the sign test, the null hypothesis was not rejected. This process was performed for all survey units within Building 2201. A total of thirty-three “Class 1,” four “Class 2,” and one “Class 3” survey units were developed, surveyed, and evaluated. All survey units successfully passed the statistical test. Building 2201 meets the release criteria commensurate with the Waste Acceptance Criteria (for radiological purposes) of the U10C landfill permit residing within NNSS boundaries. Based on the thorough statistical sampling and scanning of the building’s interior, Building 2201 may be considered radiologically “clean,” or free of contamination.

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Y-12 National Security Complex's Sustainable Recovery and Transformation - 12420

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds were used at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) to remove legacy materials from large contaminated excess facilities in order to prepare the facilities for demolition, demolish five excess buildings, and clean up sources of environmental contamination. The legacy materials and buildings presented many challenges and the potential hazards included depleted uranium and other radiological contaminants, lead, polychlorinated biphenyls, Freon, mold, mildew, asbestos, beryllium and mercury. Y-12 project teams have integrated sustainable waste management practices into each of the seven ARRA projects. The ARRA clean up efforts have resulted in the reduction of potential environmental, health, and safety risks posed by the excess facilities and sources of environmental contamination. Y-12's ARRA project teams focused on completing the activities in a sustainable, timely and safe manner. The site utilized a systematic material disposition evaluation process to ensure that materials were not automatically dis-positioned as waste. ARRA projects have recycled or reused over 1.3 million pounds of materials while preventing over 3 million vehicle miles traveled for waste disposal. Y-12 ARRA projects have worked over 2 million safe work hours without a lost time injury. The site has already begun to beneficially reuse land cleared by ARRA project activities to support sustainable transformation efforts. The Y-12 ARRA project activities have demonstrated that large complex projects can be completed sustainably and safely while maintaining an aggressive schedule. Through careful planning and execution, ARRA projects at the site have sustainably reduced the potential environmental, health, and safety risks posed to site employees and the community by the excess facilities and sources of environmental contamination. Y-12's systematic material disposition process ensured that materials were not automatically assumed to be wastes and facilitated the evaluation of all unneeded materials for reuse or recycling. The site's pervasive pollution prevention culture is reflected in the recycling or reuse of over 1.3 million pounds of materials by the ARRA project teams. While the disposal of a large volume of ARRA wastes could not be avoided, the projects were able to reduce the local and national impacts of waste transportation and disposal through careful planning and efficient execution. The site has conserved natural resources through the preservation and beneficial reuse of materials and land cleared by ARRA activities. Y-12 has taken steps to preserve its history as the site undergoes a sustainable and safe transformation for the future. (authors)

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