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At least 19 records

Analysis of Data Fusion Between Waveform Events and Radionuclide Detections Reported in 2021 by the International Data Centre

During this project, we assessed the percentage of events reported by the International Data Centre (IDC) that are candidates for evaluation using data fusion methods. We calculated the percentage of waveform (seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, SHI) events that may be associated with radionuclide (RN) detections and vice versa. For this task, data fusion means identifying RN detections that may be associated with SHI events. The task of producing a fused SHI and RN bulletin is included in the IDC operational manual. As of 2022, the production of a fused event bulletin remains incomplete, largely because methods for producing the bulletin are under development. Nonetheless, simple methods for data fusion have been developed and preliminary software tools are available at the IDC to associate SHI events and RN detections. This report is a first look at the percentage of SHI events that may be candidates for fusion with RN detections or bulletins. One year of IDC bulletin data (2021) is considered in this report. It is important to note that there were no known nuclear explosions during this time period. Hence, we expect that events during this time period would generate SHI and RN signals. If many SHI events are candidates for fusion with RN data, greater priority should be placed on establishing screening procedures before and/or during the fusion process. By contrast, if the number of candidate events is diminishingly small, then data fusion is not a driver for further development of event or detection screening at the IDC. LLNL reviewed the events reported in the Standard Event Bulletin (SEB) and determined which events are candidates for fusion with the Reviewed Radionuclide Reports (RRR). Much of the work involves establishing a metric or metrics for determining whether a Reviewed Event Bulletin (REB) event is a candidate for data fusion.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

NEST Lectures [PowerPoint]

The presentation is composed of the slides used in various NEST lectures including: Interaction of Radiation with Matter, Biological and Health Effects of Radiation Exposure, Radionuclide Detection and Dose Assessment, Plutonium, Other Radionuclides Monitored by Bioassay and Case Studies, and, Counting Statistics.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Measurements of Argon-39 from locations near historic underground nuclear explosions

Measurement of radioactive gas seepage from an underground nuclear explosion is one of the primary methods to confirm whether an event was nuclear in nature. Radioactive noble gas indicators that are commonly targeted by such measurements (e.g. 133Xe, 37Ar) have half-lives of 35 days or less. Argon-39, an activation product similar to 37Ar, is produced by the interaction between neutrons and potassium in the surrounding geology and has a half-life of 269 years. Measurements taken at three sites near three historic underground nuclear test locations at the Nevada National Security Site have all shown highly elevated levels of 39Ar in subsurface air decades after the test events. Elevated levels of 39Ar (30-50 times background) were also detected in atmospheric air collected roughly 30 cm above ground level near two of these sites, and outside the entrance of the one tunnel site. These measurements demonstrate that 39Ar has the potential to be a long-term signature of an underground nuclear event which can be reliably detected at the surface or in the shallow subsurface. This radionuclide detection of an underground nuclear event decades after the event takes place is in contrast to the commonly held assumption that detecting underground nuclear events via radionuclides at the surface needs to be done in a matter of months. Depending upon what further studies show about the robustness of this signature in a variety of geological settings, it may in fact be easy to detect underground nuclear events at the surface for a very long time post-detonation.

Johnson, Christine M.↗

Energy-Efficient Neuromorphic Architectures for Nuclear Radiation Detection Applications

A comprehensive analysis and simulation of two memristor-based neuromorphic architectures for nuclear radiation detection is presented. Both scalable architectures retrofit a locally competitive algorithm to solve overcomplete sparse approximation problems by harnessing memristor crossbar execution of vector–matrix multiplications. The proposed systems demonstrate excellent accuracy and throughput while consuming minimal energy for radionuclide detection. To ensure that the simulation results of our proposed hardware are realistic, the memristor parameters are chosen from our own fabricated memristor devices. Based on these results, we conclude that memristor-based computing is the preeminent technology for a radiation detection platform.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Updated Application of Frequency of Detection Methods for the INL Site Ambient Air Monitoring Network

This report presents a quantitative assessment of the current INL Site air monitoring network using frequency of detection (FD) methods. The first assessment of the INL network was performed in 2015 and made recommendations for improving the network. As a result of changes made in response to the recommendations and the addition of new source locations, the network was modified and reassessed in 2017. Since 2017, administration of the air sampling program has been consolidated under one contractor, which resulted in additional changes to the network (sampler numbers and locations) and changes in radionuclide detection levels. As a result of these changes and others, an updated assessment of the INL Site ambient air monitoring network was performed. The same two exposure scenarios used in previous assessments were used for this assessment: a resident scenario and a shepherd/rancher scenario. The resident was assumed to be continuously present at their residence/business/farm operation outside the INL Site boundary while the shepherd/rancher was assumed to be present 24-hours at the nearest INL grazing allotment boundary in each of the 22.5-degree sectors along the sector centerline from each source. Updates to both the resident and shepherd/rancher receptor locations were included. Other changes include updates to flow rates for stack sources, expansion of the list of important radionuclides based on the most recent National Emission Standards for Hazardous Pollutants (NESHAPs) analysis, and updated dose coefficients. The assessment was conducted to determine whether the current INL monitoring network is capable of detecting releases of important radionuclides from INL Site sources that have the potential to exceed a conservative dose threshold for the two exposure scenarios. The assessment revealed that for the resident scenario, the current network meets the desired performance objective (FD = 95%) for all radionuclides and sources except for Cl-36 from the TRA-770 stack (94.4%). For the shepherd/rancher scenario, the FD performance objective is met for all radionuclides and sources except tritium from MFC-774 and TAN 679 (91% for both). An investigation of reported emissions for the past three years revealed that Cl 36 is not emitted from TRA-770, and routine tritium emissions from MFC-774 and TAN-679 are very small and the sources are likely incapable of emitting enough tritium to cause a release that should be detectable by the monitoring network. This assessment is based on a conservative dose threshold. This coupled with fact that the FD for Cl 36 is only slightly less than the performance objective and Cl-36 is not emitted from TRA-770, modifying the network (i.e. adding another sampler, increasing sampler flow rate, moving samplers) to meet the 95% performance objective for this radionuclide/source/receptor scenario is not warranted. Similarly, because tritium emissions from MFC-774 and TAN-679 are very small and these two sources are likely incapable of causing a dose due to tritium release that should be detectable by the network, modifications to increase tritium detection for these sources is also unwarranted at this time. However, if it is required to meet the performance objective for tritium for all sources and receptor scenarios, additional analysis determined the FD could be raised from 91% to > 99% for both sources by adding two tritium samplers to the network.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Predicting multiphase flow and tracer transport for an underground chemical explosive test

Detecting radionuclide gas seepage from clandestine underground nuclear tests is central to nonproliferation explosion monitoring research. Yet, early-time (<6 day) gas transport driven by the explosive pressure wave remains poorly constrained due to scarcity of field data. We simulate multi-phase gas transport in the vadose zone using pre-shot data from a recent chemical explosion in P-Tunnel at the Nevada National Security Site, USA. Despite using a simplified 2D-radial model, predictions of tracer arrival matched observations within one order-of-magnitude. Our results show how transient blast forcing rapidly mobilizes gases from the cavity into surrounding rock – critical for optimizing sensor placement and test planning. This unique integration of field data and modeling represents a significant improvement in our ability to predict gas migration from underground explosions. More broadly, it offers insights into the coupled dynamics of pressure waves and contaminant transport in the vadose zone, with implications for monitoring and hazard assessment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Multifunctional two-dimensional metal-organic frameworks for radionuclide sequestration and detection

Two lanthanide containing porous coordination polymers, [Ln2(bpdc)6(phen)2] · nH2O (1) and [Ln2(bpdc)6(terpy)2] · 3H2O (2) (Ln = either Pr, Nd or Sm-Dy); bpdc: 2,2'-bipyridine-5,5'-dicarboxylic acid, phen: 1,10-phenanthroline, and terpy: 2,2':6',2''-terpyridine, have been hydrothermally synthesized and structurally characterized by powder and single crystal X-ray diffraction. The crystallographic analyses reveal compounds 1 and 2 feature Ln3+ containing dimeric nodes that form a porous two-dimensional (2D) and non-porous three-dimensional (3D) framework, respectively. Each material is stable in aqueous media between pH 3-10 and exhibits modest thermal stability to ~400ºC. Notably, a portion of the phen and bpdc ligands in 1 can be removed thermally, without compromising the crystal structure, causing the surface area and pore volume to increase. The optical properties of 1 and 2 with Gd3+, Sm3+, Tb3+, and Eu3+ were explored in the solid-state using absorbance, fluorescence, and lifetime spectroscopies. The analyses reveal a complex blend of metal and ligand emission in the materials containing Sm3+ and Tb3+, while those featuring Eu3+ are dominated by intense metal-based emission. Compound 1 with Eu3+ displayed promise for the capture and detection of the uranyl cation, (UO2)2+, from aqueous media. In short, uranyl capture was observed at pH 4 and the adsorption thereof was detectable via vibrational and fluorescence spectroscopies and colorimetrically as the off-white color of 1 turned yellow with uptake. Finally, both 1 and 2 with Eu3+ produce bright red emission upon irradiation with Cu ka X-ray radiation (8.04 keV) and are candidate materials for applications in solid-state scintillation.

Surbella, Robert G.↗

Detection and Mitigation of Radionuclides in the Environment: Toward a Clean Ecosystem

This research describes a straightforward approach to producing surface-engineered nanomaterials for the detection and mitigation of radionuclides generated in nuclear facilities. Here, a micelle forming surfactant ligand, namely cetyltrimethylammonium bromide (CTAB), was engineered on the surface of iron oxide nanoparticles and explored for the removal of radioactive materials, such as pertechnetate (TcO 4 – ), from aqueous environments. A series of analytical tools were employed to characterize the nanocomposite materials, such as SEM, EDS, UV-Vis spectroscopy, DLS, and PALS, and evaluated for their ability to capture a model analyte, perrhenate (ReO 4 – ) ions. The iron oxide magnetic nanoparticles retain their magnetic properties after surface functionalization and can be easily manipulated and collected with a magnet. Therefore, these nanocomposite materials can be used to remotely remediate environments by scavenging and collecting radionuclide species at the desired location.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

Worker Safety and Radionuclide Intakes [Slides]

Our team detects intakes of radionuclides using urine bioassay and confirms the people responsible for protecting workers from radiation are limiting or preventing intakes. Plutonium or americium enter the body by inhalation, or a wound and stays in the body for decades. Committed Effective Dose (CED(50)) is the total dose an intake will cause over 50 years after it happens. Radiation can’t escape the body, so we look in urine. There is almost never enough radiation to make an employee sick. It takes months and multiple samples to confirm. Most “elevated” samples turn out to be false alarms.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Multiaxis sensing system for detection of airborne molecules and radionuclides

Various technologies presented herein relate to a method and equipment for detecting both airborne radioisotope and molecular effluent gases. Multi-Axis Sensing can be conducted by utilizing a pressurized MOF sorbent, such as a scintillating Metal-Organic Frameworks (S-MOFs). These MOFs are crystalline nanoporous materials that have synthetic versatility that allow adjustment of pore size, chemical environment, and luminescence properties. A method for detecting an analyte in a fluid sample is provided that comprises: loading a sorbent with a sample fluid, wherein the sorbent comprises a MOF material; pressurizing the sample fluid to increase the fluid in the sorbent thereby making a pressurized sorbent; and detecting ionizing radiation or a chemical property of the analyte in the pressurized sorbent.

Allendorf, Mark D.↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions (CY 2019)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this source dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2020

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. Radionuclides in air from NNSS activities have been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this sources dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of manmade radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), specifically the National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (40 CFR 61, Subpart H, 2020) limits the release of radioactivity from a DOE facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent (EDE) to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS. This alternative was proposed and formerly submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are closer to radionuclide releases than where the public resides so they act as protective substitutes for public receptor locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in Table 2 of 40 CFR 61, Appendix E. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. The EPAapproved air transport model, called the Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) is also used to calculate the effective dose equivalent to the maximally exposed individual from NNSS air emissions. CAP88-PC was also used to calculate the population dose, or the collective EDE (expressed as person-rem [roentgen equivalent man] per year [person-rem/y]) for all individuals combined who reside within 80 kilometers (km) of NNSS emission sources. In 2020, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by both the air sampling data collected at critical receptor air monitoring stations and CAP88-PC modeling. The average concentrations of radioactivity at air critical receptor stations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 4.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. CAP88-PC modeling of all 2020 NNSS radionuclide emissions showed the maximally exposed individual to be in Amargosa Valley and this individual received a potential dose of 0.063 mrem/y. The collective dose was calculated to be 0.29 person-rem/year for the 521,300 people who lived within 80 km of NNSS emission sources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

GPS-Based Gamma Survey for Characterizing and Decommissioning NORM Sites - 20389

Gamma survey techniques are an especially powerful decommissioning tool at naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) sites due to both the low cost to obtain data over a large spatial scale and the abundance of gamma emitters in the uranium and thorium decay series. Gamma surveys are executed by coupling a detector - most often a sodium iodide crystal - to a global positioning system (GPS), then reporting a location and gross gamma reading coincidentally to a data logger. Systems may be carried by workers or mounted to a car, all-terrain vehicle, or unmanned aerial system (UAS). The resulting data set provides a high-resolution but low precision map of the gamma radiation field over the area surveyed. Frequently this map is also correlated to soil concentrations of NORM radionuclides (most often, Ra-226) and/or exposure rate. Gamma survey parameters such as movement speed, transect spacing, and data logging frequency define the spatial resolution of the resulting surface, and can be optimized depending on the desired survey sensitivity. This paper examines gamma survey as a tool for decommissioning NORM sites and provides an overview of current gamma survey technology designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the decommissioning process. Topics to be discussed in the paper include: - An overview of gamma survey systems, and the utility of different delivery vehicles depending on desired cost, desired spatial resolution, and site topography. - The influence of physical detector characteristics on detection sensitivity and survey planning. - The tradeoff between high-resolution and large spatial extent, but inherently uncertain data, and low-resolution, low spatial extent, but highly certain data, as well as the specific utility of each of these types of data during NORM facility decommissioning. - Confounding variables that may limit the utility of gamma survey at some sites (e.g., radon gas and spatial heterogeneity / hot spots), and methods to plan for and control these conditions. Results show that the confounding variables, such as radon and data output can greatly influence the overall data quality associated with the decommissioning process. In addition, the use of real-time and aerial survey platforms provides a method for ensuring proper spatial extent of the data. When applied thoughtfully, gamma survey is a powerful tool for detecting NORM radionuclides in the environment and a cost-effective technique for identifying areas requiring remediation. However, entities performing or using gamma survey as a decommissioning tool must be aware of both its advantages and its limitations before basing remediation or regulatory action on gamma survey results. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Machine Learning technique for isotopic determination of radioisotopes using HPGe γ-ray spectra

γ-ray spectroscopy is a quantitative, non-destructive technique that may be utilized for the identification and quantitative isotopic estimation of radionuclides. Traditional methods of isotopic determination have various challenges that contribute to statistical and systematic uncertainties in the estimated isotopics. Furthermore, these methods typically require numerous pre-processing steps, and have only been rigorously tested in laboratory settings with limited shielding. Here, in this work, we examine the application of a number of machine learning based regression algorithms as alternatives to conventional approaches for analyzing γ-ray spectroscopy data in the Emergency Response arena. This approach not only eliminates many steps in the analysis procedure, and therefore offers potential to reduce this source of systematic uncertainty, but is also shown to offer comparable performance to conventional approaches in the Emergency Response Application.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Examining the potential for detecting simultaneous noble gas and aerosol samples in the international monitoring system radionuclide network

The purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to establish a legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) is developing the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes a global network of 80 stations to monitor for airborne radionuclides upon entry into force of the CTBT. All 80 radionuclide stations will monitor for particulate radionuclides and at least half of the stations will monitor for radioxenon. The airborne radionuclide monitoring is an important verification technology both for the detection of a radionuclide release and in the determination of whether the release event originates from a nuclear explosion as opposed to an industrial use of nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and many medical isotope production facilities release radioxenon into the atmosphere. Low levels of a few particulate isotopes, such as iodine, may also be released. Detections of multiple isotopes are useful for screening the radionuclide samples for relevance to the Treaty. This paper examines the anticipated joint detections in the IMS of noble gas and particulate isotopes from underground nuclear explosions where breaches in the underground containment vents from low levels to up to 1% of the radionuclide inventory of the resulting fission products to the atmosphere. Detection probabilities are based on 844 simulated release events spaced out at 17 release locations and one year in time. Six different release (venting) scenarios, including two fractionated scenarios, were analyzed. When ranked by detection probability, 11 particulate isotopes and one noble gas isotope ( 133 Xe) appear in the top 20 isotopes for all six release scenarios. Using the 11 particulate isotopes and the one noble gas isotope, the IMS has nearly the same detection probability as when 45 particulate and 4 noble gas isotopes are used. Thus, a limited list of relevant radionuclides may be sufficient for treaty verification purposes. The probability that at least one particulate and at least one radioxenon isotope would be detected in the IMS from the release events ranged from 0.15 to 0.86 depending on the release scenario.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

In the nuclear explosion monitoring context, what is an anomaly?

Abstract In the early years of nuclear explosion monitoring, experts used downwind detections with meaningful ratios of radioactive species to identify an explosion. Today’s reality is sparse networks of radionuclide monitoring stations looking for weak signals. Analysts need to discriminate between industrial background radioactivity and nuclear explosion signals, even using the detection of one isotope. Aerosol and xenon measurements potentially related to nuclear tests in 2006 and 2013 announced by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and from worldwide civilian background radioactivity are considered when defining radionuclide detection anomalies to objectively guide the use of limited analyst resources and reduce the possibility of not detecting nuclear explosions.

Miley, Harry S.↗