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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2018

Validation of MCNPX-PoliMi code for simulations of radioxenon beta-gamma coincidence detection

Radioxenon detection is an important component of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We developed and validated a new model in MCNPX-PoliMi to simulate the decay of various radioxenon isotopes and the detector response of a variety of detector types. The model was validated using calibration data from a plastic and NaI(Tl) beta-gamma coincidence detector and the results are presented. The results of this validation show that this model can also be used as a tool to produce training spectra and as a method to calibrate radioxenon detection systems.

Radioxenon analysis, MCNP, beta-gamma coincidence↗
DOE OSTI2017

Comparison of new and existing algorithms for the analysis of 2D radioxenon beta gamma spectra

The aim of this paper is to compare radioxenon beta-gamma analysis algorithms using simulated spectra with experimentally measured background, where the ground truth of the signal is known. We believe that this is among the largest efforts to date in terms of the number of synthetic spectra generated and number of algorithms compared using identical spectra. We generate an estimate for the Minimum Detectable Counts (MDC) for each isotope using each algorithm. The paper also points out a conceptual model to put the various algorithms into a continuum. Our results show that existing algorithms can be improved and some newer algorithms can be better than the currently used ones.

actinides↗
DOE OSTI2017

A review of the developments of radioxenon detectors for nuclear explosion monitoring

Developments in radioxenon monitoring since the implementation of the International Monitoring System are reviewed with emphasis on the most current technologies to improve detector sensitivity and resolution. The nuclear detectors reviewed include combinations of plastic and NaI(Tl) detectors, high purity germanium detectors, silicon detectors, and phoswich detectors. The minimum detectable activity and calibration methods for the various detectors are also discussed.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2016

International challenge to predict the impact of radioxenon releases from medical isotope production on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty sampling station

Abstract The International Monitoring System (IMS) is part of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO). At entry-into-force, half of the 80 radionuclide stations will be able to measure concentrations of several radioactive xenon isotopes produced in nuclear explosions, and then the full network may be populated with xenon monitoring afterward (Bowyer et al., 2013). Fission-based production of 99Mo for medical purposes also releases radioxenon isotopes to the atmosphere (Saey, 2009). One of the ways to mitigate the effect of emissions from medical isotope production is the use of stack monitoring data, if it were available, so that the effect of radioactive xenon emissions could be subtracted from the effect from a presumed nuclear explosion, when detected at an IMS station location. To date, no studies have addressed the impacts the time resolution or data accuracy of stack monitoring data have on predicted concentrations at an IMS station location. Recently, participants from seven nations used atmospheric transport modeling to predict the time-history of 133Xe concentration measurements at an IMS station in Germany using stack monitoring data from a medical isotope production facility in Belgium. Participants received only stack monitoring data and used the atmospheric transport model and meteorological data of their choice. Some of the models predicted the highest measured concentrations quite well (a high composite statistical model comparison rank or a small mean square error with the measured values). The results suggest release data on a 15 min time spacing is best. The model comparison rank and ensemble analysis suggests that combining multiple models may provide more accurate predicted concentrations than any single model. Further research is needed to identify optimal methods for selecting ensemble members and those methods may depend on the specific transport problem. None of the submissions based only on the stack monitoring data predicted the small measured concentrations very well. The one submission that best predicted small concentrations also included releases from nuclear power plants. Modeling of sources by other nuclear facilities with smaller releases than medical isotope production facilities may be important in discriminating those releases from releases from a nuclear explosion.

133Xe↗
DOE OSTI2015

Testing of the KRI-developed Silicon PIN Radioxenon Detector

Radioxenon detectors are used for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in a network of detectors throughout the world called the International Monitoring System (IMS). The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) has tasked Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) with testing a V.G. Khlopin Radium Institute (KRI) and Lares Ltd-developed Silicon PIN detector for radioxenon detection. PNNL measured radioxenon with the silicon PIN detector and determined its potential compared to current plastic scintillator beta cells. While the PNNL tested Si detector experienced noise issues, a second detector was tested in Russia at Lares Ltd, which did not exhibit the noise issues. Without the noise issues, the Si detector produces much better energy resolution and isomer peak separation than a conventional plastic scintillator cell used in the SAUNA systems in the IMS. Under the assumption of 1 cm 3 of Xe in laboratory-like conditions, 24-hr count time (12-hr count time for the SAUNA), with the respective shielding the minimum detectable concentrations for the Si detector tested by Lares Ltd (and a conventional SAUNA system) were calculated to be: 131m Xe – 0.12 mBq/m 3 (0.12 mBq/m 3 ); 133 Xe – 0.18 mBq/m 3 (0.21 mBq/m 3 ); 133m Xe – 0.07 mBq/m 3 (0.15 mBq/m 3 ); 135 Xe – 0.45 mBq/m 3 (0.67 mBq/m 3 ). Detection limits, which are one of the important factors in choosing the best detection technique for radioxenon in field conditions, are significantly better than for SAUNA-like detection systems for 131m Xe and 133m Xe, but similar for 133 Xe and 135 Xe. Another important factor is the amount of “memory effect” or carry over signal from one radioxenon measurement to the subsequent sample. The memory effect is reduced by a factor of 10 in the Si PIN detector compared to the current plastic scintillator cells. There is potential for further reduction with the removal of plastics within the cell, which will need to be explored in future work. A third important parameter in choosing the best detection technique for radioxenon is the resolution of the electron detection. While the resolution is important in determining the minimum detectable concentration, it plays a larger role in source identification when there is a visible signal. The Silicon PIN diodes generated improved resolution over a similar plastic scintillator cell. With the improved resolution, it becomes easier to distinguish the radioxenon isomers ( 133m Xe and 131m Xe) from the 133 Xe beta continuum background. With the beta background from 133 Xe ever present with the detection of the isomers, the improved resolution proves vital in calculating the ratios of the three isotopes. With an accurate measurement of the isotopic ratios, the anthropogenic sources of radioxenon (medical isotope production and nuclear reactors) can be more accurately distinguished. Based on the results shown within this report, a Si PIN beta cell shows the potential to aid in the operation and discriminating power of the IMS for the CTBTO. However, there are a number of issues that need attention before a detector of this design would be reliable enough for field operations in the IMS. Issues that need develop include, but are not limited to: studying the robustness of the design in field conditions, eliminating or minimizing the noise and variability of individual Si detector elements, understanding the long-term gain stability of the Si detectors, and reducing the non-Si materials within the cell (i.e. the plastic housing).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2012

Categorization of Radioxenon

This report summarizes a study into some false positive issues in the use of radioxenon as a method to verify a clandestine nuclear weapons explosion. False positives arise due to similarities between the radioxenon signature generated in medical isotope production and that generated in a nuclear weapon explosion. This report also discusses how to categorize the radioxenon by levels of urgency for manual analysis and interpretation and recommends applying machine learning and time series analysis techniques in the automation of radioxenon characterization. The literature indicates that medical isotope production is a major contributor to atmospheric radioxenon and is the main source of confusion in determining the source of radioxenon. While radioxenon emissions from nuclear power plants can be distinguished from that from nuclear weapon explosions, emissions from medical isotope production generate signatures similar to certain nuclide ratios found in nuclear weapons explosions. Different techniques for analyzing nuclide concentrations and ratios as well as including other sensing modalities via sensor fusion are discussed.

CTBTO↗
DOE OSTI2013

Worldwide measurements of radioxenon background near isotope production facilities, a nuclear power plant and at remote sites: the ‘‘EU/JA-II’’ Project

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) specifies that radioxenon measurements should be performed at 40 or more stations worldwide within the International Monitoring System (IMS). Measuring radioxenon is one of the principle techniques to detect underground nuclear explosions. Specifically, presence and ratios of different radioxenon isotopes allows determining whether a detection event under consideration originated from a nuclear explosion or a civilian source. However, radioxenon monitoring on a global scale is a novel technology and the global civil background must be characterized sufficiently. This paper lays out a study, based on several unique measurement campaigns, of the worldwide concentrations and sources of verification relevant xenon isotopes. It complements the experience already gathered with radioxenon measurements within the CTBT IMS programme and focuses on locations in Belgium, Germany, Kuwait, Thailand and South Africa where very little information was available on ambient xenon levels or interesting sites offered opportunities to learn more about emissions from known sources. The findings corroborate the hypothesis that a few major radioxenon sources contribute in great part to the global radioxenon background. Additionally, the existence of independent sources of 131mXe (the daughter of 131I) has been demonstrated, which has some potential to bias the isotopic signature of signals from nuclear explosions.

Saey, P. R.J.↗
DOE OSTI2017

Improved performance comparisons of radioxenon systems for low level releases in nuclear explosion monitoring

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear tests and mandates development of verification measures to detect treaty violations. One verification measure is detection of radioactive xenon isotopes produced in the fission of actinides. The International Monitoring System (IMS) currently deploys automated radioxenon systems that can detect four radioxenon isotopes. Radioxenon systems with lower detection limits are currently in development. Historically, the sensitivity of radioxenon systems was measured by the minimum detectable concentration for each isotope. In this paper we analyze the response of radioxenon systems using rigorous metrics in conjunction with hypothetical representative releases indicative of an underground nuclear explosion instead of using only minimum detectable concentrations. Our analyses incorporate the impact of potential spectral interferences on detection limits and the importance of measuring isotopic ratios of the relevant radioxenon isotopes in order to improve discrimination from background sources particularly for low-level releases. To provide a sufficient data set for analysis, hypothetical representative releases are simulated every day from the same location for an entire year. The performance of three types of samplers are evaluated assuming they are located at 15 IMS radionuclide stations in the region of the release point. The performance of two IMS-deployed samplers and a next-generation system is compared with proposed metrics for detection and discrimination using representative releases from the nuclear test site used by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Haas, Derek A.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Incorporating civilian radioxenon background estimates in anomaly detection

A nuclear explosion screening exercise in 2023 (Maurer et al., 2023) found challenges with discerning anomalous radioxenon activity concentrations relative to elevated background concentrations. Research has continued into methods to detect anomalous radioxenon concentrations by comparing samples to estimates of atmospheric radioxenon background concentrations caused by releases at nuclear reactors or medical isotope production facilities. A new approach estimates the sample concentrations using time-varying radioxenon release rates obtained using optimization techniques that constrain the facility release rates to plausible amounts based on historical data or facility knowledge. The purpose of the optimization is to determine whether any combination of plausible release rates from emitting facilities can explain a series of radioxenon measurements at one or more sampling stations. A case study uses radioxenon data collected at three locations in western Europe for a month in 2021 and considers releases from 77 locations. Fewer samples are identified as being anomalous using a simplistic flagging rule than from an application of the current International Monitoring System (IMS) activity concentration-level rule.

Environmental sciences↗
DOE OSTI2019

A stilbene - CdZnTe based radioxenon detection system

Atmospheric monitoring of radioxenon is one of the most widely used methods by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to detect elevated levels of 131m Xe, 133/133m Xe, and 135 Xe. The ratios of these radionuclides help discriminate between peaceful use of nuclear technology and nuclear weapon explosions. Radioxenon detection systems often use plastic scintillators in the capacity of an electron detector and a gas cell, plastic gas cells are responsible for introducing high memory effect in these systems. This work presents the design of a new detection system for radioxenon monitoring that utilizes silicon photomultipliers, a stilbene gas cell, and a CdZnTe detector. This detector was evaluated using xenon radioisotope samples produced in the TRIGA reactor at Oregon State University. Here, a 48-h background was collected and calculations of the Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC) were carried out using the Region of Interest (ROI) approach. An MDC of less than 1 mBq/m 3 was obtained for 131m Xe, 133 Xe, and 133m Xe in accordance with the sensitivity limits set by the CTBTO and performs respectably when compared to state-of-the-art radioxenon detection systems. Using 131m Xe, this study indicates that the stilbene gas cell exhibits a memory effect of 0.045 ±0.017%, this is almost a two-order magnitude improvement compared to plastic scintillators. The main purpose of this work is to explore the use of new stilbene detection media for radioxenon application and addressing the problem of memory effect.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Analysis of measurements from an array of radioxenon samplers near to Hartlepool Nuclear Power Station

As part of a scientific research and development project, the radionuclide fingerprint of an operating advanced gas-cooled reactor 25 (AGR) has been studied across several facets (Goodwin et al., 2024). One part of this project was to deploy an array of 26 radioxenon samplers to the region for a period of around 1 year, to measure any radioxenon emissions from the reactors of the 27 Hartlepool nuclear power station at a range of tens of kilometres away. The array of 3 sensors was operational for around 12 28 months from March 2022 and detected many occurrences of isotopes of radioxenon. Here we provide a detailed analysis and 29 interpretation of the data and where possible, attribution of detections to a source or region. Whilst a key part of this work is to 30 measure any emissions of radioxenon from Hartlepool, this work presents one of the most comprehensive efforts to determine the 31 source of a great number of (mostly) 133Xe detections. A combination of different types of atmospheric dispersion modelling 32 techniques, including the use of stack monitoring data from nearby civil radioxenon-emitting nuclear facilities has enabled the 33 majority of detections to be attributed to one or more possible sources. Whilst emissions from Hartlepool have been detected on 34 the systems, the majority of detections are associated with a medical isotope production facility in Fleurus, Belgium (IRE).

Advanced gas-cooled reactor↗
DOE OSTI2017

Detection in subsurface air of radioxenon released from medical isotope production

Abstract Under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, an On-Site Inspection (OSI) may be conducted to clarify whether a nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I of the Treaty. A major component of an OSI is the measurement of subsurface gases in order to detect radioactive noble gases that are produced in a nuclear explosion, particularly radioxenon and radioargon. In order to better understand potential backgrounds of these gases, a sampling campaign was performed near Canadian Nuclear Laboratories in the Ottawa River Valley, a major source of environmental radioxenon. First of their kind measurements of atmospheric radioxenon imprinted into the shallow subsurface from an atmospheric pressure driven force were made using current OSI techniques to measure both atmospheric and subsurface gas samples which were analyzed for radioxenon. These measurements indicate that under specific sampling conditions, on the order of one percent of the atmospheric radioxenon concentration may be measured via subsurface sampling.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

Efficient, Portable Radioxenon Collection for Nuclear Test Monitoring

Detection of radioxenon in the atmosphere is considered the most specific method to determine whether a nuclear test has occurred. It is therefore an important component of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification regime. Radioxenon collection is primarily performed by means of a network of remote monitoring stations at fixed locations around the world. This arrangement is effective but often limited in terms of the response time and sensitivity, two factors that could be improved if radioxenon collection devices were portable. By employing recent advancements in porous materials and adsorption technologies, it is possible to overcome some of the limitations of current radioxenon collection systems. This work established the initial modeling and scoping study towards developing an efficient and portable radioxenon collection system for nuclear test monitoring.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2021

A PIPS + SrI 2 (Eu) detector for atmospheric radioxenon monitoring

The PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) is a prototype atmospheric radioxenon detection system designed at Oregon State University in support of international efforts towards monitoring clandestine nuclear weapon testing activities. This detector aims to address some shortcomings found in currently deployed beta–gamma atmospheric radioxenon detection systems, such as lackluster energy resolution and memory effect, by employing modern detection materials and readout. The system uses a PIPSBox, a silicon-based gas cell, for electron detection, and a pair of ultrabright, D-shaped SrI 2 (Eu) scintillators coupled to silicon photomultipliers for photon detection. A custom eight-channel digital pulse processor equipped with a field programmable gate-array (FPGA) identifies electron–photon coincidences between the volumes in near real-time. Gas samples of the four radioxenon isotopes of interest were independently measured with the PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) detection system to determine energy resolution and efficiency. Application of FPGA-based coincidence discrimination in near real-time reduced the ambient background count rate by 95.85 ± 0.04%. Using parameters from the Xenon International gas processing unit and assuming a blank sample and zero memory effect the minimum detectable concentrations (MDCs) for the isotopes were calculated to be 0.12 ± 0.03, 0.27 ± 0.05, 0.15 ± 0.02, and 1.00 ± 0.08 mBq/m 3 air for 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe, respectively. These MDC estimates compare well with other radioxenon detection systems employed in the International Monitoring System (IMS) and indicate that the PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) is in compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO) sensitivity requirement of ≤ 1 mBq/m 3 for 133 Xe.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2012

TECHNOLOGY GOALS FOR A NEXT GENERATION RADIOXENON MONITORING SYSTEM

The Swedish Automated/Unattended Noble Gas Analyzer (SAUNA) is a nuclear explosion monitoring technology that was developed to provide continuous field measurement of radioxenon gas escaping from an underground nuclear detonation. This capability is a key to the verification of the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). While the SAUNA technology has demonstrated success in the field, a decade of operation primarily in the International Noble Gas Experiment (INGE) has yielded areas for improvement in operations and verification. These opportunities include measurement sensitivity, sample throughput time, system uptime, and data availability. Increasing measurement sensitivity allows for finer discrimination between manmade radioxenon signals (from sources such as medical isotope production facilities) and radioxenon signals that result from fission in a nuclear weapon. Measurement sensitivity can be increased with techniques such as halving the sample processing time or increasing the quantity of xenon extracted from the atmosphere. Additionally, improvements in gas processing technology and control system software can improve the uptime and data availability. This paper will discuss the technical requirements as well as the system and operational specifications which we expect to be the groundwork for the next-generation of radioxenon monitoring systems.

Ely, James H.↗
DOE OSTI2016

A program to generate simulated radioxenon beta–gamma data for concentration verification and validation and training exercises

Abstract Several hundred simulated radioxenon beta-gamma data files were developed to assist in evaluating the performance and results from radioxenon concentration calculation analysis at the International Data Center (IDC) and other National Data Centers (NDC). PNNL developed a Beta-Gamma Simulator (BGSim) that incorporated GEANT-modeled data sets from radioxenon decay chains, as well as functionality to use nuclear detector-acquired data sets to create new beta-gamma spectra with varying amounts of background, 133Xe, 131mXe, 133mXe, 135Xe, and 222Rn and its decay products. The program has been implemented on a web-based applications platform and allows the user to create very specific data sets that incorporate most of the operational parameters for the current beta-gamma systems deployed in the International Monitoring System (IMS) and the On-site Inspection (OSI) equipment. After an initial beta-gamma simulations program was developed, additional uses began to be identified for the program output: training sets of two-dimensional spectra for data analysts at the IDC and other NDC, spectra for exercises such as the Integrated Field Exercise 2014 (IFE14) held in Jordan at the Dead Sea, and testing new analysis methods and algorithms

custom datasets↗
DOE OSTI2016

Radioxenon detector calibration spike production and delivery systems

Abstract Beta-Gamma coincidence radioxenon detectors must be calibrated for each of the four-radioxenon isotopes (135Xe, 133Xe, 133mXe, and 131mXe). Without a proper calibration, there is potential for the misidentification of the amount of each isotope detected. It is important to accurately determine the amount of each radioxenon isotope, as the ratios can be used to distinguish between an anthropogenic source and a nuclear explosion. We have developed a xenon calibration system (XeCalS) that produces calibration spikes of known activity and pressure for field calibration of detectors. The activity concentrations of these calibration spikes are measured using a beta-gamma coincidence detector and a high purity germanium (HPGe) detector. We will present the results from the development and commissioning of XeCalS, along with the future plans for a portable spike implementation system.

beta-gamma coincidence detector↗