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Editorial: A Note on Good Research Practice

Good scientific practice and research misconduct have been concerns of mine for more than a decade (Dooley and Kerch, 2000) and in my role as an editor of the International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, I feel it is time to speak up and at the very least share my concerns and suggestions as they relate to the integrity of the research published in this journal. Rather than wait to write an editorial on good research practices in response to a major incident, I thought it might be best to be proactive and address some of the trends we see in submissions to this peer reviewed journal and to offer some suggestions for improvement improving the level of scholarship in some – but by no means all – of the papers submitted.

plagerism↗

Know Before You Go: A Community-Derived Approach to Planning for and Preventing Sexual Harassment at Oceanographic Field Sites

Sexual harassment is a pervasive problem on oceanographic research vessels and while conducting fieldwork in general. A variety of factors contribute to inadequate protection against sexual harassment, such as poor training in prevention, support, and response; the remoteness of field sites; academic hierarchies that reinforce uneven power dynamics that extend to fieldwork; and multi-institutional teams with distinct policies or reporting structures that can lead to confusion in reporting and responding to incidents in the field. In compromising individuals’ physical and mental health, sexual harassment can negatively affect research expeditions. For example, harassed individuals may decide to refrain from working on complicated team-based tasks, which can be a safety issue. A broader concern is that sexual harassment deters talented people from pursing or maintaining employment in ocean science. Harassment must be treated with the same gravity as research misconduct and safety policy infringements. When planning a research expedition, science team leaders are responsible for the safety of their team and other colleagues aboard and would benefit from resources aimed at helping team leadership create a plan to ensure safety and inclusivity. To address this resource gap and support consistent safety preparedness, 18 participants in the Workshop to Promote Field Safety in Ocean Sciences, convened by the Consortium for Ocean Leadership and held May 17-18, 2022, in Washington, D.C., developed a checklist for use by scientific leaders and others to assist in planning for participant safety and to prevent harassment the field. The checklist specifies the timing of, and who is responsible for, specific actions that should be taken to improve safety while conducting fieldwork, whether on a research vessel or on land. It also provides additional resources and suggestions for leaders on how to amend the checklist to address their specific fieldwork situations.

Oceanography↗

Beyond the Textbook: Ethics Education in Physics

The existing research on why people fail to act ethically identifies a range of motivations, with character traits and peer pressure being the top two causes. Other factors include gain, fear of loss, relationships, competition, opportunity, and cultural factors. In addition to the ethics component, studies have identified also individual and institutional ones. For instance, narcissism plays a significant role in misconduct. The effect of institutional actions, from neglecting punishment in many cases of misconduct up to letting researchers succeed through unethical behavior, was also studied. The only way for an organization to have every member perceive that ethical conduct will enhance their standing and reputation is to display leadership by example. However, despite leaders in academia being nowadays much more educated than twenty years ago about equity, diversity, inclusion and ethical behavior, the occurrence of misconduct has not decreased. Because of the power t hat this demographic holds in enacting reform, as opposed to minority groups who are already encumbered enough, it would be helpful to target the former for equity education. Education and intervention in identifying patterns of thought and action that prevent ethical progress, in deflecting peer pressure, in assuming accountability for their departments, etc. can help. Once again, all roads lead to Rome: an educated and inspired leadership is the most effective tool for change.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

On the origins of the linear no-threshold (LNT) dogma by means of untruths, artful dodges and blind faith

This paper is an historical assessment of how prominent radiation geneticists in the United States during the 1940s and 1950s successfully worked to build acceptance for the linear no-threshold (LNT) dose–response model in risk assessment, significantly impacting environmental, occupational and medical exposure standards and practices to the present time. Detailed documentation indicates that actions taken in support of this policy revolution were ideologically driven and deliberately and deceptively misleading; that scientific records were artfully misrepresented; and that people and organizations in positions of public trust failed to perform the duties expected of them. Key activities are described and the roles of specific individuals are documented. These actions culminated in a 1956 report by a Genetics Panel of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) on Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation (BEAR). In this report the Genetics Panel recommended that a linear dose response model be adopted for the purpose of risk assessment, a recommendation that was rapidly and widely promulgated. The paper argues that current international cancer risk assessment policies are based on fraudulent actions of the U.S. NAS BEAR I Committee, Genetics Panel and on the uncritical, unquestioning and blind-faith acceptance by regulatory agencies and the scientific community. - Highlights: • The 1956 recommendation of the US NAS to use the LNT for risk assessment was adopted worldwide. • This recommendation is based on a falsification of the research record and represents scientific misconduct. • The record misrepresented the magnitude of panelist disagreement of genetic risk from radiation. • These actions enhanced public acceptance of their risk assessment policy recommendations.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

LNTgate: How scientific misconduct by the U.S. NAS led to governments adopting LNT for cancer risk assessment

This paper provides a detailed rebuttal to the letter of Beyea (2016) which offered a series of alternative interpretations to those offered in my article in Environmental Research (Calabrese, 2015a) concerning the role of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation (BEAR) I Committee Genetics Panel in the adoption of the linear dose response model for cancer risk assessment. Significant newly uncovered evidence is presented which supports and extends the findings of Calabrese (2015a), reaffirming the conclusion that the Genetics Panel should be evaluated for scientific misconduct for deliberate misrepresentation of the research record in order to enhance an ideological agenda. This critique documents numerous factual errors along with extensive and deliberate filtering of information in the Beyea letter (2016) that leads to consistently incorrect conclusions and an invalid general perspective.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Lessons to be learned from a contentious challenge to mainstream radiobiological science (the linear no-threshold theory of genetic mutations)

There are both statistically valid and invalid reasons why scientists with differing default hypotheses can disagree in high-profile situations. Examples can be found in recent correspondence in this journal, which may offer lessons for resolving challenges to mainstream science, particularly when adherents of a minority view attempt to elevate the status of outlier studies and/or claim that self-interest explains the acceptance of the dominant theory. Edward J. Calabrese and I have been debating the historical origins of the linear no-threshold theory (LNT) of carcinogenesis and its use in the regulation of ionizing radiation. Professor Calabrese, a supporter of hormesis, has charged a committee of scientists with misconduct in their preparation of a 1956 report on the genetic effects of atomic radiation. Specifically he argues that the report mischaracterized the LNT research record and suppressed calculations of some committee members. After reviewing the available scientific literature, I found that the contemporaneous evidence overwhelmingly favored a (genetics) LNT and that no calculations were suppressed. Calabrese's claims about the scientific record do not hold up primarily because of lack of attention to statistical analysis. Ironically, outlier studies were more likely to favor supra-linearity, not sub-linearity. Finally, the claim of investigator bias, which underlies Calabrese's accusations about key studies, is based on misreading of text. Attention to ethics charges, early on, may help seed a counter narrative explaining the community's adoption of a default hypothesis and may help focus attention on valid evidence and any real weaknesses in the dominant paradigm. - Highlights: • Edward J Calabrese has made a contentious challenge to mainstream radiobiological science. • Such challenges should not be neglected, lest they enter the political arena without review. • Key genetic studies from the 1940s, challenged by Calabrese, were found consistent and unbiased. • A 1956 genetics report did not hide estimates and does not need investigation for misconduct. • The scientific record was strong for a no-threshold, linear genetic response to radiation.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗