Technology portfolio analysis: presentation to SBIRS Program Office
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For five decades, the semiconductor industry has distinguished itself by the rapid pace of improvement in miniaturization of electronics products-Moore's Law. Now, scaling hits a brick wall, a paradigm shift. The industry roadmaps recognized the scaling limitation and project that packaging technologies will meet further miniaturization needs or ak.a "More than Moore". This paper presents packaging technology trends and accelerated reliability testing methods currently being practiced. Then, it presents industry status on key advanced electronic packages, factors affecting accelerated solder joint reliability of area array packages, and IPC/JEDEC/Mil specifications for characterizations of assemblies under accelerated thermal and mechanical loading. Finally, it presents an examples demonstrating how Accelerated Testing and Analysis have been effectively employed in the development of complex spacecraft thereby reducing risk. Quantitative assessments necessarily involve the mathematics of probability and statistics. In addition, accelerated tests need to be designed which consider the desired risk posture and schedule for particular project. Such assessments relieve risks without imposing additional costs. and constraints that are not value added for a particular mission. Furthermore, in the course of development of complex systems, variances and defects will inevitably present themselves and require a decision concerning their disposition, necessitating quantitative assessments. In summary, this paper presents a comprehensive view point, from technology to systems, including the benefits and impact of accelerated testing in offsetting risk.
Differences in communication styles and languages between groups often lead to miscommunication, confusion, and/or frustration. Engineers, computer specialists, clinicians, and managers often utilize the English language in very different ways, with different groups using the same words to represent different concepts ("complaint" is a typical example). In addition, medical issues are often perceived as "off-nominal" and not "primary mission tasks" by managers, which can cause them to assign lower priorities to medical training time and resources. Knowledge bases differ due to variations in training and skill sets, and the goals (both immediate and long-term) of the communicators may also vary, with managers being primarily concerned with overall mission objectives, while clinicians focus on individual or group health issues. Furthermore, true communication is only possible when clinicians possess a deep understanding of mission requirements as well as the ability to communicate medical requirements on a priority basis using risk assessment, added value, and cost benefit analysis. These understandable differences may contribute to difficulties in expressing concerns and ideas in an efficient manner, particularly in projects, such as the space program or many military operations, where these varied groups must collaborate, and where the final decisions must be made by fully informed mission commanders. Methods: Three scenario-based approaches were developed utilizing decision trees and problem based learning, to help define and integrate these concepts. Results: Use of these techniques by NASA and military personnel will be presented. Discussion: To enhance communication, particularly of medical needs, one must identify the concerns and motivating factors for the other groups; for example, members of management may focus on financial concerns, a desire for risk mitigation, public perceptions, mission objectives, etc. Training clinicians to frame issues in these terms may lead to better understanding of the medical concerns by other groups.
The end-to-end verification of a spacecraft photovoltaic power generation system requires light! A lowcost, portable, and end-to-end photovoltaic-system test appropriate for NASA's new generation of Class D missions is presented. High risk, low-cost, and quick-turn satellites rarely have the resources to execute the traditional approaches from higher-class (A-C) missions. The Class D approach, as demonstrated on the Lunar Atmospheric and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE), utilizes a portable, metalhalide, theatre lamp for an end-to-end photovoltaic system test. While not as precise and comprehensive as the traditional Large Area Pulsed Solar Simulator (LAPSS) test, the LADEE method leverages minimal resources into an ongoing assessment program that can be applied through numerous stages of the mission. The project takes a true Class D approach in assessing the technical value of a costly, highfidelity performance test versus a simpler approach with less programmatic risk. The resources required are a fraction of that for a LAPSS test, and is easy to repeat due to its portability. Further, the test equipment can be handed down to future projects without building an on-site facility. At the vanguard of Class D missions, the LADEE team frequently wrestled with and challenged the status quo. The philosophy of risk avoidance at all cost, typical to Class A-C missions, simply could not be executed. This innovative and simple testing solution is contextualized to NASA Class D programs and a specific risk encountered during development of the LADEE Electrical Power System (EPS). Selection of the appropriate lamp and safety concerns are discussed, with examples of test results. Combined with the vendor's panellevel data and periodic inspection, the method ensures system integrity from Integration and Test (I&T) through launch. Following launch, mission operations tools are utilized to assess system performance based on a scant amount of available data.
The end-to-end verification of a spacecraft photovoltaic power generation system requires light! A low-cost, portable, and end-to-end photovoltaic-system test appropriate for NASAs new generation of Class D missions is presented. High risk, low-cost, and quick-turn satellites rarely have the resources to execute the traditional approaches from higher-class (A-C) missions. The Class D approach, as demonstrated on the Lunar Atmospheric and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE), utilizes a portable, metal-halide, theatre lamp for an end-to-end photovoltaic system test. While not as precise and comprehensive as the traditional Large Area Pulsed Solar Simulator (LAPSS) test, the LADEE method leverages minimal resources into an ongoing assessment program that can be applied through numerous stages of the mission. The project takes a true Class D approach in assessing the technical value of a costly, high-fidelity performance test versus a simpler approach with less programmatic risk. The resources required are a fraction of that for a LAPSS test, and is easy to repeat due to its portability. Further, the test equipment can be handed down to future projects without building an on-site facility.At the vanguard of Class D missions, the LADEE team frequently wrestled with and challenged the status quo. The philosophy of risk avoidance at all cost, typical to Class A-C missions, simply could not be executed. This innovative and simple testing solution is contextualized to NASA Class D programs and a specific risk encountered during development of the LADEE Electrical Power System (EPS). Selection of the appropriate lamp and safety concerns are discussed, with examples of test results. Combined with the vendors panel-level data and periodic inspection, the method ensures system integrity from Integration and Test (IT) through launch. Following launch, mission operations tools are utilized to assess system performance based on a scant amount of available data.
Secondary Electron Yield (SEY) is a material property that plays a fundamental role in material and spacecraft charging. SEY values for dielectric materials (insulators) are crucial inputs to models used to assess mission risk posed by high differential voltages and electrostatic discharge (ESD) on spacecraft. There are only two (non-NASA) facilities that attempt such measurements. The lack of NASA capability results in high cost and long, unpredictable schedules to obtain measurements. Future Artemis crewed lunar surface missions will involve the first use of many insulating materials for which SEY properties are poorly understood or absent entirely. Unconstrained SEY values in models increase uncertainty in charging/ESD risk assessment. The capability for reliable SEY determination will lead to improved charging and ESD risk assessments. We are developing a new capability, using pulsed ultralow (<femtoampere) incident electron beam intensity to eliminate sample charging, coupled with sensitive non-contact surface potential measurements, to measure secondary electron yield (SEY) from insulating materials. Present methods for SEY measurement on insulators suffer from highly inconsistent results due to sample charging from the incident electron beam during the measurement. In this first phase we are leveraging existing EM41 instrumentation, facilities, and expertise to perform proof-of-concept tests.
The National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine 2017 Decadal Survey of Earth Science and Applications identified geodetic measurements of surface deformation and related change as one of the top five "observables" to be prioritized in NASA's program going forward. In response, NASA commissioned a multi-center Surface Deformation and Change (SDC) team to perform a five year study of mission architectures that would support SDC observables and provide the most value to the diverse science and applications communities it serves. The study is being conducted in phases, in which the science and applications capabilities identified in the Decadal Survey are interpreted and refined, candidate mission architectures and associated technologies to support these needs are identified, architectures are assessed against a science value framework specific to SDC, and recommendations to NASA are made. Ultimately, NASA will decide which amongst these recommendations will proceed to mission formulation. As synthetic aperture radar (SAR) was identified as the prime sensor technology to satisfy SDC observational needs, a key component of the SDC study is to assess the current state of the art in SAR sensor and spacecraft systems and components. The number of SAR systems, both civil and commercial, is growing rapidly, requiring that mission architectures not only consider technology, but availability of data from other missions, possible partnerships or collaborations, and even data purchase. The mechanism for assessment involves development of an end-to-end science performance evaluation tool for multi-satellite constellations, which feeds into a science value framework that considers science performance, technological programmatic risks, and cost. This paper will present an overview of the ongoing study including the architectures under consideration and the technology road map needed to achieve the objectives of the mission.
The National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine 2017 Decadal Survey of Earth Science and Applications identified geodetic measurements of surface deformation and related change as one of the top five “observables” to be prioritized in NASA’s future program. In response, NASA commissioned a multi-center Surface Deformation and Change(SDC) team to perform a five year study of mission architectures that would support SDC observables and provide the most value to the diverse science and applications communities it serves. The study is being conducted in phases, in which the science and applications capabilities identified in the Decadal Survey are refined, candidate architectures and associated technologies to support these needs are identified, architectures are assessed against a science value framework specific to SDC, and recommendations to NASA are made. Ultimately, NASA will decide which amongst these recommendations will proceed to mission formulation. As synthetic aperture radar (SAR) was identified as the prime sensor technology to satisfy SDC observational needs, a key component of the SDC study is to assess the current state of the art in SAR sensor and supporting technology. The number of SAR systems, both civil and commercial, is growing rapidly, requiring that mission architectures not only consider technology, but availability of data from other missions, possible partnerships or collaborations, and even data purchase. The mechanism for assessment involves development of an end-to-end science performance evaluation tool for multi-satellite con-stellations, which feeds into a science value framework that con-siders science performance, technological programmatic risks, and cost. This paper will present an overview of the ongoing study including the candidate architectures and the technology road map needed to achieve the objectives of the mission.
The International Space University (ISU) conducted a study of an international program to support human exploration of Mars as its annual Design Project activity during its 1991 summer session in Toulouse, France. Although an ISU Design Project strives to produce an in-depth analysis during the intense 10-week summer session, the International Mars Mission (IMM) project was conducted in a manner designed to provide a learning experience for young professionals working in an unusual multidisciplinary and multinational environment. The breadth of the IMM study exceeds that of most Mars mission studies of the past, encompassing political organization for long-term commitment, multinational management structure, cost analysis, mission architecture, vehicle configuration, crew health, life support, Mars surface infrastructure, mission operations, technology evaluation, risk assessment, scientific planning, exploration, communication networks, and Martian resource utilization. The IMM Final Report has particular value for those seeking insight into the choices made by a multinational group working in an apolitical environment on the problems of international cooperation in space.
A global, satellite-based, terrestrial snow mission planning tool is proposed to help inform experimental mission design with relevance to snow depth and snow water equivalent (SWE). The idea leverages the capabilities of NASAs Land Information System (LIS) and the Tradespace Analysis Tool for Constellations (TAT C) to harness the information content of Earth science mission data across a suite of hypothetical sensor designs, orbital configurations, data assimilation algorithms, and optimization and uncertainty techniques, including cost estimates and risk assessments of each hypothetical orbital configuration.One objective the proposed observing system simulation experiment (OSSE) is to assess the complementary or perhaps contradictory information content derived from the simultaneous collection of passive microwave (radiometer), active microwave (radar), and LIDAR observations from space-based platforms. The integrated system will enable a true end-to-end OSSE that can help quantify the value of observations based on their utility towards both scientific research and applications as well as to better guide future mission design. Science and mission planning questions addressed as part of this concept include:1. What observational records are needed (in space and time) to maximize terrestrial snow experimental utility?2. How might observations be coordinated (in space and time) to maximize utility? 3. What is the additional utility associated with an additional observation?4. How can future mission costs being minimized while ensuring Science requirements are fulfilled?
A global, satellite-based, terrestrial snow mission planning tool is proposed to help inform experimental mission design with relevance to snow depth and snow water equivalent (SWE). The idea leverages the capabilities of NASA's Land Information System (LIS) and the Tradespace Analysis Tool for Constellations (TAT-C) to harness the information content of Earth science mission data across a suite of hypothetical sensor designs, orbital configurations, data assimilation algorithms, and optimization and uncertainty techniques, including cost estimates and risk assessments of each hypothetical permutation. One objective of the proposed observing system simulation experiment (OSSE) is to assess the complementary or perhaps contradictory information content derived from the simultaneous collection of passive microwave (radiometer), active microwave (radar), and LIDAR observations from space-based platforms. The integrated system will enable a true end-to-end OSSE that can help quantify the value of observations based on their utility towards both scientific research and applications as well as to better guide future mission design. Science and mission planning questions addressed as part of this concept include: What observational records are needed (in space and time) to maximize terrestrial snow experimental utility? How might observations be coordinated (in space and time) to maximize this utility? What is the additional utility associated with an additional observation? How can future mission costs be minimized while ensuring Science requirements are fulfilled?
This paper describes a Bayesian approach for comparing the productivity and cost-risk tradeoffs of sending versus not sending one or more robotic surveyor missions prior to a human mission to land on an asteroid. The expected value of sample information based on productivity combined with parametric variations in the prior probability an asteroid might be found suitable for landing were used to assess the optimal number of spacecraft and asteroids to survey. The analysis supports the value of surveyor missions to asteroids and indicates one launch with two spacecraft going simultaneously to two independent asteroids appears optimal.
This report summarizes work completed under the Human Transportation System Study. This study was conducted by the New Initiatives Office at JSC with the technical support of Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas, Martin Marietta, and Rockwell. The study was designed to generate information on determining the appropriate path to follow for new system development to meet the Nation's space transportation needs. The study evaluates 18 transportation architecture options using a parametric set of mission requirements. These options include use of current systems (e.g., Shuttle, Titan, etc. ) as well as proposed systems (e.g., PLS, Single-Stage-to-Orbit, etc.) to assess the impact of various considerations, such as the cost of alternate access, or the benefit of separating people and cargo. The architecture options are compared to each other with six measurable evaluation criteria or attributes. They are: funding profile, human safety, probability of mission success, architecture cost risk, launch schedule confidence, and environmental impact. Values for these attributes are presented for the architecture options, with pertinent conclusions and recommendations.
This report summarizes work completed under the Human Transportation System Study. This study was conducted by the New Initiatives Office at JSC with the technical support of Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas, Martin Marietta, and Rockwell. The study was designed to generate information on determining the appropriate path to follow for new system development to meet the Nation's space transportation needs. The study evaluates 18 transportation architecture options using a parametric set of mission requirements. These options include use of current systems (e.g., Shuttle, Titan, etc.) as well as proposed systems (e.g., PLS, Single-Stage-to-Orbit, etc.) to assess the impact of various considerations, such as the cost of alternate access, or the benefit of separating people and cargo. The architecture options are compared to each other with six measurable evaluation criteria or attributes. They are: funding profile, human safety, probability of mission success, architecture cost risk, launch schedule confidence, and environmental impact. Values for these attributes are presented for the architecture options, with pertinent conclusions and recommendations.
This report summarizes work completed under the Human Transportation System Study. This study was conducted by the New Initiatives Office at JSC with the technical support of Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas, Martin Marietta, and Rockwell. The study was designed to generate information on determining the appropriate path to follow for new system development to meet the Nation's space transportation needs. The study evaluates 18 transportation architecture options using a parametric set of mission requirements. These options include use of current systems (e.g., Shuttle, Titan, etc.) as well as proposed systems (e.g., PLS, Single-Stage-to-Orbit, etc.) to assess the impact of various considerations, such as the cost of alternate access, or the benefit of separating people and cargo. The architecture options are compared to each other with six measurable evaluation criteria or attributes. They are: funding profile, human safety, probability of mission success, architecture cost risk, launch schedule confidence, and environmental impact. Values for these attributes are presented for the architecture options, with pertinent conclusions and recommendations.
On October 28, 2009 the Ares I-X flight test rocket launched from Kennedy Space Center and flew its suborbital trajectory as designed. The mission was successfully completed as data from the test, and associated development activities were analyzed, transferred to stakeholders, and well documented. Positive lessons learned from Ares I-X were that the application of lean thinking principles and kaizen practices are effective in streamlining development activities. Ares I-X, like other historical rocket development projects, was hampered by technical, cost, and schedule challenges and if not addressed boldly could have resulted in cancellation of the test. The mission management team conducted nine major meetings, referred to as lean events, across its elements to assess plans, procedures, processes, requirements, controls, culture, organization, use of resources, and anything that could be changed to optimize schedule or reduce risk. The preeminent aspect of the lean events was the focus on value added activities and the removal or at least reduction in non-value activities. Trained Lean Six Sigma facilitators assisted the Ares I-X developers in conducting the lean events. They indirectly helped formulate the mission s own unique methodology for assessing schedule. A core team was selected to lead the events and report to the mission manager. Each activity leveraged specialized participants to analyze the subject matter and its related processes and then recommended alternatives and solutions. Stakeholders were the event champions. They empowered and encouraged the team to succeed. The keys to success were thorough preparation, honest dialog, small groups, adherence to the Ares I-X ground rules, and accountability through disciplined reporting and tracking of actions. This lean event formula was game-changing as demonstrated by the success of Ares I-X. It is highly recommended as a management tool to help develop other complex systems efficiently. The key benefits for Ares I-X were obtaining unambiguous schedule margin, defining enabling options for risk reduction, and most importantly a stronger more unified team.
On October 28, 2009 the Ares I-X flight test rocket launched from Kennedy Space Center and flew its suborbital trajectory as designed. The mission was successfully completed as data from the test, and associated development activities were analyzed, transferred to stakeholders, and well documented. A positive lesson learned from Ares I-X was that the application of lean thinking principles and kaizen practices was very effective in streamlining development activities. Ares I-X, like other historical rocket development projects, was hampered by technical, cost, and schedule challenges and if not addressed boldly could have resulted in cancellation of the test. The mission management team conducted nine major meetings, referred to as lean events, across its elements to assess plans, procedures, processes, requirements, controls, culture, organization, use of resources, and anything that could be changed to optimize schedule or reduce risk. The preeminent aspect of the lean events was the focus on value added activities and the removal or at least reduction in non-value added activities. Trained Lean Six Sigma facilitators assisted the Ares I-X developers in conducting the lean events. They indirectly helped formulate the mission s own unique methodology for assessing schedule. A core team was selected to lead the events and report to the mission manager. Each activity leveraged specialized participants to analyze the subject matter and its related processes and then recommended alternatives and solutions. Stakeholders were the event champions. They empowered and encouraged the team to succeed. The keys to success were thorough preparation, honest dialog, small groups, adherence to the Ares I-X ground rules, and accountability through disciplined reporting and tracking of actions. This lean event formula was game-changing as demonstrated by Ares I-X. It is highly recommended as a management tool to help develop other complex systems efficiently. The key benefits for Ares I-X were obtaining unambiguous schedule margin, defining enabling options for risk reduction, and most importantly a stronger more unified team.
NASA was chartered as an independent civilian space agency in 1958 following the Soviet Union's dramatic launch of the Sputnik 1 (1957). In his state of the union address in May of 1961, President Kennedy issued to the fledging organization his famous challenge for a manned lunar mission by the end of the decade. The Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programs that followed put the utmost value on high quality, low risk (as low as possible within the context of space flight), quick results, all with little regard for cost. These circumstances essentially melded NASAs culture as an organization capable of great technological achievement but at extremely high cost. The Space Shuttle project, the next major agency endeavor, was put under severe annual budget constraints in the 1970's. NASAs response was to hold to the high quality standards, low risk and annual cost and let schedule suffer. The result was a significant delay in the introduction of the Shuttle as well as overall total cost growth. By the early 1990's, because NASA's budget was declining, the number of projects was also declining. Holding the same cost and schedule productivity levels as before was essentially causing NASA to price itself out of business. In 1992, the helm of NASA was turned over to a new Administrator. Dan Goldin's mantra was "faster, better, cheaper" and his enthusiasm and determination to change the NASA culture was not to be ignored. This research paper documents the various implementations of "faster, better, cheaper" that have been attempted, analyzes their impact and compares the cost performance of these new projects to previous NASA benchmarks. Fundamentally, many elements of "faster, better, cheaper" are found to be working well, especially on smaller projects. Some of the initiatives are found to apply only to smaller or experimental projects however, so that extrapolation to "flagship" projects may be problematic.