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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Transitioning CO2-EOR Field to Dedicated CO2 Storage: Risk Considerations and Quantifications

Presentation slides on “Transitioning CO2-EOR Field to Dedicated CO2 Storage: Risk Considerations and Quantifications” for the CCUS 2025 conference held in Houston, Texas March 3-5, 2025. CO2 injection wells for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) are currently regulated as Class II wells under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Underground Injection Control (UIC) program, while dedicated geological CO2 storage (GCS) wells are considered Class VI wells. The UIC classification of wells for a transitioning CO2-EOR facility has the potential to substantially impact the feasibility of operations. This paper reports a case study of risk assessment of this transition, including areas review, plume stability and pressure transient and its impacts in dedicated CO2 storage.

carbon storage↗
NASA NTRS2020

Risk considerations for autonomy software

This paper summarizes key findings related to methods for the risk considerations of autonomy software. Existing methods for Verification and Validation (V&V) of autonomy software are summarized and a method for the assurance of autonomy software is suggested and demonstrated on a command execution use case. Risk and reliability are defined in the context of autonomy and an approach for risk assessment of autonomy is presented using an example use case. Key insights regarding areas of uncertainty for autonomy are provided, along with a suggested architecture for the systematic consideration of reliability within the context of a given autonomous planner.

Meshkat, Leila↗
NASA NTRS2004

Towards a systems approach to risk considerations for concurrent design

This paper describes the new process used by the Project Design Center at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory for the identification, assessment and communication of risk elements throughout the lifecycle of a mission design. This process includes a software tool, 'RAP' that collects and communicates risk information between the various designers and a 'risk expert' who mediates this process. The establishment of this process is an attempt towards the systematic consideration of risk in the design decision making process. Using this process, we are able to better keep track of the risks associated with the design decisions. Furthermore, it helps us develop better risk profiles for the studies under consideration. We aim to refine and expand the current process to enable more thorough risk analysis capabilities in the future.

concurrent design↗
DOE OSTI2024

Risk Considerations of Transitioning CO2-EOR Field to CO2 storage Field: Case Study

In the United States (U.S.), carbon dioxide (CO2) injection wells at EOR sites are currently regulated as Class II wells under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Underground Injection Control (UIC) program while dedicated geological CO2 storage (GCS) wells are considered Class VI wells. A CO2-EOR facility considering a transitioning from tertiary oil recovery to injecting CO2 for the primary purpose of long-term storage is required to obtain a Class VI permit where this transition poses an increased risk to underground sources of drinking water. This study considers how transitioning operations from CO2-EOR to storage can impact reservoir plume and pressure transient in the storage envelope, and how these changes could impact area of review and potential unwanted fluid migration. We developed a case study to assess subsurface response and leakage risks associated with a representative, hypothetical operation in a carbonate reservoir. This reservoir transitions from tertiary hydrocarbon recovery to dedicated GCS. Reservoir simulations were run for a set of credible CO2-EOR scenarios to estimate distributions of fluids phases and pressures throughout the model domain after CO2 flooding as well as forecasting the behavior of the reservoir after the transition to a dedicated storage phase. The evolutions from all simulated scenarios were used as the basis for leakage risk quantification using the National Risk Assessment Partnership’s Open-Source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM) with a novel reduced-order model to estimate time-dependent leakage of CO2, brine, and hydrocarbon fluids through potentially leaky wells. Results include a description of reservoir response, an estimate of the areal extent that could potentially be impacted by leakage to underground sources of drinking water, and estimates of the magnitude of potential leakage. Considerations for dedicated storage injection well selection, injectivity, and injection scheme performance and potential leakage risk are presented, with implications for risk assessment of well transition discussed. This study presents a risk-based workflow for the Class II to Class VI well transition. Integrating credible numerical simulation of viable CO2-EOR to dedicated CO2 storage with quantitative risk assessment tools, such as the NRAP-Open-IAM, will provide a valuable means to devise operational scenarios and inform decision-making related to storage benefit, leakage risk, and liability. Presented at the SPE/AAPG/SEG Carbon Capture Utilization and Storage Conference in Houston, TX, March 11-13, 2024.

Liu, Guoxiang↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber Risk Considerations for Nuclear Digital I&C Systems

Many engineers and scientists researching modeling and analysis methods for nuclear energy advancement are focused on proof-of-concept and early-stage development for new reactor designs. Since instrumentation and control (I&C) systems are traditionally developed later in the systems engineering lifecycle, researchers may be unfamiliar with modern digital technology used in these I&C systems. It is even more likely that they are unfamiliar with the cyber risks associated with them. This paper provides a brief overview of nuclear digital I&C systems before examining the importance of cyber risk management at nuclear reactors and the benefits of including Cyber-Informed Engineering throughout the systems engineering lifecycle. The primary goal is for engineers and scientists to develop a mindset that incorporates cybersecurity as another discipline alongside safety when designing and developing new technologies, regardless of technology readiness level.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2016

Risk Considerations of Bird Strikes to Space Launch Vehicles

Within seconds after liftoff of the Space Shuttle during mission STS-114, a turkey vulture impacted the vehicle's external tank. The contact caused no apparent damage to the Shuttle, but the incident led NASA to consider the potential consequences of bird strikes during a Shuttle launch. The environment at Kennedy Space Center provides unique bird strike challenges due to the Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge and the Atlantic Flyway bird migration routes. NASA is currently refining risk assessment estimates for the probability of bird strike to space launch vehicles. This paper presents an approach for analyzing the risks of bird strikes to space launch vehicles and presents an example. The migration routes, types of birds present, altitudes of those birds, exposed area of the launch vehicle, and its capability to withstand impacts affect the risk due to bird strike. A summary of significant risk contributors is discussed.

Hales, Christy↗
NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

INTRODUCTION. Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during ground testing at Johnson Space Center identified a break-in-prebreathe (BIP) 13 minutes prior to depressurization as the leading credible cause despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 mins in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Full restart of prebreathe is directed following breaks > 10 min. The adequacy of NASA’s BIP rules was evaluated prior to resuming hypobaric ground testing or ISS extravehicular activities. METHODS. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) Type II DCS case report and investigation findings; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA), iv) relevant published literature, v) model estimates of tissue on-gassing and off-gassing, and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe. RESULTS. NASA’s nominal prebreathe protocols are validated via extensive ground testing to ensure DCS risk is reduced to within acceptable limits. Conversely, there exists a paucity of data, no validated models, and limited documentation regarding BIP risk for NASA prebreathe protocols. Flight rules implemented for shuttle and later ISS are based primarily on expert opinion and an assumption of symmetric on-gassing and off-gassing, which would make 2:1 payback a conservative mitigation for a BIP. Assumption of exponential gas kinetics makes late breaks higher risk, or require greater payback, than earlier breaks. Two BIPs have occurred using the current ISS prebreathe protocol, each of which was followed by greater than 2:1 payback and at least 59 minutes of 100% O2 pre-depress. No DCS cases have been reported during shuttle or ISS EVA operations. DISCUSSION. Interim changes were implemented to protect against late breaks during ground and flight prebreathes by ensuring negligible difference in conservatively modeled ppN2 pre-depress compared to nominal validated protocols. Additional documentation and literature review as well as chamber test planning are ongoing with the objective of further ground and flight rule updates and validation of a BIP risk model.

Prebreathe↗
NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

INTRODUCTION. Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during ground testing at Johnson Space Center identified a break-in-prebreathe (BIP) 13 minutes prior to depressurization as the leading credible cause despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 mins in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Full restart of prebreathe is directed following breaks > 10 min. The adequacy of NASA’s BIP rules was evaluated prior to resuming hypobaric ground testing or ISS extravehicular activities. METHODS. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) Type II DCS case report and investigation findings; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA), iv) relevant published literature, v) model estimates of tissue on-gassing and off-gassing, and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe. RESULTS. NASA’s nominal prebreathe protocols are validated via extensive ground testing to ensure DCS risk is reduced to within acceptable limits. Conversely, there exists a paucity of data, no validated models, and limited documentation regarding BIP risk for NASA prebreathe protocols. Flight rules implemented for shuttle and later ISS are based primarily on expert opinion and an assumption of symmetric on-gassing and off-gassing, which would make 2:1 payback a conservative mitigation for a BIP. Assumption of exponential gas kinetics makes late breaks higher risk, or require greater payback, than earlier breaks. Two BIPs have occurred using the current ISS prebreathe protocol, each of which was followed by greater than 2:1 payback and at least 59 minutes of 100% O2 pre-depress. No DCS cases have been reported during shuttle or ISS EVA operations. DISCUSSION. Interim changes were implemented to protect against late breaks during ground and flight prebreathes by ensuring negligible difference in conservatively modeled ppN2 pre-depress compared to nominal validated protocols. Additional documentation and literature review as well as chamber test planning are ongoing with the objective of further ground and flight rule updates and validation of a BIP risk model.

Prebreathe↗
DOE OSTI2021

Organs at Risk Considerations for Thoracic Stereotactic Body Radiation Therapy: What Is Safe for Lung Parenchyma?

Stereotactic body radiation therapy (SBRT) has become the standard of care for inoperable early-stage non-small cell lung cancer and is often used for recurrent lung cancer and pulmonary metastases. Radiation-induced lung toxicity (RILT), including radiation pneumonitis and pulmonary fibrosis, is a major concern for which it is important to understand dosimetric and clinical predictors.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’S Break-in-Prebreathe Flight Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during hypobaric ground testing at Johnson Space Center (JSC) identified a ~3 min break-in-prebreathe (BiP) late in the prebreathe (13 min prior to depressurization) as the leading credible cause for the DCS case. This occurred despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 min in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Breaks lasting longer than 10 min require a complete restart of the prebreathe protocol. The adequacy of NASA’s BiP rules was evaluated prior to resuming any hypobaric ground testing or International Space Station (ISS) extravehicular activity (EVA). Of particular interest to the authors was the timing of the BiP in relation to the overall prebreathe timeline. Although there exists no agreed-upon definition, a ‘late’ BiP means towards the end of the prebreathe period, and in particular, the last hour prior to depressurization. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) the type II DCS case report and findings from the investigation; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA); iv) relevant published literature; v) tissue gas loading model estimates; and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe.

Andrew F J Abercromby↗
DOE OSTI2025

Risk Assessment Considerations for Underground Hydrogen Storage in Depleted Gas Reservoirs

Underground hydrogen storage (UHS) in depleted reservoirs presents a promising solution for large-scale energy storage as hydrogen demand grows. As the UHS industry emerges, robust risk assessments are critical to ensuring safe operation of the storage facilities and minimizing the risk of accidents. This work explores risk assessment protocols for underground natural gas storage (UGS) in depleted reservoirs and identifies key considerations for repurposing these facilities for UHS. By examining the differences in physical and chemical properties between hydrogen and natural gas, this work highlights new and modified hazards that merits a reevaluation of traditional natural gas risk assessment practices. This investigation synthesizes insights from previous literature reviews and interviews with UGS industry experts and operators to identify key areas for adapting risk assessment methodologies for hydrogen. The insights gleaned from expert interviews indicate that existing risk assessment standards are non-prescriptive, leading to diverse company-specific risk assessment methodologies requiring substantial additions to become practical. Due to a lack of concrete risk assessment requirements, experience, and relevant data, this uncertainty is expected to be magnified considerably when considering hydrogen. This study identifies several areas for potential modification of existing risk assessment practices that could be considered by those developing standards or performing risk assessments for UHS. Specifically, risk assessments may be improved by including risks unique to hydrogen in existing standards, changing the magnitude of different risk factors in existing risk assessment protocols, and improving methods of data collection and communication across the industry to address large areas of uncertainty.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2022

Uncertainty Analysis in Multi‐Sector Systems: Considerations for Risk Analysis, Projection, and Planning for Complex Systems

Abstract Simulation models of multi‐sector systems are increasingly used to understand societal resilience to climate and economic shocks and change. However, multi‐sector systems are also subject to numerous uncertainties that prevent the direct application of simulation models for prediction and planning, particularly when extrapolating past behavior to a nonstationary future. Recent studies have developed a combination of methods to characterize, attribute, and quantify these uncertainties for both single‐ and multi‐sector systems. Here, we review challenges and complications to the idealized goal of fully quantifying all uncertainties in a multi‐sector model and their interactions with policy design as they emerge at different stages of analysis: (a) inference and model calibration; (b) projecting future outcomes; and (c) scenario discovery and identification of risk regimes. We also identify potential methods and research opportunities to help navigate the tradeoffs inherent in uncertainty analyses for complex systems. During this discussion, we provide a classification of uncertainty types and discuss model coupling frameworks to support interdisciplinary collaboration on multi‐sector dynamics (MSD) research. Finally, we conclude with recommendations for best practices to ensure that MSD research can be properly contextualized with respect to the underlying uncertainties.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS1996

Risk as a Resource: A New Paradigm

In the new NASA, risk management must be developed as a skill to a far greater degree than has existed in the past. Past approaches have produced great successes but at great cost and lengthy schedules. In the future, risk and its component contributors must be re-evaluated. There are three contexts of risk that will be addressed in this paper: risk as a resource, which expands and shifts traditional risk considerations; marginal cost of risk, which addresses the cumulative and time related effects of risk reduction; and an alternative definition or new meaning of success and how it relates to work.

risk management risk success mission risk↗