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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2020

Risk considerations for autonomy software

This paper summarizes key findings related to methods for the risk considerations of autonomy software. Existing methods for Verification and Validation (V&V) of autonomy software are summarized and a method for the assurance of autonomy software is suggested and demonstrated on a command execution use case. Risk and reliability are defined in the context of autonomy and an approach for risk assessment of autonomy is presented using an example use case. Key insights regarding areas of uncertainty for autonomy are provided, along with a suggested architecture for the systematic consideration of reliability within the context of a given autonomous planner.

Meshkat, Leila↗
NASA NTRS2004

Towards a systems approach to risk considerations for concurrent design

This paper describes the new process used by the Project Design Center at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory for the identification, assessment and communication of risk elements throughout the lifecycle of a mission design. This process includes a software tool, 'RAP' that collects and communicates risk information between the various designers and a 'risk expert' who mediates this process. The establishment of this process is an attempt towards the systematic consideration of risk in the design decision making process. Using this process, we are able to better keep track of the risks associated with the design decisions. Furthermore, it helps us develop better risk profiles for the studies under consideration. We aim to refine and expand the current process to enable more thorough risk analysis capabilities in the future.

concurrent design↗
NASA NTRS2016

Risk Considerations of Bird Strikes to Space Launch Vehicles

Within seconds after liftoff of the Space Shuttle during mission STS-114, a turkey vulture impacted the vehicle's external tank. The contact caused no apparent damage to the Shuttle, but the incident led NASA to consider the potential consequences of bird strikes during a Shuttle launch. The environment at Kennedy Space Center provides unique bird strike challenges due to the Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge and the Atlantic Flyway bird migration routes. NASA is currently refining risk assessment estimates for the probability of bird strike to space launch vehicles. This paper presents an approach for analyzing the risks of bird strikes to space launch vehicles and presents an example. The migration routes, types of birds present, altitudes of those birds, exposed area of the launch vehicle, and its capability to withstand impacts affect the risk due to bird strike. A summary of significant risk contributors is discussed.

Hales, Christy↗
NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

INTRODUCTION. Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during ground testing at Johnson Space Center identified a break-in-prebreathe (BIP) 13 minutes prior to depressurization as the leading credible cause despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 mins in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Full restart of prebreathe is directed following breaks > 10 min. The adequacy of NASA’s BIP rules was evaluated prior to resuming hypobaric ground testing or ISS extravehicular activities. METHODS. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) Type II DCS case report and investigation findings; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA), iv) relevant published literature, v) model estimates of tissue on-gassing and off-gassing, and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe. RESULTS. NASA’s nominal prebreathe protocols are validated via extensive ground testing to ensure DCS risk is reduced to within acceptable limits. Conversely, there exists a paucity of data, no validated models, and limited documentation regarding BIP risk for NASA prebreathe protocols. Flight rules implemented for shuttle and later ISS are based primarily on expert opinion and an assumption of symmetric on-gassing and off-gassing, which would make 2:1 payback a conservative mitigation for a BIP. Assumption of exponential gas kinetics makes late breaks higher risk, or require greater payback, than earlier breaks. Two BIPs have occurred using the current ISS prebreathe protocol, each of which was followed by greater than 2:1 payback and at least 59 minutes of 100% O2 pre-depress. No DCS cases have been reported during shuttle or ISS EVA operations. DISCUSSION. Interim changes were implemented to protect against late breaks during ground and flight prebreathes by ensuring negligible difference in conservatively modeled ppN2 pre-depress compared to nominal validated protocols. Additional documentation and literature review as well as chamber test planning are ongoing with the objective of further ground and flight rule updates and validation of a BIP risk model.

Prebreathe↗
NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

INTRODUCTION. Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during ground testing at Johnson Space Center identified a break-in-prebreathe (BIP) 13 minutes prior to depressurization as the leading credible cause despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 mins in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Full restart of prebreathe is directed following breaks > 10 min. The adequacy of NASA’s BIP rules was evaluated prior to resuming hypobaric ground testing or ISS extravehicular activities. METHODS. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) Type II DCS case report and investigation findings; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA), iv) relevant published literature, v) model estimates of tissue on-gassing and off-gassing, and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe. RESULTS. NASA’s nominal prebreathe protocols are validated via extensive ground testing to ensure DCS risk is reduced to within acceptable limits. Conversely, there exists a paucity of data, no validated models, and limited documentation regarding BIP risk for NASA prebreathe protocols. Flight rules implemented for shuttle and later ISS are based primarily on expert opinion and an assumption of symmetric on-gassing and off-gassing, which would make 2:1 payback a conservative mitigation for a BIP. Assumption of exponential gas kinetics makes late breaks higher risk, or require greater payback, than earlier breaks. Two BIPs have occurred using the current ISS prebreathe protocol, each of which was followed by greater than 2:1 payback and at least 59 minutes of 100% O2 pre-depress. No DCS cases have been reported during shuttle or ISS EVA operations. DISCUSSION. Interim changes were implemented to protect against late breaks during ground and flight prebreathes by ensuring negligible difference in conservatively modeled ppN2 pre-depress compared to nominal validated protocols. Additional documentation and literature review as well as chamber test planning are ongoing with the objective of further ground and flight rule updates and validation of a BIP risk model.

Prebreathe↗
NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’S Break-in-Prebreathe Flight Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during hypobaric ground testing at Johnson Space Center (JSC) identified a ~3 min break-in-prebreathe (BiP) late in the prebreathe (13 min prior to depressurization) as the leading credible cause for the DCS case. This occurred despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 min in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Breaks lasting longer than 10 min require a complete restart of the prebreathe protocol. The adequacy of NASA’s BiP rules was evaluated prior to resuming any hypobaric ground testing or International Space Station (ISS) extravehicular activity (EVA). Of particular interest to the authors was the timing of the BiP in relation to the overall prebreathe timeline. Although there exists no agreed-upon definition, a ‘late’ BiP means towards the end of the prebreathe period, and in particular, the last hour prior to depressurization. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) the type II DCS case report and findings from the investigation; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA); iv) relevant published literature; v) tissue gas loading model estimates; and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe.

Andrew F J Abercromby↗
NASA NTRS1996

Risk as a Resource: A New Paradigm

In the new NASA, risk management must be developed as a skill to a far greater degree than has existed in the past. Past approaches have produced great successes but at great cost and lengthy schedules. In the future, risk and its component contributors must be re-evaluated. There are three contexts of risk that will be addressed in this paper: risk as a resource, which expands and shifts traditional risk considerations; marginal cost of risk, which addresses the cumulative and time related effects of risk reduction; and an alternative definition or new meaning of success and how it relates to work.

risk management risk success mission risk↗
NASA NTRS2016

Toward a Safety Risk-Based Classification of Unmanned Aircraft

There is a trend of growing interest and demand for greater access of unmanned aircraft (UA) to the National Airspace System (NAS) as the ongoing development of UA technology has created the potential for significant economic benefits. However, the lack of a comprehensive and efficient UA regulatory framework has constrained the number and kinds of UA operations that can be performed. This report presents initial results of a study aimed at defining a safety-risk-based UA classification as a plausible basis for a regulatory framework for UA operating in the NAS. Much of the study up to this point has been at a conceptual high level. The report includes a survey of contextual topics, analysis of safety risk considerations, and initial recommendations for a risk-based approach to safe UA operations in the NAS. The next phase of the study will develop and leverage deeper clarity and insight into practical engineering and regulatory considerations for ensuring that UA operations have an acceptable level of safety.

Torres-Pomales, Wilfredo↗
NASA NTRS2014

Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) Development Risk Communication

There are clear advantages of development of a Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) for a crewed mission to Mars. NTR for in-space propulsion enables more ambitious space missions by providing high thrust at high specific impulse (approximately 900 sec) that is 2 times the best theoretical performance possible for chemical rockets. Missions can be optimized for maximum payload capability to take more payload with reduced total mass to orbit; saving cost on reduction of the number of launch vehicles needed. Or missions can be optimized to minimize trip time significantly to reduce the deep space radiation exposure to the crew. NTR propulsion technology is a game changer for space exploration. However, "NUCLEAR" is a word that is feared and vilified by some groups and the hostility towards development of any nuclear systems can meet great opposition by the public as well as from national leaders and people in authority. Communication of nuclear safety will be critical to the success of the development of the NTR. Why is there a fear of nuclear? A bomb that can level a city is a scary weapon. The first and only times the Nuclear Bomb was used in a war was on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 2. The "Little Boy" atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and the "Fat Man" on Nagasaki 3 days later on August 9th. Within the first 4 months of bombings, 90- 166 thousand people died in Hiroshima and 60-80 thousand died in Nagasaki. It is important to note for comparison that over 500 thousand people died and 5 million made homeless due to strategic bombing (approximately 150 thousand tons) of Japanese cities and war assets with conventional non-nuclear weapons between 1942- 1945. A major bombing campaign of "firebombing" of Tokyo called "Operation Meetinghouse" on March 9 and 10 consisting of 334 B-29's dropped approximately1,700 tons of bombs around 16 square mile area and over 100 thousand people have been estimated to have died. The declaration of death is very clear for conventional weapons and then the declaration of death due to radiation becomes vague and unclear. This may have been due to people mis-understanding the dangers and effects of radiation when assessing the damage and harm to people initially, but it is also become insidious when expressing opposition to nuclear energy. A nuclear radiation accident can be scary due to the power involved and the fear of radiation release. The International Atomic Energy Agency defines a nuclear and radiation accident a "an event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or the facility." There have been 3 commercial nuclear reactor accidents (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima) that stand out to the public and much of the information about the result and impact to workers, environment, and public can be misleading. Often information is presented without clear correlation with radiation and other pertinent information is left out presenting a very scary situation to affect the emotions of the reader. A very boring but "critically acclaimed" movie was made in 1979 called "The China Syndrome" starring Jane Fonda and Jack Lemmon. The film was released on March 16, 1979, 12 days before the 3-Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania. The basis from the movie was from a few nuclear plant incidents and in particular, the Brown's Ferry Alabama Power Plant fire. In one scene from the movie, a physicist Dr. Elliott Lowell played by Donald Hotton states that a China Syndrome event would make "an area the size of Pennsylvania" permanently uninhabitable. Real serious nuclear incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are often sited to make people fear the consequences of using nuclear power. However, the consequences are at best poorly communicated and at worst fictitiously inflated to instigate social unrest against nuclear power. There is an article being circulated on Facebook with a title "28 Signs that the (US) West Coast is being absolutely fried with nuclear radiation from Fukushima" which focus on mis-information and fear mongering. Nuclear power and NTR are powerful resources that can open many doors for future prosperity and capability. With great power comes great responsibility. Radiation and its effects need to be better understood, quantified, and communicated. A human mission to mars has its own risks of deep space radiation and is considered a considerable risk at 400 milli-Sieverts per year in deep space and 245 milli-Sieverts per year on the surface of Mars as measured by the Mars Curiosity mission. Although these quantities of ionizing radiation are within the astronaut career limit, it exceeds the yearly average amounts of ionizing radiation. Astronaut crews have experienced these levels of radiation before, but for durations shorter than a year, and a mission to Mars could possibly be 3 years in length. There is also evidence that people can comfortably handle higher levels of ionizing radiation where the radiation occurs naturally like Ramsar, Iran when people can experience 270 milli-Sieverts per year. A risk posture that the development, test, and flight of an NTR will meet opposition from groups who oppose nuclear energy must be likely and the impact can be sever to the effort. Active risk mitigation must be taken for an NTR full-scale development project. The NTR design must take into account safety for transport and off nominal conditions. Nuclear fuel element must consider containment of fission products and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that may meet less opposition should be considered for safety and security reasons. Even though testing was conducted on Rover/NERVA safely and successfully in the 60's with exhaust sent heavenward in to open air, modern testing of NTR must consider full containment and no release of ionizing radiation to the public and must meet the current requirement of no more than 0.1 milli-Sieverts per year to the public. 0.1 milli-Sieverts is equivalent to eating one banana or a 20 hour plane flight. Good communication with the public and regulatory agencies will be essential to show that all effort is applied toward protection to the public and astronauts. The inspiring endeavor to put humans on Mars to study the planet, search for life, and learn more about this Solar System will be full of risks but it will be worth it. NTR will be worth the development effort if it allows humans to explore our Solar System.

Kim, Tony↗
NASA NTRS2014

Planetary Science Technology Infusion Study: Findings and Recommendations Status

The Planetary Science Division (PSD) within the National Aeronautics and Space Administrations (NASA) Science Mission Directorate (SMD) at NASA Headquarters sought to understand how to better realize a scientific return on spacecraft system technology investments currently being funded. In order to achieve this objective, a team at NASA Glenn Research Center was tasked with surveying the science and mission communities to collect their insight on technology infusion and additionally sought inputs from industry, universities, and other organizations involved with proposing for future PSD missions. This survey was undertaken by issuing a Request for Information (RFI) activity that requested input from the proposing community on present technology infusion efforts. The Technology Infusion Study was initiated in March 2013 with the release of the RFI request. The evaluation team compiled and assessed this input in order to provide PSD with recommendations on how to effectively infuse new spacecraft systems technologies that it develops into future competed missions enabling increased scientific discoveries, lower mission cost, or both. This team is comprised of personnel from the Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS) Program and the In-Space Propulsion Technology (ISPT) Program staff.The RFI survey covered two aspects of technology infusion: 1) General Insight, including: their assessment of barriers to technology infusion as related to infusion approach; technology readiness; information and documentation products; communication; integration considerations; interaction with technology development areas; cost-capped mission areas; risk considerations; system level impacts and implementation; and mission pull. 2) Specific technologies from the most recent PSD Announcements of Opportunities (AOs): The Advanced Stirling Radioisotope Generator (ASRG), aerocapture and aeroshell hardware technologies, the NASA Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT) ion propulsion system, and the Advanced Materials Bi-propellant Rocket (AMBR) engine.This report will present the teams Findings from the RFI inputs and the recommendations that arose from these findings. Methodologies on the findings and recommendations development are discussed.

technology infusion↗
NASA NTRS1985

In-flight testing of the space shuttle orbiter thermal control system

In-flight thermal control system testing of a complex manned spacecraft such as the space shuttle orbiter and the considerations attendant to the definition of the tests are described. Design concerns, design mission requirements, flight test objectives, crew vehicle and mission risk considerations, instrumentation, data requirements, and real-time mission monitoring are discussed. An overview of the tests results is presented.

Taylor, J. T.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Manchester Coding Option for SpaceWire: Providing Choices for System Level Design

This paper proposes an optional coding scheme for SpaceWire in lieu of the current Data Strobe scheme for three reasons. First reason is to provide a straightforward method for electrical isolation of the interface; secondly to provide ability to reduce the mass and bend radius of the SpaceWire cable; and thirdly to provide a means for a common physical layer over which multiple spacecraft onboard data link protocols could operate for a wide range of data rates. The intent is to accomplish these goals without significant change to existing SpaceWire design investments. The ability to optionally use Manchester coding in place of the current Data Strobe coding provides the ability to DC balanced the signal transitions unlike the SpaceWire Data Strobe coding; and therefore the ability to isolate the electrical interface without concern. Additionally, because the Manchester code has the clock and data encoded on the same signal, the number of wires of the existing SpaceWire cable could be optionally reduced by 50. This reduction could be an important consideration for many users of SpaceWire as indicated by the already existing effort underway by the SpaceWire working group to reduce the cable mass and bend radius by elimination of shields. However, reducing the signal count by half would provide even greater gains. It is proposed to restrict the data rate for the optional Manchester coding to a fixed data rate of 10 Megabits per second (Mbps) in order to make the necessary changes simple and still able to run in current radiation tolerant Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Even with this constraint, 10 Mbps will meet many applications where SpaceWire is used. These include command and control applications and many instruments applications with have moderate data rate. For most NASA flight implementations, SpaceWire designs are in rad-tolerant FPGAs, and the desire to preserve the heritage design investment is important for cost and risk considerations. The Manchester coding option can be accommodated in existing designs with only changes to the FPGA.

Electrical Isolation↗
NASA NTRS2016

Risk of Performance Decrements and Adverse Health Outcomes Resulting from Sleep Loss, Circadian Desynchronization, and Work Overload

Sleep loss, circadian desynchronization, and work overload occur to some extent for ground and flight crews, prior to and during spaceflight missions. Ground evidence indicates that such risk factors may lead to performance decrements and adverse health outcomes, which could potentially compromise mission objectives. Efforts are needed to identify the environmental and mission conditions that interfere with sleep and circadian alignment, as well as individual differences in vulnerability and resiliency to sleep loss and circadian desynchronization. Specifically, this report highlights a collection of new evidence to better characterize the risk and reveals new gaps in this risk as follows: Sleep loss is apparent during spaceflight. Astronauts consistently average less sleep during spaceflight relative to on the ground. The causes of this sleep loss remain unknown, however ground-based evidence suggests that the sleep duration of astronauts is likely to lead to performance impairment and short and long-term health consequences. Further research is needed in this area in order to develop screening tools to assess individual astronaut sleep need in order to quantify the magnitude of sleep loss during spaceflight; current and planned efforts in BHP's research portfolio address this need. In addition, it is still unclear whether the conditions of spaceflight environment lead to sleep loss or whether other factors, such as work overload lead to the reduced sleep duration. Future data mining efforts and continued data collection on the ISS will help to further characterize factors contributing to sleep loss. Sleep inertia has not been evaluated during spaceflight. Ground-based studies confirm that it takes two to four hours to achieve optimal performance after waking from a sleep episode. Sleep inertia has been associated with increased accidents and reduced performance in operational environments. Sleep inertia poses considerable risk during spaceflight when emergency situations necessitate that crewmembers wake from sleep and make quick decisions. A recently completed BHP investigation assesses the effects of sleep inertia upon abrupt awakening, with and without hypnotics currently used in spaceflight; results from this investigation will help to inform strategies relative to sleep inertia effects on performance. Circadian desynchrony has been observed during spaceflight. Circadian desynchrony during spaceflight develops due to schedule constraints requiring non-24 operations or 'slam-shifts' and due to insufficient or mis-timed light exposure. In addition, circadian misalignment has been associated with reduced sleep duration and increased medication use. In ground-based studies, circadian desynchrony has been associated with significant performance impairment and increased risk of accidents when operations coincide with the circadian nadir. There is a great deal of information available on how to manage circadian misalignment, however, there are currently no easily collected biomarkers that can be used during spaceflight to determine circadian phase. Current research efforts are addressing this gap. Work overload has been documented during current spaceflight operations. NASA has established work hour guidelines that limit shift duration, however, schedule creep, where duty requirements necessitate working beyond scheduled work hours, has been reported. This observation warrants the documentation of actual work hours in order to improve planning and in order to ensure that astronauts receive adequate down time. In addition to concerns about work overload, ground based evidence suggests that work underload may be a concern during deep space missions, where torpor may develop and physically demanding workload will be exchanged for monitoring of autonomous systems. Given that increased automation is anticipated for exploration vehicles, fatigue effects in the context of such systems needs to be further understood. Performance metrics are needed to evaluate fitness-for-duty during spaceflight. Although ground-based evidence supports the notion that sleep loss, circadian desynchronization and work overload lead to performance impairment, inconsistency in the measures used to evaluate performance during spaceflight make it difficult to evaluate the magnitude of performance impairment during spaceflight. Work is underway to standardize measures of performance evaluation during spaceflight. Once established, such performance indicators need to be correlated with operational performance. Individual differences in sleep need and circadian preference, phase shifting ability and period have been documented in ground-based studies. Individual differences in response to sleep loss and circadian misalignment have also been documented and are presumed to be associated with genetic polymorphisms. No studies have systematically reported individual differences in sleep or circadian-related outcomes during spaceflight. More work is needed in this area in order to identify genetic or phenotypic biomarkers that predict resilience or vulnerability to sleep loss in order to personalize countermeasure strategies and mitigate performance impairment during spaceflight. Two laboratory and field investigations specific to this topic are currently ongoing; additional efforts, including an effort to mine existing biological data from spaceflight relative to sleep and circadian outcomes, are planned. Sex differences in sleep need and circadian period and phase have been reported in ground-based studies. The impact of these sex differences on performance is unclear. Sex differences in sleep need and circadian rhythms have not been systematically studied during spaceflight, presumably due to the small number of women that have flown in space. More research is needed in this area to evaluate whether any of the observed sex differences in physiology lead to altered performance in spaceflight and on the ground.

Flynn-Evans, Erin↗
NASA NTRS1984

Space industrialization: A national perspective

Space industrialization (or commercialization) has the potential to be a major player in America's space program. If this potential is to be realized, however, industrialization efforts must be considered within the context of the other major portions of the space program: shuttle, space station, and civil remote sensing. Further, development efforts must be based upon a sound scientific and technical understanding of the products and processes, and there must be a trained cadre of dedicated individuals willing to devote time and effort to this effort. There remain considerable risks and uncertainties. Given all this, the best path to follow would seem to be a long term, balanced commitment, emphasizing government, industry, and academia partnerships. Several points are addressed: (1) the place of space industrialization in the overall national space program; (2) the meaning of space industrialization with respect to the historic, national aims of space; and (3) specifically what is being industrialized.

Reis, V. H.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Surface activities on the first piloted Mars mission

The objectives of the first piloted Mars mission, in addition to safe Mars landing and return to earth for the crew, would encompass a demonstration of human working capabilities in the Martian environment, the exploration of the landing site, and the establishment of that planet's potential for the support of permanent human habitation. An evaluation is presently made of constraints on Martian service activities, mission risk considerations, and the three mission profiles that can be envisioned for total durations of 14, 21, and 35 months.

Duke, Michael B.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Managing Ada development

The Ada programming language was developed under the sponsorship of the Department of Defense to address the soaring costs associated with software development and maintenance. Ada is powerful, and yet to take full advantage of its power, it is sufficiently complex and different from current programming approaches that there is considerable risk associated with committing a program to be done in Ada. There are also few programs of any substantial size that have been implemented using Ada that may be studied to determine those management methods that resulted in a successful Ada project. The items presented are the author's opinions which have been formed as a result of going through an experience software development. The difficulties faced, risks assumed, management methods applied, and lessons learned, and most importantly, the techniques that were successful are all valuable sources of management information for those managers ready to assume major Ada developments projects.

Green, James R.↗