NASA Failure Detection and Prevention Program: Risk Identification and Management Tools - Risk Balancing Profiles (RBP) Defect Detection and Prevention (DDP)
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Risk identification during the early design phases of complex systems is commonly implemented but often fails to result in the identification of events and circumstances that truly challenge project performance. Inefficiencies in cost and schedule estimation are usually held accountable for cost and schedule overruns, but the true root cause is often the realization of programmatic risks. A deeper understanding of frequent risk identification trends and biases pervasive during space system design and development is needed, for it would lead to improved execution of existing identification processes and methods.
The need for a systematic and effective software risk identification methodology is critical for interplanetary probes that are using increasingly complex and critical software. Several probe failures are examined that suggest more attention and resources need to be dedicated to identifying software risks. The direct causes of these failures can often be traced to systemic problems in all phases of the software engineering process. These failures have lead to the development of a practical methodology to identify risks for interplanetary probes. The proposed methodology is based upon the tailoring of the Software Engineering Institute's (SEI) method of taxonomy-based risk identification. The use of this methodology will ensure a more consistent and complete identification of software risks in these probes.
This brief report summarizes research and planning conducted during Summer 1993 for MSFC on the subjects of risk identification, assessment, and management. Research findings are presented, citing useful references. The major output of this work, the AXAF-S Project Risk Management Plan is outlined.
Incorporating risk assessment into the dynamic environment of a concurrent engineering team requires rapid response and adaptation. Generating consistent risk lists with inputs from all the relevant subsystems and presenting the results clearly to the stakeholders in a concurrent engineering environment is difficult because of the speed with which decisions are made. In this paper we describe the various approaches and techniques that have been explored for the point designs of JPL's Team X and the Trade Space Studies of the Rapid Mission Architecture Team. The paper will also focus on the issues of the misuse of categorical and ordinal data that keep arising within current engineering risk approaches and also in the applied risk literature.
The purpose of this report is to document the results of a high-level qualitative study that was conducted to identify future aviation safety risks and to assess the potential impacts to the National Airspace System (NAS) of NASA Aviation Safety research on these risks. Multiple external sources (for example, the National Transportation Safety Board, the Flight Safety Foundation, the National Research Council, and the Joint Planning and Development Office) were used to develop a compilation of future safety issues risks, also referred to as future tall poles. The primary criterion used to identify the most critical future safety risk issues was that the issue must be cited in several of these sources as a safety area of concern. The tall poles in future safety risk, in no particular order of importance, are as follows: Runway Safety, Loss of Control In Flight, Icing Ice Detection, Loss of Separation, Near Midair Collision Human Fatigue, Increasing Complexity and Reliance on Automation, Vulnerability Discovery, Data Sharing and Dissemination, and Enhanced Survivability in the Event of an Accident.
Performing functional tasks while inside of the space suit introduces additional ergonomic challenges which can lead to musculoskeletal stresses and injuries in astronauts. Computational modeling of the suit-body interaction can be used alongside human-in-the-loop testing to understand and mitigate these risks and potentially improve the work performance. In this work, a static rigid-body model of the human body was integrated with the space suit and the process is described. This model enables prediction of the resulting joint torques and musculoskeletal loading from a simulated extravehicular activity (EVA) task. For representative EVA tasks, joint torque and body angles were used as parameters to predict the muscle strength required to achieve the task, as well as the percentage of the general and astronaut-like population that could achieve that strength demand. Population strength capability can be used as an indicator of the difficulty of a task and the level of injury risk for the given task types and crew anthropometry. The sensitivity of the model to inputs such as body joint location within the space suit and individual anthropometry will also be evaluated. Future work will use a database of3D human body scans and the movements of the body inside the suit during different EVA tasks to identify potential soft tissue contact points. The specific locations and magnitudes of contacts between the body and suit are expected to identify risk of repetitive tissue contact stresses. Overall, this model will provide a new tool to structurally identify the injury risks of EVA tasks and evaluate alternate strategies to reduce injury risk.
The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) is part of the Office of Mission Assurance of the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). The SATC's mission is to assist National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) projects to improve the quality of software which they acquire or develop. The SATC's efforts are currently focused on the development and use of metric methodologies and tools that identify and assess risks associated with software performance and scheduled delivery. This starts at the requirements phase, where the SATC, in conjunction with software projects at GSFC and other NASA centers is working to identify tools and metric methodologies to assist project managers in identifying and mitigating risks. This paper discusses requirement metrics currently being used at NASA in a collaborative effort between the SATC and the Quality Assurance Office at GSFC to utilize the information available through the application of requirements management tools.
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The Imaging X-ray Polarimetry Explorer (IXPE) project is an international collaboration to build and fly a polarization sensitive X-ray observatory. The IXPE Observatory consists of the spacecraft and payload. The payload is composed of three X-ray telescopes, each consisting of a mirror module optical assembly and a polarization-sensitive X-ray detector assembly; a deployable boom maintains the focal length between the optical assemblies and the detectors. The goal of the IXPE Mission is to provide new information about the origins of cosmic X-rays and their interactions with matter and gravity as they travel through space. IXPE will do this by exploiting its unique capability to measure the polarization of X-rays emitted by cosmic sources. The collaboration for IXPE involves national and international partners during design, fabrication, assembly, integration, test, and operations. The full collaboration includes NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Ball Aerospace, the Italian Space Agency (ASI), the Italian Institute of Astrophysics and Space Planetology (IAPS)/Italian National Institute of Astrophysics (INAF), the Italian National Institute for Nuclear Physics (INFN), the University of Colorado (CU) Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics (LASP), Stanford University, McGill University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The goal of this paper is to discuss risk management as it applies to the IXPE project. The full IXPE Team participates in risk management providing both unique challenges and advantages for project risk management. Risk management is being employed in all phases of the IXPE Project, but is particularly important during planning and initial execution-the current phase of the IXPE Project. The discussion will address IXPE risk strategies and responsibilities, along with the IXPE management process which includes risk identification, risk assessment, risk response, and risk monitoring, control, and reporting.
Lithium-ion batteries inevitably suffer minor damage or defects caused by external mechanical abusive loading, e.g. , penetration, deformation, and scratch without triggering a hard/major short circuit. The replacement of cells becomes a dilemma if the safety risk of the defective batteries remains unknown. Herein, by introducing a representative defect form, i.e. , screw indentation, we demonstrate the safety characteristics of defective batteries. We prove that defective batteries have a significantly increased thermal risk and deteriorated mechanical integrity, but can go undetected due to prompt voltage recovery and insignificant local temperature increase. We discover that the voltage curve within the first few cycles contains sufficient information to identify defective batteries from otherwise good ones and propose methodologies to monitor the cells. Capacity loss and current leakage are two characteristics that can be estimated using the voltage curve. According to the defect size and position, the capacity loss could be 1 to 10 2 mA h and the leakage current could be 5–50 mA. Results remove the barriers for defective battery safety risk evaluation, enabling identification, monitoring, and early warning of minor damaged batteries.
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Typically, the most important decisions in the design of a spacecraft are made in the earliest stages of its conceptual design the Pre-Phase A stages. It is in these stages that the greatest number of design alternatives is considered, and the greatest number of alternatives is rejected. The focus of Pre-Phase A conceptual development is on the evaluation and comparison of whole concepts and the larger-scale systems comprising those concepts. This comparison typically uses general Figures of Merit (FOMs) to quantify the comparative benefits of designs and alternative design features. Along with mass, performance, and cost, risk should be one of the major FOMs in evaluating design decisions during the conceptual design phases. However, risk is often given inadequate consideration in conceptual design practice. The reasons frequently given for this lack of attention to risk include: inadequate mission definition, lack of rigorous design requirements in early concept phases, lack of fidelity in risk assessment methods, and under-evaluation of risk as a viable FOM for design evaluation. In this paper, the role of risk evaluation in early conceptual design is discussed. The various requirements of a viable risk evaluation tool at the Pre-Phase A level are considered in light of the needs of a typical spacecraft design study. A technique for risk identification and evaluation is presented. The application of the risk identification and evaluation approach to the conceptual design process is discussed. Finally, a computational tool for risk profiling is presented and applied to assess the risk for an existing Pre-Phase A proposal. The resulting profile is compared to the risks identified for the proposal by other means.
This slide presentation provides an overview of the attempt to develop and demonstrate a methodology for the comparative assessment of risks across the entire portfolio of NASA projects and assets. It includes information about strategic risk identification, normalizing strategic risks, calculation of relative risk score, and implementation options.
The purpose of integrated hazard analyses, probabilistic risk assessments, failure modes and effects analyses, fault trees and many other similar tools is to give managers of a program some idea of the risks associated with their program. All risk tools establish a set of undesired events and then try to evaluate the risk to the program by assessing the severity of the undesired event and the likelihood of that event occurring. Some tools provide qualitative results, some provide quantitative results and some do both. However, in the end the program manager and his/her team must decide which risks are acceptable and which are not. Even with a wide array of analysis tools available, risk acceptance is often a controversial and difficult decision making process. And yet, today's space exploration programs are moving toward more risk based design approaches. Thus, risk identification and good risk assessment is becoming even more vital to the engineering development process. This paper explores how known and unknown information influences risk-based decisions by looking at how the various parts of our personalities are affected by what they know and what they don't know. This paper then offers some criteria for consideration when making risk-based decisions.
Since the cyber threat landscape changes daily, cybersecurity needs to be an ongoing activity for every organization within the UAM environments. This paper will provide information on identified cyber threats and controls associated with an instance of the Urban Air Mobility (UAM) environment. The MITRE ATT&CK model and framework and the selection of cyber threats and the National Institute of Standards and Technology publications for security control identification and cybersecurity risk identification will be leveraged for analysis.
Since the cyber threat landscape changes daily, cybersecurity needs to be an ongoing activity for every organization within the UAM environments. This paper will provide information on identified cyber threats and controls associated with an instance of the Urban Air Mobility (UAM) environment. The MITRE ATT&CK model and framework and the selection of cyber threats and the National Institute of Standards and Technology publications for security control identification and cybersecurity risk identification will be leveraged for analysis.
Since the cyber threat landscape changes daily, cybersecurity needs to be an ongoing activity for every organization within the UAM environments. This paper will provide information on identified cyber threats and controls associated with an instance of the Urban Air Mobility (UAM) environment. The MITRE ATT&CK model and framework and the selection of cyber threats and the National Institute of Standards and Technology publications for security control identification and cybersecurity risk identification will be leveraged for analysis.