Software risk estimation and risk reduction using the 'defect detection and prevention' risk approach and tool
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technology transfer↗
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The Integration and Mapping of an Open-Source National Well Resource to Inform Geologic Carbon Storage Site Selection and Risk Prevention: The CO2-Locate Database
Geologic carbon storage (GCS) offers a way to capture and permanently store CO₂ from fossil fuel operations in underground geologic structures, aiding in the transition to a carbon-neutral energy economy. However, CO₂ injection sites can experience gas leakage through existing wells that penetrate storage reservoirs, making knowledge of well locations and characteristics crucial for permitting, infrastructure reusability, and risk assessment in GCS. Currently, public wellbore data from state, federal, and tribal entities are inconsistent and fragmented, with gaps and redundancies. To address this, the National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) developed CO2-Locate, an open-source, geospatial database and online application. CO2-Locate integrates over 50 data sources from federal, state, and tribal entities, creating a standardized national well database. Funded by the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the database is publicly available through the Energy Data eXchange (EDX) and viewable via the CO2-Locate web mapping application. This tool allows users to query, filter, and visualize well data to support GCS planning, permitting, and risk assessments. This presentation covers the methods used to create CO2-Locate, including data acquisition, processing, attribute mapping, and integration, much of which is automated for future updates. The web mapping application and its role in GCS site selection will also be discussed.
Tetteh, Daniel A.↗
Applied AI/ML Models: In Support of Offshore Hazard Recognition and Infrastructure Risk Prevention
Resource Sustainability Program Review Meeting, Pittsburgh, PA, October 23-25, 2022
Zaengle, Dakota↗
NASA Failure Detection and Prevention Program: Risk Identification and Management Tools - Risk Balancing Profiles (RBP) Defect Detection and Prevention (DDP)
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risk management failure prevention↗
The NASA Continuous Risk Management Process
As an intern this summer in the GRC Risk Management Office, I have become familiar with the NASA Continuous Risk Management Process. In this process, risk is considered in terms of the probability that an undesired event will occur and the impact of the event, should it occur (ref., NASA-NPG: 7120.5). Risk management belongs in every part of every project and should be ongoing from start to finish. Another key point is that a risk is not a problem until it has happened. With that in mind, there is a six step cycle for continuous risk management that prevents risks from becoming problems. The steps are: identify, analyze, plan, track, control, and communicate & document. Incorporated in the first step are several methods to identify risks such as brainstorming and using lessons learned. Once a risk is identified, a risk statement is made on a risk information sheet consisting of a single condition and one or more consequences. There can also be a context section where the risk is explained in more detail. Additionally there are three main goals of analyzing a risk, which are evaluate, classify, and prioritize. Here is where a value is given to the attributes of a risk &e., probability, impact, and timeframe) based on a multi-level classification system (e.g., low, medium, high). It is important to keep in mind that the definitions of these levels are probably different for each project. Furthermore the risks can be combined into groups. Then, the risks are prioritized to see what risk is necessary to mitigate first. After the risks are analyzed, a plan is made to mitigate as many risks as feasible. Each risk should be assigned to someone in the project with knowledge in the area of the risk. Then the possible approaches to choose from are: research, accept, watch, or mitigate. Next, all risks, mitigated or not, are tracked either individually or in groups. As the plan is executed, risks are re-evaluated, and the attribute values are adjusted as necessary. Metrics are established and monitored as tools for risk tracking. Also a trigger or threshold should be set on the metric data that indicates when an action is needed. Results of this tracking are usually evaluated and reported in a relevant format at weekly or monthly meetings. Choosing controls is the subsequent step, which involves the effects of the tracking. The three basic controls are: close, continue tracking, and re- plan. Finally communicate & document is the last step, but occurs throughout the process. It is vital that main risks, plans, changes, and progress are known by everyone in the project. A good way to keep everyone updated and inform other projects of common issues is by thoroughly documenting project risks. NASA sees value in risk management and believes that projects have greater probability or success by using the NASA Continuous Risk Management Process.
Pokorny, Frank M.↗
Risk Analysis of Various Design Architectures for High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants during Accident Scenarios
This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Mapping Critical Vulnerabilities in Natural Gas Pipeline Systems through Network Centrality and GIS Analytics
Natural gas plays a central role in the US energy landscape, providing 43% of electricity generation in 2023. Its exclusive recovery ability on pipelines for transmission underscores the importance of understanding the disruption recovery ability of this infrastructure. This study employs a network-based analytical framework integrating geographic information systems (GIS) with multiple centrality measures—betweenness, closeness, degree, and eigenvector—to pinpoint key segments and evaluate the structural robustness of the national pipeline network. Pipelines are grouped by System ID and Operator ID to capture variations across organizational and physical structures. The analysis reveals uneven patterns of network influence, where certain pipelines function as critical connectors or dominant hubs. Spatial mapping highlights geographic dependencies and potential chokepoints, offering a clear view of where targeted risk prevention measures would be most effective. The findings provide practical guidance for prioritizing maintenance, enhancing system robustness, and mitigating risks to ensure a stable and secure energy supply. Future research will expand the framework to incorporate dynamic operational data and real-time network behavior.
Peterson, Steven [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000287672998)↗
Large Scale Experiments on Spacecraft Fire Safety
Full scale fire testing complemented by computer modelling has provided significant know how about the risk, prevention and suppression of fire in terrestrial systems (cars, ships, planes, buildings, mines, and tunnels). In comparison, no such testing has been carried out for manned spacecraft due to the complexity, cost and risk associated with operating a long duration fire safety experiment of a relevant size in microgravity. Therefore, there is currently a gap in knowledge of fire behaviour in spacecraft. The entire body of low-gravity fire research has either been conducted in short duration ground-based microgravity facilities or has been limited to very small fuel samples. Still, the work conducted to date has shown that fire behaviour in low-gravity is very different from that in normal-gravity, with differences observed for flammability limits, ignition delay, flame spread behaviour, flame colour and flame structure. As a result, the prediction of the behaviour of fires in reduced gravity is at present not validated. To address this gap in knowledge, a collaborative international project, Spacecraft Fire Safety, has been established with its cornerstone being the development of an experiment (Fire Safety 1) to be conducted on an ISS resupply vehicle, such as the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) or Orbital Cygnus after it leaves the ISS and before it enters the atmosphere. A computer modelling effort will complement the experimental effort. Although the experiment will need to meet rigorous safety requirements to ensure the carrier vehicle does not sustain damage, the absence of a crew removes the need for strict containment of combustion products. This will facilitate the possibility of examining fire behaviour on a scale that is relevant to spacecraft fire safety and will provide unique data for fire model validation. This unprecedented opportunity will expand the understanding of the fundamentals of fire behaviour in spacecraft. The experiment is being developed by an international topical team that is collaboratively defining the experiment requirements and performing supporting analysis, experimentation and technology development. This paper presents the objectives, status and concept of this project.
Urban, David L.↗
Large Scale Experiments on Spacecraft Fire Safety
Full scale fire testing complemented by computer modelling has provided significant knowhow about the risk, prevention and suppression of fire in terrestrial systems (cars, ships, planes, buildings, mines, and tunnels). In comparison, no such testing has been carried out for manned spacecraft due to the complexity, cost and risk associated with operating a long duration fire safety experiment of a relevant size in microgravity. Therefore, there is currently a gap in knowledge of fire behaviour in spacecraft. The entire body of low-gravity fire research has either been conducted in short duration ground-based microgravity facilities or has been limited to very small fuel samples. Still, the work conducted to date has shown that fire behaviour in low-gravity is very different from that in normal gravity, with differences observed for flammability limits, ignition delay, flame spread behaviour, flame colour and flame structure. As a result, the prediction of the behaviour of fires in reduced gravity is at present not validated. To address this gap in knowledge, a collaborative international project, Spacecraft Fire Safety, has been established with its cornerstone being the development of an experiment (Fire Safety 1) to be conducted on an ISS resupply vehicle, such as the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) or Orbital Cygnus after it leaves the ISS and before it enters the atmosphere. A computer modelling effort will complement the experimental effort. Although the experiment will need to meet rigorous safety requirements to ensure the carrier vehicle does not sustain damage, the absence of a crew removes the need for strict containment of combustion products. This will facilitate the possibility of examining fire behaviour on a scale that is relevant to spacecraft fire safety and will provide unique data for fire model validation. This unprecedented opportunity will expand the understanding of the fundamentals of fire behaviour in spacecraft. The experiment is being developed by an international topical team that is collaboratively defining the experiment requirements and performing supporting analysis, experimentation and technology development. This paper presents the objectives, status and concept of this project.
Urban, David↗
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Marshall Space Flight Center Space Transportation Directorate Risk Management Implementation Program
The US civil aerospace program has been a great contributor to the creation and implementation of techniques and methods to identify, analyze, and confront risk. NASA has accomplished mission success in many instances, but also has had many failures. Anomalies have kept the Agency from achieving success on other occasions, as well. While NASA has mastered ways to prevent risks, and to quickly and effectively react and recover from anomalies or failures, it was not until few years ago that a comprehensive Risk Management process started being implemented in some of its programs and projects. A Continuous Risk Management (CRM) cycle process was developed and has been promoted and used successfully in programs and projects across the Agency.
Duarte, Luis Alberto↗
An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology Refinement and Exploration
This report documents activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A risk assessment-informed framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk informed capability to quantitatively estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for safety-related DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of safety-related DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals, the LWRS-developed framework provides a means to address relevant technical issues by: (1) defining a risk informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade that integrates hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying risk informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies in nuclear power plants (NPPs). Adding diversity within a system or components is the primary means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases system complexity and may not address all sources of systematic failures. Optimization of diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the proposed framework provides: (a) A best-estimate, risk informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, focusing on software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; (b) A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems; (c) Technical bases and risk informed insights to assist users address the risk informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; and (d) A risk informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The research and development efforts of this project in FY 2023 are focused on refining current methods on software CCF modeling and estimation and exploring additional innovative approaches to risk assessment of DI&C systems to enable a more comprehensive and complete assessment of various safety-related DI&C design architectures. The primary audience of this report are DI&C designers, engineers, and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practitioners. This includes stakeholders, such as the nuclear utilities and regulators who consider the deployment and upgrade of DI&C systems, DI&C software developers and reviewers, and cybersecurity specialists. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the methodology, not for the evaluation of an actual digital control system. Results are obtained based on limited design information and testing data.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Cybersecurity Resiliency of Marine Renewable Energy Systems Part 2: Cybersecurity Best Practices and Risk Management
Marine renewable energy (MRE) is an emerging source of power for marine applications, marine devices, and coastal communities. This energy source relies on industrial control systems and IT to support operations and maintenance activities, which create a pathway for an adversary to gain unauthorized access to systems and data and disrupt operations. Incorporating cybersecurity risk prevention measures and mitigation capabilities from inception, development, operation, to decommissioning of the MRE system and components is paramount to the protection of energy generation and the security of network architecture and infrastructure. To improve the resilience of MRE systems as a predictable, affordable, and reliable source of energy, cybersecurity guidance was developed to enable operators to assess cybersecurity risks and implement security measures commensurate with the risk. This publication is the second of a two-part series, with Part 1 addressing a framework to determine cybersecurity risk by assessing the vulnerability of an MRE system to potential cyber threats and the consequences a cyberattack would have on the end user. This Part 2 publication describes an approach to select appropriate cybersecurity best practices commensurate with the MRE system's cybersecurity risk. The guidance includes 86 cybersecurity best practices, which are associated with 36 cybersecurity domains and grouped into nine categories. The best practices follow the core functions of the National Institute of Science and Technology Cybersecurity Framework (e.g., identify, detect, protect, respond, and and recover) and insights from both maritime and energy industry guidance documents to identify security measures effective in protecting information and operational technology assets prevalent in MRE systems.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
CRADA Number NFE-19-07859 with Purist, Inc. (CRADA Final Report)
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) NFE-19-07859 between Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Purist Inc. (Purist) focused on developing a technology for production of high purity radioisotopes using small-scale underutilized research nuclear reactors. Purist is developing a novel production mechanism that will produce, and efficiently isolate radioisotopes with high specific activity at small-scale research reactors. The goal of this technology is to enable underutilized smaller scale reactors, typically not capable of producing medical grade radioisotopes, to be utilized as a production supply source. Such radioisotope production facilities will complement production efforts of the few larger production facilities to reduce and prevent risk in the medical isotope supply chain. The work done under this CRADA explored target development, to maximize isotope production and separation using Purist’s technology to ultimately obtain a radioisotope product with high specific activity for use in medical applications. Furthermore, under this CRADA post production, capture, concentration and encapsulation of the radioisotope product was studied by developing post irradiation midi to microscale processes to capture, store and release the separated radioisotopes from large volumes of the capture matrix after production, via automated High-Pressure Ion Chromatography (HPIC) and microfluidic purification/separation systems. This will enable concentration of the radioisotope product obtained into small volumes, which will aid in packaging and transporting the final radioisotope product to users.
07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
Situational Awareness of Grid Anomalies (SAGA)
The modern power industry becomes more vulnerable to cyber events due to the growing interconnectivity, interdependence, and complexity of the electric power grid. High-fidelity modeling and simulation tools that support the preventative risk analysis on potential cyber-relevant events is essential for ensuring the situational awareness of the system operator as it provides an inexpensive and risk-free environment to test the system responses under various cyber-relevant events and hereby can support research on cyber anomaly detection, optimal protective resource allocation, and mitigation measures. In this webinar, we will share NREL's cybersecurity research capabilities by highlighting the development of a scalable cyber-physical event test bed and demonstration with real hardware in the loop. The developed cyber-physical event test bed is backboned by an integrated transmission, distribution, and communication dynamic co-simulation framework and a plug-and-play cyber event generation module. It is designed to be modular and compatible with parallel computing, and thereby supports large-scale system simulations at an affordable computation cost. The test bed can capture millisecond-to-minutes dynamic frequency and voltage responses under cyber events from the bulk transmission system to the active distribution systems and distributed energy resources at the grid edge.
co-simulation↗
A graph embedding‐based approach for automatic cyber‐physical power system risk assessment to prevent and mitigate threats at scale
Abstract Power systems are facing an increasing number of cyber incidents, potentially leading to damaging consequences to both physical and cyber aspects. However, the development of analytical methods for the study of large‐scale power infrastructures as cyber‐physical systems is still in its early stages. Drawing inspiration from machine‐learning techniques, the authors introduce a method inspired by the principles of graph embedding that is tailored for quantitative risk assessment and the exploration of possible mitigation strategies of large‐scale cyber‐physical power systems. The primary advantage of the graph embedding approach lies in its ability to generate numerous random walks on a graph, simulating potential access paths. Meanwhile, it enables capturing high‐dimensional structures in low‐dimensional spaces, facilitating advanced machine‐learning applications, and ensuring scalability and adaptability for comprehensive network analysis. By employing this graph embedding‐based approach, the authors present a structured and methodical framework for risk assessment in cyber‐physical systems. The proposed graph embedding‐based risk analysis framework aims to provide a more insightful perspective on cyber‐physical risk assessment and situation awareness for power systems. To validate and demonstrate its applicability, the method has been tested on two cyber‐physical power system models: the Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC) 9‐Bus System and the Illinois 200‐Bus System , thereby showing its advantages in enhancing the accuracy of risk analysis and comprehensiveness of situational awareness.
Sun, Shining↗
Risk Assessment and Management Workflow—An Example of the Southwest Regional Partnership
This paper summarizes the risk assessment and management workflow developed and applied to the Southwest Regional Partnership on Carbon Sequestration (SWP) Phase III Demonstration Project. The risk assessment and management workflow consists of six primary tasks, including management planning, identification, qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, response planning, and monitoring. Within the workflow, the SWP assembled and iteratively updated a risk registry that identifies risks for all major activities of the project. Risk elements were ranked with respect to the potential impact to the project and the likelihood of occurrence. Both qualitative and quantitative risk analyses were performed. To graphically depict the interactions among risk elements and help building risk scenarios, process influence diagrams were used to represent the interactions. The SWP employed quantitative methods of risk analysis including Response Surface Method (RSM), Polynomial Chaos Expansion (PCE), and the National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) toolset. The SWP also developed risk response planning and performed risk control and monitoring to prevent the risks from affecting the project and ensure the effectiveness of risk management. As part of risk control and monitoring, existing and new risks have been tracked and the response plan was subsequently evaluated. Findings and lessons learned from the SWP’s risk assessment and management efforts will provide valuable information for other commercial geological CO2 storage projects.
Lee, Si-Yong↗
Optimizing spacecraft design - optimization engine development : progress and plans
At JPL and NASA, a process has been developed to perform life cycle risk management. This process requires users to identify: goals and objectives to be achieved (and their relative priorities), the various risks to achieving those goals and objectives, and options for risk mitigation (prevention, detection ahead of time, and alleviation). Risks are broadly defined to include the risk of failing to design a system with adequate performance, compatibility and robustness in addition to more traditional implementation and operational risks. The options for mitigating these different kinds of risks can include architectural and design choices, technology plans and technology back-up options, test-bed and simulation options, engineering models and hardware/software development techniques and other more traditional risk reduction techniques.
risk↗
Risk reduction using DDP (Defect Detection and Prevention): Software support and software applications
Risk assessment and mitigation is the focus of the Defect Detection and Prevention (DDP) process, which has been applied to spacecraft technology assessments and planning, both hardware and software. DDP's major elements and their relevance to core requirement engineering concerns are summarized. The accompanying research demonstration illustrates DDP's tool support, and further customizations for application to software.
Software-specific customizations↗