Results for “root traits”

NASA NTRS1993

Exploiting the Cannibalistic Traits of Reed-Solomon Codes

In Reed-Solomon codes and all other maximum distance separable codes, there is an intrinsic relationship between the size of the symbols in a codeword and the length of the codeword. Increasing the number of symbols in a codeword to improve the efficiency of the coding system thus requires using a larger set of symbols. However, long Reed-Solomon codes are difficult to implement and many communications or storage systems cannot easily accommodate an increased symbol size, e.g., M-ary frequency shift keying (FSK) and photon-counting pulse-position modulation demand a fixed symbol size. A technique for sharing redundancy among many different Reed-Solomon codewords to achieve the efficiency attainable in long Reed-Solomon codes without increasing the symbol size is described. Techniques both for calculating the performance of these new codes and for determining their encoder and decoder complexities is presented. These complexities are usually found to be substantially lower than conventional Reed-Solomon codes of similar performance.

O Collins↗

NASA NTRS1994

What to Do Until the Money Runs Out: A Refinement Framework for Cognitive Engineering in the Real World

A case study is presented to illustrate some of the problems of applying cognitive science to complex human-machine systems. Disregard for facts about human cognition often undermines the safety, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of complex systems. Yet single-point methods (for example, better user-interface design), whether rooted in computer science or in experimental psychology, fall far short of addressing systems-level problems in a timely way using realistic resources. A model-based methodology is proposed for organizing and prioritizing the cognitive engineering effort, focusing appropriate expertise on major problems first, then moving to more sophisticated refinements if time and resources permit. This case study is based on a collaborative effort between the Human Factors Division at NASA-Ames and the Spaceborne Imaging Radar SIR-C/X-Band Synthetic Aperture Radar (SIR-C/X-SAR) Project at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), California institute of Technology. The first SIR-C/X-SAR Shuttle mission flew successfully in April, 1994. A series of such missions is planned to provide radar data to study Earth's ecosystems, climatic and geological processes, hydrologic cycle, and ocean circulation. In addition to JPL and NASA personnel, the SIR-C/X-SAR operations team included Scientists and engineers from the German and Italian space agencies.

Shafto, Michael G.↗

NASA NTRS2026

Biobased Polybenzoxazine Derived from Furfurylamine and Piceol with Low Cure Temperature and Advanced Properties for Composite Matrices

A novel benzoxazine made from furfurylamine, paraformaldehyde, and piceol, Bz-FA-HA, is assessed for applications in fiber reinforced (FR) composites. Piceol is a biobased phenolic compound derived from the roots of Norwegian spruce trees and contains a methyl ketone group at the para position. Bz-FA-HA is a liquid at room temperature, has a viscosity of < 1 Pa.s at temperatures above 90 °C, and a Tonset of cure at 132 °C. The carbonyl is found to react with the furan ring, yielding a crosslinking reaction, when cured above 180 °C as indicated by differential scanning calorimetry and thermogravimetric analysis coupled with Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy. Poly(Bz-FA-HA) has a Tg > 350 °C, attributed to the crosslinking reaction. Furthermore, the storage modulus is > 3 GPa, regardless of cure temperature. Poly(Bz-FA-HA) has a char yield at 800 °C of 65.0 % (62.3 % at 1000 °C), and a Tonset of decomposition of 357 °C in nitrogen. The resulting carbon formed during pyrolysis shrinks during the carbonization reaction and scanning electron microscopy imaging shows a cross-section with micro cracks. The high processability, advanced mechanical properties, and exceptional char yield make it a promising candidate as the matrix for FR composites.

Benzoxazine↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development and Validation of a High-Vacuum Thermal Conductivity Testbed for Aerospace Interface Materials

Spacecraft thermal margins depend on the temperature penalty of installed interfaces, yet catalog conductivity omits bondline thickness, mating surfaces, preload, and environment. The Testbed for Advanced Interface Materials in Vacuum (TAIMV) addresses this engineering-data gap by converting ambient/vacuum temperature fields from a four-coupon stack into quantities usable in spacecraft thermal models. Its 17-node steady-state model resolves axial conduction, parasitic fixture paths, grease-filled contact, radiation, and ambient convection. Four monolithic checks gave axial heat-rate ratios of 0.90–1.02, and Braycote calibration self-recovery gave 2.20% casewise mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) and 2.85% maximum difference. With transferable fixture terms frozen, Krytox LVP tested cross-material transfer against a manufacturer-derived external relation. The six Krytox cases gave 2.28% MAPE, 5.10% maximum difference, and full-field residual root-mean-square values of 0.553 °C ambient and 1.306 °C vacuum. Installed-joint resistance spanned 6.39–7.15 × 10⁻⁴ m²·K/W for Braycote and 4.09–4.49 × 10⁻⁴ m²·K/W for Krytox, corresponding to 2.33–6.66 K per modeled interface over the tested heat-flux range. TAIMV therefore supplies directly usable installed-joint resistance and conductance, plus apparent installed conductivity and explicitly model-conditioned grease conductivity/contact terms.

heat transfer↗

NASA NTRS2025

ISS Radiator Face Sheet Anomaly Investigation and Return to Function

Maintaining sufficient heat rejection on the International Space Station (ISS) is critical to the function of the Low-Earth Orbit station. The External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS) rejects the excess heat generated by the US On-Orbit Segment (USOS) modules. The system uses single-phase liquid ammonia to collect the heat and reject it to six radiators (three on the Starboard side, three on the Port side). Each radiator is made up of eight panels. In September 2008, imagery of the Starboard radiators was conducted and showed one of the panels’ face sheets had peeled up from the internal honeycomb core structure. Out of an abundance of caution, the radiator was isolated from the rest of the EATCS and the ammonia was vented to space. Since the radiator was vented, periodic imagery of all radiator panels was taken to monitor any changes in the face sheet and inspect for other radiator anomalies. In January 2025, after years of trending and inspections, the radiator was reintegrated into the system to increase heat rejection capabilities. This paper will document the multi-year investigation that took place to determine root cause and mitigations implemented to reduce risk to the system. A summary of the data since the investigation will show rationale for reintegrating the radiator even with the damaged panel. The goal of the paper is to document the investigation for historical purposes and provide future programs with findings discovered during the investigation.

Aaron Rodriguez↗

NASA NTRS2026

ISS Radiator Face Sheet Anomaly Investigation and Return to Function

Maintaining sufficient heat rejection on the International Space Station (ISS) is critical to the function of the Low-Earth Orbit station. The External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS) rejects the excess heat generated by the US On-Orbit Segment (USOS) modules. The system uses single-phase liquid ammonia to collect the heat and reject it to six radiators (three on the Starboard side, three on the Port side). Each radiator is made up of eight panels. In September 2008, imagery of the Starboard radiators was conducted and showed one of the panels’ face sheets had peeled up from the internal honeycomb core structure. Out of an abundance of caution, the radiator was isolated from the rest of the EATCS and the ammonia was vented to space. Since the radiator was vented, periodic imagery of all radiator panels was taken to monitor any changes in the face sheet and inspect for other radiator anomalies. In January 2025, after years of trending and inspections, the radiator was reintegrated into the system to increase heat rejection capabilities. This paper will document the multi-year investigation that took place to determine root cause and mitigations implemented to reduce risk to the system. A summary of the data since the investigation will show rationale for reintegrating the radiator even with the damaged panel. The goal of the paper is to document the investigation for historical purposes and provide future programs with findings discovered during the investigation.

Aaron Rodriguez↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Under Pressure: The Artemis I Heatshield Char Loss Investigation and Artemis II’s Successful Entry

Following the successful Artemis I skip reentry on December 11, 2022, unexpected char liberation from the Orion heat- shield prompted formation of an Anomaly Response Team to determine root cause and establish flight rationale and corrective actions for subsequent missions. Through a comprehensive investigation including detailed hardware analysis, modeling & simulation, and ground testing, the team determined that the low permeability Avcoat experienced extreme internal gas pressure buildup during the skip entry that could not adequately outgas, leading to crack formation and char liberation. Key discoveries included significant performance differences between permeable and impermeable heatshield regions and successful replication of the anomaly through ground testing. Based on extensive ground testing and analysis, Artemis II flew a modified trajectory without the skip entry to minimize crack-inducing conditions, and successfully splashed down on April 10, 2026 with significantly reduced char loss. For Artemis III and beyond, a corrective action was implemented to produce a more permeable version of Avcoat that will substantially reduce internal pressure accumulation during entry.

Artemis II↗

NASA NTRS2026

A Review of Pump Package Assembly Anomalies and Demonstration to Gain Motor Controller Replacement Capability

The International Space Station (ISS) generates heat within the US modules from systems used to operate the station, maintain crew health, and conduct science experiments in the orbiting laboratory. The Internal Thermal Control System (ITCS) collects this heat in water loops and transfers it to the external ammonia system for rejection to space. The ITCS uses six Pump Package Assemblies (PPA) as the motive force to circulate the water within the Lab, Node 2, and Node 3 (Node 1 is parasitic to the Lab and Node 3 ITCS loops). In the life of ISS, 3 PPAs have had to be replaced and 2 PPAs are currently showing signs of degradation. The first PPA to fail in 2003 was due to early coolant chemistry issues; the remaining pump failures and current pump degradations are determined to be related to the Pump/Fan Motor Controller (PFMC), with their individual signatures all being unique to this point. The PFMC of one of the failed PPAs was returned and testing confirmed its sub-components to be the root cause of the PPA failure. Due to the relative size and weight of the standalone PFMC in comparison to the integrated assembly, it is desired, from a launch and on-orbit stowage perspective, to replace the PFMC component of the degraded PPA instead of the entire PPA. The PPA was not designed for this capability, so on the ground demonstrations are planned using crew tools to show that the PFMC can be replaced on-orbit while maintaining full functionality. This paper will focus on the signatures of the two most recent PPA failures and the two PPAs showing signs of degradation, in addition to presenting the findings from the PFMC demonstration effort.

Aaron Rodriguez↗

NASA NTRS2026

A Review of Pump Package Assembly Anomalies and Demonstration to Gain Motor Controller Replacement Capability

The International Space Station (ISS) generates heat within the US modules from systems used to operate the station, maintain crew health, and conduct science experiments in the orbiting laboratory. The Internal Thermal Control System (ITCS) collects this heat in water loops and transfers it to the external ammonia system for rejection to space. The ITCS uses six Pump Package Assemblies (PPA) as the motive force to circulate the water within the Lab, Node 2, and Node 3 (Node 1 is parasitic to the Lab and Node 3 ITCS loops). In the life of ISS, 3 PPAs have had to be replaced and 2 PPAs are currently showing signs of degradation. The first PPA to fail in 2003 was due to early coolant chemistry issues; the remaining pump failures and current pump degradations are determined to be related to the Pump/Fan Motor Controller (PFMC), with their individual signatures all being unique to this point. The PFMC of one of the failed PPAs was returned and testing confirmed its sub-components to be the root cause of the PPA failure. Due to the relative size and weight of the standalone PFMC in comparison to the integrated assembly, it is desired, from a launch and on-orbit stowage perspective, to replace the PFMC component of the degraded PPA instead of the entire PPA. The PPA was not designed for this capability, so on the ground demonstrations are planned using crew tools to show that the PFMC can be replaced on-orbit while maintaining full functionality. This paper will focus on the signatures of the two most recent PPA failures and the two PPAs showing signs of degradation, in addition to presenting the findings from the PFMC demonstration effort.

Aaron Rodriguez↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Revisiting the Soyuz-1 Parachute Failure in the Context of Safety in the Modern Era

The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.

Aaron L Morris↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Performance of a Regenerative Fuel Cell System for the Lunar Surface

Regenerative fuel cells (RFCs) are an attractive energy storage solution for lunar missions as a technology capable of providing a higher specific energy (i.e., W∙h/kg) than state-of-the-art packaged Li-ion battery systems. An RFC consists of the (1 & 2) electrochemical stacks (chemical to electrical energy conversion to supply electricity to an external load, i.e. the fuel cell reaction, and electrical to chemical energy conversion of supplied electrical power to dissociate water into hydrogen and oxygen gases, i.e. water electrolysis), (3) fluidic conditioning, (4) reactant storage, (5) avionics, (6) power management and distribution (PMAD), and (7) thermal management. NASA’s Glenn Research Center has designed, assembled, and tested a breadboard RFC sys-tem capable of operating autonomously for multiple simulated lunar day/night cycles in a laboratory environment. The system is comprised of a non-flow through proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cell stack and a liquid-anode feed PEM electrolyzer (EZ) stack designed to electrochemically compress the reactants at balanced pressures up to 12.4 MPa (1800 psia). The fluidic conditioning, avionics, PMAD, and thermal management sub-systems are largely comprised of commercial-off-the-shelf components for this system-level development effort. The hardware is controlled by a CubeSat space processor running an operational program based on core flight architecture that can control the RFC hardware autonomously through a state machine with fault monitoring. The testing results highlighted here were completed with the system in an open-loop configuration such that reactants generated through water electrolysis were vented while gas cylinders supplied fuel cell operation. The breadboard operated autonomously, but there were five unplanned transitions to a safe state that required a manual restart after reviewing the data, determining a root cause, and implementing a solution. Four of the transitions were caused by the thermal management subsystem and the fifth was caused by a water management control issue in the EZ sub-system. The RFC system operated for over 550 hours with the final cycle being slightly abbreviated due to reasons unrelated to system performance.

Kerrigan Cain↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Performance of a Regenerative Fuel Cell System for the Lunar Surface

Regenerative fuel cells (RFCs) are an attractive energy storage solution for lunar missions as a technology capable of providing a higher specific energy (i.e., W∙h/kg) than state-of-the-art packaged Li-ion battery systems. An RFC consists of the (1 & 2) electrochemical stacks (chemical to electrical energy conversion to supply electricity to an external load, i.e. the fuel cell reaction, and electrical to chemical energy conversion of supplied electrical power to dissociate water into hydrogen and oxygen gases, i.e. water electrolysis), (3) fluidic conditioning, (4) reactant storage, (5) avionics, (6) power management and distribution (PMAD), and (7) thermal management. NASA’s Glenn Research Center has designed, assembled, and tested a breadboard RFC sys-tem capable of operating autonomously for multiple simulated lunar day/night cycles in a laboratory environment. The system is comprised of a non-flow through proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cell stack and a liquid-anode feed PEM electrolyzer (EZ) stack designed to electrochemically compress the reactants at balanced pressures up to 12.4 MPa (1800 psia). The fluidic conditioning, avionics, PMAD, and thermal management sub-systems are largely comprised of commercial-off-the-shelf components for this system-level development effort. The hardware is controlled by a CubeSat space processor running an operational program based on core flight architecture that can control the RFC hardware autonomously through a state machine with fault monitoring. The testing results highlighted here were completed with the system in an open-loop configuration such that reactants generated through water electrolysis were vented while gas cylinders supplied fuel cell operation. The breadboard operated autonomously, but there were five unplanned transitions to a safe state that required a manual restart after reviewing the data, determining a root cause, and implementing a solution. Four of the transitions were caused by the thermal management subsystem and the fifth was caused by a water management control issue in the EZ sub-system. The RFC system operated for over 550 hours with the final cycle being slightly abbreviated due to reasons unrelated to system performance.

Kerrigan Cain↗