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Safeguards Envelope

The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z-testing. A brief analysis of the impact of the safeguard's optimization on the rest of plant efficiency, criticality concerns, and overall requirements is presented.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safeguards Envelope Progress FY09

The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters which nuclear facilities may operate within to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). As a result of the U.S. having no operating nuclear chemical reprocessing plants, there has been a strong interest in obtaining process monitoring data from the ICPP. The ICPP was shut down in 1996 and a recent effort has been made to retrieve the PM data from storage in a data mining effort. In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z- testing7.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES

The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of “non-traditional” operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Advanced Non-Destructive Assay Systems and Special Instrumentation Requirements for Spent Nuclear Fuel Recycling Facilities

The safe and efficient operation of the next generation of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) recycling / reprocessing facilities is dependent upon the availability of high performance real time Non- Destructive Assay (NDA) systems at key in-line points. A diverse variety of such special instrument systems have been developed and commissioned at reprocessing plants worldwide over the past fifty years.. The measurement purpose, technique and plant performance for selected key systems have been reviewed. Obsolescence issues and areas for development are identified in the context of the measurements needs of future recycling facilities and their associated waste treatment plants. Areas of concern include (i) Materials Accountancy and Safeguards, (ii) Head End process control and feed envelope verification, (iii) Real-time monitoring at the Product Finishing Stages, (iv) Criticality safety and (v) Radioactive waste characterization. Common characteristics of the traditional NDA systems in historical recycling facilities are (i) In-house development of bespoke instruments resulting in equipment that if often unique to a given facility and generally not commercially available, (ii) Use of 'novel' techniques - not widely deployed in other applications, (iii) Design features that are tailored to the specific plant requirements of the facility operator, (iv) Systems and software implementation that was not always carried out to modern industry standards and (v) A tendency to be overly complex - refined by on-plant operational usage and experience. Although these systems were 'validated in use' and are generally fit for purpose, there are a number of potential problems in transferring technology that was developed ten or more years ago to the new build SNF recycling facilities of the future. These issues include (i) Obsolescence of components - particularly with respect to computer hardware and data acquisition electronics, (ii) Availability of Intellectual Property and design drawings and documentation (iii) Lack of compatibility with modern computers, software, data transfer networks, digital protocols and electrical code standards, (iv) Non-compliance with current and future mandatory standards and regulations for nuclear facilities (v) Design focused on measurement and control points that may be specific to the facility process (vi) Lack of utilization of recent technological advances where better performing, less complex and more cost-effective options are now available. Key radiometric measurement drivers and control points for future recycling facilities have been determined and a review of the adequacy of existing instrumentation has been performed. Areas where recent technology improvements may be more effectively deployed and future technology development may be appropriate are identified. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Andra's strategy and approach for operational safety of French underground facility Cigeo - 15127

According to the French Act on radioactive waste of 28 June 2006, Andra shall design a reversible repository. In response to this demand, Andra is developing the industrial project namely 'Cigeo', a reversible geological disposal facility for HLW and ILW located in Meuse/Haute-Marne. The previous safety cases of 2005, 2009 and 2012 give a sound basis to assess Cigeo's safety both for the operational and post-closure periods. Regarding operational safety, in this new stage of the project, the challenging issues for the preparation of the safety case are the following: - To adapt the various regulatory frameworks (nuclear and non-nuclear) to the underground facility - To design the underground facility and handling equipment's to reduce at first risks in the underground facility as such radioactive particles release, gas explosion, fire and co-activity and limit their consequence. - To establish waste acceptance criteria to be fulfilled by waste producers in line with operational safety and design options. The objective of the paper is to present the experience of Andra in operation safety of the underground facility of Cigeo. Operational safety for Cigeo is assessed as much as possible according to the existing French regulations and guidance for nuclear facilities. Indeed, compared to existing nuclear facilities, a geological repository is a specific case due to the existence of underground facilities with particularities such as: - ventilation management in a large scale underground facility, - fire risk management. As an input for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation, Andra defined a fire guidance and a specific reference safety guidance, based on the adaptation of the French nuclear regulatory texts for and when feasible to mines and tunnels regulatory texts and on its own experience gained through safety operational reports since 2005 and their reviews by the Safety Authority. - underground co-activity of nuclear operation with construction works. According to the common 'defense-in depth' principle for nuclear facilities, these guidelines for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation consider the successive levels of defense of: - Preventing the risk and its spreading by design and construction; - Detecting incidents and early fighting by design and operation dispositions (detection and control systems, survey procedure); - Controlling incidents and limiting of their consequences by safeguarding systems, specific procedures. At that stage, design options for Cigeo constitute an adequate response to the operational safety functions and requirements: - Two levels of containment are set up: the first one is ensured by the waste package, the second one is ensured from the surface facility to the disposal vaults by the transfer cask during the transfer of waste packages in the disposal vaults by the disposal vault itself and a nuclear ventilation with HEPA filter; - Favorable options for fire risk prevention and mitigation: transport system minimizing heat load (cable car for the transfer from the surface, electric transfer engines), twin access tunnels to ease fire-fighting and evacuation...; - Permanent complete physical separation of nuclear zone and construction zone (including ventilation systems). In practice, operation safety assessment of Cigeo, designed following the aforesaid reference safety guidelines, follows a common risk analysis (internal aggressions such as auxiliary losses, chemical and toxic risks, fall or collision, fire, human factors and external aggressions such as earthquake, air traffic, flooding) with the following steps: - Identification of the major risks and the design basis scenarios that have to be considered for dimensioning of the installations and the safety devices; - On the basis of these different situations, those who will have to be quantified are identified; one or more representative and envelop situations are chosen in order to evaluate robustness of the installation. Quantitative evaluation of these situations permits to: - identify the consequences on man, environment and installation, and in particular to gain confidence in the maintaining of the safety functions; - identify or define the technic and/or organisational dispositions classified as 'important elements for protection' (IEP); - Situations beyond dimensioning permit to verify the robustness of the installation. They permit, on one hand to identify possible complementary material or organisational dispositions; on the other hand, to define the 'hard core' i.e. structures, systems and components that permit to maintain the confinement function of radioactive substance. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Material Property Determinations for Rock Valley Legacy Samples in Support of Source Physics Experiment

The Source Physics Experiment (SPE) is a long-term NNSA research and development effort designed to improve nonproliferation verification and monitoring capabilities. The overarching goals of the SPE program are to improve understanding of prompt signals and physical signatures that develop from underground chemical explosions and associated modeling capabilities. Our work focuses on a primary factor controlling chemical explosion induced signals and signatures: the material properties of the rocks in which the chemical explosion takes place. This document reports on material property determinations of legacy core USGS Test Well F and outcrop analogs for the subsurface stratigraphy for the third phase of SPE in the Rock Valley (RV) area of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The objective of this work is to establish a baseline set of lithologic descriptions and material properties expected prior to observatory borehole drilling in support of the SPE-RVDC (Rock Valley Direct Comparison) experiment. We determine for each rock type the compressional failure envelope, elastic properties as a function of stress (bulk modulus versus mean stress, shear modulus versus shear stress, Young’s modulus versus axial stress and Poisson’s ratio versus axial stress), indirect tensile strength, and porosity. Geologic characterization, both at the core-scale and microscale, provides context for using the data in modeling efforts and to inform interpretations for the material properties testing.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Advanced Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Demonstration

A key area of the Advanced Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) strategy is the development of methodologies and tools that will be used to predict the safety, security, safeguards, performance, and deployment viability of SMRs. The goal of the SMR PRA activity will be to develop quantitative methods and tools and the associated analysis framework for assessing a variety of risks. Development and implementation of SMR-focused safety assessment methods may require new analytic methods or adaptation of traditional methods to the advanced design and operational features of SMRs. We will need to move beyond the current limitations such as static, logic-based models in order to provide more integrated, scenario-based models based upon predictive modeling which are tied to causal factors. The development of SMR-specific safety models for margin determination will provide a safety case that describes potential accidents, design options (including postulated controls), and supports licensing activities by providing a technical basis for the safety envelope. This report documents the progress that was made to implement the PRA framework, specifically by way of demonstration of an advanced 3D approach to representing, quantifying and understanding flooding risks to a nuclear power plant.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Reactor Physics Scoping and Characterization Study on Implementation of TRIGA Fuel in the Advanced Test Reactor

The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), under the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), is conducting feasibility studies for the conversion of its fuel from a highly enriched uranium (HEU) composition to a low enriched uranium (LEU) composition. These studies have considered a wide variety of LEU plate-type fuels to replace the current HEU fuel. Continuing to investigate potential alternatives to the present HEU fuel form, this study presents a preliminary analysis of TRIGA® fuel within the current ATR fuel envelopes and compares it to the functional requirements delineated by the Naval Reactors Program, which includes: greater than 4.8E+14 fissions/s/g of 235 U, a fast to thermal neutron flux ratio that is less than 5% deviation of its current value, a constant cycle power within the corner lobes, and an operational cycle length of 56 days at 120 MW. Other parameters outside those put forth by the Naval Reactors Program which are investigated herein include axial and radial power profiles, effective delayed neutron fraction, and mean neutron generation time.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Oxidation Behavior and Property Degradation of Nuclear Graphites

During its multidecade operation in the core of nuclear reactors, graphite components are subjected to aggressive and continuous exposure to a high field of ionizing and neutron irradiation, high temperature, and various types of present and postulated chemical attacks. High density, high crystallinity polygranular synthetic graphite is unique among other materials for its extraordinary capacity of resisting and adapting to the aggression inflicted by high temperature, high energy neutron bombardment and ionizing gamma radiation. But, as a carbonaceous material, even though of very high purity, graphite is reactive towards common oxidizing agents: oxygen, carbon dioxide, water. Safe operation of HTGRs relies, among other aspects, on engineered safeguard systems for efficient and continuous protection of graphite components against oxidation. Graphite oxidation behavior was, and continues to be, an important direction of theoretical and experimental research, engineering analyses, models and simulations, and design and safety regulations. The avalanche of publications, reports, experimental data, computer codes, and regulatory documents related to oxidation behavior of nuclear graphite is now accelerating to new levels, prompted by the increased interest for nuclear energy as a clean, carbon-free energy source. Even though public’s perception of nuclear energy advantages may still be influenced by the memories of past accidents of nuclear reactors from generations II and III, the community of informed scientists and engineers, regulators and statemen knows that generation IV of nuclear reactors is designed at very high safety standards, doubled by great advances of scientific knowledge and technological progress. One of routes of these recent advances is directed at better understanding of graphite oxidation behavior, its relationship with graphite manufacturing and microstructural properties, along with the effects of various environmental factors and process variables. Together, the recent progress in manufacturing, properties characterization, and modeling of intricated physical and chemical processes that concur to the oxidation behavior led to development of powerful simulation codes able to analyze various scenarios of normal operation and hypothetical off-normal events, and thus to clearly specify the allowable parameters envelopes for the designers, constructors, and operators of current and future modular HTGRs. This review begins with an introduction on manufacturing methods, structure, and properties of nuclear graphite, including basic requirements that this specialty graphite type must satisfy for nuclear use. It continues with a chapter on environmental effects on nuclear graphite, where emphasis is placed less on irradiation and much more on oxidation phenomena, their safety implications, and the basic traits of chronic and acute oxidation by air (oxygen) and water (humidity, steam). Particular attention is placed on the three graphite grades of interest for this document (IG-110, NBG-18, PCEA). A chapter on properties degradation induced by oxidation follows, with focus on density, dimensional, and mechanical properties changes. The next chapter is intended as a brief review of various approaches used for modeling of graphite oxidation behavior. It summarizes the progress of oxidation models, from the early attempts to complex computational approaches interfaced with specialized computer codes designed for nuclear reactor simulations. Last, a list is presented of knowledge gaps where more research is needed. A short summary concludes the review.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Final Report: Non-Visible, Automated Target Acquisition and Tracking

The Roadside Tracker (RST) represents a new approach to radiation portal monitors. It uses a combination of gamma-ray and visible-light imaging to localize gamma-ray radiation sources to individual vehicles in free-flowing, multi-lane traffic. Deployed as two trailers that are parked on either side of the roadway (Fig. 1); the RST scans passing traffic with two large gamma-ray imagers, one mounted in each trailer. The system compensates for vehicle motion through the imager’s fields of view by using automated target acquisition and tracking (TAT) software applied to a stream of video images. Once a vehicle has left the field of view, the radiation image of that vehicle is analyzed for the presence of a source, and if one is found, an alarm is sounded. The gamma-ray image is presented to the operator together with the video image of the traffic stream when the vehicle was approximately closest to the system (Fig. 2). The offending vehicle is identified with a bounding box to distinguish it from other vehicles that might be present at the same time. The system was developed under a previous grant from the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). This report documents work performed with follow-on funding from DNDO to further advance the development of the RST. Specifically, the primary thrust was to extend the performance envelope of the system by replacing the visible-light video cameras used by the TAT software with sensors that would allow operation at night and during inclement weather. In particular, it was desired to allow operation after dark without requiring external lighting. As part of this work, the system software was also upgraded to allow the use of 64-bit computers, the current generation operating system (OS), software development environment (Windows 7 vs. Windows XP, and current Visual Studio.Net), and improved software version controls (GIT vs. Source Safe.) With the upgraded performance allowed by new computers, and the additional memory available in a 64-bit OS, the system was able to handle greater traffic densities, and this also allowed addition of the ability to handle stop-and-go traffic.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Thermal Response of TATB-Based PBXs

In the design mode of operation, TATB-­based PBXs, such as PBX 9502 or LX-­17, are promptly initiated by a detonator and booster system. In abnormal situations, such as accidents, a wide variety of non-­design-­mode insults can arise and it is desirable that these do not produce detonation but rather that, at most, they lead to a low chemical energy release. The most significant abnormal hazard is the direct shock initiation threat arising from high-­velocity fragment impact. This is quite well defined and may result in a detonative response if the fragment is large enough and fast enough. However, it is of considerably greater significance to the safety envelope of these explosives whether they are at all capable of DDT (deflagration-­to-­detonation transition), either at ambient or elevated temperatures since accidental insults to the explosive, either mechanical or thermal, that may produce local burning are both more numerous and more likely than shock loading. The purpose of this document is to demonstrate, based on the accumulated body of conservative experimental testing, that in explosive geometries and masses relevant to the Weapons Program, TATB-­based PBXs do not present a deflagration-­to-­detonation transition (DDT) hazard at any temperature. This is a significant statement since it removes detonative outcome concerns from the majority of insult scenarios on TATB-­based charges. It does not address the response of included detonator and booster assemblies, the response of which must be considered separately.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Institute for Clean Energy Technology Mississippi State University NSR&D Aged HEPA Filter Study Final Report

Data have demonstrated that filter media lose tensile strength and the ability to resist the effects of moisture as a function of age. Testing of new and aged filters needs to be conducted to correlate reduction of physical strength of HEPA media to the ability of filters to withstand upset conditions. Appendix C of the Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook provides the basis for DOE’s HEPA filter service life guidance. However, this appendix also points out the variability of data, and it does not correlate performance of aged filters to degradation of media due to age. Funding awarded by NSR&D to initiate full-scale testing of aged HEPA filters addresses the issue of correlating media degradation due to age with testing of new and aged HEPA filters under a generic design basis event set of conditions. This funding has accelerated the process of describing this study via: (1) establishment of a Technical Working Group of all stakeholders, (2) development and approval of a test plan, (3) development of testing and autopsy procedures, (4) acquiring an initial set of aged filters, (5) testing the initial set of aged filters, and (6) developing the filter test report content for each filter tested. This funding was very timely and has moved the project forward by at least three years. Activities have been correlated with testing conducted under DOE-EM funding for evaluating performance envelopes for AG-1 Section FC Separator and Separatorless filters. This coordination allows correlation of results from the NSR&D Aged Filter Study with results from testing new filters of the Separator and Separatorless Filter Study. DOE-EM efforts have identified approximately 100 more filters of various ages that have been stored under Level B conditions. NSR&D funded work allows a time for rigorous review among subject matter experts before moving forward with development of the testing matrix that will be used for additional filters. The NSR&D data sets are extremely valuable in as much as establishing a selfimproving, NQA-1 program capable of advancing the service lifetime study of HEPA filters. The data and reports are available for careful and critical review by subject matter experts before the next set of filters is tested and can be found in the appendices of this final report. NSR&D funds have not only initiated the Aged HEPA Filter Study alluded to in Appendix C of the NACH, but have also enhanced the technical integrity and effectiveness of all of the follow-on testing for this long-term study.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗