Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “safety analysis”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

Integrated deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis for safety assessment of nuclear power plants

The present special issue contains an overview of the research in the field of Integrated Deterministic and Probabilistic Safety Assessment (IDPSA) of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). Traditionally, safety regulation for NPPs design and operation has been based on Deterministic Safety Assessment (DSA) methods to verify criteria that assure plant safety in a number of postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA) scenarios. Referring to such criteria, it is also possible to identify those plant Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) and activities that are most important for safety within those postulated scenarios. Then, the design, operation, and maintenance of these “safety-related” SSCs and activities are controlled through regulatory requirements and supported by Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Development of Tritide Dose Assumptions for Tritium Processing and Extraction Facilities MACCS2 Consolidated Hazard Analysis and Documented Safety Analysis Revision

The purpose of this report is to identify the Tritide Dose Assumptions applicable to the Tritium Facilities. These dose assumptions support the MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System 2 (MACCS2) revision of the Consolidated Hazards Analysis (CHA) and Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Tritium Facilities, including the Tritium Extraction Facility.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Development of Tritide Dose Assumptions for Tritium Processing and Extraction Facilities MACCS2 Consolidated Hazard Analysis and Documented Safety Analysis Revision

The purpose of this report is to identify the Tritide Dose Assumptions applicable to the Tritium Facilities. These dose assumptions support the MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System 2 (MACCS2) revision of the Consolidated Hazards Analysis (CHA) and Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Tritium Facilities, including the Tritium Extraction Facility.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Reachability Analysis for FollowerStopper: Safety Analysis and Experimental Results

Motivated by earlier work and the developer of a new algorithm, the FollowerStopper, this article uses reachability analysis to verify the safety of the FollowerStopper algorithm, which is a controller designed for dampening stop-and-go traffic waves. With more than 1100 miles of driving data collected by our physical platform, we validate our analysis results by comparing it to human driving behaviors. The FollowerStopper controller has been demonstrated to dampen stop-and-go traffic waves at low speed, but previous analysis on its relative safety has been limited to upper and lower bounds of acceleration. To expand upon previous analysis, reachability analysis is used to investigate the safety at the speeds it was originally tested and also at higher speeds. Two formulations of safety analysis with different criteria are shown: distance-based and time headway-based. The FollowerStopper is considered safe with distance-based criterion. However, simulation results demonstrate that the FollowerStopper is not representative of human drivers - it follows too closely behind vehicles, specifically at a distance human would deem as unsafe. On the other hand, under the time headway-based safety analysis, the FollowerStopper is not considered safe anymore. A modified FollowerStopper is proposed to satisfy time-based safety criterion. Simulation results of the proposed FollowerStopper shows that its response represents human driver behavior better.

Chou, Fang-Chieh↗

RDS - A systematic approach towards system thermal hydraulics input code development for a comprehensive deterministic safety analysis

Deterministic Safety Analysis (DSA) is one of the mandatory requirements conducted for Nuclear Power Plant licensing process, with the aim of ensuring safety compliance with relevant regulatory acceptance criteria. DSA is a technique whereby a set of conservative deterministic rules and requirements are applied for the design and operation of facilities or activities. Computer codes are normally used to assist in performing all required analysis under DSA. To ensure a comprehensive analysis, the conduct of DSA should follow a systematic approach. One of the methodologies proposed is the Standardized and Consolidated Reference Experimental (and Calculated) Database (SCRED) developed by University of Pisa. Based on this methodology, the use of Reference Data Set (RDS) as a pre-requisite reference document for developing input nodalization was proposed. This paper shall describe the application of RDS with the purpose of assessing its effectiveness. Two RDS documents were developed for an Integral Test Facility of LOBI-MOD2 and associated Test A1-83. Data and information from various reports and drawings were referred in preparing the RDS. The results showed that by developing RDS, it has made possible to consolidate all relevant information in one single document. This is beneficial as it enables preservation of information, promotes quality assurance, allows traceability, facilitates continuous improvement, promotes solving of contradictions and finally assisting in developing thermal hydraulic input regardless of whichever code selected. However, some disadvantages were also recognized such as the need for experience in making engineering judgments, language barrier in accessing foreign information and limitation of resources. Some possible improvements are suggested to overcome these challenges.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Preconceptual design of a fluoride high temperature salt-cooled engineering demonstration reactor: Core design and safety analysis

Engineering demonstration reactors are nuclear reactors built to establish proof of concept for technology options that have never been built. Examples of engineering demonstration reactors include Peach Bottom 1 for high temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs) and Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) for sodium-cooled fast reactors. Engineering demonstrations have historically played a vital role in advancing the technology readiness level of reactor technologies. This paper details a preconceptual design for a fluoride salt-cooled engineering demonstration reactor. The fluoride salt-cooled high-temperature reactor (FHR) demonstration reactor (DR) is a concept for a salt-cooled reactor with 100 megawatts of thermal output (MWt). It would use tristructural-isotropic (TRISO) particle fuel within prismatic graphite blocks. FLiBe (2 7LiF-BeF2) is the reference primary coolant. The FHR DR is designed to be small, simple, and affordable. Core design characteristics, fuel cycle performance, and safety analysis of the FHR DR preconcept have been evaluated. The FHR DR core design features a negative or negligible void coefficient throughout a reactor operating cycle. Both single-batch (cartridge) and multiple-batch fuel cycles can be demonstrated in the FHR DR. The single-batch cycle length of the FHR DR core is estimated at between 12-18 months, assuming the successful qualification of composite carbon (C/C) or silicon carbide (SiC/SiC) structural fuel block tie rod material. Fuel cycle performance of the FHR DR is similar to a high temperature gas-cooled reactor. Preliminary safety analysis of the FHR DR indicates that the reactor could be used to demonstrate the inherent safety characteristics of FHR designs.

Brown, Nicholas R.↗

Dynamic event tree analysis with the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 safety analysis code

The consequences of a transient in an advanced sodium-cooled fast reactor are difficult to capture with the traditional approach to probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). Numerous safety-relevant systems are passive and may have operational states that cannot be represented by binary success or failure. In addition, the specific order and timing of events may be crucial which necessitates the use of dynamic PRA tools such as ADAPT. The modifications to the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 sodium-cooled fast reactor safety analysis code for linking it to ADAPT to perform a dynamic PRA are described. A test case is used to demonstrate the linking process and to illustrate the type of insights that may be gained with this process. Finally, newly-developed dynamic importance measures are used to assess the significance of reactor parameters/constituents on calculated consequences of initiating events.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Development of the FHR advanced natural circulation analysis code and application to FHR safety analysis

The University of California, Berkeley (UCB) is performing thermal hydraulics safety analysis to develop the technical basis for design and licensing of fluoride-salt-cooled, high-temperature reactors (FHRs). FHR designs investigated by UCB use natural circulation for emergency, passive decay heat removal when normal decay heat removal systems fail. The FHR advanced natural circulation analysis (FANCY) code has been developed for assessment of passive decay heat removal capability and safety analysis of these innovative system designs. The FANCY code uses a one-dimensional, semi-implicit scheme to solve for pressure-linked mass, momentum and energy conservation equations. Graph theory is used to automatically generate a staggered mesh for complicated pipe network systems. Heat structure models have been implemented for three types of boundary conditions (Dirichlet, Neumann and Robin boundary conditions). Heat structures can be composed of several layers of different materials, and are used for simulation of heat structure temperature distribution and heat transfer rate. Control models are used to simulate sequences of events or trips of safety systems. A proportional-integral controller is also used to automatically make thermal hydraulic systems reach desired steady state conditions. A point kinetics model is used to model reactor kinetics behavior with temperature reactivity feedback. The underlying large sparse linear systems in these models are efficiently solved by using direct and iterative solvers provided by the SuperLU code on high performance machines. Input interfaces are designed to increase the flexibility of simulation for complicated thermal hydraulic systems. In conclusion, this paper mainly focuses on the methodology used to develop the FANCY code, and safety analysis of the Mark 1 pebble-bed FHR under development at UCB is performed.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Quasi-Dynamic Electromagnetic Field Safety Analysis and Mitigation for High-Power Dynamic Wireless Charging of Electric Vehicles

Dynamic wireless charging of electric vehicles (EV) is an emerging charging technology to enable non-contact wireless charging while the vehicle is moving. Compared to stationary wireless charging, in-motion wireless charging involves dynamic processes in which an EV is passing over the charging pads (transmitters). This in motion process makes the dynamic electromagnetic (EM) environment more complicated, and EM safety needs to be ensured under all circumstances. This is due to the fact that the entire vehicle body may be exposed to magnetic fields while the vehicle moves over the energized transmitter. This paper investigates several typical charging scenarios when EVs approach, pass over, and move away from the charging pads. Quasi-dynamic models, which are preliminarily verified by coils’ inductance measurements, are developed to analyze the dynamic process. Based on the quasi-dynamic analysis, shielding solutions are also studied to ensure EM safety for the dynamic wireless charging processes.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

FY2017 Updates to the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Safety Analysis Code

The SAS4A/SASSYS-1 safety analysis software is used to perform deterministic analysis of anticipated events as well as design-basis and beyond-design-basis accidents for advanced fast reactors. It plays a central role in the analysis of U.S. DOE conceptual designs, proposed test and demonstration reactors, and in domestic and international collaborations. This report summarizes the code development activities that have taken place during FY2017. Extensions to the void and cladding reactivity feedback models have been implemented, and Control System capabilities have been improved through a new virtual data acquisition system for plant state variables and an additional Block Signal for a variable lag compensator to represent reactivity feedback for novel shutdown devices. Current code development and maintenance needs are also summarized in three key areas: software quality assurance, modeling improvements, and maintenance of related tools. With ongoing support, SAS4A/SASSYS-1 can continue to fulfill its growing role in fast reactor safety analysis and help solidify DOE’s leadership role in fast reactor safety both domestically and in international collaborations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Level-3 Probabilistic Safety Analysis VAB-3 as an NPP Safety Enhancement Stage

Questions pertaining to the development of reactors from the standpoint of the evolution of protection and emergency response systems for large radiation accidents, and development of probabilistic safety analysis at different levels are examined. Examples are presented of the calculation of quantitative characteristics of risk in an accident at a model NPP that show the possibility of using VAB-3 to evaluate the scale of countermeasures as a function of the level of intervention, their effectiveness as a function of the time of application and validation of countermeasures for an individual populated point. It is shown that the VAB-3 methodology must be developed in order to increase NPP safety.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Draft Feasibility Assessment for Use of AI in Preparing Transportation Safety Analysis Reports

Preparing transportation safety analysis reports for microreactors is time and labor intensive, requiring extensive cross referencing to Federal regulations, previously approved documents, and expert review comments across structural, thermal, criticality, shielding, containment, and security. These burdens are magnified by the novelty of microreactor technologies and the evolving regulatory landscape, as well as current workforce constraints. Generative AI and supporting machine learning tools present an opportunity to accelerate drafting timelines, lift generalized writing burdens, and systematically enforce regulatory adherence through retrieval augmented generation and other knowledge retrieval and mapping methods. This draft report presents a preliminary feasibility assessment of the use of AI to expedite the preparation of microreactor transportation safety analysis reports and proposes an initial methodology for doing so.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Evaluation of AI-Enabled Digital Documented Safety Analysis: A Case Study

Safety basis documentation development and review under U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) authorization have emerged as critical constraint throttling deployment of advanced nuclear reactors, with traditional processes demanding extraordinary resource investment that delays the delivery of these technologies. Traditional Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) processes rely on static documents with limited traceability [U.S. DOE]. The regulatory review and engagement processes are similarly constrained, often requiring significant effort and extensive manual verification. The scale of this challenge is exemplified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review of the NuScale application, which required over 250,000 staff hours and the evaluation of approximately two million pages of documentation [Bergman 2021]. The volume and complexity of information within nuclear licensing applications or authorization reviews demands innovative approaches to document generation and data management.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR PACKAGING SHIELDING & NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY COURSES DEVELOPED AND CONDUCTED BY OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program, Office of Packaging and Transportation, is offering Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Shielding and Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) courses for SARP generalists and analysts. The SARP generalist course is designed for project managers, supervisors, NCS/shielding subject matter experts (SME), and SMEs in non-NCS/shielding technical areas (e.g., structural, thermal, package design) who need to improve their understanding of how NCS/shielding analyses fit into the broader spectrum of SARP documentation. The generalist course provides an overview of the regulations and guidelines for the criticality and shielding analyses included in a SARP, and it illustrates how the NCS/shielding chapters integrate with the other parts of the SARP. After course material is presented, students in the generalist course will review an actual SARP document to examine key elements of the shielding and criticality analyses. The analyst course provides detailed instructions on the radioactive material package shielding analyses and NCS evaluation fundamentals needed by analysts/practitioners, including safety analysts and/or technical reviewers, to prepare and/or review technical analyses for SARP documentation. The analyst course also provides an overview of regulations and guidelines, in addition to detailed in-class exercises associated with package shielding and NCS analyses. Analysis teams will be faced with staged SARP examples in which several important decision processes in the generation of a SARP will be demonstrated and discussed. Both courses are offered at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and for interested students, the analyst course is offered for one hour of graduate credit (course ME-690) from the University of Nevada at Reno. An overview of the course will be provided to ensure that the NCS community is aware of the course and its intent to support the shielding and NCS aspects of packaging and transportation analyses for SARP activities.

Bowen, Douglas G.↗

Safety Analysis for the Versatile Test Reactor Conceptual Design

Safety analysis simulations have been carried out using the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 safety analysis code system to update the baseline set of results for the Versatile Test Reactor conceptual design. Results from a previous revision of this work provided input for the Conceptual Safety Design Report summarizing the overall safety basis for the VTR. This work will also support future analyses that will be required for Chapter 13, “Accident Analysis,” of a preliminary safety analysis report. A number of transients have been evaluated based on categories of postulated accident sequences suggested for consideration in NUREG-1537. Ultimately, the full spectrum of event initiators and subsequent accident sequences will be defined through a probabilistic risk assessment of the plant design following the implementation of the Licensing Modernization Project guidelines as described in the VTR Safety Design Strategy. Since that process is ongoing, the present analysis addresses several transients that are expected to be bounding accident scenarios that represent the three key ways to perturb a reactor: through changes to the core inlet temperature, mass flow rate, or reactivity. These correspond to a loss of heat sink (LOHS), loss of flow (LOF) or station blackout (SBO), and transient overpower (TOP), respectively. Both Protected and Unprotected versions of these transients have been evaluated, along with additional transients that include transient overpower with one stuck rod, pump coast-down failures, seismic events, and overcooling events. At the current stage of design, transient simulation results for the Versatile Test Reactor indicate that large safety margins exist for many event initiators. However, several “enabling” assumptions have been made, in terms of both design features and design limits, in order to perform the analyses; and these assumptions will need to be revised as the design matures. In addition, a larger spectrum of events needs to be evaluated as part of the on-going probabilistic risk assessment process.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Safety analysis report for packaging shielding and nuclear criticality safety courses developed and conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program, Office of Packaging and Transportation, is offering Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Shielding and Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) courses for SARP generalists and analysts. The SARP generalist course is designed for project managers, supervisors, NCS/shielding subject matter experts (SME), and SMEs in non-NCS/shielding technical areas (e.g., structural, thermal, package design) who need to better understand how NCS/shielding analyses fit into the broader body of SARP documentation. The generalist course provides an overview of the regulations and guidelines for the criticality and shielding analyses for a SARP and illustrates how the NCS/shielding chapters integrate with the other parts of the SARP. After course material is presented, students in the generalist course will review an actual SARP document to examine key elements of the shielding and criticality analyses. The analyst course provides detailed instructions on the radioactive material package shielding analyses and NCS evaluation fundamentals needed by analysts/practitioners (i.e., safety analysts and/or technical reviewers) to prepare and/or review technical analyses for the SARP documentation. The analyst course also provides an overview of regulations and guidelines, in addition to detailed in-class exercises associated with package shielding and NCS analyses. Analysis teams will be faced with staged SARP examples in which several important decision processes in the generation of a SARP will be demonstrated and discussed. The courses are offered at Oak Ridge National Laboratory's National Transportation Research Center. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Preliminary Safety Analysis of the Gorleben Site: Safety Concept and Application to Scenario Development Based on a Site-Specific Features, Events and Processes (FEP) Database - 13304

Based upon the German safety criteria, released in 2010 by the Federal Ministry of the Environment (BMU), a safety concept and a safety assessment concept for the disposal of heat-generating high-level waste have both been developed in the framework of the preliminary safety case for the Gorleben site (Project VSG). The main objective of the disposal is to contain the radioactive waste inside a defined rock zone, which is called containment-providing rock zone. The radionuclides shall remain essentially at the emplacement site, and at the most, a small defined quantity of material shall be able to leave this rock zone. This shall be accomplished by the geological barrier and a technical barrier system, which is required to seal the inevitable penetration of the geological barrier by the construction of the mine. The safe containment has to be demonstrated for probable and less probable evolutions of the site, while evolutions with very low probability (less than 1 % over the demonstration period of 1 million years) need not to be considered. Owing to the uncertainty in predicting the real evolution of the site, plausible scenarios have been derived in a systematic manner. Therefore, a comprehensive site-specific features, events and processes (FEP) data base for the Gorleben site has been developed. The safety concept was directly taken into account, e.g. by identification of FEP with direct influence on the barriers that provide the containment. No effort was spared to identify the interactions of the FEP, their probabilities of occurrence, and their characteristics (values). The information stored in the data base provided the basis for the development of scenarios. The scenario development methodology is based on FEP related to an impairment of the functionality of a subset of barriers, called initial barriers. By taking these FEP into account in their probable characteristics the reference scenario is derived. Thus, the reference scenario describes a comprehensive set of probable future evolutions of the repository site. By stepwise consideration of less probable FEP or less probable characteristics of FEP within this process, alternative scenarios are also developed, which are characterized by a lower probability of occurrence. An important methodological aspect is that some assumptions had to be made for the scenario development. They allow, on the one hand, to deal systematically with incomplete knowledge regarding the geological situation below ground owing to restricted site investigations, and, on the other hand, to structure the scenario development process. The consideration of alternative assumptions may result in additional alternative scenarios. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗