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At least 19 records

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NASA NTRS2013

A Formal Basis for Safety Case Patterns

By capturing common structures of successful arguments, safety case patterns provide an approach for reusing strategies for reasoning about safety. In the current state of the practice, patterns exist as descriptive specifications with informal semantics, which not only offer little opportunity for more sophisticated usage such as automated instantiation, composition and manipulation, but also impede standardization efforts and tool interoperability. To address these concerns, this paper gives (i) a formal definition for safety case patterns, clarifying both restrictions on the usage of multiplicity and well-founded recursion in structural abstraction, (ii) formal semantics to patterns, and (iii) a generic data model and algorithm for pattern instantiation. We illustrate our contributions by application to a new pattern, the requirements breakdown pattern, which builds upon our previous work

Formal Methods↗

NASA NTRS2009

A Mathematical Basis for the Safety Analysis of Conflict Prevention Algorithms

In air traffic management systems, a conflict prevention system examines the traffic and provides ranges of guidance maneuvers that avoid conflicts. This guidance takes the form of ranges of track angles, vertical speeds, or ground speeds. These ranges may be assembled into prevention bands: maneuvers that should not be taken. Unlike conflict resolution systems, which presume that the aircraft already has a conflict, conflict prevention systems show conflicts for all maneuvers. Without conflict prevention information, a pilot might perform a maneuver that causes a near-term conflict. Because near-term conflicts can lead to safety concerns, strong verification of correct operation is required. This paper presents a mathematical framework to analyze the correctness of algorithms that produce conflict prevention information. This paper examines multiple mathematical approaches: iterative, vector algebraic, and trigonometric. The correctness theories are structured first to analyze conflict prevention information for all aircraft. Next, these theories are augmented to consider aircraft which will create a conflict within a given lookahead time. Certain key functions for a candidate algorithm, which satisfy this mathematical basis are presented; however, the proof that a full algorithm using these functions completely satisfies the definition of safety is not provided.

Maddalon, Jeffrey M.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Classification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. UAS Classification/Categorization for Certification

Category, class, and type designations are primary means to identify appropriate aircraft certification basis, operating rules/limitations, and pilot qualifications to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS). The question is whether UAS fit into existing aircraft categories or classes, or are unique enough to justify the creation of a new category/class. In addition, the characteristics or capabilities, which define when an UAS becomes a regulated aircraft, must also be decided. This issue focuses on UAS classification for certification purposes. Several approaches have been considered for classifying UAS. They basically group into either using a weight/mass basis, or a safety risk basis, factoring in the performance of the UAS, including where the UAS would operate. Under existing standards, aircraft must have a Type Certificate and Certificate of Airworthiness, in order to be used for "compensation or hire", a major difference from model aircraft. Newer technologies may make it possible for very small UAS to conduct commercial services, but that is left for a future discussion to extend the regulated aircraft to a lower level. The Access 5 position is that UAS are aircraft and should be regulated above the weight threshold differentiating them from model airplanes. The recommended classification grouping is summarized in a chart.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2015

Towards a Formal Basis for Modular Safety Cases

Safety assurance using argument-based safety cases is an accepted best-practice in many safety-critical sectors. Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), which is widely used for presenting safety arguments graphically, provides a notion of modular arguments to support the goal of incremental certification. Despite the efforts at standardization, GSN remains an informal notation whereas the GSN standard contains appreciable ambiguity especially concerning modular extensions. This, in turn, presents challenges when developing tools and methods to intelligently manipulate modular GSN arguments. This paper develops the elements of a theory of modular safety cases, leveraging our previous work on formalizing GSN arguments. Using example argument structures we highlight some ambiguities arising through the existing guidance, present the intuition underlying the theory, clarify syntax, and address modular arguments, contracts, well-formedness and well-scopedness of modules. Based on this theory, we have a preliminary implementation of modular arguments in our toolset, AdvoCATE.

Safety↗

NASA NTRS2019

Human Performance Contributions to Safety in Commercial Aviation

Every day in aviation, pilots, air traffic controllers, and other front-line personnel perform countless correct judgments and actions in a variety of operational environments. These judgments and actions are often the difference between an accident and a non-event. Ironically, data on these behaviors are rarely collected or analyzed. Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. Large volumes of data are collected on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that result in routine successful outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of nonrepresentative safety data. This assessment aimed to find and document “safety successes” made possible by human operators. With many Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Programs and Projects focusing on increased automation and autonomy and decreased human involvement, failure to fully consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a significant risk — a risk that has not been recognized to date. Without understanding how humans contribute to safety, any estimate of predicted safety of autonomous capabilities is incomplete and inherently suspect. Furthermore, understanding the ways in which humans contribute to safety can promote strategic interactions among safety technologies, functions, procedures and the people using them. Without this understanding, the full benefits of an integrated, optimized human/technology or autonomous system will not be realized. Historically, safety has been consistently defined in terms of the occurrence of accidents or recognized risks (i.e., in terms of things that go wrong). These adverse outcomes are explained by identifying their causes, and safety is restored by eliminating or mitigating these causes. An alternative to this approach is to focus on what goes right and identify how to replicate that process. Focusing on the rare cases of failures attributed to “human error” provides little information about why human performance routinely prevents adverse events. Hollnagel has proposed that things go right because people continuously adjust their work to match their operating conditions. These adjustments become increasingly important as systems continue to grow in complexity. Thus, the definition of safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that go wrong” but “ensuring that things go right.” The basis for safety management requires developing an understanding of everyday activities. However, few mechanisms to monitor everyday work exist in the aviation domain, which limits opportunities to learn how designs function in reality. This concept of safety thinking and safety management is reflected in the emerging field of resilience engineering. According to Hollnagel, a system is resilient if it can sustain required operations under expected and unexpected conditions by adjusting its functioning prior to, during, or following changes, disturbances, and opportunities. To explore “positive” behaviors that contribute to resilient performance in commercial aviation, the assessment team examined a range of existing sources of data about pilot and air traffic control (ATC) tower controller performance, including subjective interviews with domain experts and objective aircraft flight data records. These data were used to identify strategies that support resilient performance, methods for exploring and refining those strategies in existing data, and proposed methods for capturing and analyzing new data.

Null, Cynthia H.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Informing New Concepts for UAS and Autonomous System Safety Management using Disaster Management and First Responder Scenarios

As emerging flight operations become more prevalent and increasingly automated and distributed, the capabilities for managing safety of vehicles and operations will also need to evolve. To address this challenge, the National Academies has envisioned an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) capability for a wide range of aviation operations including current commercial operations as well as new entrants envisioned with advanced air mobility (AAM). The suite of IASMS services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) would be implemented in a federated approach and would address trends as well as individual operations. Through predictive modeling and data analysis, IASMS is envisioned to identify arising risks so that they can be mitigated, in-time, before a safety incident occurs. IASMS and its requisite set of SFCs must leverage a wide range of information to perform. To better understand these new needs, FSF worked with the aviation and humanitarian communities to develop and validate scenarios that include traditional aviation operations and UAS operations intermingled as they are deployed for disaster management and first responder (DMFR) situations. The three scenarios developed include: • Post Natural disaster response, such as a hurricane, involving multiple parties utilizing traditional aviation and UAS to support rescue operations, surveil damage, and locate survivors needing assistance. • Wildfire fighting in remote locations with traditional aircraft for transport and fire-retardant delivery combined with UAS for surveillance of fire locations as well as to track individual firefighter locations. • Medical Operations and AAM in Urban Environments including passenger-carrying helicopters and AAM vehicles, medical missions (such as transport of radio-pharmaceuticals), and other UAS delivery operations (such as the delivery of defibrillators). Each scenario was developed and validated by representatives with expertise in humanitarian operations, urban and rural emergency response, air traffic management, UAS operations, and traditional flight operations. The scenario definitions address roles and responsibilities of individual actors, the appropriate utilization of UAS, and the actions taken by those actors to appropriately manage risks associated with the mission and environment. The risks to aviation traffic and to people on the ground explored included potential risks arising from incompatibilities in calculating reference altitudes (eg, differing uses of AGL, MSL, barometric, or GPS-derived values), loss of command and control (C2) communications, rapid changes in weather and winds, and physical interference. For each risk, IASMS SFCs were postulated in the context of monitoring services, risk assessment capabilities, and identifying appropriate mitigation strategies. The identified SFC capabilities were envisioned from known services postulated for IASMS and for UTM. For these unique environments, IASMS SFCs are needed to address conditions such as hazardous payloads, micro-climates and urban canyons, and the need to keep uninvolved air traffic out of the area where DMFR operations are being conducted. The second phase of analysis focused on inferring the specific information needs and the SFCs for IASMS, utilizing a structure of 16 information classes to organize requirements. For each of the risks identified in the workshops, it was postulated what data sources would be necessary to monitor critical aspects of the risk (eg, surrounding air traffic, ground population, terrain, etc). to be directly measured as well as data that would be derived, which implies additional SFCs for different actors to understand what information would likely be exchanged between parties. For an IASMS to be effective, additional research is needed to develop the advanced algorithms that can address the increasingly autonomous and complex operations in differing environments and to develop means of identifying unknown risks. Looking at these scenarios highlighted a number of research issues. These include the ability to quickly "cordon off" airspace thru temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) or other means, developing clear definitions to enable automation-based algorithms for prioritizing operations, defining airspace density metrics, standardization of altitude reporting, and establishing a basis for safety data metrics definition and collection. This paper seeks to outline the development of an IASMS in the context of the DMFR scenarios and resulting demonstrations. Utilizing this contextual approach, NASA will generate recommendations for an assured safety framework for AAM operations that enables AAM operations to safely access the NAS.

In Time Aviation Safety Management System↗

NASA NTRS1992

An assessment of waste processing/resource recovery technologies for lunar/Mars life applications

NASA's future manned missions to explore the solar system are by nature of long duration, mandating extensive regeneration of life support consumables from wastes generated in space-based habitats. Long-duration exploration missions would otherwise be prohibitive due to the number and frequency of energy-intensive resupply missions from Earth. Resource recovery is therefore a critical component of the controlled ecological life support system (CELSS). In order to assess resource recovery technologies for CELSS applications, the Crew and Thermal Systems Division at NASA-Johnson Space Center convened a three-day workshop to assess potential resource recovery technologies for application in a space-based CELSS. This paper describes the methodology of assessing and ranking of these technologies. Recommendations and issues are identified. Evaluations focused on the processes for handling and treatment of inedible plant biomass, human waste, and human generated trash. Technologies were assessed on the basis of safety, reliability, technology readiness, and performance characteristics.

Verostko, Charles E.↗

NASA NTRS2015

"Evidence" Under a Magnifying Glass: Thoughts on Safety Argument Epistemology

Common definitions of "safety case" emphasize that evidence is the basis of a safety argument, yet few widely referenced works explicitly define "evidence". Their examples suggest that similar things can be regarded as evidence. But the category evidence seems to contain (1) processes for finding things out, (2) information resulting from such processes, and (3) relevant documents. Moreover, any item of evidence could be replaced by further argument. Normative models of informal argumentation do not offer clear guidance on when a safety argument should cite evidence rather than appeal to a more detailed argument. Disciplines such as the law address the problem with a practical, domain-specific epistemology. In this paper, we explore these problems associated with evidence citations in safety arguments, identify goals for a theory of safety argument evidence and a practical safety argument epistemology, propose a model of safety evidence citation that advances the identified goals, and present a related extension to the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN).

Graydon, P. J.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This Annual Report of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) presents results of activities during calendar year 2001. The year was marked by significant achievements in the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs and encouraging accomplishments by the Aerospace Technology Enterprise. Unfortunately, there were also disquieting mishaps with the X-43, a LearJet, and a wind tunnel. Each mishap was analyzed in an orderly process to ascertain causes and derive lessons learned. Both these accomplishments and the responses to the mishaps led the Panel to conclude that safety and risk management is currently being well served within NASA. NASA's operations evidence high levels of safety consciousness and sincere efforts to place safety foremost. Nevertheless, the Panel's safety concerns have never been greater. This dichotomy has arisen because the focus of most NASA programs has been directed toward program survival rather than effective life cycle planning. Last year's Annual Report focused on the need for NASA to adopt a realistically long planning horizon for the aging Space Shuttle so that safety would not erode. NASA's response to the report concurred with this finding. Nevertheless, there has been a greater emphasis on current operations to the apparent detriment of long-term planning. Budget cutbacks and shifts in priorities have severely limited the resources available to the Space Shuttle and ISS for application to risk-reduction and life-extension efforts. As a result, funds originally intended for long-term safety-related activities have been used for operations. Thus, while safety continues to be well served at present, the basis for future safety has eroded. Section II of this report develops this theme in more detail and presents several important, overarching findings and recommendations that apply to many if not all of NASA's programs. Section III of the report presents other significant findings, recommendations and supporting material applicable to specific program areas. Appendix A presents a list of Panel members. Appendix B contains the reaction of the ASAP to NASA's response to the calendar year 2000 findings and recommendations. In accordance with a practice started last year, this Appendix includes brief narratives as well as classifications of the responses as 'open,' 'closed,' or 'continuing.' Appendix C details the Panel's activities during the reporting period.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2014

Querying Safety Cases

Querying a safety case to show how the various stakeholders' concerns about system safety are addressed has been put forth as one of the benefits of argument-based assurance (in a recent study by the Health Foundation, UK, which reviewed the use of safety cases in safety-critical industries). However, neither the literature nor current practice offer much guidance on querying mechanisms appropriate for, or available within, a safety case paradigm. This paper presents a preliminary approach that uses a formal basis for querying safety cases, specifically Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) argument structures. Our approach semantically enriches GSN arguments with domain-specific metadata that the query language leverages, along with its inherent structure, to produce views. We have implemented the approach in our toolset AdvoCATE, and illustrate it by application to a fragment of the safety argument for an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) being developed at NASA Ames. We also discuss the potential practical utility of our query mechanism within the context of the existing framework for UAS safety assurance.

Safety Case↗

NASA NTRS1979

Safety, reliability, maintainability and quality provisions for the Space Shuttle program

This publication establishes common safety, reliability, maintainability and quality provisions for the Space Shuttle Program. NASA Centers shall use this publication both as the basis for negotiating safety, reliability, maintainability and quality requirements with Shuttle Program contractors and as the guideline for conduct of program safety, reliability, maintainability and quality activities at the Centers. Centers shall assure that applicable provisions of the publication are imposed in lower tier contracts. Centers shall give due regard to other Space Shuttle Program planning in order to provide an integrated total Space Shuttle Program activity. In the implementation of safety, reliability, maintainability and quality activities, consideration shall be given to hardware complexity, supplier experience, state of hardware development, unit cost, and hardware use. The approach and methods for contractor implementation shall be described in the contractors safety, reliability, maintainability and quality plans. This publication incorporates provisions of NASA documents: NHB 1700.1 'NASA Safety Manual, Vol. 1'; NHB 5300.4(IA), 'Reliability Program Provisions for Aeronautical and Space System Contractors'; and NHB 5300.4(1B), 'Quality Program Provisions for Aeronautical and Space System Contractors'. It has been tailored from the above documents based on experience in other programs. It is intended that this publication be reviewed and revised, as appropriate, to reflect new experience and to assure continuing viability.

M S Malkin↗

NASA NTRS1981

Safety aspects of nuclear waste disposal in space

Safety issues involved in the disposal of nuclear wastes in space as a complement to mined geologic repositories are examined as part of an assessment of the feasibility of nuclear waste disposal in space. General safety guidelines for space disposal developed in the areas of radiation exposure and shielding, containment, accident environments, criticality, post-accident recovery, monitoring systems and isolation are presented for a nuclear waste disposal in space mission employing conventional space technology such as the Space Shuttle. The current reference concept under consideration by NASA and DOE is then examined in detail, with attention given to the waste source and mix, the waste form, waste processing and payload fabrication, shipping casks and ground transport vehicles, launch site operations and facilities, Shuttle-derived launch vehicle, orbit transfer vehicle, orbital operations and space destination, and the system safety aspects of the concept are discussed for each component. It is pointed out that future work remains in the development of an improved basis for the safety guidelines and the determination of the possible benefits and costs of the space disposal option for nuclear wastes.

Rice, E. E.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT and E) Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems

A team directed by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) collected methodologies for how best to develop safe and reliable human rated systems and how to identify the drivers that provide the basis for assessing safety and reliability. The team also identified techniques, methodologies, and best practices to assure that NASA can develop safe and reliable human rated systems. The results are drawn from a wide variety of resources, from experts involved with the space program since its inception to the best-practices espoused in contemporary engineering doctrine. This report focuses on safety and reliability considerations and does not duplicate or update any existing references. Neither does it intend to replace existing standards and policy.

Miller, James↗

NASA NTRS2008

Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT and E) Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems

Miller, James↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Expertise and the Perils of Novelty

Emerging aviation markets such as urban air mobility are giving rise to new technologies and means of operation. However, novelty may hide ‘unknown unknowns,’ raising new hazards. This paper examines how expertise and safety techniques enable transformative technologies such as reduced crew operations, hybrid wing-borne and rotor-born flight, federated air traffic services, and urban operations. We explore how analysts use expertise to address common-cause failures, collect and interpret safety data, and perform exacting tradeoffs between dissimilarity, redundancy, independence, and diversity (human, process lifecycle, or otherwise) to ensure safety. When novelty is present, analysts might not possess the expertise needed to fully understand the implications of design decisions and tradeoffs being made, especially in early lifecycle phases, on emergent properties such as safety. Safety expertise must be carefully cultivated. The conflicting views of safety experts must be unpacked to identify the divergence in fundamental assumptions, models, means, and methods that may be causing them. Once systems venture beyond the basis of what safety expertise can reliably guarantee, projects take on risk that must be managed. The paper contains key takeaways and actionable recommendations for novel OEMs and regulators touching on topics such as robust monitoring; clear and transparent reporting; incremental approaches to fielding novel systems in hazard-rich, risk-tolerant environments; the cultivation of safety culture and expertise in an organization; and the use of scientific study to reduce epistemic uncertainty in novel operations with new technologies. Since excessive novelty in aviation can undermine the current foundation of safety, humility and incrementalism are necessary to enable emerging aviation markets safely.

safety expertise↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Expertise and the Perils of Novelty

safety expertise↗

NASA NTRS2000

A Safety Index and Method for Flightdeck Evaluation

If our goal is to improve safety through machine, interface, and training design, then we must define a metric of flightdeck safety that is usable in the design process. Current measures associated with our notions of "good" pilot performance and ultimate safety of flightdeck performance fail to provide an adequate index of safe flightdeck performance for design evaluation purposes. The goal of this research effort is to devise a safety index and method that allows us to evaluate flightdeck performance holistically and in a naturalistic experiment. This paper uses Reason's model of accident causation (1990) as a basis for measuring safety, and proposes a relational database system and method for 1) defining a safety index of flightdeck performance, and 2) evaluating the "safety" afforded by flightdeck performance for the purpose of design iteration. Methodological considerations, limitations, and benefits are discussed as well as extensions to this work.

Latorella, Kara A.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Quantifying Pilot Contribution to Flight Safety During an In-Flight Airspeed Failure

Accident statistics cite the flight crew as a causal factor in over 60% of large transport fatal accidents. Yet a well-trained and well-qualified crew is acknowledged as the critical center point of aircraft systems safety and an integral component of the entire commercial aviation system. A human-in-the-loop test was conducted using a Level D certified Boeing 737-800 simulator to evaluate the pilot's contribution to safety-of-flight during routine air carrier flight operations and in response to system failures. To quantify the human's contribution, crew complement was used as an independent variable in a between-subjects design. This paper details the crew's actions and responses while dealing with an in-flight airspeed failure. Accident statistics often cite flight crew error (Baker, 2001) as the primary contributor in accidents and incidents in transport category aircraft. However, the Air Line Pilots Association (2011) suggests "a well-trained and well-qualified pilot is acknowledged as the critical center point of the aircraft systems safety and an integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation system." This is generally acknowledged but cannot be verified because little or no quantitative data exists on how or how many accidents/incidents are averted by crew actions. Anecdotal evidence suggest crews handle failures on a daily basis and Aviation Safety Action Program data generally supports this assertion, even if the data is not released to the public. However without hard evidence, the contribution and means by which pilots achieve safety of flight is difficult to define. Thus, ways to improve the human ability to contribute or overcome deficiencies are ill-defined.

Etherington, Timothy J.↗