Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “safety testing”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

Comparison of fission product release predictions using PARFUME with results from the AGR-1 safety tests

Safety tests were conducted on fuel compacts from AGR-1, the first irradiation experiment of the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) Fuel Development and Qualification program, at temperatures ranging from 1600 to 1800 °C to determine fission product release at temperatures that bound reactor accident conditions. The PARFUME (PARticle FUel ModEl) code was used to predict the release of fission products silver, cesium, strontium, and krypton from fuel compacts containing tristructural isotropic (TRISO) coated particles during 15 of these safety tests. Comparisons between PARFUME predictions and post-irradiation examination results of the safety tests were conducted on two types of AGR-1 compacts: compacts containing only intact particles and compacts containing one or more particles whose SiC layers failed during safety testing. In both cases, PARFUME globally over-predicted the experimental release fractions by several orders of magnitude: more than three (intact) and two (failed SiC) orders of magnitude for silver, more than three and up to two orders of magnitude for strontium, and up to two and more than one orders of magnitude for krypton. The release of cesium from intact particles was also largely over-predicted (by up to five orders of magnitude) but its release from particles with failed SiC was only over-predicted by a factor of about 3. These over-predictions can be largely attributed to an over-estimation of the diffusivities used in the modeling of fission product transport in TRISO-coated particles. The integral release nature of the data makes it difficult to estimate the individual over-estimations in the kernel or each coating layer. Nevertheless, a tentative assessment of correction factors to these diffusivities was performed to enable a better match between the modeling predictions and the safety testing results. The method could only be successfully applied to silver and cesium. In the case of strontium, correction factors could not be assessed because potential release during the safety tests could not be distinguished from matrix content released during irradiation. Furthermore, in the case of krypton, all the coating layers are partly retentive and the available data did not allow the level of retention in individual layers to be determined, hence preventing derivation of any correction factors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Comparison of fission product release predictions using PARFUME with results from the AGR-1 safety tests

Safety tests were conducted on fourteen fuel compacts from AGR-1, the first irradiation experiment of the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) Fuel Development and Qualification program, at temperatures ranging from 1600 to 1800°C to determine fission product release at temperatures that bound reactor accident conditions. The PARFUME (PARticle FUel ModEl) code was used to predict the release of fission products silver, cesium, strontium, and krypton from fuel compacts containing tristructural isotropic (TRISO) coated particles during the safety tests, and the predicted values were compared with experimental results. Preliminary comparisons between PARFUME predictions and post-irradiation examination (PIE) results of the safety tests show different trends in the prediction of the fractional release depending on the species, and it leads to different conclusions regarding the diffusivities used in the modeling of fission product transport in TRISO-coated particles: • For silver, the diffusivity in silicon carbide (SiC) might be over-estimated by a factor of at least 102 to 103 at 1600°C and 1700°C, and at least 10 to 102 at 1800°C. The diffusivity of silver in uranium oxy-carbide (UCO) might also be over-estimated, but the available data are insufficient to allow definitive conclusions to be drawn. • For cesium, the diffusivity in UCO might be over-estimated by a factor of at least 102 to 103 at 1600°C, 105 at 1700°C, and 103 at 1800°C. The diffusivity of cesium in SiC might also over-estimated, by a factor of 10 at 1600°C and 103 at 1700°C, based upon the comparisons between calculated and measured release fractions from intact particles. There is no available estimate at 1800°C since all the compacts heated up at 1800°C contain particles with failed SiC layers whose release dominates the release from intact particles. • For strontium, the diffusivity in SiC might be over-estimated by a factor of 10 to 102 at 1600 and 1700°C, and 102 to 103 at 1800°C. These values might be somewhat over-estimated because the strontium retention during irradiation cannot be assessed a priori, which affects the magnitude of the calculated release during safety testing. The diffusivity of strontium in UCO cannot be derived from these heating tests, but it is assumed to be modeled correctly using the IAEA recommended value for kernel diffusivity. • For krypton, there is no reliable release data for compacts heated up at 1600°C, which includes all the compacts containing only intact particles. At 1700 and 1800°C, comparisons show an over-prediction of the release from compacts containing particles with failed SiC by 1 to 1.5 orders of magnitude. The available data from these heating tests do not allow to determine which of the TRISO-coating’s layers diffusivities are under or over-estimated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safety Testing and Post-Safety Test Examination of AGR-2 UCO Compact 2-3-2 and AGR-2 UO2 Compact 3-4-1

In this report, results from 1800°C safety testing and post-safety-test PIE of AGR-2 UCO Compact 2-3-2 and 1700°C safety testing of AGR-2 UO2 Compact 3-4-1 are discussed and compared to previously reported results from 1800°C safety testing of AGR-2 UCO Compact 5-4-1 and 1600°C safety testing of compact “twins”: AGR-2 UCO Compact 2-3-1 and AGR-2 UO 2 Compact 3-4-2. These compact pairs are called “twins” because their symmetric locations in the irradiation test train resulted in similar irradiation conditions. Table 1 shows the calculated burnup in percent fissions per initial metal atom (FIMA), the fast neutron fluence (neutron energies > 0.18 MeV), and the average compact temperatures during irradiation for these compacts. Capsule 2 Compacts 2-3-2 and 2-3-1 were intentionally irradiated at notably higher temperature than compacts in the other AGR-2 capsules or those previously studied in the AGR-1 irradiation test. The Capsule 2 compacts provide insight into the irradiation and post-irradiation safety test performance at higher temperatures than typical HTGR operating temperatures.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Initial results from safety testing of US AGR-2 irradiation test fuel

Two cylindrical compacts containing tristructural isotropic (TRISO)-coated particles with kernels that contained a mixture of uranium carbide and uranium oxide (UCO) and two compacts with UO 2 -kernel TRISO particles have undergone 1600°C safety testing. These compacts were irradiated in the US Advanced Gas Reactor Fuel Development and Qualification Program's second irradiation test (AGR-2). The time-dependent releases of several radioisotopes ( 110m Ag, 134 Cs, 137 Cs, 154 Eu, 155 Eu, 90 Sr, and 85 Kr) were monitored while heating the fuel specimens to 1600°C in flowing helium for 300 h. The UCO compacts behaved similarly to previously reported 1600°C-safety-tested UCO compacts from the AGR-1 irradiation. No failed TRISO or failed SiC were detected (based on krypton and cesium release), and cesium release through intact SiC was very low. Release behavior of silver, europium, and strontium appeared to be dominated by inventory originally released through intact coating layers during irradiation but retained in the compact matrix until it was released during safety testing. Both UO 2 compacts exhibited cesium release from multiple particles whose SiC failed during the safety test. Europium and strontium release from these two UO 2 compacts appeared to be dominated by release from the particles with failed SiC. Silver release was characteristically like the release from the UCO compacts in that an initial release of the majority of silver trapped in the matrix occurred during ramping to 1600°C. However, additional silver release was observed later in the safety testing due to the UO 2 TRISO with failed SiC. Failure of the SiC layer in the UO 2 fuel appears to have been dominated by CO corrosion, as opposed to the palladium degradation observed in AGR-1 UCO fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Standardizing an Intermediate-Scale High Explosive Safety Test Suite

Small-scale safety testing, while successful in screening out extremely dangerous explosive compositions, does not fully characterize the explosive hazards associated with handling larger, consolidated or bare charges. It is proposed that intermediate-scale tests using consolidated charges in the range 25 mg – 1 kg are warranted to satisfactorily address the hazards. A standard for this intermediate-scale testing should be developed, proofed, peer-reviewed and adopted to assist in the development of safe new high explosive compositions across the complex. This whitepaper explains why current small-scale safety testing is insufficient to characterize the handling hazard, identifies the guiding aspects of explosive response that drive the handling hazards associated with larger consolidated charges, and proposes a suite of tests/experiments that can serve as a starting point for an intermediate-scale safety standard.

42 ENGINEERING↗

AGR-2 safety test predictions using the PARFUME code

This report documents calculations performed to predict failure probability of TRISO-coated fuel particles and diffusion of fission products through these particles during safety tests following the second irradiation test of the Advanced Gas Reactor program (AGR-2). The calculations include the modeling of the AGR-2 irradiation that occurred from June 2010 to October 2013 in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) and the modeling of a safety testing phase to support safety tests planned at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for a selection of AGR-2 compacts. The heat-up of AGR-2 compacts is a critical component of the AGR-2 fuel performance evaluation, and its objectives are to identify the effect of accident test temperature, burnup, and irradiation temperature on the performance of the fuel at elevated temperature. Safety testing of compacts will be followed by detailed examinations of the fuel particles to further evaluate fission product retention and behavior of the kernel and coatings. The modeling was performed using the particle fuel model computer code PARFUME developed at INL. PARFUME is an advanced gas-cooled reactor fuel performance modeling and analysis code (Miller 2009). It has been developed as an integrated mechanistic code that evaluates the thermal, mechanical, and physico-chemical behavior of fuel particles during irradiation to determine the failure probability of a population of fuel particles given the particle-to-particle statistical variations in physical dimensions and material properties that arise from the fuel fabrication process, accounting for all viable mechanisms that can lead to particle failure. The code also determines the diffusion of fission products from the fuel through the particle coating layers, and through the fuel matrix to the coolant boundary. The subsequent release of fission products is calculated at the compact level (release of fission products from the compact). PARFUME calculates the release fraction as the ratio of the number of atoms released from the compact to the amount produced in the compact fuel kernels and through uranium contamination. These safety test predictions aim at giving guidance for the upcoming safety tests to be conducted at ORNL and INL. The AGR-2 compacts modeled in this study belong to the four U.S. capsules of the AGR-2 irradiation test train. For each capsule, the compacts with the lowest and highest burnups were selected to provide a prediction envelope. The objective of this document is to present results of calculations and analyses made by PARFUME on these selected AGR-2 compacts. These results include: • Fuel failure probability • Palladium penetration • Fractional release of fission products Details associated with completion of these calculations are provided in the remainder of this document: the AGR-2 Safety Testing plan is briefly introduced in Section 2, PARFUME modeling is outlined in Section 3, results are described in Section 4, conclusions are given in Section 5, and references are listed in Section 6.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

HIGH-TEMPERATURE SAFETY TESTING OF IRRADIATED AGR-1 TRISO FUEL

High-Temperature Safety Testing of Irradiated AGR-1 TRISO Fuel John D. Stempien, Paul A. Demkowicz, Edward L. Reber, and Cad L. Christensen Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625 Idaho Falls, ID 83415, USA Corresponding Author: john.stempien@inl.gov, +1-208-526-8410 Two new safety tests of irradiated tristructural isotropic (TRISO) coated particle fuel have been completed in the Fuel Accident Condition Simulator (FACS) furnace at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). In the first test, three fuel compacts from the first Advanced Gas Reactor irradiation experiment (AGR-1) were simultaneously heated in the FACS furnace. Prior to safety testing, each compact was irradiated in the Advanced Test Reactor to a burnup of approximately 15 % fissions per initial metal atom (FIMA), a fast fluence of 3×1025 n/m2 (E > 0.18 MeV), and a time-average volume-average (TAVA) irradiation temperature of about 1020 °C. In order to simulate a core-conduction cool-down event, a temperature-versus-time profile having a peak temperature of 1700 °C was programmed into the FACS furnace controllers. Gaseous fission products (i.e., Kr-85) were carried to the Fission Gas Monitoring System (FGMS) by a helium sweep gas and captured in cold traps featuring online gamma counting. By the end of the test, a total of 3.9% of an average particle’s inventory of Kr-85 was detected in the FGMS traps. Such a low Kr-85 activity indicates that no TRISO failures (failure of all three TRISO layers) occurred during the test. If released from the compacts, condensable fission products (e.g., Ag-110m, Cs-134, Cs-137, Eu-154, Eu-155, and Sr-90) were collected on condensation plates fitted to the end of the cold finger in the FACS furnace. These condensation plates were then analyzed for fission products. In the second test, five loose UCO fuel kernels, obtained from deconsolidated particles from an irradiated AGR-1 compact, were heated in the FACS furnace to a peak temperature of 1600 °C. This test had two primary goals. First, the test was intended to assess the retention of fission products in loose kernels without the effects of the other TRISO layers (buffer, IPyC, SiC, and OPyC) or the graphitic matrix material comprising the compact. Second, this test served as an evaluation of the FACS fission product condensation plate collection efficiency.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Initial results from safety testing of US AGR-2 irradiation test fuel - 18574

Two cylindrical compacts containing tri-structural isotropic (TRISO)-coated particles with kernels that contained a mixture of uranium carbide and uranium oxide (UCO) and two compacts with UO{sub 2}-kernel TRISO particles have undergone 1600 deg. C safety testing. These compacts were irradiated in the US Advanced Gas Reactor Fuel Development and Qualification Program's second irradiation test (AGR-2). The time-dependent releases of several radioisotopes ({sup 110m}Ag, {sup 134}Cs, {sup 137}Cs, {sup 154}Eu, {sup 155}Eu, {sup 90}Sr, and {sup 85}Kr) were monitored while heating the fuel specimens to 1600 deg. C in flowing helium for 300 h. The UCO compacts behaved similarly to previously reported 1600 deg. C-safety-tested UCO compacts from the AGR-1 irradiation. No failed TRISO or failed SiC were detected (based on krypton and cesium release), and cesium release through intact SiC was very low. Release behavior of silver, europium, and strontium appeared to be dominated by inventory originally released through intact coating layers during irradiation but retained in the compact matrix until it was released during safety testing. Both UO{sub 2} compacts exhibited cesium release from multiple particles whose SiC failed during the safety test. Europium and strontium release from these two UO{sub 2} compacts appeared to be dominated by release from the particles with failed SiC. Silver release was characteristically similar to the release from the UCO compacts in that an initial release of the majority of silver trapped in the matrix occurred during ramping to 1600 deg. C. However, additional silver release was observed later in the safety testing due to the UO{sub 2} TRISO with failed SiC. Failure of the SiC layer in the UO{sub 2} fuel may have been dominated by CO corrosion, as opposed to the palladium degradation observed in AGR-1 UCO fuel. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Concentration of Actinides in Plant Mounds at Safety Test Nuclear Sites in Nevada

Plant mounds or blow-sand mounds are accumulations of soil particles and plant debris around large shrubs and are common features in deserts in the southwestern United States. Believed to be an important factor in their formation, the shrubs create surface roughness that causes wind-suspended particles to be deposited and resist further suspension. Shrub mounds occur in some plant communities on the Nevada Test Site, the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), and Tonopah Test Range (TTR), including areas of surface soil contamination from past nuclear testing. In the 1970s as part of early studies to understand properties of actinides in the environment, the Nevada Applied Ecology Group (NAEG) examined the accumulation of isotopes of Pu, {sup 241}Am, and U in plant mounds at safety test sites. The NAEG studies found concentrations of these contaminants to be greater in shrub mounds than in the surrounding areas of desert pavement. For example, at Project 57 on the NTTR, it was estimated that 15 percent of the radionuclide inventory of the site was associated with shrub mounds, which accounted for 17 percent of the surface area of the site, a ratio of inventory to area of 0.85. At Clean Slate III at the TTR, 29 percent of the inventory was associated with approximately 32 percent of the site covered by shrub mounds, a ratio of 0.91. While the total inventory of radionuclides in intershrub areas was greater, the ratio of radionuclide inventory to area was 0.40 and 0.38, respectively, at the two sites. The comparison between the shrub mounds and adjacent desert pavement areas was made for only the top 5 cm since radionuclides at safety test sites are concentrated in the top 5 cm of intershrub areas. Not accounting for radionuclides associated with the shrub mounds would cause the inventory of contaminants and potential exposure to be underestimated. As part of its Environmental Restoration Soils Subproject, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office has proposed that the majority of its contaminated soil 'Corrective Action Units', including the safety test sites, be closed by fencing and posting with administrative controls. The concentration of actinides in the shrub mounds has important implications for postclosure management of the safety test sites. Because resuspension factors at safety test sites can be three to four orders-of-magnitude higher than soil sites associated with atmospheric tests where criticality occurred, the shrub mounds are an important factor in stabilization of actinide contaminants. Loss of shrubs associated with mounds from fire or plant die-back from drought could cause radionuclides at these sites to become more prone to suspension and water erosion until the sites are stabilized. Alternatively, although shrub mounds are usually composed of predominantly fine sand size particles, smaller silt and clay size particles in them are often high in CaCO{sub 3} content. The CaCO{sub 3} may act as a cementing agent to limit erosion of the shrub mounds even if the vegetation cover is temporarily lost.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Fission product distribution in irradiated safety-tested and as-irradiated AGR-2 TRISO particles

In this work, two tristructural isotropic (TRISO)-coated nuclear fuel particles were examined by electron probe microanalysis (EPMA) as part of the Advanced Gas Reactor program. The compacts’ average irradiation temperatures ranged from approximately 1260 to 1290 °C. One particle was examined in the as-irradiated condition, while the other was subject to 1600 °C post-irradiation safety testing. This study was undertaken to test a newly-developed EPMA technique to determine fission product masses in TRISO particles on a layer-by-layer basis, and to compare fission product distributions between an as-irradiated and safety-tested particle. Fission product concentration profiles were collected along two radii in each particle, with measured concentrations used to compute the fission product mass in each TRISO particle layer. These measured masses were then compared to those predicted from ORIGEN modeling calculations. Data collected from these measurements show that for these two particles, masses determined via EPMA were within ± 20% of the calculated masses for the rare-earth elements, Mo, Zr, Cs, I, and Pd. Elements that tend to be less homogeneously distributed include Sr, Te, Eu, Ag, and possibly Ba. Measured Ag masses differed by more than 40% from the calculated mass. Lanthanides other than Eu remain primarily within the fuel kernel in the as-irradiated particle but in the safety-tested particle these element masses were divided approximately equally between the kernel and kernel periphery. In both particles, the majority of Sr and Eu accumulated in the carbon-rich kernel periphery, although in the safety-tested particle, Sr and Eu accumulated farther from the fuel kernel than occurred with irradiation alone. A greater mass fraction of mobile elements, such as Cs and I accumulated in the buffer and IPyC in the safety-tested particle as compared to the as-irradiated particle. When fully developed and tested, this mass balance approach to TRISO particle analysis has the potential to provide insight into fuel behavior.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safety Tests on Irradiated AGR-1 Compacts 3-3-2, 3-2-2, and 6-2-1

Post-irradiation examination (PIE) is in progress on coated particle fuel compacts from the first Advanced Gas Reactor irradiation experiment (AGR-1). The AGR-1 Post-Irradiation Examination Plan, INL/PLN- 2828/Rev. 1, includes safety testing of the irradiated compacts in the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Core Conduction Cooldown Test Facility (CCCTF) facility and the Idaho National Laboratory Fuel Accident Condition Simulator (FACS) to evaluate the effect of elevated temperature on the fuel microstructure and fission product retention. Safety tests will involve heating compacts for 100– 500 hours to maximum temperatures of 1600°C–1800°C, where 1600°C is the expected maximum temperature during a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor depressurization conduction cooldown event, and 1800°C is the expected temperature at which the performance of the SiC layer will begin to degrade. ORNL completed the first AGR-1 post-irradiation compact safety test in FY2011. During the first two quarters of FY2012, three additional safety tests were completed. Each of these three compacts was heated up to a maximum temperature of 1600°C and held at this temperature for a period of 300 hours. The standard heating profile specified in each compact examination plan called for a controlled ramp of the furnace to 1600°C with soaks at 400 and 1250°C, a hold at 1600°C for 300 hours, and then a controlled ramp back down to room temperature. The CCCTF performed as designed, except for a few interruptions while the furnace was being ramped up to 1600°C. These interruptions were caused by several power supply problems and one mechanical problem with the cold finger. The root causes of these issues have been identified and addressed to ensure better reliability for future CCCTF operation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

AGR-1 Safety Test Predictions using the PARFUME code

The PARFUME modeling code was used to predict failure probability of TRISO-coated fuel particles and diffusion of fission products through these particles during safety tests following the first irradiation test of the Advanced Gas Reactor program (AGR-1). These calculations support the AGR-1 Safety Testing Experiment, which is part of the PIE effort on AGR-1. Modeling of the AGR-1 Safety Test Predictions includes a 620-day irradiation followed by a 300-hour heat-up phase of selected AGR-1 compacts. Results include fuel failure probability, palladium penetration, and fractional release of fission products. Results show that no particle failure is predicted during irradiation or heat-up, and that fractional release of fission products is limited during irradiation but that it significantly increases during heat-up.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

PIE on Safety-Tested Loose Particles from Irradiated Compact 4-4-2

Post-irradiation examination (PIE) is being performed in support of tristructural isotropic (TRISO) coated particle fuel development and qualification for High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors (HTGRs). This work is sponsored by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) through the Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART) Office under the Advanced Gas Reactor Fuel Development and Qualification (AGR) Program. The AGR-1 experiment was the first in a series of TRISO fuel irradiation tests initiated in 2006. The AGR-1 TRISO particles and fuel compacts were fabricated at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in 2006 using laboratory-scale equipment and irradiated for 3 years in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to demonstrate and evaluate fuel performance under HTGR irradiation conditions. Post-irradiation examination was performed at INL and ORNL to study how the fuel behaved during irradiation, and to test fuel performance during exposure to elevated temperatures at or above temperatures that could occur during a depressurized conduction cooldown event. This report summarizes safety testing and post-safety testing PIE conducted at ORNL on loose particles extracted from irradiated AGR-1 Compact 4-4-2.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

PIE on safety-tested AGR-1 compact 4-2-2

Post-irradiation examination (PIE) is being performed in support of tristructural isotropic (TRISO) coated particle fuel development and qualification for High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors (HTGRs). AGR-1 was the first in a series of TRISO fuel irradiation experiments initiated in 2006 under the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) Fuel Development and Qualification Program [Petti et al. 2010]; this work continues to be funded by the Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy in support of Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART). AGR-1 fuel compacts were fabricated at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in 2006 and irradiated for 3 years in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to demonstrate and evaluate fuel performance under HTGR irradiation conditions. PIE is being performed at INL and ORNL to study how the fuel behaved during irradiation, and to test fuel performance during exposure to elevated temperatures at or above temperatures that could occur during a depressurized conduction cooldown event. This report summarizes safety testing and post-safety testing PIE recently completed at ORNL on irradiated AGR-1 Compact 4-2-2.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

PIE on Safety-tested AGR-1 Compacts 5-3-3, 5-1-3, and 3-2-3

Post-irradiation examination (PIE) is being performed in support of tristructural isotropic (TRISO) coated particle fuel development and qualification for High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors (HTGRs). AGR-1 was the first in a series of TRISO fuel irradiation experiments initiated in 2006 under the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) Fuel Development and Qualification Program; this work continues to be funded by the Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy in support of Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART). AGR-1 fuel compacts were fabricated at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in 2006 and irradiated for 3 years in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to demonstrate and evaluate fuel performance under HTGR irradiation conditions. PIE is being performed at INL and ORNL to study how the fuel behaved during irradiation, and to test fuel performance during exposure to elevated temperatures at or above temperatures that could occur during a depressurized conduction cooldown event. This report summarizes safety testing and post-safety testing PIE recently completed at ORNL on irradiated AGR-1 Compacts 5-3-3, 5-1-3, and 3-2-3.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safety Test on Irradiated Compact 4-2-2

Post-irradiation examination (PIE) is in progress on coated particle fuel compacts from the first Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) Fuel Development and Qualification irradiation experiment (AGR-1). The AGR-1 Post-Irradiation Examination Plan (INL/PLN-2828, Rev. 1) includes safety testing of the irradiated compacts in the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Core Conduction Cooldown Test Facility (CCCTF) and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Fuel Accident Condition Simulator (FACS) to evaluate the effect of elevated temperature on the fuel microstructure and fission product retention. Standard safety tests involve heating compacts to maximum temperatures of 1600, 1700, or 1800°C for typically 300 hours, where 1600°C is the expected maximum temperature during a high-temperature gascooled reactor (HTGR) depressurization conduction cooldown event, while 1700 and 1800°C explore the performance margin. The Compact 4-2-2 safety test was conducted using multiple hold temperatures from 1000–1600°C to investigate fission product retention at temperatures below 1600°C and during thermal cycling, with particular emphasis on silver retention behavior [INL/PLN-4714]. Previous tests produced unusual silver releases when temperatures were inadvertently or intentionally cycled between room temperature and 1600°C [ORNL/LTR-2012/396]; the Compact 4-2-2 test was designed to reproduce and explore these observations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗