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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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14 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2007

Pressure Sensitive Tape in the Manufacture of Reusable Solid Rocket Motors

ATK Launch Systems Inc. manufactures the reusable solid rocket motor (RSRM) for NASA's Space Shuttle program. They are used in pairs to launch the Space Shuttle. Pressure sensitive tape (PST) is used throughout the RSRM manufacturing process. A few PST functions are: 1) Secure labels; 2) Provide security seals; and 3) Protect tooling and flight hardware during various inert and live operations. Some of the PSTs used are: Cloth, Paper, Reinforced Teflon, Double face, Masking, and Vinyl. Factors given consideration for determining the type of tape to be used are: 1) Ability to hold fast; 2) Ability to release easily; 3) Ability to endure abuse; 4) Strength; and 5) Absence of adhesive residue after removal.

Champneys, Jeff↗
NASA NTRS2016

Empirical Analysis and Automated Classification of Security Bug Reports

With the ever expanding amount of sensitive data being placed into computer systems, the need for effective cybersecurity is of utmost importance. However, there is a shortage of detailed empirical studies of security vulnerabilities from which cybersecurity metrics and best practices could be determined. This thesis has two main research goals: (1) to explore the distribution and characteristics of security vulnerabilities based on the information provided in bug tracking systems and (2) to develop data analytics approaches for automatic classification of bug reports as security or non-security related. This work is based on using three NASA datasets as case studies. The empirical analysis showed that the majority of software vulnerabilities belong only to a small number of types. Addressing these types of vulnerabilities will consequently lead to cost efficient improvement of software security. Since this analysis requires labeling of each bug report in the bug tracking system, we explored using machine learning to automate the classification of each bug report as a security or non-security related (two-class classification), as well as each security related bug report as specific security type (multiclass classification). In addition to using supervised machine learning algorithms, a novel unsupervised machine learning approach is proposed. An ac- curacy of 92%, recall of 96%, precision of 92%, probability of false alarm of 4%, F-Score of 81% and G-Score of 90% were the best results achieved during two-class classification. Furthermore, an accuracy of 80%, recall of 80%, precision of 94%, and F-score of 85% were the best results achieved during multiclass classification.

Cybersecurity↗
NASA NTRS2017

NEPP Update of Independent Single Event Upset Field Programmable Gate Array Testing

This presentation provides a NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program update of independent Single Event Upset (SEU) Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) testing including FPGA test guidelines, Microsemi RTG4 heavy-ion results, Xilinx Kintex-UltraScale heavy-ion results, Xilinx UltraScale+ single event effect (SEE) test plans, development of a new methodology for characterizing SEU system response, and NEPP involvement with FPGA security and trust.

Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA); Triple Modul↗
NASA NTRS2018

Identification of Security related Bug Reports via Text Mining using Supervised and Unsupervised Classification

This paper is focused on automated classification of software bug reports to security and non-security related, using both supervised and unsupervised approaches. For both approaches, three types of feature vectors are used. For supervised learning, we experiment with multiple learning algorithms and training sets with different sizes. Furthermore, we propose a novel unsupervised approach based on anomaly detection. The evaluated is based on three NASA datasets. The results show that supervised classification is affected more by the learning algorithms than by feature vectors and using only 25% of the data for training provides as good results as if 90% of data are used for training. Both supervised and unsupervised learning can be used for identification of security bug reports; the former slightly outperforms the latter at the expense of labeling the testing set. In general, the performance differs across datasets, mainly due to the different amounts of security related information.

Goseva-Popstojanova, Katerina↗
NASA NTRS2015

Technology Candidates for Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground Data Exchange

Technology Candidates for Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground Data Exchange is a two-year research effort to visualize the U. S. aviation industry at a point 50 years in the future, and to define potential communication solutions to meet those future data exchange needs. The research team, led by XCELAR, was tasked with identifying future National Airspace System (NAS) scenarios, determining requirements and functions (including gaps), investigating technical and business issues for air, ground, & air-to-ground interactions, and reporting on the results. The project was conducted under technical direction from NASA and in collaboration with XCELAR's partner, National Institute of Aerospace, and NASA technical representatives. Parallel efforts were initiated to define the information exchange functional needs of the future NAS, and specific communication link technologies to potentially serve those needs. Those efforts converged with the mapping of each identified future NAS function to potential enabling communication solutions; those solutions were then compared with, and ranked relative to, each other on a technical basis in a structured analysis process. The technical solutions emerging from that process were then assessed from a business case perspective to determine their viability from a real-world adoption and deployment standpoint. The results of that analysis produced a proposed set of future solutions and most promising candidate technologies. Gap analyses were conducted at two points in the process, the first examining technical factors, and the second as part of the business case analysis. In each case, no gaps or unmet needs were identified in applying the solutions evaluated to the requirements identified. The future communication solutions identified in the research comprise both specific link technologies and two enabling technologies that apply to most or all specific links. As a result, the research resulted in a new analysis approach, viewing the underlying architecture of ground-air and air-air communications as a whole, rather than as simple "link to function" paired solutions. For the business case analysis, a number of "reference architectures" were developed for both the future technologies and the current systems, based on three typical configurations of current aircraft. Current and future costs were assigned, and various comparisons made between the current and future architectures. In general, it was assumed that if a future architecture offers lower cost than the current typical architecture, while delivering equivalent or better performance, it is likely that the future solution will gain industry acceptance. Conversely, future architectures presenting higher costs than their current counterparts must present a compelling benefit case in other areas or risk a lack of industry acceptance. The business case analysis consistently indicated lower costs for the proposed future architectures, and in most cases, significantly so. The proposed future solutions were found to offer significantly greater functionality, flexibility, and growth potential over time, at lower cost, than current systems. This was true for overall, fleet-wide equipage for domestic and oceanic air carriers, as well as for single, General Aviation (GA) aircraft. The overall research results indicate that all identified requirements can be met by the proposed solutions with significant capacity for future growth. Results also illustrate that the majority of the future communication needs can be met using currently allocated aviation RF spectrum, if used in more effective ways than it is today. A combination of such optimized aviation-specific links and commercial communication systems meets all identified needs for the 50-year future and beyond, with the caveat that a new, overall function will be needed to manage all information exchange, individual links, security, cost, and other factors. This function was labeled "Delivery Manager" (DM) within this research. DM employs a distributed client/server architecture, for both airborne and ground communications architectures. Final research results included identifying the most promising candidate technologies for the future system, conclusions and recommendations, and identifying areas where further research should be considered.

Communications↗
NASA NTRS2018

Engineering Trade-off Considerations Regarding Design-for-Security, Design-for-Verification, and Design-for-Test

The United States government has identified that application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) and field programmable gate array (FPGA) hardware are at risk from a variety of adversary attacks. This finding affects system security and trust. Consequently, processes are being developed for system mitigation and countermeasure application. The scope of this tutorial pertains to potential vulnerabilities and countermeasures within the ASIC/FPGA design cycle. The presentation demonstrates how design practices can affect the risk for the adversary to: change circuitry, steal intellectual property, and listen to data operations. An important portion of the design cycle is assuring the design is working as specified or as expected. This is accomplished by exhaustive testing of the target design. Alternatively, it has been shown that well established schemes for test coverage enhancement (design-for-verification (DFV) and design-for-test (DFT)) can create conduits for adversary accessibility. As a result, it is essential to perform a trade between robust test coverage versus reliable design implementation. The goal of this tutorial is to explain the evolution of design practices; review adversary accessibility points due to DFV and DFT circuitry insertion (back door circuitry); and to describe common engineering trade-off considerations for test versus adversary threats.

Design for reliability (DFR)↗
NASA NTRS2016

Reliable Design Versus Trust

This presentation focuses on reliability and trust for the users portion of the FPGA design flow. It is assumed that the manufacturer prior to hand-off to the user tests FPGA internal components. The objective is to present the challenges of creating reliable and trusted designs. The following will be addressed: What makes a design vulnerable to functional flaws (reliability) or attackers (trust)? What are the challenges for verifying a reliable design versus a trusted design?

Field Programmable Gate Aray (FPGA)↗
NASA NTRS2018

Government Microelectronics Assessment for Trust (GOMAT)

NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) is developing a process to be employed in critical applications. The framework assesses levels of trust and assurance in microelectronic systems. The process is being created with participation from a variety of organizations. We present a synopsis of the framework that includes contributions from The Aerospace Corporation.

Assurance↗
NASA NTRS1994

Development of Experiment Kits for Processing Biological Samples In-Flight on SLS-2

The design of the hematology experiment kits for SLS-2 has resulted in a modular, flexible configuration which maximizes crew efficiency and minimizes error and confusion when dealing with over 1200 different components over the course of the mission. The kit layouts proved to be very easy to use and their packaging design provided for positive, secure containment of the many small components. The secondary Zero(Tm) box enclosure also provided an effective means for transport of the kits within the Spacelab and for grouping individual kits by flight day usage. The kits are readily adaptable to use on future flights by simply replacing the inner components as required and changing the labelling scheme to match new mission requirements.

Jaquez, R.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Names Don't Fly: Smart Filters for Profanity Detection and Classification in User-Generated Content

Generally, names associate with a person’s identity. But what if in the pretext of a legitimate name and given the opportunity, users of software provide names to online web forms that carry along offensive language, slurs, and other profanity that is then sent to Mars ? The answer is simple: they don’t fly. In this paper,we perform model explorations to detect and classify inappropriate content in the names submitted from people across the world to ‘Send Your Names to MARS’ public engagement campaign.We propose a novel pipeline approach, that can effectively overcome the issues of lack of negative samples, noisy labels by gathering expert knowledge over time with human(s) in the loop and data augmentation, and achieve high accuracy in classifying inappropriate names with very little or no context. We describe cloud-based infrastructure to deploy our application and run predictions on large-scale data through our pipeline and achieve significant speedup over offline processes, with enhanced reliability and security.

Soderstrom, Tomas↗
NASA NTRS2016

Verification of Triple Modular Redundancy Insertion for Reliable and Trusted Systems

If a system is required to be protected using triple modular redundancy (TMR), improper insertion can jeopardize the reliability and security of the system. Due to the complexity of the verification process and the complexity of digital designs, there are currently no available techniques that can provide complete and reliable confirmation of TMR insertion. We propose a method for TMR insertion verification that satisfies the process for reliable and trusted systems.

Verification↗
NASA NTRS2016

Verification of Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) Insertion for Reliable and Trusted Systems

We propose a method for TMR insertion verification that satisfies the process for reliable and trusted systems. If a system is expected to be protected using TMR, improper insertion can jeopardize the reliability and security of the system. Due to the complexity of the verification process, there are currently no available techniques that can provide complete and reliable confirmation of TMR insertion. This manuscript addresses the challenge of confirming that TMR has been inserted without corruption of functionality and with correct application of the expected TMR topology. The proposed verification method combines the usage of existing formal analysis tools with a novel search-detect-and-verify tool. Field programmable gate array (FPGA),Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR),Verification, Trust, Reliability,

Trust↗
NASA NTRS2015

Analyzing Cyber Security Threats on Cyber-Physical Systems Using Model-Based Systems Engineering

The spectre of cyber attacks on aerospace systems can no longer be ignored given that many of the components and vulnerabilities that have been successfully exploited by the adversary on other infrastructures are the same as those deployed and used within the aerospace environment. An important consideration with respect to the mission/safety critical infrastructure supporting space operations is that an appropriate defensive response to an attack invariably involves the need for high precision and accuracy, because an incorrect response can trigger unacceptable losses involving lives and/or significant financial damage. A highly precise defensive response, considering the typical complexity of aerospace environments, requires a detailed and well-founded understanding of the underlying system where the goal of the defensive response is to preserve critical mission objectives in the presence of adversarial activity. In this paper, a structured approach for modeling aerospace systems is described. The approach includes physical elements, network topology, software applications, system functions, and usage scenarios. We leverage Model-Based Systems Engineering methodology by utilizing the Object Management Group's Systems Modeling Language to represent the system being analyzed and also utilize model transformations to change relevant aspects of the model into specialized analyses. A novel visualization approach is utilized to visualize the entire model as a three-dimensional graph, allowing easier interaction with subject matter experts. The model provides a unifying structure for analyzing the impact of a particular attack or a particular type of attack. Two different example analysis types are demonstrated in this paper: a graph-based propagation analysis based on edge labels, and a graph-based propagation analysis based on node labels.

MBSE↗