Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “security operations”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

Anatomy of a Security Operations Center

Many agencies and corporations are either contemplating or in the process of building a cyber Security Operations Center (SOC). Those Agencies that have established SOCs are most likely working on major revisions or enhancements to existing capabilities. As principle developers of the NASA SOC; this Presenters' goals are to provide the GFIRST community with examples of some of the key building blocks of an Agency scale cyber Security Operations Center. This presentation viII include the inputs and outputs, the facilities or shell, as well as the internal components and the processes necessary to maintain the SOC's subsistence - in other words, the anatomy of a SOC. Details to be presented include the SOC architecture and its key components: Tier 1 Call Center, data entry, and incident triage; Tier 2 monitoring, incident handling and tracking; Tier 3 computer forensics, malware analysis, and reverse engineering; Incident Management System; Threat Management System; SOC Portal; Log Aggregation and Security Incident Management (SIM) systems; flow monitoring; IDS; etc. Specific processes and methodologies discussed include Incident States and associated Work Elements; the Incident Management Workflow Process; Cyber Threat Risk Assessment methodology; and Incident Taxonomy. The Evolution of the Cyber Security Operations Center viII be discussed; starting from reactive, to proactive, and finally to proactive. Finally, the resources necessary to establish an Agency scale SOC as well as the lessons learned in the process of standing up a SOC viII be presented.

Wang, John↗

NASA Blue Team: Determining Operational Security Posture of Critical Systems and Networks

Emergence of Cybersecurity has increased the focus on security risks to Information Technology (IT) assets going beyond traditional Information Assurance (IA) concerns: More sophisticated threats have emerged from increasing sources as advanced hacker tools and techniques have emerged and proliferated to broaden the attack surface available across globally interconnected networks.

cybersecurity↗

Autonomous Satellite Operations Via Secure Virtual Mission Operations Center

The science community is interested in improving their ability to respond to rapidly evolving, transient phenomena via autonomous rapid reconfiguration, which derives from the ability to assemble separate but collaborating sensors and data forecasting systems to meet a broad range of research and application needs. Current satellite systems typically require human intervention to respond to triggers from dissimilar sensor systems. Additionally, satellite ground services often need to be coordinated days or weeks in advance. Finally, the boundaries between the various sensor systems that make up such a Sensor Web are defined by such things as link delay and connectivity, data and error rate asymmetry, data reliability, quality of service provisions, and trust, complicating autonomous operations. Over the past ten years, researchers from the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC), General Dynamics, Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL), Cisco, Universal Space Networks (USN), the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the Naval Research Laboratory, the DoD Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office, and others have worked collaboratively to develop a virtual mission operations capability. Called VMOC (Virtual Mission Operations Center), this new capability allows cross-system queuing of dissimilar mission unique systems through the use of a common security scheme and published application programming interfaces (APIs). Collaborative VMOC demonstrations over the last several years have supported the standardization of spacecraft to ground interfaces needed to reduce costs, maximize space effects to the user, and allow the generation of new tactics, techniques and procedures that lead to responsive space employment.

Miller, Eric↗

Simulation and Modeling Concepts for Secure Airspace Operations

This paper examines cyber security vulnerabilities of Urban Air Mobility operations. With the expected advent of new entrants including Unmanned Aerial Systems, Commercial Launch Vehicles and Urban Air Mobility aircraft, the future United States National Airspace System will have to evolve to include their operations along with the current commercial, general aviation and military operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration are working together to provide a vision for aviation operations in the future—2045 and beyond. Their National Airspace System Horizons initiative seeks to provide stakeholders a list of operational scenarios and technologies, concepts and strategies needed for supporting that vision. They have identified cybersecurity as one of the seven strategic interest areas for realizing this vision. Consequently, NASA is studying cyber resiliency for secure airspace operations. While there are many pathways to attack a cyber physical system such as Urban Air Mobility, their effect is expressed in modification or corruption of data/information used for controlling vehicles and making operational decisions. The paper describes cybersecurity technologies of Encryption, Blockchain, Virtual Information Fabric Infrastructure, Trusted Platform Module and Anomaly Detection for protecting the data, and the cyber resiliency of the current and future air traffic management system.

Urban Air Mobility↗

Simulation and Modeling Concepts for Secure Airspace Operations

This paper examines cyber security vulnerabilities of Urban Air Mobility operations. With the expected advent of new entrants including Unmanned Aerial Systems, Commercial Launch Vehicles and Urban Air Mobility aircraft, the future United States National Airspace System will have to evolve to include their operations along with the current commercial, general aviation and military operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration are working together to provide a vision for aviation operations in the future—2045 and beyond. Their National Airspace System Horizons initiative seeks to provide stakeholders a list of operational scenarios and technologies, concepts and strategies needed for supporting that vision. They have identified cybersecurity as one of the seven strategic interest areas for realizing this vision. Consequently, NASA is studying cyber resiliency for secure airspace operations. While there are many pathways to attack a cyber physical system such as Urban Air Mobility, their effect is expressed in modification or corruption of data/information used for controlling vehicles and making operational decisions. The paper describes cybersecurity technologies of Encryption, Blockchain, Virtual Information Fabric Infrastructure, Trusted Platform Module and Anomaly Detection for protecting the data, and the cyber resiliency of the current and future air traffic management system.

Urban Air Mobility↗

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere was heightened from Airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDSsIPSs. In addition I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, policies and procedures.

computer information security↗

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control Systems Development Ground Support Development Operations

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere has heightened from airports to the communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APT's) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated and secured state in a launch control system environment. FISMA is a law that is mandated by the government to follow when government agencies secure networks and devices. My role on this project is to ensure network devices and systems are in compliance with NIST, as outlined in FISMA. I will achieve this by providing assistance with security plan documentation and collection, system hardware and software inventory, malicious code and malware scanning, and configuration of network devices i.e. routers and IDS's/IPS's. In addition, I will be completing security assessments on software and hardware, vulnerability assessments and reporting, and conducting patch management and risk assessments. A guideline that will help with compliance with NIST is the SANS Top 20 Critical Controls. SANS Top 20 Critical Controls as well as numerous security tools, security software and the conduction of research will be used to successfully complete the tasks given to me. This will ensure compliance with FISMA and NIST, secure systems and a secured network. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out the tasks stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, as well as policies and procedures.

security↗

Simulation and Modeling Concepts for Secure Airspace Operations

With the expected advent of new entrants including Unmanned Aerial Systems, Commercial Launch Vehicles and Urban Air Mobility aircraft, the future United States National Airspace System will have to evolve to include their operations along with the current commercial, general aviation and military operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration are working together to provide a vision for aviation operations in the future—2045 and beyond. Their National Airspace System Horizons initiative seeks to provide stakeholders a list of operational scenarios and technologies, concepts and strategies needed for supporting that vision. They have identified cybersecurity as one of the seven strategic interest areas for realizing this vision. Consequently, NASA is studying cyber resiliency for secure airspace operations. This paper examines cyber security vulnerabilities of Urban Air Mobility operations. While there are many pathways to attack a cyber physical system such as Urban Air Mobility, their effect is expressed in modification or corruption of data/information used for controlling vehicles and making operational decisions. The paper describes cybersecurity technologies of Encryption, Blockchain, Virtual Information Fabric Infrastructure, Trusted Platform Module and Anomaly Detection for protecting the data, thus, improving the cyber resiliency of the current and future air traffic management system.

Cybersecurity↗

Smashing the Stovepipe: Leveraging the GMSEC Open Architecture and Advanced IT Automation to Rapidly Prototype, Develop and Deploy Next-Generation Multi-Mission Ground Systems

Satellite/Payload Ground Systems - Typically highly-customized to a specific mission's use cases - Utilize hundreds (or thousands!) of specialized point-to-point interfaces for data flows / file transfers Documentation and tracking of these complex interfaces requires extensive time to develop and extremely high staffing costs Implementation and testing of these interfaces are even more cost-prohibitive, and documentation often lags behind implementation resulting in inconsistencies down the road With expanding threat vectors, IT Security, Information Assurance and Operational Security have become key Ground System architecture drivers New Federal security-related directives are generated on a daily basis, imposing new requirements on current / existing ground systems - These mandated activities and data calls typically carry little or no additional funding for implementation As a result, Ground System Sustaining Engineering groups and Information Technology staff continually struggle to keep up with the rolling tide of security Advancing security concerns and shrinking budgets are pushing these large stove-piped ground systems to begin sharing resources - I.e. Operational / SysAdmin staff, IT security baselines, architecture decisions or even networks / hosting infrastructure Refactoring these existing ground systems into multi-mission assets proves extremely challenging due to what is typically very tight coupling between legacy components As a result, many "Multi-Mission" ops. environments end up simply sharing compute resources and networks due to the difficulty of refactoring into true multi-mission systems Utilizing continuous integration / rapid system deployment technologies in conjunction with an open architecture messaging approach allows System Engineers and Architects to worry less about the low-level details of interfaces between components and configuration of systems GMSEC messaging is inherently designed to support multi-mission requirements, and allows components to aggregate data across multiple homogeneous or heterogeneous satellites or payloads - The highly-successful Goddard Science and Planetary Operations Control Center (SPOCC) utilizes GMSEC as the hub for it's automation and situational awareness capability Shifts focus towards getting GS to a final configuration-managed baseline, as well as multi-mission / big-picture capabilities that help increase situational awareness, promote cross-mission sharing and establish enhanced fleet management capabilities across all levels of the enterprise.

GMSEC↗

Challenges in Securing UAM Operations

Urban air mobility (UAM) is a concept that proposes to develop short-range, point-to-point transportation systems in metropolitan areas using vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) or short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft to overcome increasing surface congestion. To realize the potential of UAM, an assurance of cybersecurity is critical for public acceptance. Cybersecurity has come to the forefront highlighting the need to protect these networks and systems from cyberattacks. The growth in the development of UAM systems, and the associated data exchange and service interactions will create abundant challenges due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. As these threats evolve, the UAM cybersecurity capabilities must adapt to these changes as well.

Urban Air Mobility,↗

Extensible Adaptable Simulation Systems: Supporting Multiple Fidelity Simulations in a Common Environment

Common practice in the development of simulation systems is meeting all user requirements within a single instantiation. The Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) presents a unique challenge to establish a simulation environment that meets the needs of a diverse user community while also spanning a multi-mission environment over decades of operation. In response, the JPSS Flight Vehicle Test Suite (FVTS) is architected with an extensible infrastructure that supports the operation of multiple observatory simulations for a single mission and multiple mission within a common system perimeter. For the JPSS-1 satellite, multiple fidelity flight observatory simulations are necessary to support the distinct user communities consisting of the Common Ground System development team, the Common Ground System Integration & Test team, and the Mission Rehearsal Team/Mission Operations Team. These key requirements present several challenges to FVTS development. First, the FVTS must ensure all critical user requirements are satisfied by at least one fidelity instance of the observatory simulation. Second, the FVTS must allow for tailoring of the system instances to function in diverse operational environments from the High-security operations environment at NOAA Satellite Operations Facility (NSOF) to the ground system factory floor. Finally, the FVTS must provide the ability to execute sustaining engineering activities on a subset of the system without impacting system availability to parallel users. The FVTS approach of allowing for multiple fidelity copies of observatory simulations represents a unique concept in simulator capability development and corresponds to the JPSS Ground System goals of establishing a capability that is flexible, extensible, and adaptable.

McLaughlin, Brian J.↗

Non-developmental item computer systems and the malicious software threat

The following subject areas are covered: a DOD development system - the Army Secure Operating System; non-development commercial computer systems; security, integrity, and assurance of service (SI and A); post delivery SI and A and malicious software; computer system unique attributes; positive feedback to commercial computer systems vendors; and NDI (Non-Development Item) computers and software safety.

Bown, Rodney L.↗

Endpoint Security Using Biometric Authentication for Secure Remote Mission Operations

We propose a flexible security authentication solution for the spacecraft end-user, which will allow the user to interact over Internet with the spacecraft, its instruments, or with the ground segment from anywhere, anytime based on the user's pre-defined set of privileges. This package includes biometrics authentication products, such as face, voice or fingerprint recognition, authentication services and procedures, such as: user registration and verification over the Internet and user database maintenance, with a configurable schema of spacecraft users' privileges. This fast and reliable user authentication mechanism will become an integral part of end-to-end ground-to-space secure Internet communications and migration from current practice to the future. All modules and services of the proposed package are commercially available and built to the NIST BioAPI standard, which facilitates "pluggability" and interoperability.

Donohue, John T.↗

PIMS-Universal Payload Information Management

As the overall manager and integrator of International Space Station (ISS) science payloads and experiments, the Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) at Marshall Space Flight Center had a critical need to provide an information management system for exchange and management of ISS payload files as well as to coordinate ISS payload related operational changes. The POIC's information management system has a fundamental requirement to provide secure operational access not only to users physically located at the POIC, but also to provide collaborative access to remote experimenters and International Partners. The Payload Information Management System (PIMS) is a ground based electronic document configuration management and workflow system that was built to service that need. Functionally, PIMS provides the following document management related capabilities: 1. File access control, storage and retrieval from a central repository vault. 2. Collect supplemental data about files in the vault. 3. File exchange with a PMS GUI client, or any FTP connection. 4. Files placement into an FTP accessible dropbox for pickup by interfacing facilities, included files transmitted for spacecraft uplink. 5. Transmission of email messages to users notifying them of new version availability. 6. Polling of intermediate facility dropboxes for files that will automatically be processed by PIMS. 7. Provide an API that allows other POIC applications to access PIMS information. Functionally, PIMS provides the following Change Request processing capabilities: 1. Ability to create, view, manipulate, and query information about Operations Change Requests (OCRs). 2. Provides an adaptable workflow approval of OCRs with routing through developers, facility leads, POIC leads, reviewers, and implementers. Email messages can be sent to users either involving them in the workflow process or simply notifying them of OCR approval progress. All PIMS document management and OCR workflow controls are coordinated through and routed to individual user's "to do" list tasks. A user is given a task when it is their turn to perform some action relating to the approval of the Document or OCR. The user's available actions are restricted to only functions available for the assigned task. Certain actions, such as review or action implementation by non-PIMS users, can also be coordinated through automated emails.

Elmore, Ralph↗

Universal Payload Information Management

As the overall manager and integrator of International Space Station (ISS) science payloads, the Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) at Marshall Space Flight Center has a critical need to provide an information management system for exchange and control of ISS payload files as well as to coordinate ISS payload related operational changes. The POIC's information management system has a fundamental requirement to provide secure operational access not only to users physically located at the POIC, but also to remote experimenters and International Partners physically located in different parts of the world. The Payload Information Management System (PIMS) is a ground-based electronic document configuration management and collaborative workflow system that was built to service the POIC's information management needs. This paper discusses the application components that comprise the PIMS system, the challenges that influenced its design and architecture, and the selected technologies it employs. This paper will also touch on the advantages of the architecture, details of the user interface, and lessons learned along the way to a successful deployment. With PIMS, a sophisticated software solution has been built that is not only universally accessible for POIC customer s information management needs, but also universally adaptable in implementation and application as a generalized information management system.

Elmore, Ralph B.↗

Common Operating Picture: UAV Security Study

This initial communication security study is a top-level assessment of basic security issues related to the operation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the National Airspace System (NAS). Security considerations will include information relating to the use of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN) protocols and applications identifying their maturity, as well as the use of IPV4 and a version of mobile IPV6. The purpose of this assessment is to provide an initial analysis of the security implications of introducing UAVs into the NAS.

Source record↗

IT Data Mining Tool Uses in Aerospace

Data mining has a broad spectrum of uses throughout the realms of aerospace and information technology. Each of these areas has useful methods for processing, distributing, and storing its corresponding data. This paper focuses on ways to leverage the data mining tools and resources used in NASA's information technology area to meet the similar data mining needs of aviation and aerospace domains. This paper details the searching, alerting, reporting, and application functionalities of the Splunk system, used by NASA's Security Operations Center (SOC), and their potential shared solutions to address aircraft and spacecraft flight and ground systems data mining requirements. This paper also touches on capacity and security requirements when addressing sizeable amounts of data across a large data infrastructure.

Monroe, Gilena A.↗

Analysis of CSIRT/SOC Incidents and Continuous Monitoring of Threats

Security Operations Centers (SOC) contain a wealth of data which, if properly classified and tagged upfront, can yield a wealth of real-time information about your organizations IT Security posture, risks, and threats. These include answers to relevant and actionable questions such as: What are our biggest threats? Who is attacking us and what do they want? What controls are working or not working? How effective was the new technology we just implemented? What is our ROI?

Wang, John↗