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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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7 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Self-Security for Grid-Interactive Smart Inverters Using Steady-State Reference Model

Smart inverters exchange information with other devices through a shared communication link, making the inverters more prone to receive harmful commands from external parties. This erroneous data can be received due to an anomaly in the system, such as a device fault, unintentional utility operator action, or a cyber-attack. In this paper, a device-level self-security strategy is implemented using reference models for a grid-interactive inverter to examine the incoming power setpoints, detect the anomalies, and protect the system accordingly. The PQ setpoints received from the utility supervisory controller are autonomously examined using the inverter’s normal and stable operating regions before engaging the setpoints to the inverter’s local controller. Grid parameters are estimated in real-time during the examination process. The efficacy of the self-security algorithm is tested using a three-phase 3-kVA SiC-MOSFET inverter and a 12-kW NHR 9410 regenerative grid emulator. The results verify that the proposed method can detect harmful PQ setpoints that can cause abnormal or unstable inverter operation.

Gursoy, Mehmetcan↗
DOE OSTI2021

Digital Twin for Self-Security of Smart Inverters

Smart inverters connected to a communication network are susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, a self-security approach is implemented using the digital twin concept for smart inverters. The digital twin is formed using the inverter’s normal operating region and the inverter’s dynamic model. Then, the incoming setpoints are autonomously examined using the digital twin, and only the safe setpoints are engaged to the inverter’s local controller. This paper demonstrates how the inverter’s normal operating region and dynamic model are formed. In particular, the normal operation region is experimentally verified by changing the P and Q setpoints engaged to the local controller, using a laboratory setup including a three-phase 3-kVA SiC-MOSFET inverter and a 12-kW NHR 9410 regenerative power grid emulator. The results demonstrate that the self-security technique can potentially protect inverters from man-in-the-middle attacks by examining the incoming commands (new setpoints) using the inverter’s digital twin before engaging the setpoints to the local controller.

Hossen, Tareq↗
DOE OSTI2020

Self-Secure Inverters Against Malicious Setpoints

The next generation of grid-interactive inverters brings a communication feature that allows data sharing from utility supervisory controllers and smart devices that are connected to the same network. This feature enhances the control capabilities of grid-interactive inverters to provide services beyond active power injection. However, communication networks entail more vulnerable surfaces to malicious attacks that may result in modifying active and reactive power setpoints and causing weak-grid conditions or abnormal inverter operation. In this paper, steady-state and the dynamic behavior of the inverter for the incoming setpoints are analyzed to detect false data injection attacks and provide device-level security. The steady-state behavior of the inverter in the operating region is determined from the grid parameters such as the grid voltage and the grid impedance. These estimations are accomplished by the proposed self-security technique through a low-frequency signal injection-based approach combined with the recursive least square method. Moreover, a reduced fourth-order inverter model is used as the dynamic reference model, and grid parameters as well as the incoming setpoints are implemented to the reference model to verify whether the dynamic behavior of the inverter is inside the permissible region of operation. The validity and performance of the proposed method are verified experimentally through Allen-Bradley Powerflex 755 three-phase inverter and a 12 kW NHR 9410 regenerative power grid emulator. The results show that the self-secure smart-inverter is able to accept or reject the incoming commands and thus is protected from malicious cyber-physical attacks.

Hossen, Tareq↗
DOE OSTI2021

On Self-Security of Grid-Interactive Smart Inverters

The capability to exchange information with utility operators, aggregators, and nearby smart devices can make a grid-interactive inverter an intelligent cyber-physical device. However, the capability of exchanging information can also put the inverters at the risk of insecure operation. In this paper, possible software manipulations into the inverters are studied to understand their vulnerability to cyberattacks. Moreover, the state-of-the-art system-level and device-level cyber-defense measures are discussed, and advantages and drawbacks of each technique are provided. Studies show that a reference model can be implemented in device-level security to effectively examine incoming setpoints for detecting and preventing malicious or harmful actions. This paper particularly underlines the significance of device-level self-security and its advantages for grid-interactive inverters. Finally, recommendations for future studies are provided.

Gursoy, Mehmetcan↗
DOE OSTI2021

Smart Inverter Twin Model for Anomaly Detection

Smart inverters connected to a communication network are vulnerable to various anomalies in the form of cyberattacks. In this paper, a self-security approach is implemented using the digital twin concept for smart inverters. The digital twin is formed using the inverter’s dynamic model. Then, the incoming setpoints are autonomously examined using the digital twin, and only the safe setpoints are engaged to the inverter’s local controller. This paper demonstrates the details of the self-security algorithm and how the inverter’s digital twin is formed. In particular, the stable and unstable operation region is experimentally verified by changing the power setpoints engaged to the local controller, using a laboratory setup including a three-phase 1.5-kVA SiC-MOSFET inverter and a 12-kW NHR 9410 regenerative power grid emulator. The results demonstrate that the digital twin model can potentially protect inverters from abnormal operation by examining the incoming commands (new setpoints) using the inverter’s digital twin before engaging the setpoints to the local controller.

Hossen, Tareq↗