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DOE OSTI2021

A Reconfigurable Neural Network ASIC for Detector Front-End Data Compression at the HL-LHC

Despite advances in the programmable logic capabilities of modern trigger systems, a significant bottleneck remains in the amount of data to be transported from the detector to off-detector logic where trigger decisions are made. We demonstrate that a neural network (NN) autoencoder model can be implemented in a radiation-tolerant application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) to perform lossy data compression alleviating the data transmission problem while preserving critical information of the detector energy profile. For our application, we consider the high-granularity calorimeter from the Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) experiment at the CERN Large Hadron Collider. The advantage of the machine learning approach is in the flexibility and configurability of the algorithm. By changing the NN weights, a unique data compression algorithm can be deployed for each sensor in different detector regions and changing detector or collider conditions. To meet area, performance, and power constraints, we perform quantization-aware training to create an optimized NN hardware implementation. The design is achieved through the use of high-level synthesis tools and the hls4ml framework and was processed through synthesis and physical layout flows based on a low-power (LP)-CMOS 65-nm technology node. The flow anticipates 200 Mrad of ionizing radiation to select gates and reports a total area of 3.6 mm 2 and consumes 95 mW of power. The simulated energy consumption per inference is 2.4 nJ. Furthermore, this is the first radiation-tolerant on-detector ASIC implementation of an NN that has been designed for particle physics applications.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

NASA NTRS2018

Robust, Radiation Tolerant Command and Data Handling and Power System Electronics for SmallSats

In today's budgetary environment, there is significant interest within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to enable small robotic science missions that can be executed faster and cheaper than previous larger missions. To help achieve this, focus has shifted from using exclusively radiation-tolerant or radiation-hardened parts to using more commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components for NASA small satellite missions that can last at least one year in orbit. However, there are some portions of a spacecraft's avionics, such as the Command and Data Handling (C&DH) subsystem and the Power System Electronics (PSE) that need to have a higher level of reliability that goes beyond what is attainable with currently available COTS parts. While there are a number of COTS components that can withstand a total ionizing dose (TID) of tens or hundreds of kilorads, there is still a great deal of concern about tolerance to and mitigation of single-event effects (SEE).

6U satellite↗

NASA NTRS2019

Goddard Modular SmallSat Architecture (GMSA) Hardware Presentation

In today's rapidly advancing technology roadmap for space applications there is an emphasis on completing missions faster and cheaper than previous large-scale missions at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) such as the Magnetospheric Multiscale (MMS) mission. As part of this effort, focus has shifted from using mostly radiation-tolerant or radiation-hardened parts to more commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components for missions that can last at least one year in orbit. However, there are some portions of a spacecraft's avionics, such as the command and data handling (C&DH) system and the Electrical Power Systems (EPS) that need to have some level of predictable reliability that goes beyond the capabilities of currently available COTS parts. While there are a number of COTS components that can withstand a total ionizing dose (TID) of tens or hundreds of kilorads, there is still a great deal of concern about tolerance to and mitigation of single-event effects (SEE).

Fraction, James↗

NASA NTRS2021

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 19-01-1: Mitigating Risks of Single-Event Effects in Space Applications

Since most Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts are intended for terrestrial applications, they are susceptible to a range of radiation threats in the space environment if the resulting effects are not properly characterized and mitigated. Even specially designed radiation-hardened parts may not be tolerant to all types of radiation effects. Radiation hardness is a multi-dimensional property of any part that describes intrinsic abilities to tolerate various radiation environments [1,2]. Effects to be concerned with include total ionizing dose, total non-ionizing dose, and single-event effects (SEE) – all of which depend on the mission, environment, application, and lifetime. Radiation effects concerns may be the same whether a EEE part is Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), MIL-SPEC, or some other variant, all of which are susceptible to the same radiation threats [3]. SEE consequences range from recoverable faults to catastrophic failure. Like other random faults, SEE can be mitigated with informed circuit design practices at the device, card, and/or system level.

Single-event effects↗

NASA NTRS2005

Radiation Testing and Evaluation Issues for Modern Integrated Circuits

Abstract. Changes in modern integrated circuit (IC) technologies have modified the way we approach and conduct radiation tolerance and testing of electronics. These changes include scaling of geometries, new materials, new packaging technologies, and overall speed and device complexity challenges. In this short course section, we will identify and discuss these issues as they impact radiation testing, modeling, and effects mitigation of modern integrated circuits. The focus will be on CMOS-based technologies, however, other high performance technologies will be discussed where appropriate. The effects of concern will be: Single-Event Effects (SEE) and steady state total ionizing dose (TID) IC response. However, due to the growing use of opto-electronics in space systems issues concerning displacement damage testing will also be considered. This short course section is not intended to provide detailed "how-to-test" information, but simply provide a snapshot of current challenges and some of the approaches being considered.

LaBel, Kenneth A.↗

DOE OSTI2021

Reconfigurable Framework for Resilient Semantic Segmentation for Space Applications

Deep learning (DL) presents new opportunities for enabling spacecraft autonomy, onboard analysis, and intelligent applications for space missions. However, DL applications are computationally intensive and often infeasible to deploy on radiation-hardened (rad-hard) processors, which traditionally harness a fraction of the computational capability of their commercial-off-the-shelf counterparts. Commercial FPGAs and system-on-chips present numerous architectural advantages and provide the computation capabilities to enable onboard DL applications; however, these devices are highly susceptible to radiation-induced single-event effects (SEEs) that can degrade the dependability of DL applications. In this article, we propose Reconfigurable ConvNet (RECON), a reconfigurable acceleration framework for dependable, high-performance semantic segmentation for space applications. In RECON, we propose both selective and adaptive approaches to enable efficient SEE mitigation. In our selective approach, control-flow parts are selectively protected by triple-modular redundancy to minimize SEE-induced hangs, and in our adaptive approach, partial reconfiguration is used to adapt the mitigation of dataflow parts in response to a dynamic radiation environment. Combined, both approaches enable RECON to maximize system performability subject to mission availability constraints. We perform fault injection and neutron irradiation to observe the susceptibility of RECON and use dependability modeling to evaluate RECON in various orbital case studies to demonstrate a 1.5–3.0× performability improvement in both performance and energy efficiency compared to static approaches.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NASA NTRS2010

Localized Triple Modular Redundancy vs. Distributed Triple Modular Redundancy on a ProASIC3E Reprogrammable FPGA

Field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) are used in every space application. Currently, most space flight applications use radiation hardened (RH) FPGAs, which are very expensive. There is a desire to use cheaper, commercial off the shelf reprogrammable FPGAs, which are more susceptible to radiation effects known as single-event effects (SEE). The RH parts have SEE and total ionizing dose (TID) hardened elements pre-integrated into the part. This means that the designer does not need to implement any hardening techniques while configuring the device. The COTS parts on the other hand must be mitigated by design in order to insure any form of mitigation. The design techniques this project examines concern the use of localized triple modular redundancy (LTMR) and distributed triple modular redundancy (DTMR). LTMR triples every flip flop in the device architecture while DTMR triples everything except for the global routes (clocks, resets, and enables). The testing was performed on a ProASIC3E FPGA at the Texas A&M cyclotron facility. Two design architectures were used: shift registers and counters, both with LTMR and DTMR mitigation techniques. The test results prove that DTMR is more effective at reducing SEE than LTMR. We also determined that there was not a significant difference between the use of shift registers and counters for test purposes. More testing is required to obtain additional linear energy transfer values for each architecture and mitigation technique in order to determine the most cost-effective method of SEE mitigation.

McGuffey, Alex↗

NASA NTRS2013

What Reliability Engineers Should Know about Space Radiation Effects

Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.

DiBari, Rebecca↗

NASA NTRS2019

Mechanisms of Heavy Ion-Induced Single Event Burnout in 4H-SiC Power MOSFETs

This describes the mechanisms behind the failure of 4H-SiC Power MOSFETs when struck by a heavy ion. The modeled device is designed to simulate a commercially available 1200 V power MOSFET and the ion simulated is a silver ion with a Linear Energy Transfer of 46 MeV-cm2/mg commonly used in single event effect (SEE) testing. The device is shown in simulation to fail near 500 V, which is in close agreement to experiments. These simulations go to show that the failure of SiC MOSFET occurs near the interface between the epi and substrate layers due to the rapid increase of the electric field in that region and destruction of the device from impact ionization. From this, two designs were proposed and investigated that would help to mitigate the electric field in these regions and improve the device's tolerance to single-event burnout (SEB). The new designs increased the voltage at which SEB occurs from 500 V to over 900 V and increased the Ron,sp by only 5%.

Mcpherson, Joseph A.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Tradeoffs in Flight Design Upset Mitigation in State of the Art FPGAs: Hardened by Design vs. Design Level Hardening

This presentation compares and contrasts the effectiveness and the system/designer impacts of the two main approaches to upset hardening: the Actel approach (RTSX-S and RTAX-S) of low-level (inside each flip-flop) triplication and the Xilinx approach (Virtex and Virtex2) of design-level triplication of both functional blocks and voters. The effectiveness of these approaches is compared using measurements made in conjunction with each of the FPGAs' manufacturer: for Actel, published data [1] and for Xilinx, recent results from the Xilinx SEE Test Consortium (note that the author is an active and founding member). The impacts involve Actel advantages in the areas of transistor-utilization efficiency and minimizing designer involvement in the triplication while the Xilinx advantages relate to the ability to custom tailor upset hardness and the flexibility of re-configurability. Additionally, there are currently clear Xilinx advantages in available features such as the number of I/O's, logic cells, and RAM blocks as well as speed. However, the advantage of the Actel anti-fuses for configuration over the Xilinx SRAM cells is that the latter need additional functionality and external circuitry (PROMs and, at least a watchdog timer) for configuration and configuration scrubbing. Further, although effectively mitigated if done correctly, the proton upset-ability of the Xilinx FPGAs is a concern in severe proton-rich environments. Ultimately, both manufacturers' upset hardening is limited by SEFI (single-event functional interrupt) rates where it appears the Actel results are better although the Xilinx Virtex2-family result of about one SEFI in 65 device-years in solar-min GCR (the more intense part of the galactic cosmic-ray background) should be acceptable to most missions

radiation effects↗

NASA NTRS2003

Single-Event Effects Ground Testing and On-Orbit Rate Prediction Methods: The Past, Present and Future

Over the past 27 years, or so, increased concern over single event effects in spacecraft systems has resulted in research, development and engineering activities centered around a better understanding of the space radiation environment, single event effects predictive methods, ground test protocols, and test facility developments. This research has led to fairly well developed methods for assessing the impact of the space radiation environment on systems that contain SEE sensitive devices and the development of mitigation strategies either at the system or device level.

Reed, Robert A.↗

NASA NTRS2004

FPGA-Based, Self-Checking, Fault-Tolerant Computers

A proposed computer architecture would exploit the capabilities of commercially available field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) to enable computers to detect and recover from bit errors. The main purpose of the proposed architecture is to enable fault-tolerant computing in the presence of single-event upsets (SEUs). [An SEU is a spurious bit flip (also called a soft error) caused by a single impact of ionizing radiation.] The architecture would also enable recovery from some soft errors caused by electrical transients and, to some extent, from intermittent and permanent (hard) errors caused by aging of electronic components. A typical FPGA of the current generation contains one or more complete processor cores, memories, and highspeed serial input/output (I/O) channels, making it possible to shrink a board-level processor node to a single integrated-circuit chip. Custom, highly efficient microcontrollers, general-purpose computers, custom I/O processors, and signal processors can be rapidly and efficiently implemented by use of FPGAs. Unfortunately, FPGAs are susceptible to SEUs. Prior efforts to mitigate the effects of SEUs have yielded solutions that degrade performance of the system and require support from external hardware and software. In comparison with other fault-tolerant- computing architectures (e.g., triple modular redundancy), the proposed architecture could be implemented with less circuitry and lower power demand. Moreover, the fault-tolerant computing functions would require only minimal support from circuitry outside the central processing units (CPUs) of computers, would not require any software support, and would be largely transparent to software and to other computer hardware. There would be two types of modules: a self-checking processor module and a memory system (see figure). The self-checking processor module would be implemented on a single FPGA and would be capable of detecting its own internal errors. It would contain two CPUs executing identical programs in lock step, with comparison of their outputs to detect errors. It would also contain various cache local memory circuits, communication circuits, and configurable special-purpose processors that would use self-checking checkers. (The basic principle of the self-checking checker method is to utilize logic circuitry that generates error signals whenever there is an error in either the checker or the circuit being checked.) The memory system would comprise a main memory and a hardware-controlled check-pointing system (CPS) based on a buffer memory denoted the recovery cache. The main memory would contain random-access memory (RAM) chips and FPGAs that would, in addition to everything else, implement double-error-detecting and single-error-correcting memory functions to enable recovery from single-bit errors.

Some, Raphael↗